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Abstract of Dissertation (English) 
Non-violence in personal and political life has become an unassailable pillar upon which the 
Christian church leans. The New Testament text, church tradition, and cultural mores converge in 
establishing non-violence as the pre-eminent mark of those who would be faithful followers of Christ. 
However, in a context where violence is embedded in the social order, the ethos of non-violence as 
an end goal in itself generally fails to aid the Christian, particularly the Black Christian, in the task 
of honouring one’s dignity and the dignity of one’s neighbour. With respect to the use of physical 
force during protest, it gags on the gnat of damaged property, and swallows the camel of degraded 
lives. This ethos is inconsistent with the Gospel of Jesus, which has foremost concern for the 
abundant life of the person. I do not assert in this project that Jesus promoted the use of force, or that 
Jesus opposed the use of force. I argue that the issue of the use of force was not as central to the 
teachings of Jesus as the tradition has made it. Ultimately, Jesus’s ethics allows for either the use of 
force or the non-use of force; with freedom for the choice of action depending upon the person and 
the circumstances. Jesus’s utmost concern was the internalization and assertion of one’s human 
dignity, not as an approved of member of the citizenry, but as a child of God. The goal of this research 
is to shine a light on the violence that goes unnamed that is perpetrated against Black being in ways 
that debilitate and destroy life. Being raced as Black is to be always already violently acted upon, 
and also to be made a threat or perpetrator of violence by virtue of being. Until Blackness becomes 
the centre of theologies of (non)violence, such theologies will remain incomplete, and operate in 
complicity with the violence of the culture against Black life. 
This study accomplishes several tasks. First, it examines biblical texts that are often used to 
establish that Jesus was principally concerned with non-violence and with the necessity of suffering. 
Using an honour/shame paradigm, it demonstrates the misreading of such texts, and offers an 
alternative understanding based upon the first century context. Such an alternative reading constitutes 
“good news” to those in perpetually unjust social orders that establish and maintain racialized 
dishonour and marginalization of many. Second, the study assesses Church history as to how non-
violence has been conceived and practiced from the church’s origin to the present. The research 
concludes that the language and idea of non-violence has been mutable. Further, the research 
discloses that there has never been a period when the coercive use of force has been fully 
delegitimized by the church. Third, having exposed scripture and tradition’s de-emphasis on 
(non)violence, the research then considers the meaning of “violence,” and uses the heuristic of 
Afropessimism to demonstrate the existential violence inherent to Black life. I argue that because 
violence functions perennially in an existential way against Black persons, the good news of the 
Gospel must address violence, primarily, in an existential way, such as the reading I have offered, 
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which privileges Jesus’s concern for the dignity and self-actualization of despised persons. Relying 
upon Duns Scotus’ metaphysics of the will, I show the nature of the impairment to Black human 
will/freedom/life that occurred over centuries as a result of anti-Black torture and social control. I 
then demonstrate, with South Africa as a case study, the ways in which forceful protest is evidence 
of a repairing or properly operative human will. Such protest is not a moral wrong but reflects the 
resilient re-animation of the impaired will of Black humanity. Such protest incarnates the healing, 
liberative, resurrecting, good news of the Gospel. 
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Opsomming van Proefskrif (Afrikaans) 
 
Nie-gewelddadigheid op persoonlike en politieke vlak het ‘n onaantasbare pilaar van die 
Christelike kerk geword.   Nuwe Testamentiese geskrifte, kerktradisie en kulturele norme stel saam 
‘n standaard van nie-gewelddadigheid aan diegene wat getroue volgelinge van Christus wil wees. 
Egter, die etos van nie-gewelddadigheid as ‘n einddoel op sigself help die Christen nie juis in die 
algemeen nie, veral nie die Swart Christen nie, veral waar dit gaan oor die kwessie van die self en 
die buurman/-vrou eer. In besonder wat betref protesgeweld, verstik dit aan die muggie van 
beskadigde eiendom terwyl die kameel van vernielde lewens gesluk moet word. Hierdie etos pas nie 
by die  Evangelie van Jesus nie, waar die belangrikste oorweging die oorvloedige lewe van die 
persoon is. Ek maak nie in hierdie projek aanspraak dat Jesus ‘n voorstander was vir die gebruik van 
mag, of teen die gebruik van mag was nie. Ek voer aan dat die gebruik van mag nie so sentraal in 
Jesus se leerstellinge was as wat tradisie dit uitmaak nie. Uiteindelik het Jesus se etiek die gebruik 
van sowel as die nie-gebruik van mag toegelaat; die besluit van hoe om op te tree hang uiteindelik 
van die persoon en die omstandighede af. Jesus se uiteindelike bekommernis was die internalisering 
en bevestiging van iemand se menswaardigheid, nie as ‘n vooraanstaande burger nie, maar as ‘n kind 
van God. Die doel van hierdie navorsing is om die lig te laat skyn op die naamlose geweld wat teen 
Swart wesens gepleeg word op wyses wat lewe verswak en vernietig. Om geklassifiseer word as 
Swart is reeds om gewelddadig behandel te word, of om as ‘n bedreiging of geweldenaar beskou te 
word bloot deur te wees. Tot die dag wanneer Swartwees die kern van teologieë van 
(nie)gewelddadigheid word, sal sulke teologieë onvolledig bly en kop in een mus funksioneer met 
die geweld van die kultuur teen Swart lewe.   
Hierdie studie bereik ‘n aantal take. Eerstens word bybelse tekste ondersoek wat dikwels 
gebruik word om vas te stel dat Jesus hoofsaaklik betrokke was met nie-gewelddadigheid en die 
noodsaaklikheid van lyding. Die studie wys dat sulke tekste verkeerd gelees word en bied ‘n 
alternatiewe verstaan daarvan, gebaseer op die eerste eeuse konteks. Hierdie alternatiewe lees van 
die tekste sal mense in onregverdige sosiale omstandighede waar rasgebonde oneer en 
marginalisering van baie mense vasgestel en voortgesit word, beter bystaan. Tweedens assesseer die 
studie Christelike geskiedenis vir bewyse hoe nie-gewelddadigheid verstaan en beoefen is van 
ontstaan tot in die huidige tyd. Die navorsing kom tot die slotsom dat taal en die idee van nie-
gewelddadigheid veranderend van aard is. Daar was ook nooit ‘n tydperk waar die gedwonge gebruik 
van geweld ten volle deur die kerk onwettig verklaar is nie. Derdens, nadat die skrif en tradisie se 
gebrek aan klem op nie-gewelddadigheid ontbloot is, fokus die navorsing op die betekenis van 
geweld en gebruik die heuristiek van Afro-pessimisme om die eksistensiële geweld wat deel is van 
die Swart betaan, te demonstreer. Ek voer aan dat aangesien geweld primêr op ‘n eksistensiële manier 
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teen Swart persone funksioneer, die goeie nuus van die Evangelie geweld hoofsaaklik op ‘n 
eksistensiële manier moet aanspreek, soos byvoorbeeld in die leesstuk wat ek aanbied, waar Jesus se 
besorgdheid vir die menswaardigheid en selfaktualisering van veragte mense uitgelig word. Met die 
gebruik van Scotus se metafisika van die wil, wys ek op die inkorting van Swart wil/vryheid/lewe 
deur die eeue deur middel van marteling en sosiale kontrole. Vervolgens demonstreer ek, met Suid-
Afrika as ‘n gevallestudie, op watter maniere kragdadige protesaksie ‘n bewys is van ‘n herstellende 
of funksionerende menslike wil. Sulke proteste is nie moreel verkeerd nie, maar die veerkragtige 
herstel van die ingeperkte wil van Swart humaniteit. Sulke protesaksies is die genesing, bevrydend, 
opstanding, goeie nuus van die Evangelie. 
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1. Introduction: Theologizing Non-violence While Black 
1.1. Research Problem 
This project contests the scriptural, historical theological, and ethical grounds of the 
Christian tradition’s adoption of an ethics of “non-violence,” considering the history and 
experiences of Black persons in Western Christian contexts. 
1.1.1. Background 
Non-violence in personal and political life has become an unassailable pillar upon 
which the Christian church leans. The New Testament text, church tradition, and cultural mores 
converge in establishing non-violence as the pre-eminent mark of those who would be faithful 
followers of Christ. 
The Gospels, and particularly Jesus’s Sermon on the Mount,1  are pivotal texts in 
forming the theology of non-violence. Jesus is depicted in the Sermon as blessing the poor in 
spirit, the mourners, and the persecuted, and as instructing his followers not to resist evildoers, 
but to “turn the other cheek,” to love their enemies and to pray for their persecutors. Jesus’s 
own life exemplifies this ideal; the blessedness of one who is poor, one who mourned, one who 
was persecuted, and most especially as one who sacrificed his life out of love for his enemies. 
As Hays states, “[From] Matthew to Revelation we find a consistent witness against violence 
and a calling to the community to follow the example of Jesus in accepting suffering rather 
                                               
 
1 Matt. 5:1-12, 38-48 (all scripture is from the NRSV unless otherwise noted): “When Jesus[a] saw the 
crowds, he went up the mountain; and after he sat down, his disciples came to him. 2 Then he began to speak, 
and taught them, saying: 3 “Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. 4 “Blessed are 
those who mourn, for they will be comforted. 5 “Blessed are the meek, for they will inherit the earth. 6 “Blessed 
are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they will be filled. 7 “Blessed are the merciful, for they will 
receive mercy. 8 “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they will see God. 9 “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they 
will be called children of God. 10 “Blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness’ sake, for theirs is the 
kingdom of heaven. 11 “Blessed are you when people revile you and persecute you and utter all kinds of evil 
against you falsely on my account. 12 Rejoice and be glad, for your reward is great in heaven, for in the same way 
they persecuted the prophets who were before you.….38 You have heard that it was said, ‘An eye for an eye 
and a tooth for a tooth.’ 39 But I say to you, Do not resist an evildoer. But if anyone strikes you on the right 
cheek, turn the other also; 40 and if anyone wants to sue you and take your coat, give your cloak as well; 41 and 
if anyone forces you to go one mile, go also the second mile. 42 Give to everyone who begs from you, and do 
not refuse anyone who wants to borrow from you. 43 “You have heard that it was said, ‘You shall love your 
neighbor and hate your enemy.’ 44 But I say to you, Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, 
45 so that you may be children of your Father in heaven; for he makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good, 
and sends rain on the righteous and on the unrighteous. 46 For if you love those who love you, what reward do 
you have? Do not even the tax collectors do the same? 47 And if you greet only your brothers and sisters, what 
more are you doing than others? Do not even the Gentiles do the same? 48 Be perfect, therefore, as your 
heavenly Father is perfect. 
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than inflicting it.”2 Curtiss P. DeYoung has been even more explicit. Though accepting of 
resistance and protest, he concludes that, “[v]iolence is evil. Non-violence is the Way of Jesus 
and the more holy route to justice.”3 
Church tradition also supports a reading of scripture that promotes non-violence.  
Though much of church history has endorsed Christian participation in violence for the cause 
of war, there have been consistent voices within the church that resisted the use of coercive 
force and that asserted the Christian calling to pacifism and non-violence. These voices include 
the apostles, Tertullian, Francis of Assisi, those in the anabaptist tradition, and Martin Luther 
King, Jr.  Those who have challenged the church’s legitimation of the use of physical force 
have secured prominent places in the Church’s memory and history.  Some believe that 
Christian proponents of non-violence, such as those named, have secured approbation in the 
annals of Church history because their non-violence position is equated to Christian integrity. 
“Such witnesses have had a historic influence vastly disproportionate to their meagre numbers, 
because their vision resonated so deeply with the New Testament and because their Christian 
witness therefore possessed such evident integrity.”4 
Finally, the cultural mores of the late 20th century West idealized those who were 
committed to peace and to a social gospel that incorporated an ethos of non-violence. Those 
who, like Martin Luther King, Jr., refused the use of physical force and violent retaliation in 
the face of injustice and abuse, were bequeathed a mantle of moral purity,5 and deemed worthy 
of reverence and emulation.6 America’s failure in Vietnam, the success of non-violent protest 
in the Civil Rights Movement, and the wave of assassinations occurring in the late sixties of 
prominent American public figures, coalesced in creating for the public an appetite for peace. 
This appetite was aptly expressed in the lyrics of a popular song, sung by half a million people 
                                               
 
2 Richard B. Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament: Community, Cross, New Creation, A Contemporary 
Introduction to New Testament Ethics, 1st edition (San Francisco: HarperOne, 1996), 332. 
3 Curtiss DeYoung, “From Resistance to Reconciliation: The Means and Goal of Christian Resistance,” in 
Resist: Christian Dissent for the 21st Century, ed. Michael G. Long (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2008), 15. 
4 Curtiss DeYoung, “From Resistance to Reconciliation: The Means and Goal of Christian Resistance,” in 
Resist: Christian Dissent for the 21st Century, ed. Michael G. Long (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2008), 15. 
5 It has been observed that Malcolm X’s “by any means necessary” rhetoric, which embraced violent 
methods of self-actualization for Black people, bolstered support for MLK’s platform of non-violence among 
moderate Whites. 
6 The honors expressly shown to MLK included the American Head of State granting him an audience, 
and his award of the Nobel Peace Prize. 
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in 1969 at the largest anti-war demonstration in U.S. history,7 “All we are saying, is give peace 
a chance.”8  
It is within this framework of scripture, tradition, and culture, that contemporary 
theologies of Christian non-violence re-emerged, led by such scholars as John Howard Yoder.9  
Yoder’s work reclaimed the life and teachings of Jesus as the ethical standard for Christians, 
argued forcefully that Jesus’s life and work was not merely for personal enrichment, but for 
political engagement, and asserted that the most significant political engagement indicated by 
Jesus’s life and teaching was a commitment to non-violence.  The contribution of Yoder’s 
pacifist theology and King’s successful application of a theology of non-violent resistance, 
continue to influence theological discourse and lend support to affirmations of Christian non-
violence based upon the life and teachings of Jesus. 
1.1.2. Statement of the Problem 
While advocacy of Christian “non-violence” is not inconsistent with the language of 
the biblical text, it expresses only partial truth, and it often does violence to marginalized 
Others. 
My experience as an American in South Africa gave me cause to confront the limits of 
the standard Christian theology of non-violence. It was in South Africa that I realized the ways 
in which my theology and ethics of non-violent Christianity were treacherously limited, despite 
my intent to espouse a theology with a social justice orientation. On one occasion, early in my 
sojourn in Cape Town, a years-long student protest over the intersectional issues of 
decolonization, school fees, rape culture, housing, etc., resulted in a not-unusual outburst of 
violence. The unusual feature of this particular protest was that on this occasion students 
removed paintings from the walls of a university building and incinerated the paintings in a 
bonfire on central campus.10 Shock and outrage was the public response. Having had Martin 
Luther King Jr.’s non-violent protest ethics impressed upon me all my life, shock and outrage 
to torched artwork was my response as well. That is, until seeing news reports of how some 
                                               
 
7 Jon Wiener, “Nixon and the 1969 Vietnam moratorium,” The Nation, January 12, 2010. 
http://www.thenation.com/article/nixon-and-1969-vietnam-moratorium/. (Last accessed April 14, 2016). 
8 Lennon-McCarthy. “Give Peace a Chance,” (single). Apple Records, 1969 (LP).  
9 Yoder’s text, The Politics of Jesus, has been called a Christian pacifist manifesto issued in direct 
opposition to Christian public intellectuals of the day, such as Reinhold Niebuhr, who espoused the idea that 
New Testament ethics of peace and love were impracticable in modernity. 
10 The details of South Africa’s recent student protest movement, including this incident, as well as their 
relation to (non)violence, is discussed in the final chapter of the project. 
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students-- those protesting the lack of student housing—were forced to live. Two Black female 
students relayed how they had moved into a corrugated shack in a township. Their quarters 
were cramped, their lighting was poor, their environment was unsafe and ugly. They used the 
toilets—portable outdoor toilets set up in designated areas of the township—before dusk, as 
use after dark put their safety at risk. They had moved, in other words, into a housing 
arrangement that for millions of Black people in South Africa, was the norm.  
To see these women living in a shack--while I myself was searching for affordable 
student housing (from the comfort a friend’s beautiful home)--was to confront the kind of 
housing in which I, a Black female, might possibly be compelled to live; it was to confront the 
society that deemed such housing acceptable for people like me. I became viscerally aware of 
the ways that township life constituted an assault against one’s dignity as a human being. I 
understood that the degradation of daily life as a Black person in South Africa was a much 
more nefarious violence than the burning of a painting. This research project then suggested 
itself. 
Initially, thinking of the burning of paintings during protest, I anticipated researching 
the myriad ways that Jesus legitimated violence in his life and teachings, and then writing an 
apologetic for the use of physical violence during protest by the marginalized. Hence, the 
project was entitled, “The Violence of Jesus and the Justice of God,” followed by instances in 
Jesus’s life. As the research progressed, however, it became evident that there was an existing, 
but under-utilized, theological lens for assessing Jesus’s life and teaching that might be applied 
to the issue of protesting the degradation of Black life in South Africa. A lens that accounted 
for the ambivalence of scripture with respect to the use and disuse of physical force and that 
showed concern for justice on behalf of the marginalized. That lens was tied to the socio-
historic factor of cultural honour-shame. When the honour-shame cultural ethos was used to 
exegete scripture, it became clear that Jesus’s actions and teachings could be viewed as rooted 
in his goal of securing self-actualization and dignity for his marginalized, dishonoured 
followers. Such a perspective has astounding relevance for those in a contemporary context 
enduring marginalization, including women, LGBT persons, and especially Black persons.  
With this realization, the goal of the project shifted from one of establishing the 
violence in Jesus’s life and teachings and its connection to justice, to establishing the emphasis 
that Jesus made upon the human dignity of the individual. What the research reveals is that, for 
Jesus, human dignity entails deep security in one’s identity and one’s truth, as beloved children 
of God. It entails asserting one’s dignity in the face of society’s attempts to humiliate. This 
means that protest of the subaltern, including protest that includes the use of physical force, 
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may be construed theologically as a means of asserting self-ness and personhood long denied, 
and thus an affirmation of human dignity.  
The difficulty with the assertion that the use of force during protest is theologically 
legitimate, is the basis for the first two sections of the research, which investigates non-violence 
in the life and teachings of Jesus. Was Jesus as non-violent as contemporary readings of 
scripture depict? Is there a standard of non-violence that the church has upheld since its purest 
expressions during the apostolic age? Is non-violence a fundamental ethical tenet of Christian 
life and practice? These are some of the questions with which Parts One and Two of the 
research grapples. Part Three of the research then applies the lens of Black being to the study 
and questions whether the issues of non-violence are impacted by one being raced as Black. 
Because the answer is a firm, “Yes, race does matter to matters of violence and non-violence,” 
Part Three discusses the positive metaphysical developments within the will that are reflected 
by forceful protest, and then discusses protest violence in the context of South Africa. 
1.1.3. Contribution and Relevance 
Out of the significant body of research related to the ethics of Christian non-violence,11 
as well as to the ethics of Christian engagement in war,12 there are three prevailing assumptions 
with which this study will engage. 
Because a key aspect of modern theological scholarship involves the notion that non-
violence is the central ethic of the New Testament and the Christian faith (e.g., Richard Hays’s 
claim that, “the normative witness of the New Testament against…violence is powerful, 
virtually univocal, and integrally related to the central moral vision of the New Testament 
texts"), 13  the project will demonstrate that scripturally and historically, the church has 
continually grappled with issues of violence and non-violence without consensus.  
First, with regard to scripture, the project will disrupt Hays’s claim of the “normativity” 
of non-violence in the pages of the New Testament. This normative view presumes the viewer’s 
social location of gender, racial, and economic privilege. As Ward states, “[t]heological 
discourse always comes from somewhere, is spoken by someone, and is legitimated or 
delegitimated by some institution implicated in particular sets of social and cultural 
                                               
 
11 See, as representative examples of proponents of nonviolence, the work of Howard Thurman, 
Dorothy Day, Thomas Merton, as well as John H. Yoder, Stanley Hauerwas, Richard B. Hays, Walter Wink, and 
N.T. Wright. 
12 See, e.g., the work of Richard Niebuhr, Paul Ramsey, Nigel Biggar, and Richard Horsley. 
13 Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament, 315. 
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relations.”14 Hays’s normativity, then, can be seen as a capital-controlling, Western, White, 
male’s New Testament normativity. The conceptualization of Jesus by this specific social-
economic class is not universal, nor does it necessarily resonate phenomenologically with most 
Christians, or humans, on the planet. Which is to say that most people do not experience life, 
and most Christians do not experience Jesus in the same ways as capital-controlling, Western, 
White, male Christians.15 This study will show that the Western, White, male theologian’s 
reading of the “normative” witness of the New Testament, specifically the reading of the gospel 
treatment of non-violence in the life of Jesus, may not be afforded presumptive privilege. On 
the contrary, a liberationist interrogation of the New Testament narratives of Jesus’s life, death, 
and resurrection reveal a Jesus who views violence comprehensively as encompassing more 
than physical force, who sanctions physically forceful methods against those who engage in 
violences of various kinds, and who ultimately overcomes the violent tendencies of humanity 
(through violent judgment). Not only this, but the reading of scripture from the view of the 
marginalized reveals that where Jesus used examples that referenced physical force, his point 
was not about the use of force. Rather, Jesus made use of examples using physical force to 
make a larger point about human dignity, self-worth and valour. 
Second, with respect to tradition, rather than “non-violence” being the most consistent 
ethical teaching of the church, it is clear from a historical theological perspective that both 
violence and non-violence have been sanctioned by the church. More accurate than construing 
the Christian imperative as one of non-violence, is recognition of the more consistent ethic of 
the Christian, which has been survival with intact Christian dignity. Where survival with 
dignity for Christian adherents was not feasible through use of physical force, non-violent 
means were employed to accomplish these ends. The converse was also true, however. Where 
non-violent means of transformation with dignity was not possible, the use of force was 
employed to accomplish the necessary end, which was human dignity. In either case, the 
Church’s survival was a factor in the response chosen, but even where survival was not the 
principal goal, the intact human dignity of those in the church allowed followers to choose to 
forgo survival. The Christian tradition reflects consistently, not that the church has been called 
                                               
 
14 Graham Ward, How the Light Gets In: Ethical Life I, Reprint edition (New York; Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018), 116. 
15 This is merely to acknowledge that, statistically, the majority of the world’s population is outside of 
the West and is materially poor, thus their worldview would not likely coincide with that of Western White 
males. Also, statistically the majority of Christians reside outside of the West and have a tradition of faith that is 
experientially different than that of the capital-controlling, Western, White male. [research needed]  
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to refrain from violence, but that human flourishing within the culture has been a motivating 
concern. Also, retaining the Christian witness of Jesus and orthodox doctrine, securing the 
Christian faith against heretics and non-Christians, and ensuring the proliferation of the church, 
in whatever ways were most efficacious, were deemed the most imperative ethical warrants for 
Christian faith. 
Third, the research demonstrates that the historic extremes of violence perpetrated 
against Black persons, makes the claim and assertion of dignity deeply significant to human 
actualization. The research demonstrates that Black beings endured existential violence 
through their being excised from the construction of “the human.” That Black persons endured 
ongoing oppression and degradation that continued the existential violence against them and 
that resulted in the impairment of the will. Finally, that the resuscitated will, recently 
exemplified in South Africa through Black Consciousness building, could result in the inner 
force of the will’s re-orientation being expressed in an outward show of physical force. I argue 
that the re-orientation that results in the use of physical force warrants ethical approbation, not 
because of the use of force, but because of the imperative good of the vivified will acting to 
secure its highest good. 
The final chapter demonstrates the ways in which the use of force has been accepted by 
iconic Black South African fighters for justice, as they sought justice and self-hood for South 
Africa’s most marginalized population. Just as these figures made legitimate use of physical 
force in their insistence on human dignity, so too have the student protestors of today. 
1.2. Research Plan 
1.2.1. Research Questions 
The question that this project seeks to answer is: 
In what ways is the “normative” conceptualization of non-violence in the Christian 
tradition impacted by a reading of historical theology from margins; particularly 
from the perspective of Blackness? 
1.2.2. Research Paradigm 
This study falls within the field of systematic theology and is undertaken in the Western 
Cape of South Africa by a Black American woman. These facts are significant to the 
methodology implemented in the study and to the goals that the study seeks to accomplish. 
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Theory is used to determine relationships between constructs that “describe or explain 
a phenomenon by going beyond the local event and trying to connect it with similar events.”16 
The theoretical framework, not the theory itself, is often described as a paradigm. A paradigm 
refers to the framework that determines the intent, motivation and expectations of the 
research.17  Egon Guba expands this concept by explaining the ways in which paradigms are 
shaped by three basic kinds of inquiry: ontological, which asks, “what is the nature of the 
knowable or of reality?”, epistemological, which asks, “what is the relationship between the 
knower (the inquirer) and the known (knowable)?”, and methodological, which asks “how 
should the inquirer go about finding out knowledge?”18 
The research paradigm within which this study is located is that of Critical Theory.19 
While critical theory has roots in Marxism, it is concerned less with economic ordering, and 
more with the political and cultural infrastructure of society.20 Critical theory in research seeks 
to transform society, and to address injustice. As Geuss notes, critical theory is characterized 
by three theses: 1) It has special standing as a guide for human action, in that, it is aimed at 
producing enlightenment and bringing about liberation; 2) critical theory is a cognitive form of 
knowing; and 3) critical theory is “reflective” rather than “objective.”21 It uses the lens of 
inequality due to race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, disability, or other conceptions of 
marginality to do so.22 
                                               
 
16 Noella Mackenzie and Sally Knipe, “Research Dilemmas: Paradigms, Methods and Methodology,” Issues 
In Educational Research 16, no. 2 (2006): 193-205, citing Mertens 2005, 2. 
17 There are a number of theoretical paradigms that are utilized in social sciences and humanities 
research, including positivist (and postpositivist), constructivist, interpretivist, transformative, emancipatory, 
critical, pragmatism and deconstructivist. See, Mackenzie and Knipe, “Research Dilemmas.” 
18 Egon G. Guba, The Paradigm Dialog (SAGE Publications, 1990), 18. 
19 Critical theory is identified with the Institute for Social Research, which was originally attached to 
Goethe University in Frankfurt, Germany. Thus, critical theory also came to be associated with theorists known 
as “the Frankfurt School.” The Frankfurt School’s most prominent members included Max Horkheimer (1895-
1973), Theodor Adorno (1937-1969), Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979), Erich Fromm (1900-1980), and, later, 
Jürgen Habermas (b. 1929). Critical theory developed in opposition to “traditional theory,” which sought 
explanation by application of universal laws. Critical theory viewed the attempt at universalizing objectivity as 
“technocratic,” and sought, instead, to present a subjective epistemology, grounded in “reflection.” At its heart, a 
critical theory of society presents a criticism of ideology. See, Raymond Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory: 
Habermas and the Frankfurt School (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 2–3; James 
Bohman, “Critical Theory,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Stanford: Metaphysics 
Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/critical-theory/; 
Stephen Eric Bronner, Critical Theory: A Very Short Introduction, 2nd edition (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2017). 
20 Bronner, Critical Theory, 2. 
21 Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory, 1–2. 
22 Mackenzie and Knipe, “Research Dilemmas.” 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
10 
Like interpretivist research, critical theorization recognizes that research is not value-
free. However, critical research seeks to do more than acknowledge the unavoidable values 
attached to the research process; it has the goal of actively challenging the way that knowledge 
has been interpreted in order to bring about transformation. 
As Hammersley notes, 
to be critical, as a researcher, [involves] assessing public 
policies, institutions, and forms of social practice, not just 
knowledge claims, and doing this in terms of practical values, 
such as social welfare, justice, political liberty, or economic 
value. Furthermore, the critical act has been expanded to 
include analysing the fundamental assumptions and social 
contexts associated with what is being assessed, and/or taking 
an oppositional stance toward it.23 
The critical research task of this project will be to interrogate what is meant by non-
violence, generally; how the church has interpreted and practiced non-violence historically, 
and how scripture, specifically the gospel narratives of Jesus’s life, have explicated the use of 
force theologically. Because the task of critical theory is not limited to examination, however, 
I will then pursue the task of transformative critical research by analysing and expanding the 
conceptualizations of violence that are often in operation in discussions of non-violence to 
show the myriad ways that violence permeates modern life, as part of accepted and proper 
political and social ordering. Further, I will contextualize this discussion by a focus on race and 
Black life, and specifically the social conditions that often result in violent protest in South 
Africa. Concretizing the discussion is meant to illuminate the ways that the misperception of 
non-violence and violence in theological discussions constitutes ongoing harm to the lives and 
human dignity of the marginalized, thus necessitating revision. 
1.2.3. Research Methodology 
Methodology is the aspect of a paradigm that emphasises the question of how the 
research should proceed.24 The methodology serves as a bridge between theoretical claims and 
                                               
 
23 Critical theory is often itself critiqued as having as its goal support of a political agenda, which, it is 
argued, research should not have. Martyn Hammersley, “Should Social Science Be Critical?,” Philosophy of the 
Social Sciences 35, no. 2 (June 1, 2005): 180, https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393105275279. 
24 Thomas A. Schwandt and Emily F. Gates, “Case Study Methodology,” in The SAGE Handbook of 
Qualitative Research, 5th ed. (SAGE Publications, 2017). 
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beliefs, so-called “grand theories” as applied to larger society, and to concrete social contexts 
and the relevant texts to be analysed.25  
1.2.3.1. Research as an Act of Bricolage 
Denzin and Lincoln compare the work of the researcher, and of qualitative research, to 
that of making a quilt. It is to become a bricoleur, engaged in bricolage. “Bricolage is ‘the 
poetic making do’…with such bricoles—the odds and ends, the bits left over…The bricoleur 
is a Jack of all trades, a kind of professional do-it-yourself[er].”26 
In attempting gain a deep understanding of the phenomenon under investigation, 
[t]he qualitative-researcher-as-bricoleur or a maker of 
quilts…deploy[s] whatever strategies, methods, or empirical 
materials are at hand…If new tools or techniques have to be 
invented or pieced together, then the researcher will do this. 
The choice of which interpretive practices to employ is not 
necessarily set in advance. The “choice of research practices 
depends upon the questions that are asked, and the questions 
depend on their context”…what is available in the context, and 
what the researcher can do in that setting.27 
The experience of the bricoleur, and of quilt-making research, has been my own during 
this project. Among the tools, or patches of quilts, that have accumulated during the research 
are those of Black theology, feminist theology, liberation theology, post-colonial (and 
decolonial) theology. With respect to biblical analysis there has been historical criticism, 
source criticism, literary criticism, as well as hermeneutics of empire, economics, and 
apocalypse, among others. As the research involves interdisciplinarity and subjects with 
intersectional concerns, the methods used have involved the crafting of a complex quilt 
involving race, gender, identity, nation, class, and condition of servitude.  
The methodological task necessitated, as Denzin further describes, a going between and 
a contextualization of the self and the subject matter. 
The researcher-as-bricoleur-theorist works between and within 
competing and overlapping perspectives and paradigms. [Like 
the] interpretive bricoleur understands that research is an 
interactive process shaped by one’s personal history, 
biography, gender, social class, race, and ethnicity and those of 
the people in the setting. Critical bricoleurs stress the dialectical 
                                               
 
25 Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis (SAGE, 2009), 23. 
26 Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research, Fifth (SAGE 
Publications, 2017), 4 (citations omitted). 
27 Denzin and Lincoln, 4. 
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and hermeneutic nature of interdisciplinary inquiry, knowing 
that the boundaries between traditional disciplines no longer 
hold.28 
The result has been a bricolage that has been cut away, measured, shaped and designed 
to accommodate a systematic theological aesthetic. The chief methods that serve the project 
have been biblical exegetical and epistemological analysis, historical theological analysis, 
discourse analysis, and case study. These methods will be considered as cmponents of the quilt. 
The biblical exegesis serves as the inner core of the quilt. The front of the quilt is the historical 
theological analysis, and the critical analysis and application to Black being related to non-
violence functions as the back side of the quilt. 
1.2.3.2. Structure of the Study 
The structure of the study, i.e., the design aesthetic or pattern of the quilt, is a 
progression from scripture, to tradition, to experience. The project is divided into three sections, 
Parts 1, 2 and 3.  
In Part One, scripture is interrogated. Four texts were selected for analysis that represent 
traditional passages that undergird the conceptualization of Christian pacifism or non-violence. 
These passages relate to the life, the arrest, the crucifixion, and finally to the resurrected life of 
Jesus. The sample passages were subjectively selected; however, they are those often regarded 
as supporting the claim that Jesus promoted pacifism and non-violence. 
The passages to be examined are from: 
1. The Sermon on the Mount from Matthew 5. 
2. The arrest in the garden of Gethsemane in Matthew 26. 
3. Jesus’s utterances on the cross in Luke 23. 
4. Jesus’s words of consolation to the martyrs in heaven in Revelation 6. 
Though a comprehensive exegetical biblical analysis exceeds the scope of this project, the 
research undertakes an abbreviated form of exegesis.  
The choice of the texts was based upon the fact that most of the writing in the Gospel 
narratives is concerned Jesus’s life, and the apex of the Gospel narratives is the occasion of 
Jesus’s death. This would seem to dictate that either an exegesis primarily focused on passages 
from Jesus’s life is warranted, since this garners most of the attention of scripture, or that an 
exegesis of texts related to Jesus’s crucifixion is warranted, since the key concern of each 
                                               
 
28 Denzin and Lincoln, 4. 
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Gospel relates to this. Instead of making the choice to favour the period covering either the life 
of Jesus or the death of Jesus over other periods of Jesus’s time on earth, in selecting passages 
for exegesis, I chose to take a middle way. 
A repeated five-fold pattern of inquiry is made of each passage examined. The five 
questions posed are: 
1. What is the source of the text? 
2. When was the text produced? 
3. Who was the author of the text? 
4. Who was the author’s intended audience? 
5. What was the author’s purpose in writing? 
The exegesis serves as the inner core of the quilt. With the core constructed and 
complete, the patchwork of the front and the back of the quilt will be created. The front of the 
quilt is Part 2, the historical theological29 analysis, while the back of the quilt, Part 3, is a 
patchwork of theologies from the margins that discuss violence and Black being. 
Part two, the historical theological review of the history of pacifism and non-violence, 
relates to particular periods in the life of the church. There are four chapters, each of which 
considers a different period. These periods are the:  
1. Apostolic church to the 4th century church 
2. 4th century to the 12th century church 
3. 13th century to the 19th century church 
4. 20th century 
The divisions in theological history reflect, generally, major shifts that occurred in the 
“non-violent” practical theology of the church. Generally, up to the fourth century, within the 
violent context of the early centuries, there was a vibrant strand of pacifist Christianity that 
forbade even self-defense. From the fourth century onwards to the twelfth there was a tolerance 
for killing and warfare, in defense of the Christian way of life, reflected in the adoption of 
principles of just war. From the thirteenth century to the eighteenth century a consistent strand 
of pacifism and non-violence philosophy/theology returned, which was embraced and adapted 
throughout Europe, and later exported, after a fashion, to the New World. The nineteenth and 
                                               
 
29 For details on historical theology, see, Alister E. McGrath, Historical Theology: An Introduction to the 
History of Christian Thought, Second (Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2012). 
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twentieth centuries reflect the continued vitality of the theologies of the previous era applied 
in various distinct forms. 
The methodology of historical theological analysis of the various periods will proceed 
with a general overview of history, using texts that include contemporary scholarly 
compendiums concerned with relevant periods of theological history, historically significant 
primary literature, scholarly articles, etc. 
In Part three of the research, the quilt is reversed, and the topic of analysis shifts from 
pacifism and non-violence to violence per se. The method in use is that of critical discourse 
analysis.  
“Discourse is a way of speaking that does not simply reflect or represent things ‘out 
there,’ but ‘constructs’ or ‘constitutes’ them.”30 Not only is discourse constructive of reality, 
but also, discourse contributes to “both the reproduction of society and to social change.”31 
Discourse that fails to account for a variety of perspectives can be said to function 
ideologically. 32  Further, hegemonic discourse is said to be in effect when “all alternative 
constructions are suppressed in favour of one dominating view.”33 
Critical discourse analysis, as Hjelm notes, does two things. “[F]irst, it focuses on 
power and ideology in discourse, and second, it acknowledges that there is a reality—physical 
and social—outside of discourse, that is reproduced and changed discursively.” 34  Critical 
discourse analysis is a valuable tool for analysing how “discursive constructions perpetuate 
particular ways of thinking and practice by suppressing alternative discourses.”35 
Using the method of critical discourse analysis, the panels of the back of the quilt will 
be stitched together, to form a conceptual analysis of the discursive use of the concept of 
violence. This analysis will include use of patches of afro-pessimist theory, post-colonial 
theory, and psycho-social theory. 
Following this discursive analysis, Part 3 will conclude by placing the quilt upon the 
South African bed. Using a case study, an analysis of violence will be applied to the concretized 
context of physically violent student protest in South Africa. This analysis will include an 
                                               
 
30 Titus Hjelm, “Discourse Analysis,” in The Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in the Study of 
Religion, ed. Michael Stausberg and Steven Engler (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 135, (internal citations omitted). 
31 Hjelm, 135. 
32 Hjelm, 141. 
33 Hjelm, 141. 
34 Hjelm, 140. 
35 Hjelm, 142. 
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historic overview of violent protest, and consideration of the arguments for violent protest 
offered by the iconic figures of Nelson Mandela and Steve Biko, as well as counter-arguments 
by Allan Aubrey Boesek. 
1.2.4. Research Outline 
The overall structure and aesthetic of the study is as follows: 
1. Introduction to the Project 
A. Research Problem 
B. Research Plan 
C. Conclusion 
2. Part I: Biblical Exegesis  
A. Principles and Presuppositions of Exegesis 
B. Exegesis of Selected Texts 
C. Conclusion 
3. Part II: Historical Theological Analysis 
A. Theological Conceptions of Non-violence through the Fourth Century 
B. Theological Conceptions of Non-violence from Late Antiquity to the Early 
Medieval Period 
C. Theological Conceptions of Non-violence from the Late Medieval Period to 
Modernity 
D. Theological Conceptions of Non-violence in Modernity 
E. SUMMARY of Conclusions from Part II 
4. Part III: Theological Analysis from the Margins 
A. Violence and Black Being 
B. Violence and Human Will 
C. Violence and Protest in South Africa 
D. SUMMARY of Conclusions from Part III 
1.3. Research Conclusion 
The project considers scripture, history, experience, and a concrete contextual example 
in order to deconstruct the notion of the normativity of non-violence in Christian life and 
practice, particularly for those who are raced as Black. The goal is not to advance use of 
violence in the Christian life, but to allow the church to gain clarity, seeing violence as 
embedded in the culture, noticing the invisible violence that works devastating harm, and that 
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is incompatible with the message of the Gospel. The goal is, more importantly, to shine a light 
on the violence that is not named that is perpetrated against Black being in ways that debilitate 
and destroy life. Being raced as Black is to be always already violently acted upon, and to be 
made a threat of, or perpetrator of violence by virtue of being Black. Until Blackness becomes 
the center of theologies of (non)violence, they will remain incomplete, and operate in 
complicity with the violence of the culture against Black life. 
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Part I 
 
Biblical Exegesis 
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2. Exegesis of Scripture Related to Non-violence 
2.1. Introduction 
An overall objective of this research project is to highlight the ways in which the conception 
of Jesus as principally non-violent is a misconception which functions to the detriment of those who 
have been characterized as the Other and marginalized because of that characterization, particularly 
those who are Black. The project aims to theologically unmask language and ideas that aid oppression, 
so that the Christian imagination might engage itself in the work of constructing social orders that not 
in word, but in truth, make the Kingdom of God an imminent reality. 
As has been articulated by theologian Allan Aubrey Boesak, if theology is to be valuable and 
relevant it must be “rooted in the prophetic, covenantal tradition of Scripture.”36 Because scripture is 
central to Christian life and practice, particularly as it relates to prophetic transformation of culture, 
this research project begins by examining biblical passages that underlie the conception of a non-
violence tradition of the Christian witness. 
This chapter will examine four passages of scripture, each from a different period of Jesus’s 
life. The passages exegeted include passages from the Sermon on the Mount, and passages that depict 
Jesus’s arrest in the garden of Gethsemane, Jesus’ s crucifixion, and the resurrected Jesus in the 
heavenly realm. The review will demonstrate that the Christian tradition has featured the theme of non-
violence, when such readings, in fact, misapprehend the purpose and meaning of the texts. 
This chapter will demonstrate that the Sermon on the Mount passage that adjures Christ 
followers to “turn the other cheek,” etc., is not a message of “non-violence,” as much as it is a message 
of asserting dignity and self-worth. The same may be said of the passage related to Jesus’s arrest. His 
admonition to “put your sword away” is not a blanket condemnation of the use of physical force. Jesus 
in this scene is demonstrating his obedience to God’s plan, and his self-possession of power that refuses 
to be threatened or shamed by the powers of the world. The specific depiction of the “sword” incident 
and recounting of the speech by Jesus in Matthew’s text, is for the purpose of alluding to an Old 
Testament passage that emphasizes shame, fortitude, and God’s vindication; themes which, again, 
relate to shame/honour, dignity, and trust in God’s restoration of dignity. When it comes to the text in 
Luke that depicts Jesus on the cross praying, “Father forgive them,” what is revealed is that the text is 
not an embrace by Jesus of suffering and an example of Jesus’s deep love for and forgiveness of his 
                                               
 
36 Allan Aubrey Boesak, Kairos, Crisis, and Global Apartheid: The Challenge to Prophetic Resistance (New York: 
Springer, 2016), 5. 
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persecutors. Instead, Luke presents in his passion narrative a Jesus whose suffering is not featured, but 
whose composure and control is. Luke conveys the message that the powers seek to hurt and humiliate 
Jesus, but they fail. Though Jesus suffers the pain and humiliation of crucifixion, he is possessed of 
such dignity in his own being, that he overcomes the dishonour of being assigned by the world the 
identity of a shameless outlaw. Jesus possesses honour that his persecutors do not. Finally, the passage 
in Revelation, that depicts Jesus consoling martyred witnesses, is also a portrayal of honour and dignity 
reclaimed. Just as the disgraced Jesus now lives and reigns with supreme honour of every kind, so the 
martyred Jesus-followers, though degraded and killed will reign with Jesus in righteousness and 
honour. 
2.2. Principles and Presuppositions of Exegesis 
The goal of the exegesis of this project is to first determine what scholars have concluded about 
the passages under examination, and then to formulate a more apt interpretation based upon research 
which incorporates an honour/shame hueristic. 
2.2.1. Principles of Exegesis 
The Bible, that is the Old Testament (Hebrew Bible) and the New Testament, are sacred 
scriptures of the Christian faith that guide and shape the identity of Christian people.37 The scriptures 
are authoritative for Christians because Christians have traditionally understood that God spoke 
through scripture and that God continues to speak through scripture.38 But what is it that scripture says, 
and what is it that scripture means by what it says? The purpose of exegesis, when applied to biblical 
text, is to discern the answers to these questions. Exegesis is an exercise of interpretation or explanation 
of what is written.39 With respect to the bible, it has been defined as “the careful historical, literary, 
and theological analysis of a text.”40 The goal of such analysis is the “coherent understanding of the 
text on its own terms and in its own context.”41 
                                               
 
37 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “The Bible and Economics: The Hermeneutical Issues,” Transformation 4, no. 3/4 (1987): 
13. 
38 Wolterstorff, 13. 
39 John H. Hayes and Carl R. Holladay, Biblical Exegesis, Third Edition: A Beginner’s Handbook, Third (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2007), 1. 
40 Michael J. Gorman, Elements of Biblical Exegesis: A Basic Guide for Students and Ministers, Revised and Expanded 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008), 10. 
41 Gorman, 10. 
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2.2.1.1. Why Exegesis is Performed 
Biblical texts warrant exegesis as they present specific issues related to the ways that the texts 
were composed. The issues that the texts present are numerous.42 The texts are originally written in 
languages different from those spoken by most readers. There is a cultural gap between those who 
wrote the texts and readers of the texts today. There is a historical gap between the period during which 
the texts were written and the present day. There is multiple and/or collective authorship of the texts, 
which means though each author may use collective wisdom and tradition to inform a writing, taken 
together the authors often do not speak with one voice. Further, because the scriptures are sacred texts, 
our reading of them involves more than intellectual comprehension and appreciation. Reading the 
Bible as sacred scripture involves the beliefs and convictions of the reader. For these reasons careful 
attention to the texts must be paid. 
These reasons also make it inevitable that those reading or studying the text will disagree with 
one another over their meaning. The disagreements that arise in interpreting the texts, Wolterstorff has 
noted, might be categorized in three ways: 43 (1) what the Bible actually says; (2) what part of what is 
said is authoritative for Christians; and (3) which social ethic is most faithful to what is authoritative 
in what the Bible says.44 For the purposes of the texts that are under consideration in this research 
project, the issue of interpretation does not typically engender dispute related to the first point, what 
the Bible actually says. There might be slight variations to the translations of the texts, but these do 
not impact the ideas communicated. For this reason, linguistic exegesis is not a focus of the research. 
The research will instead examine, albeit briefly, Wolterstorff’s second and third points of 
disagreement, what is authoritative and what social ethic is to be applied to the authoritative reading 
of the text. 
Determining what is authoritative is more complex than simply accepting every line that is 
written as having significance to Christian belief and action. First, the complete corpus may require 
resolution of seemingly incompatible directives (e.g., writings exhort the work of faith alone, and also 
faith that is evident through works). Second, the cultural and historical gaps between the context of 
scripture and the present-day context may render aspects of the text inapplicable. In the New Testament 
                                               
 
42 Hayes and Holladay, Biblical Exegesis, Third Edition, 5–12. 
43 Wolterstorff also includes a fourth point, “(4) The dispute may be grounded in disagreement as to which 
specific moral imperatives ought to be followed, in the light of…that social ethics which is most faithful to what is 
authoritative for us in what the Bible says.” Wolterstorff, “The Bible and Economics,” 14. I do not include this point as it 
is generally concerned with specific acts called for in specific circumstances, which I find to be a rather unreasonable 
expectation to impose upon the text in light of the vast differences between the material world of the text and that of 
modern readers. 
44 Wolterstorff, 14. 
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scriptures, with which the present research is concerned, this often includes making implicit reference 
to the traditions and scriptures of the Old Testament, which for technological and theological reasons 
have been superseded (e.g., references to rites of purification or ritual sacrifice at community temples). 
Third, the world view of the authors of scripture differs significantly from the modern world view and 
requires discernment to understand (e.g., belief in angels and demons). Though all scripture is 
understood to be “inspired by God and…useful for teaching, for reproof, for correction, and for training 
in righteousness,”45 because of the distinctiveness of the first century New Testament context within 
which the books were composed, some scripture is possessed of authority for belief and practice today 
that other texts do not possess. Thus, Wolterstorff writes of the importance of distinguishing between 
“what one might call the situated biblical ethic (or ethics), and the authoritative biblical ethic 
(authoritative for us, that is).”46  
Wolterstorff’s third point raises the issue of how the authoritative texts are to be constructed 
into an ethics. Here, as well, simple direct application of what has been deemed authoritative has 
limitations, most particularly in that the text does not speak directly to issues of modern life (e.g., the 
ethics of marriage to an artificially intelligent robot, or sharing of digital information by students 
outside of customary channels). An ethics must be drawn from and constructed out of the biblical text, 
therefore. 
2.2.1.2. Why Exegesis Matters to this Project 
The exegetical task is of significance to this research. First, the research re-visions the 
authoritativeness of the texts under consideration. Traditionally, when the texts under consideration, 
which relate to non-violence are examined, they are construed as supremely authoritative for belief 
and practice of the Christian. While the authority of the texts is not questioned by this research, the 
rationale for the text’s authority, or the broader meaning of the texts within the corpus, is challenged. 
Second, the ethics that is constructed around the texts that seemingly point to directives of non-violent 
conduct, is also challenged. The challenge will include reference to the historical social context within 
which the discourse of non-violence has arisen. 
2.2.1.3. Limits of the Study 
The exegesis that follows constitutes an overview and sketch of the scholarship related to the 
passages under consideration. Specialists in the field of biblical studies will almost certainly be left 
wanting greater exegetical engagement, however such engagement would overwhelm the overall 
                                               
 
45 See, 2 Timothy 3:16. 
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project. This section is intended to provide an introduction to a new paradigm (honour/shame) for 
scriptural interpretation of non-violence themes. It is meant to demonstrate the viability and ideological 
shift that is possible if the honour/shame paradigm is applied to texts traditionally understood to relate 
to nonviolence. The study is bound to intrigue, raise questions, and elicit a desire for greater 
engagement. However, such engagement must be postponed. In-depth biblical exegesis is an avenue 
for further research that has great potential for the future. 
2.2.1.1. Exegetical Approaches 
There are many different methods of performing exegesis of the biblical text. These include 
tradition-based methods, historical methods, literary methods, ideological criticism methods, and 
social-scientific methods, among others. The approach of this paper will be to utilize the historical-
critical method, the narrative critical method, the social-scientific method, as well as ideological 
criticism methods offered through the lens of post-colonial criticism and Black theological traditions. 
2.2.1.1.1. Historical-Critical Method 
As a reaction against the dogmatic reading of scripture, theologians of the Enlightenment 
period of the mid-nineteenth century began to study the bible with the intent of discovering more than 
doctrinal formulations of substantiations of the faith. Rather they sought to uncover objective data that 
might establish what actually happened in the text, and/or what the author of the book intended to 
communicate through the writing that was produced.47  The focus on “what the author intended” of 
the historical-critical method “established parameters for the Bible to be used in nondogmatic, 
nondevotional ways.”48  
The historical-critical method includes a range of tasks, beginning with textual criticism. 
Textual criticism assesses the variations found in extant copied manuscripts as a means of 
reconstructing the lost original documents.49 This method attempts to get as close as possible to 
original text and, thus,  the original meanings of the authors. However, the method has been lately 
criticized as a means of discerning the meaning of texts, since interpretation, or meaning making, 
requires more than formulaic criteria. Because external empirical evidence such as age and provenance 
                                               
 
47 Mark Allan Powell, ed., Methods for Matthew, 1 edition (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 5. 
48 Powell, 6. 
49 Clare K. Rothschild, “Historical Criticism,” in Methods for Luke, ed. Joel B. Green (Cambridge UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 10–11. 
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of manuscripts are imperfect conveyors of the history of the texts and their relationships to one 
another,50 artful skills are required to aid interpretation. As Epps describes, these involve using  
…judgment in selecting the reading that best explains all others in a 
variation unit; interpretive dexterity in showing a reading’s conformity 
to a writing’s style or theology or a reading’s derivation from an 
extraneous context; and the adroitness and sensitivity to explain how a 
reading has been formed or altered by church-historical pressures.51 
Thus, textual interpretation is both art and science and may not be confined to mere identification of 
manuscript authenticity or cohesion. 
Another task of the historical-critical method is that of source criticism. Going further than 
identification of manuscript integrity, source-criticism analyses the written sources of the texts 
examined by textual-critics.52 It is source criticism that devised that the synoptic gospels are related, 
and that attempts to argue for one gospel text’s reliance upon another, such s Matthew and Luke relying 
upon Mark. In addition to source-criticism, form-criticism is used within the historical-critical method. 
Form-criticism acknowledges the fact that oral tradition plays as important a role in the formation of 
what later became written text. Form-criticism analyses small units of the written text and attempts to 
trace the smaller units to historical contexts, or “settings in life,” in which the forms could be observed 
prior to being reduced to writing.53 Drawing together the work of both source-criticism (written) and 
form-criticism (oral) traditions, is the task of redaction criticism. Redaction criticism investigates the 
ways that New Testament authors mixed and edited source material to create their own accounts. “The 
changes made to their sources in both style and emphasis reveal a redactor’s prejudices and 
predilections,”54 providing information about the redactor as well as the document itself. Rhetorical 
criticism may be said to go a step beyond redaction criticism, in that “it takes the text as we have it, 
whether the work of a single actor or the product of editing, and looks at it from the point of view of 
the author’s or editor’s intent.”55 Rhetorical criticism analyses the ways that New Testament authors 
employed standard conventions of discourse to persuade an audience to believe.56 All of these methods 
                                               
 
50 Eldon Jay Epp, Junia: The First Woman Apostle (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005), 12. 
51 Epp, 12. 
52 See, Rothschild, “Historical Criticism,” 15–20. 
53 See, Rothschild, 20–22. 
54 Rothschild, 22–23. 
55 George A. Kennedy, New Testament Interpretation Through Rhetorical Criticism, First Edition edition (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 1984), 4. 
56 See, Kennedy, 4–7. 
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combine to allow scholars to attempt to formulate what a text says and what the author of the text 
intended to say. 
The historical-critical method is employed as the first task of the exegesis of the passages 
studied. For both the gospels of Matthew and Luke, and also the book of Revelation, a necessarily 
brief historical-critical overview is presented. The overview includes a summary of the scholarship 
concerning the source, dating, authorship, redaction, and reception of each book. In this way, the study 
begins by aiming to get at, what the text is and where it comes from. 
2.2.1.1.2. Literary Criticism and Narrative Criticism 
In the 1980s an analytical shift occurred in biblical studies. Scholars moved away from 
authorial intent of the historical-critical method, and toward a focus on the literary qualities of the text 
itself.57 Language and structure took precedence over concerns about the social-historical world of the 
text.58 Narrative criticism emphasized receiving the stories of the bible as stories. Questions about the 
narreative should be posed as with other narrative texts: 
What are the roles of characters and characterization in biblical 
narrative? How are scenes composed? What is the signiﬁcance of 
repetition in the narrative texts of the Bible? What does the narrator tell 
the reader and what information is withheld?59 
The unity of the final text and the power of the narrative to shape the audience were made the key 
emphases in narrative criticism. Reading the final compositions as a whole, rather than analysing or 
reading them in small sections, was an innovation. However, the emphasis upon the final composition 
of the text does not mean that the text may be apprehended as a “sealed container of meaning.”60 The 
Gospels and Acts are narratives within narratives, they include prominently external historical 
referents, they anticipated that there would be an effect from the writing and reading of the narratives, 
and they required audience response for meaning-making. 61  In short, the narratives cannot be 
construed as self-contained in meaning because the narratives themselves, reach beyond themselves in 
their composition. 
Narrative compositions contain diverse elements that make them narratives. Such elements of 
the narrative may consist of some or all of the following:62 1) a sequence of events; 2) scene and 
                                               
 
57 Powell, Methods for Matthew, 6. 
58 Joel B. Green, “Narrative Criticism,” in Methods for Luke, ed. Joel B. Green (Cambridge ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 75. 
59 Green, 76. 
60 Green, 82. 
61 For greter detail, see, Green, 82–92. 
62 See, Green, 95–98. 
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staging, the place where the action occurs; 3) time and the flow of time; 4) characterization, what we 
are told or shown about the persons in the story; 5) perspective—the narrator or character’s point of 
view about what is occurring; 6) insider information, such as when the narrator reveals to the audience 
what the characters do not know or understand; and 7) intertextuality, which refers to “the presence of 
quotations, allusions, and echoes of Israel’s Scriptures” in the text of the Gospels and Acts.63  The 
acknowledgement of elements such as this is not meant to be absolutely methodical or exhaustive. 
Rather, the goal is to identify recurring elements of narratives that aid in the close reading of the text. 
In this project literary analysis, and narrative criticism, are used as a second stage of exegetical 
inquiry, after historical-critical analysis is completed. In some instances, literary analysis accompanies 
social-scientific criticism of the text under consideration. The goal of the second stage of exegesis is 
to further present, the narrative meaning of the texts. In this section of the exegesis I seek to emphasise 
not the construction of the texts, but in the most “objective” manner possible, to discern the bedrock 
meaning of what the says, or what the author of the book attempted to communicate through its writing. 
2.2.1.1.3. Social-Scientific Criticism Method 
The goals of social-scientific criticism methods of biblical study are historical, in that they seek 
to understand the world that produced the texts under analysis. 64  They go beyond attempts to 
understand what the New Testament author intended and seek “seek to understand the values, 
institutions, social systems, and interconnected relationships that are intrinsic to the New Testament 
world.”65 It does this by referencing the models of social science disciplines, such as sociology, 
anthropology, archaeology, etc. Social scientific models attempt to simplify and systematize data. 
“Models of social phenomena such as kinship and family, honour and shame, patronage and clientage, 
collectivism, social status, limited good, evil eye, purity and pollution, ritual, gender and sexuality, 
landscape and spatiality, ancient economies, healing and health, and social memory permit the careful 
examination of these issues in biblical texts in socially significant ways.” Additionally, social-
scientific criticism is interested in the explanation of social facts, and not merely their observation of 
description.66 Powell explains that those using social-scientific criticism often attempt to “bridge the 
cultural distance between themselves and the Gospel so that they will understand it on its own terms. 
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64 Powell, Methods for Matthew, 9. 
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The means…often involve comparative analysis of societies similar to those that formed contexts for 
Jesus and for the author of [the Gospels].”67 
The social-scientific method is employed to explore the ways that models of honor/shame and 
collectivism, particularly when combined with Black and post-colonial readings of scripture, offer new 
insight into the emphasis that the Gospel writers placed upon honor/shame and upon equipping the 
marginalized to flourish in the hostile environments that they faced. 
2.2.1.1.4. Black and Postcolonial Hermeneutics 
Both Black Theology and Postcolonial theology share a liberative ethos and a concern for those 
oppressed by dominant culture. Black Theology emphasizes the oppression of Black persons based 
upon race, while post-colonial theology is concerned with the oppression of those whose land was 
formerly colonized by Western nations, particularly the formerly colonized in Latin America, Africa, 
and Asia. Both postcolonial and Black theologies privilege the viewpoint of those who have been 
subordinated and dominated by those with social, political, and imperial power.68  
Methodologically there are also similarities. Biblical postcolonial criticism interrogates 
colonial ideology. It seeks, first, to uncover the ways in which “colonial intentions and assumptions 
informed and inﬂuenced the production of the texts.”69 Second, it uses an intersectional analysis70 to 
re-read biblical texts “from the perspective of postcolonial concerns such as liberation struggles of the 
past and present.”71 Third, it draws attention to normative (colonial) interpretations that “(re)inscribe 
the notion of a mystical, irrational, stagnant Orient pitched against a progressive, rational and secular 
Occident.”72 The objective of postcolonial criticism is to speak the truth to the powerful, but also to 
awaken the poor and marginalized to the truth about the powerful.73 
These postcolonial criticism emphases align with the tasks of Black Theology. 74  Black 
theology arises out of the lived experiences of Black persons under conditions of anti-black racism. It 
insists upon Jesus’s solidarity with the poor and oppressed; and gives hermeneutical privilege to 
                                               
 
67 Powell, Methods for Matthew, 9. 
68 Powell, 10. 
69 R S. (Rasiah S) Sugirtharajah, “A Brief Memorandum on Postcolonialism and Biblical Studies,” Journal for the 
Study of the New Testament 73 (March 1999): 4. 
70 E.g., Musa Dube’s exegetical work on Exodus and the conquest narratives, as well as the Matthean narrative of 
Jesus’s encounter with the Canaanite woman, are grounded in her specific social location as a Botswanan, Black, African, 
female. She puts forth a strong critique of Euro-Amerian feminist interpretations and calls for the reading of scripture by 
“ordinary” women of African Independent churches. See, Musa W. Dube, Postcolonial Feminist Interpretation of the Bible (St. 
Louis, MO: Chalice Press, 2012). 
71 Sugirtharajah, “A Brief Memorandum on Postcolonialism and Biblical Studies,” 5. 
72 Sugirtharajah, 5. 
73 Sugirtharajah, 5. 
74 The genealogy of the Black theological tradition is presented in Part 3 of the research, infra. 
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Jesus’s mission of liberation of the oppressed in the material world, and not merely in the spiritual 
sense. Black theology relies upon scripture, upon the creative arts (fiction, plays, essays, etc.) and upon 
direct lived experience as epistemological sources. The goal of Black theology is to center the 
experiences of Black persons and to annunciate the elevated place of concern that God has for Black 
people, as well as God’s concern for the conditions in which Black people live. 
Black and Postcolonial theology is employed in in Part 3 of the exegesis of this research. Such 
a reading, combined with the social-scientific critical method, seeks to center the experience of the 
marginalized first century audience of the Gospel accounts, as well as to draw from the contemporary 
life conditions of postcolonial and Black marginalized persons to gain insight into the condition of the 
first century marginalized. 
2.2.2. Presuppositions of Exegesis 
While this project does undertake exegesis of four individual texts, it is possible to observe 
various characteristics related to interpretation that are relevant to all the texts under consideration.  
2.2.2.1. Gospels are Highly Contextual 
As scholars have noted, it is important to place the texts of scripture in the context in which 
they were written. As far as it is possible, we must enter the world that existed at the time the text was 
written if we hope to understand the written and also the “hidden” texts of scripture as they are 
presented to us. 75  Because of the historical and cultural gaps that exist between our lives in 
industrialized and technologized society and the agrarian world of the New Testament, consistent 
effort is required to appreciate the distinctions of the ancient period of first century Palestine. As 
Malina and Rohrbaugh point out, if the text’s reader and writer come from alien social systems, 
“then…nonunderstanding, or at best misunderstanding, will be the rule. Because this is so, 
understanding the range of meanings that would have been plausible to a first-century reader of the 
Synoptic Gospels requires the contemporary reader to seek access to the social system(s) available to 
the original audience.”76 
To that end, the general suppositions as to the social purpose and function of the Gospel 
accounts and the ancient context warrant identification. There are numerous suppositions that might 
be listed,77 three will be highlighted here. First, the Gospels were written to an in-group; they were 
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written to address a particular set of circumstances (“They were not written for all people of all 
times.”).78 This means that, though we read them and extract near universal relevance from texts, they 
were not intended to be so regarded. The specifics of the setting must be kept in mind. Second, the 
Gospels were written to help an in-group to make sense of their current experiences, not as 
proselytizing tools.79 This means that, though the mission of the church may have included the spread 
of the “Gospel” or “good news,” the Gospel in the first century was not the dissemination of what 
came to be the text of scripture. The good news was the testimony of Jesus, which was orally 
transmitted. The Gospels were narrative accounts of Jesus’s life written to specific communities facing 
specific challenges. Third, the Gospels were written for third-generation Jesus-followers to 
communicate the experiences of the first generation of followers. “The Gospels tell of what Jesus said 
and did in a way relevant to third-generation Jesus group members. Second-generation writers such as 
Paul or James or Peter say almost nothing about what Jesus said and did.”80 The Gospels were intended 
to describe Jesus in a way that was relevant to particular communities of followers. Different aspects 
of Jesus’s personhood and teaching were emphasized to different communities by each of the Gospel 
writers. 
2.2.2.2. Gospels Embedded in Honour-Shame Context 
Additional context is gleaned by accouting for the dynamic of honour/shame in first century 
Roman culture. It is of great significance to the exegesis of our texts, thus, will be consiered here at 
length. 
The concept of honour/shame is fundamental to the Roman-Palestinian context of the Gospels. 
In the context of Roman antiquity, “[c]oncern for honour permeate[d] every aspect of public 
life...Honour [w]as the fundamental value.”81, Honour was one’s public reputation.82 It was not only 
one’s status in the community but the community’s recognition of that status.83 Such recognition was 
inconsistent, and was determined within a culture of perpetual community evaluation. The social 
evaluation performed as a kind of social control.84 Honour became, then, “public acknowledgement of 
one’s worth or social value.”85 
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Honour determine[d] dress, mannerisms, gestures, vocation, posture, 
who [could] eat with whom, who [sat] at what places at a meal, who 
[could] open a conversation, who ha[d] the right to speak, and who 
[was] accorded an audience. It serve[d] as the prime indicator of social 
place (precedence) and provide[d] the essential map for persons to 
interact with superiors, inferiors, and equals in socially prescribed or 
appropriate ways.86 
Thus, honour, which was determined by communal assessment, assigned and proscribed nearly 
all facets of the ways in which one experienced life on a daily basis. One could be ascribed honour or 
could acquire honour by one’s actions.  
2.2.2.2.1. Ascribed Honour 
Ascribed honour was imputed due to one being born to an honourable social position. The 
concept of dignitas is an example of ascribed honour. Dignitas originates from ancient Roman notions 
of rank and virtue. It is a quality descriptive of persons at the highest levels in the social order, as well 
as the comportment or such individuals.87  Dignitas was related to a man’s reputation and standing, 
and was of “overwhelming importance.”88 Dignitas was not, and could not be possessed by everyone, 
lest dignitas lose its distinction.89 Dignitas was also possible to lose, depending upon one’s conduct in 
society, as Cicero wrote of his loss and struggle to regain his dignitas.90 The average inhabitant of 
Rome may not have possessed dignitas, however he or she might have been ascribed a degree of 
honour based upon their family connections or position. 
Another ascription of honour was through being regarded, ironically, as having positive shame. 
To have shame in the positive, favourable, sense was to have “sensitivity about one’s reputation, 
sensitivity to the opinions of others.”91 To lack positive shame, on the other hand, was to be considered 
shameless. To be shameless was to be a “person with a dishonourable reputation beyond all social 
doubt, one outside the boundaries of acceptable moral life, hence a person who must be denied the 
normal moral courtesies.”92 Some, such as “prostitutes, innkeepers, and actors, among others,”93 were 
irredeemably without honour. Such persons were deemed “shameless,” in an absolute manner.94 Thus, 
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again, though not explicitly recognized as an ascription of honour, the possession of positive shame 
functioned in exactly this way. 
2.2.2.2.2. Achieved Honour 
In addition to being ascribed, honour might also be achieved, meaning, either gained (or lost) 
through public success (or failure). The negotiation of honour was typically conducted through 
community enactments of the “challenge-riposte.” 
2.2.2.2.2.1. Challenge-Riposte 
Challenge-Riposte was a competitive means of attaining the elusive currency of honour in the 
first-century Roman-Palestinian context. It was a central and public act which consisted of one person 
issuing a challenge to the honour of another person, and the other person answering in a way that 
preserved their own honour and/or issuing a greater challenge to the first person.   
Challenge-riposte was pervasive and ruled many aspects of life.95 According to Malina, whose 
articulation of the model of honour/shame has gained standard acceptance,96 there are several aspects 
that make up the pervasive and agonistic97 challenge-riposte culture. First, "nearly every interaction 
with non-family members has undertones of a challenge to honour."98 This was due to a general 
consciousness and hyper-sensitivity to exchanges carrying the potential diminish one’s honour.99 
Second, the mechanics of the challenge-riposte must occur: someone says or does something to 
someone; a decision is made by the individual (based on the public’s standards) as to whether a 
challenge is occurring; if there is a challenge, a riposte must follow; finally, the “public court of 
reputation” must then evaluate the outcome of the exchange and either grant honour or grant shame.100 
Third, contests for honour only occur among those of equal social rank. “A challenge to an inferior 
brings shame and humiliation to the challenger. Likewise, when a challenge is issued it is accepted 
only if one considers the challenger worthy of respect.”101  Fourth, honour/same standards differ 
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according to gender. “[W]hat you ought to do and what others ought to do for you are determined by 
the social group and entail different obligations and entitlements depending upon gender.102 
2.2.2.2.2.1. Symbolic Representations of Honour/Shame 
As da Silva has established, in addition to conceiving honour/shame in terms of ascription and 
achievement, the culture of honour is also mediated through symbolization of the physical body, and 
the “name” or reputation of the person. Placing a crown on the head of the king, and slapping the face 
of the prisoner, are examples of honour and dishonour being mediated through the body’s treatment.103 
Placing a king on a raised throne, throwing enemies at the feet of the victor, and seating arrangements 
in a social gathering, such as being seated at the “right hand” of the king, are examples of the placement 
of bodies as communicative of honour/dishonour.104 Garments, such as white robes, are also used to 
communicate the honour of the one wearing the garment.105 The “name” is also a site of symbolic 
honour. Thus, “[p]raising or “sanctifying” God’s name or making God’s name “known” are 
expressions for giving God honour or spreading God’s honour.”106 While speaking ill of God’s name, 
blaspheming, is to dishonour God.  
2.2.2.2.2.1. Crucifixion and Honour-Shame 
Crucifixion was the ultimate in shame.  Neyrey and Malina describe the inherent shame of 
crucifixion as being the punishment of those without honour, such as criminals and slaves.107 It was 
also shameful due to the “progressive public humiliation”108 involved in the process of crucifixion, 
including powerlessness, the removal of clothing, thus, nakedness, and abuse of the body. 
2.2.2.2.3. Early Christian Community and Honour/Shame 
For the Jewish community generally, there existed tension between the civic duty to participate 
in Roman practices deemed honourable by the polis, and the duty to be loyal to Jewish culture, and the 
Jewish customs and traditions that were deemed dishonourable in larger Roman society. 109  This 
tension only increased for those Jews, and later Greeks, who embraced the testimony of Jesus. To 
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manage this tension, minority groups utilized a strategy for maintaining honour despite the lack of 
honour that one was able to acquire in the broader culture. 
DaSilva demonstrates that the strategy for minority-groups involved three components. First, 
there is the fencing of the minority group’s “court of reputation.” The minority in-group focuses their 
attention “toward one another, toward their leaders, and very frequently, toward beings beyond the 
visible sphere ([e.g.,] God or the honoured members the group who have moved to another realm after 
death.)”110 The goal was to frame the larger out-group as the “deviant body” that is out of line with the 
cosmic order. Second, in addition to controlling the conception of the public court of reputation for 
determinations of honour, the minority in-group also sought to control the in-group conception of 
honour. Thus, there is regular articulation to the in-group and for the in-group the reasons “why the 
approval or disapproval of outsiders does not matter to the members of the group and why it is no 
reflection of the group members’ true honour and worth.”111 The hostility and scorn of the out-group 
is re-interpreted in a positive light for the in-group. “Rather than being felt as a demeaning, degrading 
experience, society’s assaults on the group can become an opportunity to show courage or to 
demonstrate a person’s loyalty to God, or to have his or her moral faculty exercised and 
strengthened.” 112  The goal is to minimize the in-group’s self-perception of dishonour. The third 
strategy employed, is for the in-group to use considerations of honour/shame to enforce proper in-
group behaviour.113 The group is encouraged to do one set of things, and to refrain from another set of 
things, so that they can either receive or avoid the respective honour or disgrace that results from their 
actions. Models of behaviour are established. “Some figures are held up as praiseworthy, with the 
expectation that hearers will be led to emulate that figure in the hope of being recognized themselves 
as praiseworthy.”114 Others were held up to serve as bad examples who should not be emulated. 
For the Christian minority in-group in first century Roman-Palestine the challenges to honour 
were distinct. They were challenged to repudiate the gods, the lifestyle, and the world order of the 
context in which they lived. Additionally, they were charged to repudiate tenets of the Jewish religion 
and to abandon many Jewish cultural, and cultic, practices. Instead they were to hold onto the 
testimony of Jesus, and the belief that Jesus would return, would put an end to the rulers of the day, 
and would establish his own kingdom.115  
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The turn from the majority culture’s belief system placed the Christians under significant threat 
of dishonour. Thus, the above strategies of reclaiming honour were employed. The court of reputation 
was fenced by early Church leaders and New Testament authors. The writers of the New Testament 
were “careful continually to point the members of the Christian group away from the opinion that non-
Christians might form of them toward the opinion of those who would reflect the values of the 
group”116—the sole proper court of reputation for the Christians. Second, the Church leaders and New 
Testament authors shaped the new church’s conception of honour/shame by focusing the church on 
God’s opinion of what is honourable or shameful. The opinion of God was the most central to the 
Christian acquisition of honour. It was God who had the ultimate “stamp of approval” or disapproval, 
and God’s determination would be made on the Day of Judgment.117 “Believers are instructed to live 
for God’s approval rather than human approval…They are to seek God’s approval by their pious 
actions…rather than engage in these actions for the sake of human approval.”118 In addition to prayer, 
direct Spiritual communication, and the Hebrew scriptures, the means of knowing God’s opinion of 
what was honourable was the affirmation of the community of believers. There was in-group 
reinforcement and “kinship-like” in-group commitments (including the sharing of resources) to foster 
solidarity; to make the in-group, rather than the broader society, the source of determinations of what 
was honourable and of how to attain honour. “One’s fellow believers [were] the most visible and, in 
many senses, the most available reflection of God’s estimation of the individual, and so the New 
Testament authors are concerned with building up a strong community of faith that will reinforce 
individual commitment to the group.”119 In addition to being attentive to the honourable, church 
leaders also emphasized the dishonour and shamelessness of outsiders. Outsiders’ dishonour is found 
in their ignorance and inability to understand what is valuable and worthy, as well as in their 
dishonourable conduct, including idolatry, and vice.120 
Finally, the New Testament church used honour/shame to enforce proper in-group behaviour. 
What was stressed was the special place of honour in God’s eyes that the Christian enjoyed. Theirs 
was honour that allowed them to approach God directly in holiness and with confidence. Christians 
were assured that they are invited to become God’s own people, adopted into God’s own family, made 
a part of God’s own household, sharing in Christ’s honour.121 Also, just as leaders “held up certain 
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believers to be honoured and shamed others, …[they] encouraged the churches themselves to create a 
dynamic social environment in which honouring and shaming actively supported the group’s values 
and reinforced individual commitment to honour those values.” 122  An ethos of self-regulated 
accountability within the in-group was meant to maintain the community.123 
What is clear is that the New Testament church employed strategies of honour/shame, 
including reconfiguring the public court of reputation, in-group narration of Christian honour and non-
Christian dishonour, and modeling of desireable Christian behavior, in order to combat negative 
shaming assessments in the larger culture, and to further the new Christians’ group formation. 
 
2.3. Exegesis of Selected Texts 
A thorough exegesis of multiple passages of scripture could easily merit a full dissertation 
length project. Because of the constraints of this project, an abbreviated exegesis will be performed. 
Since the project interrogates the normativity of the concept of non-violence in the Christian tradition, 
texts were selected with the intent of engaging instances that have been construed as evidence of a 
non-violence ethic promoted by Jesus at different periods of Jesus’s life. Thus, while it would have 
been fairly easy to draw several examples of teachings related to non-violence from Jesus’s Sermon 
on the Mount, or from Jesus’s arrest and Crucifixion, in themselves, the project sought to take a more 
comprehensive look at Jesus’s life and teachings.  
The reason for this is that challenging the manner of thinking about the way that texts are 
comprehended, rather than the specifics of the texts themselves, is the chief aim of the exegesis. My 
aim is to introduce a way of seeing scripture in its entirety, in such a way that the notion of non-
violence is questioned. In this way the concept of non-violence, or non-physical violence, which allows 
for devastating violence in the lives of marginalized Others, might be deconstructed to unmask the 
violence that is always already present, and to point to the ways that Jesus is always at work against 
invisible violences that violate the marginalized. Thus, the choice of texts at different points in Jesus’s 
life, to investigate his patterns of behaviour with respect to non-violence, was more important than 
addressing exhaustively the myriad texts that might be seen as depicting Jesus promoting non-violence. 
One exemplary scripture relating to Jesus’s life was selected (from the Sermon on the Mount). 
One exemplary scripture relating to Jesus’s death was selected (one of the seven sayings from the 
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cross). Then, as a means of acknowledging the centrality to the Gospels of Jesus’s living and of his 
dying, one scripture was selected that depicts Jesus’s actions while living on his way to his death (from 
the arrest in Gethsemane). The final scripture was selected as representative of a non-violence ethics 
as part of Jesus’s resurrected life (from a heavenly vision in John’s Revelation). The passages to be 
considered are: Matthew 5:38-40, relating to the Sermon on the Mount, Matthew 26:52, relating to 
Jesus’s arrest, Luke 23:34, relating to Jesus on the Cross, and Revelation 6: 9-11, relating to the 
heavenly vision. 
As is clear, the passages selected do not relate to instances of physical violence in the Gospels. 
Rather, the choice was made to focus on texts that have tend to be used to support claims of 
nonviolence in the Gospels. This choice was made, first, because there is a range of New Testament 
scholarship that addresses the ambivalence of scripture with respect to Jesus’s acts of, and acceptance 
of the use of, physical violence in scripture.124 With abbreviated space for exegesis as part of this study, 
I chose to engage different texts, those that related to non-violence. Which points to the second reason 
for the choice of texts made. The conception of Jesus as primarily a non-violent figure is often not a 
result of overlooked texts related to acts of physical violence performed by Jesus, though these are 
often neglected or regarded as anomalous.125 The modern church desires to maintain the image of Jesus 
as a non-violent figure, and supports that desire by rooting the conception of Jesus in the depictions of 
scripture that portray Jesus as refraining from acts of physical violence, or as counselling his disciples 
to refrain from acts of physical violence. The normative, and desired, conception, as Hays has voiced 
so adroitly, is that the non-violent witness of the New Testament “is powerful, virtually univocal, and 
integrally related to the central moral vision of the New Testament texts."126 The responsive argument 
that is in want, then, is not one that highlights that acceptance of physical violence is present in the 
text’s presentation of the life and teachings of Jesus. Rather, the needed argument is one that 
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interrogates the conception of the non-violence of Jesus and of the text. For these reasons my choice 
of texts are those that are normatively read as evidence of Jesus’s non-violence. 
2.3.1. Jesus’s Life: The Sermon on the Mount 
The passage reviewed is found in Matthew’s Gospel (5:38-40) and describes the period of 
Jesus’s ministry during his lifetime on earth. The narrative depicts Jesus teaching on a mountainside 
during the day to a crowd that includes his disciples. 
2.3.1.1. Text 
Matt 5:38-40: 
38 “You have heard that it was said, ‘An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.’ 39 But I say to 
you, Do not resist an evildoer. But if anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn the other also; 40 and 
if anyone wants to sue you and take your coat, give your cloak as well; 
2.3.1.2. Historical-Critical Exegesis of the Gospel of Matthew 
Matthew is the first book of the New Testament, and the first recorded Gospel account. The 
Gospel is written in the form of historical narrative.127 This portion of the exegesis will undertake a 
historical-critical analysis of the text, before engaging in narrative criticism and ending with 
ideological criticism. 
2.3.1.2.1. Source and Dating 
Stories of Jesus were retold orally before being written as letters.128 Matthew is generally 
understood to have used two sources in the composition of his Gospel, Mark and Q.129 Keener states 
that the sources on which Matthew relies preserve a “substantially reliable picture of Jesus;” that the 
tradition transmitted events carefully, with relative stability, and “quite close in time to the events 
described.” Matthew was produced after the Jewish War, the destruction of the Temple and the break 
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with Judaism.130 This dates the book to 85-90 CE.131 Q is dated to the 40s, which is within two decades 
of Gospel events, thus Keener’s assumption of a high degree of reliability.132 
2.3.1.2.2. Authorship and Redaction 
Early church tradition names the apostle Matthew as the author. However, this is disputed.133 
Because of the similarities of language between this Gospel and Jewish-Christian linguistic features,134 
as well as the author’s understanding of the law and use of the Old Testament,135 it is likely that, 
whoever the author was, the author was a Jewish-Christian.  Matthew writes as a Jewish-Christian 
critiquing other Jews, but not with anti-Jewish sentiment.136 Kenner’s redaction criticism137 notes, as 
well, that Matthew has emphasized the Jewishness of the Jesus presented in Mark’s text.138  
2.3.1.2.3. Reception 
The author of Matthew wrote to a community that was likely urban and made up of Jews and 
Greeks,139 though the community cannot be located with certainty.140 Matthew’s Gospel alone refers 
to the ekklēsia,141 by which he indicates a group of like-minded people who were an intra-Jewish 
groups, distinct from Gentiles, and also from other groups.  Hagner adds, that Matthew was written to 
help new followers understand their faith as being in continuity with the faith of their ancestors.142 It 
is generally agreed that the audience was primarily Jewish-Christian. Matthew’s ekklesia, regarded 
Jesus as central to their faith and actions. 143  Though the Gospel is primarily written to Jewish-
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Christians, Luz and Keener agree that the Gentile Mission was central to Matthew’s Gospel. Matthew 
portrays Jesus as the supreme teacher who directs his disciples to propagate widely. 
Overall, the purpose of Matthew’s Gospel is to communicate “the fulfillment of Israel’s 
messianic expectations in Jesus Christ, the superiority of the Gospel to the religion of the Torah…and 
the constitution of a new community of salvation of both Jews and non-Jews, so as to establish all 
believers in Christ in the church of Jesus Christ.”144  
Finally, Luz notes that action is key to this Gospel. “[T]he community is exhorted to 
perseverance, to faithfulness, to practice, to courageous faith.”145 This message is aptly spoken to a 
community that had broken, and been excluded from the Jewish community, and was attempting to 
create a new blended community of Jews and Gentiles.146 
2.3.1.3. Literary and Social Scientific Analysis 
2.3.1.3.1. Retribution Teaching 
In the expanded passage of the Sermon, Jesus warns against legal retribution. Keener, who is 
concerned with the rhetoric of the passage, establishes that “Jesus is speaking the language of rhetorical 
overstatement,”147 not making literal recommendations. Notably, Matthew does not provide a rationale 
for the teachings of Jesus in the Sermon. “Any hint which could explain these demands as prudent and 
reasonable is missing.”148 This supports the view that the saying is hyperbole. Understanding the 
language as hyperbole, rather than as literal prudent and reasonable instruction, then explains Luz’s 
conclusion about this passage. “There is conscious provocation here; shocking symbolic protest against 
the regular rule of force.”149  
Commanding a higher standard of justice than an eye for an eye, Keener notes that Jesus was 
not critiquing contemporary Jewish standards of retributive justice,150 which would have reflected an 
equalizing of the punishment and the crime.  The Jewish Gospel writer of Matthew would have been 
familiar with the ample rabbinic teachings of the time that concerned not seeking retribution.151 It is 
clear that because there were Israelite laws that were meant to serve as deterrents to illicit behaviour 
(cf. Deut 19:20; 21:21), and meant to provide benefit for an injured person (e.g., Ex. 21:19, 26-27), 
the lex talionis (e.g., “an eye for an eye”) regulations, which did neither, were meant primarily to 
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avenge a person’s honour, “vindicating the person by punishing the assailant.”152 In the Sermon, then, 
Jesus was not advocating that one should not seek justice, rather that one should not seek vindication 
of their honour. He taught that honour from the outside community did not need to be sought preserved. 
This teaching is reiterated in the instruction about turning the other check. 
 “A backhanded blow to the check…was an insult, the severest public affront to a person’s 
dignity.”153 Matthew adds “right” cheek, which is absent from Luke’s parallel of this teaching. Malina 
notes that signifying the “right” is an implicit reference to Hebrew tradition that connects the “right” 
appendage to honor. E.g., 1 Sam 11:2: “But Nahash the Ammonite said to them, “On this condition I 
will make a treaty with you, namely that I gouge out everyone’s right eye, and thus put disgrace upon 
all Israel.” The context is the besieging of the territory of Jabesh-Gilead by an Ammonite ruler whose 
terms of peace were complete humiliation via disfigurement.154  
Jesus taught that the insult to dignity should not be retaliated against (gone to law against), but 
that dignity might be demonstrated by offering to further accommodate the offender.155 Jesus was 
advocating a self-respect grounded in one’s status before God so that the aggreived party “can dispense 
with human honour.”156 For the Gospel writer, the person is to seek that God be honoured and that 
God honour them, rather than the honour that comes from the larger community.157 
2.3.1.3.2. Jesus’s Conduct as Exemplary 
Davies and Allison point out the Gospel writer’s depiction of congruence between Jesus’s 
words in the sermon and Jesus’s deeds in life, which establish that Jesus was an exemplar of his 
teachings. The Sermon refers to slapping, nakedness, and being requisitioned by Romans, and later in 
Matthew’s Gospel, Jesus was slapped (26:67), his clothes were taken (27:28,35), and his cross was 
carried by someone requisitioned by order of Roman soldiers (27:32).158 
Further, in using instances of turning the other cheek, giving the outer coat, and walking the 
extra mile indicated, Matthew’s Jesus is instructing the disciples that there should be radical action in 
response to the one who seeks to abuse. Luz declares that these ethics are not a statement of specific 
rules, but of the need for radical specificity of action in daily life that is required in obedience to God.159 
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“Matthew does not define what the definitive way is for the situation of each community and every 
Christian, and especially not how far one is to go on that way. He only says: as far as possible, in any 
case further than the scribes and Pharisees (5:20).”160 Schnackenburg notes that Matthew “is thinking 
especially of life in the community…and its conduct in a situation of persecution.161  
2.3.1.4. Ideological and Social Scientific Criticism 
Based upon the scholarship reviewed, and the contextual concern for honour/shame in the 
ancient Roman-Palestinian context, and also based upon a reading of the text that privileges the 
experiences of the those living under conditions of oppression and exclusion, who subordinated and 
dominated by those with social, political, and imperial power, it can be concluded that the 
“nonresistance” that is regularly connected to this passage does not accurately reflect the passage’s 
meaning. This is not a passage that is meant to be taken literally and that instructs hearers to invite or 
to accept additional abuse of themselves. Rather, the Gospel writer uses the language of rhetoric, and 
Jesus’s words are spoken in hyperbole to depict Jesus making a shocking, even scandalous, suggestion. 
The shock and scandal are not the result of the extreme acts named. The acts named, turning the other 
cheek, giving the outer cloak, walking the extra mail, are not named as literal recommendations of acts 
to be performed by Jesus’s hearers. Rather the acts are a randomized naming of acts, that foreshadow 
acts that Matthew’s audience will later b shown were experienced by Jesus. The choice of acts that the 
gospel writer tells us that Jesus advises, correlate to the acts that Matthew tells us of Jesus’s own 
humiliation and death. Matthew reminds his hearers that Jesus, the Lord, was struck, stripped naked, 
and had someone requisitioned by Roman soldiers participate in his crucifixion. Matthew looks back 
at Jesus, to draw examples for his contemporary hearers, to (re)aquaint them with Jesus’s passion 
ordeal. Matthew’s hearers are shown that they can allow outward humiliations and entanglements such 
as being slapped, stripped, and requisitioned because these things happened to the Lord. Neither Jesus, 
nor the requisitioned cross-bearer, were diminished by their perpetrators. Ultimately, both were 
vindicated by God. Matthew is communicating that, in the same way, his hearers do not have to be 
diminished by their perpetrators. Their honour and vindication will come from God. 
Additionally, Jesus is not simply raising the standard of social interaction above the lex talionis 
standard. What Jesus teaches is not a raising of the bar, since the Jewish bar was already raised. Jesus 
is shifting the paradigm. First, the emphasis of the text is htat the audience not seek dignity/honour 
from the community, but from God. Second, the naming of specific actions is meant to indicate that 
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the radical stance that Jesus advocates is a stance that requires specific action in everyday life, not 
mere intellectual affirmation. Jesus is advocating that his ethics requires that one do things, take action, 
perform deeds. Along with this teaching, Jesus advocates not that retribution be forsaken and suffering 
embraced, but that the honour that is besmirched or degraded or lost by public humiliations not be not-
resisted. In other words, though honour comes from God, dishonour by the larger community should 
be resisted. Ultimately, one’s dignity is not a matter of social consensus, nor is the level of honour 
which one is due. One’s dignity is a matter of self-assertion, and self-actualization based upon the fact 
of being beloved members of th household of God. Jesus’s teaching is essentially: “If someone engages 
in wrongdoing to humiliate you, let them, but refuse to be humiliated by anything that anyone does to 
you. Instead, respond by taking an action that demonstrates that your dignity and self-worth is not 
determined by them, but by you; your honour comes fromGod. Respond by taking an action that 
demonstrates that your dignity and self-worth are not deterined by the offenders, but by God’s conferral 
of honour upon you.” 
 This teaching is consistent with the early Christian community’s strategy, discussed above, for 
managing the honor/shame culture. First, the illegitimacy of the out-group’s opinion of honour is 
asserted by the gospel writer. Next, by pointing to Jesus and the experiences of the cross the audience 
is meant to equate their experiences of dishonour in the larger community to Jesus’s, and likewise to 
view themselves, like Jesus, as those upon whom honour is actually conferred. Finally, by pointing to 
Jesus’s passion as an example, the Gospel writer was lifting up Jesus’s behavior as a behavioral model 
to follow. The stress on the opinion of God is the strategy that was emoloyed by the gospel writer in 
this passage. 
2.3.1.5. Conclusions from Exegesis of Sermon on the Mount Text 
In light of the foregoing, to rely upon this passage in Jesus’s Sermon on the Mount as a 
foundation for modern non-violence ideology, is to misread the text. Jesus is not making a radical 
claim about non-violence; Jesus is making a radical claim about (dis)honour, dignity and self-respect. 
The goal is for the Gospel’s audience to de-legitimize the culture’s power to determine their honour 
and dignity, or their dishoniour and shame. Matthew uses the examples of turning the other cheek, 
giving an outer cloak, and going the second mile, in order to draw a parallel between humiliations 
Jesus suffered, without a loss a dignity, and those that his hearers could also embrace without fearing 
a loss of honour or dignity. 
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2.3.2. Jesus’s Life/Death: The Arrest  
The second passage, which portrays Jesus’s arrest in the Garden of Gethsemane, reveals similar 
emphases. 
2.3.2.1. Text 
Matt 26:47-54 
47 While he was still speaking, Judas, one of the twelve, arrived; with him was a large crowd 
with swords and clubs, from the chief priests and the elders of the people. 48 Now the betrayer had 
given them a sign, saying, “The one I will kiss is the man; arrest him.” 49 At once he came up to Jesus 
and said, “Greetings, Rabbi!” and kissed him. 50 Jesus said to him, “Friend, do what you are here to 
do.” Then they came and laid hands on Jesus and arrested him. 51 Suddenly, one of those with Jesus 
put his hand on his sword, drew it, and struck the slave of the high priest, cutting off his ear. 52 Then 
Jesus said to him, “Put your sword back into its place; for all who take the sword will perish by the 
sword. 53 Do you think that I cannot appeal to my Father, and he will at once send me more than twelve 
legions of angels? 54 But how then would the scriptures be fulfilled, which say it must happen in this 
way?” 
2.3.2.2. Historical-Critical Exegesis 
See discussion of this topic under the previous section (2.3.1.2), in the section related to Jesus’s 
Life and the Sermon on the Mount. Included is discussion of the source, dating, authorship, redaction, 
reception, and purpose of the Gospel of Matthew. 
As to Redaction of the subject passage (26:47-54), all three Synoptics, and John, contain a 
version of the sword incident in the Garden of Gethsemane.162 However, in Matthew’s version alone 
does Jesus use language about calling a legion of angels. Thus, this language has special significance 
to the gospel writer. 
2.3.2.3. Narrative Criticism 
The structure of the periscope is as follows: 
• Arrival of troops, encounter and words with Judas, Jesus arrested (vv.47-50) 
• Drawing of sword, Jesus’s reaction (vv. 51-54) 
• Jesus’s words to the crowd and the flight of the disciples (vv. 55-56)163 
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This structure is roughly followed in all three synoptic gospels. It is slightly varied in John’s 
Gospel.164  
In the first movement of the structure, the troops arrive. Evans provides the background that 
the high priests routinely sent armed brigades to do their bidding.165 The swords and clubs of the troops 
indicate that they “expected a fight from Jesus’s followers.”166  
It is notable that, following the arrival of the troops, and the greeting of Judas, Jesus’s reply 
precedes the arrest. His reply is rendered variously as “why have you come?” (HCSB), “do what you 
came for” (NIV), “do what you are here to do” (NRSV), etc.167 Bruner concludes that this greeting 
triggers the arrest; that it reflects the authority of Jesus in the text, which is a central theme in 
Matthew’s gospel.168 Evans agrees that Matthew shows that Jesus is in control, “even ordering Judas 
to carry out his preordained betrayal.”169 Davies and Allison comment, “[o]ne has the impression…that 
Jesus is really the one in charge.”170 France also concludes that the arrest marks a point in the narrative 
where Jesus begins to be depicted as taking the initiative until his death.171  
In the second movement of the Gospel, it is noted that the sword-bearer was “with” Jesus (v. 
51).172 It may be concluded from this “that Jesus did have armed followers.”173 After the sword is 
wielded, it is curious that this Gospel does not reflect that Jesus healed the wounded man. Instead, 
Jesus admonishes the sword-bearer to desist. Matthew’s language is unique, here.174 Only Matthew 
contains the three sentences that make up vv. 52-54:175 
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• Put away your sword; for all who take the sword will perish by the sword.  
• Do you think that I cannot appeal to my Father, and he will at once send me more than 
twelve legions of angels?  
• But how then would the scriptures be fulfilled, which say it must happen in this way?” 
As Bruner points out, Jesus’s words are not “throw your sword away,” or “have nothing to do 
with the sword.” This seems to evidence that Jesus accepted that there was a place for the sword.176 
Davies and Allison point out that verse 52’s “Put away your sword” (Ἀπόστρεψον τὴν μάχαιράν), use 
of Ἀπόστρεψον recalls the Sermon on the Mount. Matthew uses the word for “put away,” or “return” 
only in the garden scene and in the Sermon (5:42) (“[give to everyone…and] you shall not turn away 
from/refuse (μὴ ἀποστραφῇς) [anyone who wants to borrow from you…]”).177 Thus, the Gospel writer 
uses this passage likely to refer back to the Sermon on the Mount.  
Evans elucidates that Matthew’s inclusion of the first sentence of Jesus’s second statement in 
these verses, is an Aramaic paraphrase that implicitly references Jewish tradition. 
Isa 50:11: “Behold, all you who kindle a fire, who grasp a sword! Go, 
fall in the fire, which you kindled, and on the sword, which you 
grasped!” (italics indicate departures from or additions to the 
Hebrew)…On the phrase “put . . . sword back into its place,” see 
Joseph and Aseneth 29:4, where Levi prevents Benjamin from slaying 
the wounded son of Pharaoh: “And now, put your sword back into its 
place, and come, help me, and we will heal him of his wound. . . .”178 
The Jewish tradition is strikingly similar to the phrasing in Matthew and portrays use of the sword in 
a negative way.  
Evans relays that Jewish tradition is the background of the second sentence of Jesus’s 
statement, regarding calling upon angels, as well. “In Judaism and Christianity of late antiquity, angels 
were thought of as warriors, as well as messengers and worshipers of the Lord (cf. especially 1QM 
7:6; 13:10).”179 Others have concluded about Jesus’s statement about his ability to call upon angels, 
that it is meant by Matthew to convey guidance and reinforcement to the persecuted community of 
hearers.180 It also reminded the Matthean audience of God’s plan and purpose, both for Jesus and for 
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themselves.181 That Jesus could call upon twelve legions of angels, speaks to Jesus’s power and 
authority,182 and, thus, the honour that he possessed. 
From the third sentence of Jesus’s statement in verses 52-54, Davies and Allison read the 
fulfilment of mission and Jesus’s agency as key. “Jesus’s will is God’s will. His fate is his choice, he 
can call angels but chooses not to…twelve disciples or twelve legions of angels make no difference, 
scripture must be fulfilled.”183  
2.3.2.4. Ideological and Social Scientific Criticism 
That Jesus was arrested and did not allow the use of the sword during his arrest is clear from 
this passage. His refusal of use of the sword in Matthew’s narrative is consistent with how he is 
portrayed as responding in the other Gospels that record the sword incident. What becomes clear is 
that Jesus is not renouncing all manner of violence. First, his companions wear swords and he does not 
admonish them for bearing weapons. Second, though Jesus tells his companion not to use the sword, 
he acknowledges the use of weapons of the crowd that has come to arrest him. Though not a part of 
our pericope, the third movement of the entire passage shows Jesus asking, “Have you come out with 
swords and clubs to arrest me as though I were a bandit?” (v.55) This question implies that the use of 
weapons to approach an unarmed teacher is not required; however, it could be required to arrest an 
outlaw. Finally, Jesus’s remarks about calling twelve legions of angels indicate his underlying 
acceptance of the idea of armies and battle. Though Jesus does not believe that angelic intervention 
should occur in this situation, his statement would be disingenuous and misleading if Jesus did not 
believe that in some situations, legions could be employed to engage in battle on behalf of those who 
call upon them.  
Rather than an emphasis on condemnation of physical violence, what is more intently featured 
in this passage is that Jesus is in control of the maltreatment that is about to befall him, and that what 
is about to befall Jesus is a part of God’s plan. Jesus exercises control in the garden by becoming the 
initiator, a posture that he will maintain until the end. He speaks to his betrayer, “Do what you came 
to do.” He confronts the crowds that have seized him, “Why are you coming at me with weapons?” He 
even tells them that everything that is happening is not because of their control of this situation, but 
“so that the scriptures of the prophets may be fulfilled.” (v.56) Later, he answers accusations before 
the Sanhedrin in a way that leads the high priest to tear his robes. (v. 65) When Jesus is before the 
                                               
 
181 Davies, p. 214. 
182 Allison and Davies, p. 487. 
183 Allison and Davies, p. 486-87. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
46 
governor, he refuses to answer at all or respond to his vehement accusers, “so that the governor was 
greatly amazed.” (27:14) Throughout his crucifixion Jesus depicted as not yielding to the pressure to 
emotionally crumble. He maintains his composure, which is a disposition that brings honour. The 
garden arrest is where the beginning of Jesus’s resistant demeanor occurs, at the moment when he is 
to be persecuted. His refusal of the use of the sword is a means of Jesus controlling the master-narrative 
of events, while surrendering control in the immediate situation. 
Jesus is resolute in his acquiescence to the powers, because of his commitment to the plan of 
God. Twice, after the action of arrest is underway, when Jesus speaks, he references the fulfilment of 
scripture. “But how then would the scriptures be fulfilled, which say it must happen in this way?” (v. 
54), he asks the sword-wielder. “But all this has taken place, so that the scriptures of the prophets may 
be fulfilled,” (v. 56) he informs the crowd. Jesus grounds the persecution that is to come in the plan 
and greater purpose of God. 
Finally, though the inclusion of the sword incident in this passage is not about the use of 
physical violence, Matthew does include the incident and makes special effort to portray Jesus verbally 
responding to the incident. The conclusion that may be drawn from Matthw’s depiction of the scene, 
which includes Jesus’s verbal response, is that Matthew is implicitly connecting Jesus during the sword 
incident with the Jewish tradition. As has been noted, the words of the central verse that is typically 
used to support arguments in favour of non-violence, “all who take the sword will perish by the sword,” 
has an intertextual reference to Isaiah 50:11. This verse represents reference to a larger passage that 
offers significant insight into Matthew’s intention in including in the narrative the statements Jesus 
makes during the sword incident. 
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to exegete Isaiah 50, however a cursory examination 
of the text reveals that it contains at its core, six verses that relate to the “humiliation,” of the servant 
of God, and to the servant’s resolute faith in God’s vindication in the face of the humiliation. This 
familiar section of scripture reads as follows: 
4 The Lord God has given me the tongue of a teacher, that I may know 
how to sustain the weary with a word. Morning by morning he 
wakens—wakens my ear to listen as those who are taught. 5 The Lord 
God has opened my ear, and I was not rebellious, I did not turn 
backward. 6 I gave my back to those who struck me, and my cheeks to 
those who pulled out the beard; I did not hide my face from insult and 
spitting. 7 The Lord God helps me; therefore I have not been 
disgraced; therefore I have set my face like flint, and I know that I 
shall not be put to shame; 8 he who vindicates me is near. Who will 
contend with me? Let us stand up together. Who are my adversaries? 
Let them confront me. 9 It is the Lord God who helps me; who will 
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declare me guilty? All of them will wear out like a garment; the moth 
will eat them up. (Isa. 50: 4-9) 
This passage from Isaiah has direct resonance with the tortures endured by Jesus. So much so 
that it has been connected to the suffering servant passage of Isaiah 53. In this passage the writer 
proclaims that he allowed his back to be struck, he offered his face/cheeks for defacement, and he 
presented himself to be insulted and spat upon. In other words, he allowed grievous actsof dishonour 
to be enacted against himself. Despite all this, the servant says, he “ha[s] not been disgraced.” (v. 7) 
The servant’s face was set “like flint” and the servant would “not be put to shame” (v. 7). The servant 
was convinced that “the Lord God who helps me” (v. 9) was their vindication (v. 8). The servant 
demands to be allowed to face his/her adversaries; demands to confront the accusers (v. 8). Further, 
because vindication, and honour, come from the Lord, the servant ca discount the opinion of the public 
that judges the servant to be dishonoured (“who will declare me guilty [dishonoured]” (v. 9)) The 
public that judges the servant are who will come to be destroyed, presumably by the servant’s 
vindicator, God ( “[they] will wear out like a garment; the moth will eat them up.” (v. 9)). 
In the Isaiah passage we see that the servant shows inner fortitude in the face of (especially 
physically violent) humiliation. The Matthean author wants the audience to connect Jesus’s arrest in 
the Garden of Gethsemane with the willingness to allow seeign dishonour to be shown. Jesus (and the 
servant in Isaiah) though seemingly dishonoured by having his back struck, his beard plucked, and his 
body spat upon, was vindicated; not dishonoured but honoured by God. Jesus, then, is portrayed as 
prescribing the resistance of claimed dignity and self-respect, rooted in trust in God’s vindication. This 
is the same message of the Sermon on the Mount, which the Gospel writer also alludes to in the same 
line of the statement of Jesus that alludes to the passage in Isaiah. 
2.3.2.5. Conclusions from Exegesis of Arrest Text 
To rely upon the passage that describes Jesus’s refusal of the use of the sword during his arrest 
as a foundation for modern “non-violence” ideology, is to misapply the message of the text. Jesus is 
not making a claim about non-violence, and the use of physical force. Rather, he is making a claim 
about his power to choose to yield to the powers that are against him, and a statement about his trust 
in and commitment to the plan of God. Matthew draws special attention to the sword event, using 
language cues, as a way of connecting the passage to Isaiah 50, with its message of seeming 
humiliation, fortitude, trust in God’s vindication, and God;’s ultimate bestowal of honour. As in the 
analysis of the Sermon passage, the gospel writer is portraying Jesus as an advocate of an inner self-
respect that acts to convert public humiliation into occassions to publicly assert God’s honour of the 
person. The emphasis is, again, that the ostracized Christian community use a self-reference, and a 
God-reference, rather than the opinion of the larger culture, to secure their dignity and honour. 
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As in the Sermon on the Mount passage, this treatment is consistent with the early Christian 
community’s strategy for managing the honour/shame culture of the first century Roman-Palestine. 
There is reframing of the out-group’s opinion of honour as illegetimate. Then there is stress on the 
opinion of God as the arbiter of what brings honour, and depiction of the seemingly dishonoured as 
actually those who are honoured. Finally, by pointing to Jesus’s actions that show him taking the 
intiative, exhibiting fortitude and dignified conduct in the persecution, Jesus is meant t be an example 
of honourable conduct as a model for the Christian community to emulate. 
 
2.3.3. Jesus’s Death: The Crucifixion 
The passages exegeted in Luke’s Gospel (23:34) depicts Jesus being crucified on the cross at 
Golgotha.  
2.3.3.1. Text 
LUKE 23:34 
3 When they came to the place that is called The Skull, they crucified Jesus there with the 
criminals, one on his right and one on his left. [[34 Then Jesus said, “Father, forgive them; for they do 
not know what they are doing.”]] And they cast lots to divide his clothing. 
2.3.3.2. Historical-Critical Exegesis of the Gospel of Luke 
Luke is the third book of the New Testament, and the third recorded gospel account. The Gospel 
is written in the form of historical narrative.184 Luke-Acts occupies fully one quarter of the NT canon 
and has been a pivotal source of Christian history and theology.185 The two books can be read together 
as a single literary work (in a literary-critical approach to the text). 
2.3.3.2.1. Source and Dating 
The Lukan author makes clear that the reading offered is not the first attempt that has been 
made to construct an account of Jesus’s life and impact. (Luke 1:1-4) Scholars generally agree that the 
author of the Lukan Gospel knew of the other documents that recorded Jesus’s life and teachings and 
relied upon earlier compositions in constructing the Lukan Gospel; that that there was particular 
reliance upon Mark.186 There is also a “double tradition” hypothesis, that holds that Luke relied upon 
Matthew as well as the Marcan document. However, this theory has been deemed problematic and 
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unlikely.187 The double tradition theory has not gained widespread support.188 A minor stream of 
scholarship argues a “Proto-Luke” hypothesis.189 This hypothesis asserts that Luke used “Q” and “L” 
sources to produce a “Proto-Luke” text, which comprised a full gospel narrative. This proto-Luke later 
incorporated Marcan material. This diverges from views that postulate that Mark’s Gospel was first, 
and underwent Lucan additions and redactions.190 What is not contested is that the Gospel of Luke 
derives from two principal sources. As Danker says, “evidence points to a [second] written source,” 
and not just oral tradition.191 
The book of Acts, which is a joint composition with Luke, ends in the early sixties, rather 
abruptly, leading to the suspicion that it ended before Paul’s death in 64 CE.192 Yet that would be an 
early dating that is unlikely.193 The reference in Luke to the temple’s “abandonment” (13:35) and to 
“Jerusalem surrounded by camps” (21:20) suggests a reference to the destruction of the temple 
(28:54).194 However, Robinson,195 argues that the absence of any explicit mention of the temple’s 
destruction in any of the Gospels argues for their dating earlier than 70 CE. Yet, because it appears 
that the references to the temple’s destruction are subtly included, and not omitted, Fitzmeyer 
concludes that the dating must be post-war.  Danker agrees that the neither absence of mention of the 
destruction of the temple nor the absence of mention of Paul’s death in the book of Acts are sufficient 
reasons for an early dating. Both are explainable. He argues that it was tact that led Luke to omit the 
temple’s demise, and that Paul’s death was irrelevant to the narrative purpose and unnecessary to 
discuss.196 Hagner states that the apologetic tone of the Gospel makes it likely that it was written during 
a time of persecution, such as during the first Jewish Revolt of 66-74 CE. “It was above all such times 
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that made it important to stress that the Christian faith was no threat to the Roman Empire.”197 Dating, 
then is likely during the mid first century. 
2.3.3.2.2. Authorship and Redaction 
The author states that he is not an eyewitness to the events that are described but that he depends 
on those who are. (1:2) The author’s writing reveals that he is educated and acquainted with Old 
Testament and Hellenistic literary traditions.198 Church tradition199 holds that the author was not an 
apostle, which, considering the significance of not associating the Gospel with an apostle for the 
earliest Christians, is a fact in favour or accepting that truth of that identity.200 Though it is generally 
accepted by scholars that the author of Luke also authored the book of Acts,201 which describe in detail 
the life and journeys of Paul, the evidence supporting the author’s identity as Paul’s reputed physician 
is weak.202 Luke’s ethnicity is not clear, however there is consensus that Luke was a Gentile.203 The 
author is interested in relating the Jesus-tradition to the biblical history of Israel, showing that Jesus-
followers have the same legitimacy as Judaism itself within the Roman empire.204 In Acts the writer 
refers to the Jesus-followers as a party (24:5, 14) and sect (28:22). By doing so he is showing that there 
is connection and continuity between Judaism and Jewish and Gentile Christianity. 
The text to be exegeted appears in Luke’s gospel, and no other Gospel account. It appears to 
derive from oral tradition. Significantly, Luke 23:34 is a verse that is missing from important early 
manuscripts of Luke’s Gospel.205 This raises the question as to whether this verse was originally 
included and later omitted, or whether it was a later addition.206 It is generally acknowledged not to be 
a part of the original text,207 as the textual evidence is against its inclusion as original.208 It might be 
patterned on Stephen’s prayer in Acts (7:60), or Stephen’s prayer might be patterned on this prayer.209 
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Danker notes that the omission of this verse was considered by some as intentional, since the 
destruction of Jerusalem was deemed judgment for the crucifixion.210 Such a judgment, Edwards notes, 
would mean that Jesus’s prayer for forgiveness was not answered.211 However, Ellis notes that Jesus’s 
death provided the answer to his prayer as his death brings forgiveness of sin, according to Acts 2:38.212 
The prayer was also deemed as contrary to Jesus’s predictions for judgment awaiting Jerusalem (13:34-
35, 19:41-44, 20:16, 21:20-24, 23:27-33).213  
However, as Edwards remarks, the fact that the prayer exists, argues for its authenticity as a 
saying of Jesus, since “who but Jesus would pray for the forgiveness of those mocking and crucifying 
him?” 214  Plummer notes that despite the uncertainty of its original inclusion, the prayer, “has 
exceptional claims to be permanently retained, with the necessary safeguards in its accustomed 
place.”215  
Amplifying this is Johnson who gives multiple reasons for why this verse should be retained 
in the Gospel. He argues that it confirms the image of Jesus as representing virtue even unto his death; 
it matches Luke’s version of the Lord’s prayer (11:4 “And forgive us our sins, for we ourselves forgive 
everyone indebted to us.”); and it fits Luke’s narrative preference, which is to feature the prophet being 
rejected out of ignorance (Acts 3:17, 7:25, 13:27).216 Danker agrees, saying that the utterance on the 
cross anticipates the “ignorance motif” that will appear later in the book of Acts.217  
Fitzmeyer also notes that the prayer fits Luke’s pattern of showing Jesus at prayer regularly, 
particularly at pivotal moments of the narrative. (e.g., baptism (3:12), choosing the twelve (6:12), 
before Peter’s confession and the first announcement of the passion (9:18), at his transfiguration (9:28), 
before he teaches the “Our Father” prayer (11:2), at the Last Supper (to strengthen Peter’s faith) 
(22:32), during his agony on the Mount of Olives (22:41), and on the cross itself (23:46). Jesus, thus, 
modelling the life of prayer that the disciples should follow.218 
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2.3.3.2.3. Reception 
Johnson states, “everything about Luke’s narrative confirms that it was directed to Gentile 
Christians.”219 The “everything” mentioned by Johnson is spelled out by Fitzmeyer and includes, the 
fact that Luke communicates in the Greco-Roman literary style, his dedication is to a person with a 
Greek name, and his eagerness to connect the salvation promised to the Jews to Gentiles. Also, Luke 
eliminates as unnecessary much of the material in Mark or Q sources that is of Jewish concern.220 
“If there is a main purpose of Luke-Acts, however, it has to be the obvious one of telling the 
story of Jesus and the birth of the church,”221 as is noted in the prologue to the Gospel (1:3-4).  Luke’s 
favourable treatment of Romans and Gentiles, as well as the books deferential tone, suggests that Luke 
wrote “an apology” for the early church, and was attempting to portray the Christians as nonthreatening 
to the empire.222 Further, there is a question of whether theodicy was at stake in the writing of the 
Gospel. Did God forsake God’s promise to the Jews, since the Jews rejected the Gospel and it was 
taking root among Gentiles? Luke, thinks Johnson, seeks to defend the work and faithfulness of God 
in history. Luke makes God’s faithfulness to Israel, before the Gospel penetration to the Gentiles, 
significant to his narrative. 
2.3.3.3. Narrative Criticism 
2.3.3.3.1. Structure 
Luke divides the scene on the cross into two units. First, the unit with vv.33-38 “records the 
continued mocking of Jesus.”223 It parallels the accounts in Matthew and Mark. The second unit of the 
scene on the cross relates to the Jesus’s exchange with the thief and is only found in Luke, it 
encompasses vv. 39-43.224 
Luke highlights the rejection of Jesus in the first unit, by allowing his verses to implicitly 
reference passages related to rejection from the Old Testament.225 Per Parsons the correspondence is 
as follows (see, Table 2-1): 
  
                                               
 
219 Johnson, Gospel of Luke, 3:9. 
220 Fitzmeyer, The Gospel According to Luke I-IX, 28:58. 
221 Hagner, The New Testament, 244. 
222 Johnson, Gospel of Luke, 3:8, and Hagner, The New Testament, 244. 
223 Mikeal C. Parsons, Luke (Paideia: Commentaries on the New Testament), Commentaries on the New Testament 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2015), 336. 
224 This section will not be discussed in the exegesis as it exceeds the scope of the project. 
225 Parsons, Luke (Paideia), 336–37. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
53 
 
Table 2-1 Comparison of Jesus’s Arrest and OT Rejection Intertexts 
Luke 
Verse: 
 Fulfils  
OT 
Verse: 
 
v.33 When they came to the place that is 
called The Skull, they crucified 
Jesus there with the criminals, one 
on his right and one on his left. 
Isa. 53.12 Therefore, I will allot him a 
portion with the great, and he 
shall divide the spoil with the 
strong; because he poured out 
himself to death, and was 
numbered with the 
transgressors; yet he bore the 
sin of many, and made 
intercession for the 
transgressors. 
v.34 [Then Jesus said, “Father, forgive 
them; for they do not know what 
they are doing.”] And they cast lots 
to divide his clothing. 
Ps. 22:18 They divide up my garments 
among them, and for my 
clothing they cast goral (lots) 
v.35 And the people stood by, watching; 
but the leaders scoffed at him, 
saying, “He saved others; let him 
save himself if he is the Messiah of 
God, his chosen one!”  
Ps. 22:7 All who see me mock at me; 
they make mouths at me, they 
shake their heads; 
vv.36-
37 
The soldiers also mocked him, coming 
up and offering him sour wine, 
37 
and 
saying, “If you are the King of the 
Jews, save yourself!”  
Ps. 69.21 They gave me poison for 
food, and for my thirst they 
gave me vinegar to drink. 
 
Thus, in unit one, three different psalms are referenced that emphasize the theme of 
humiliation, mocking, and shame. 
Between both units, three groups of mockers are noted. Those who reject Jesus are listed in 
descending order of social status. First, the religious leaders scoff at Jesus (23:35), next the soldiers 
mock him (23:36), finally at the apex of his humiliation, Jesus is ridiculed by the bandit who hangs 
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beside him (23:39). Fitzmeyer notes that Luke makes a distinction between the crowd, which stands 
silently, and the threefold mockery.226 Johnson comments upon the division of groups that Luke 
includes as related to belief and unbelief. The leaders of the Jews mock Jesus, but the crowd remains 
silent and not mocking. The soldiers mock Jesus, and one soldier in the end realizes Jesus was 
righteous. One thief bandit Jesus, one bandit responds to Jesus in faith.227  
Noting that all three groups of mockers mention the word “save,” Fitzmeyer concludes that this 
indicates that there is salvific significance to Jesus’s crucifixion in Luke. Jesus is crucified as saviour. 
(24:26, 46; Acts 3:18, 17:3, 26.23).228 This coincides with Johnson’s observation that the three groups 
ascribe a title to Jesus. In mockery, the leaders question if Jesus is “God’s Messiah, the Chosen One,” 
(v.35) the soldiers refer to him as “King of the Jews,” (v.38) and the bandit referred to Jesus as “the 
Messiah.” (v.39) The reiteration of the titles supports the argument that Luke is making Jesus’s salvific 
identity significant to the scene. 
2.3.3.3.2. Themes 
2.3.3.3.2.1. Who and What is Forgiven 
Luke seems to adopt the view of the tradition that holds the Jews responsible for the death of 
Jesus.229 Plummer determines the forgiveness prayed for by Jesus to refer to the Jews, and not the 
Romans or Pilate, since the latter were bureaucrats simply doing what was expected. Plummer 
determines that the ignorance of the Jews mitigated their guilt.230 Edwards concludes that there was 
no actual ignorance; those who killed Jesus knew what they were doing. Nonetheless, the prayer should 
be understood as applying to “Sanhedrin, Antipas, Pilate, Jewish leaders, and others of ill 
will…intercession for all without distinction.”231 Fitzmeyer’s interpretation is similar - that application 
of Luke’s “ignorance motif” would suggest that the prayer applies to the Jews.232  
For Danker, the “what” referent is ambiguous by design. The persecutors know not that 
grouping Jesus with “malefactors” belies his identity as the “Great Benefactor.” 233  Plummer’s 
conclusion is more obvious, that Jesus was praying for forgiveness for the act of crucifixion 
orchestrated by the Jews, but not of for their sins generally.234 
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2.3.3.3.2.2. Ignorance 
An “ignorance motif” forms part of Luke’s theological emphasis, according to Ellis and 
others235 that though persecutors knew what they were doing, in practice they were unaware of the 
cosmic significance of their deeds.236  
Conzelmann provides a detailed explanation of the meaning of ignorance as it pertains to this 
verse.237 Because Jesus repeatedly told the Jewish elites of his identity, they did possess knowledge of 
who he was. However, because they did not believe him, they were not aware that they were killing 
the Messiah. They believed they were killing a false pretender. The resurrection, however, proved that 
Jesus was the Messiah, therefore denials can no longer be maintained. “[U]nbelief becomes 
inexcusable.”238 For Luke, ignorance is not an automatic excuse, but it is grounds for an excuse.239 
Ellis agrees that, “[i]gnorance does not mean a deficient mentality or a lack of information but 
a sinful moral state…It exists in unbelief.”240  He finds that, for early Christians, prior to being exposed 
to the reality of who Jesus is, one’s unbelief was excused. However, “persistent, or ‘fixed’ ignorance 
is a particularly damnable quality.”241 Here, as Fitzmeyer noted, because the Jewish and Gentile 
persecutors were ignorant that Jesus was indeed the Messiah, their ignorance is excused. 
2.3.3.3.2.3. Humiliation 
Jesus is portrayed by Luke as not threatening his executioners, nor cursing them as was typical 
of the condemned. He accepted his death “in the manner of a faithful witness.”242 Malina comments 
that this is the true victory of Jesus during the crucifixion.  
The true test of the victim, in the Mediterranean context, was not in the 
brutal pain itself, but rather in the endurance of pain and suffering, as a 
mark of andrēai, manly courage. Silence of the victim during torture 
proved his honour. And yet the loss of honour evidenced by the whole 
process and inability to defend one’s honour were deemed far worse 
than the physical pain involved.243 
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Parsons also comments that this passage is “portrayal of the extreme humiliation of Jesus.”244 
Edwards notes that the crucifixion was a part of “Rome’s terror apparatus, designed especially to 
punish criminals and quash slave rebellions in the most painful, protracted, and public manner possible 
as a warning against rebellion.”245 
That the Messiah could endure or be subjected to crucifixion was scandalous, “[a] stumbling 
block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles (1 Cor. 1:23).”246 The physical violence was not the source 
of the scandal, however. 
The Gospels quickly pass over the physical pain and torture of Jesus 
(“Good Friday” is a medieval Christian invention.). Rather, they focus 
on the various attempts to dishonour Jesus by spitting on him (Mark 
14:65/Matt 26:67…striking him in the face and head (Mark 14.65, 
Matt. 26:67, John 18:22, 19:3) ridiculing him (Mark 15:20, 31; Matt 
27:29, 31, 41; John 19:3), heaping insults upon him (Mark 15:32, 34; 
Matt 27:44), and treating him as though he were nothing (Luke 23:11; 
see Acts 4:11).247 
The multitude of ways that Jesus is shown to have been humiliated and degraded, not merely 
physically abused, makes it clear that Jesus’s humiliation and loss of honour is a key feature of the 
crucifixion. 
2.3.3.3.2.4. Love 
Jesus’s words from the cross are seen also as embodying Jesus’s teaching on love of enemies 
described in 6:27-28 and 11:2-4. His words are echoed in Stephen’s death prayer in Acts 7:59-60. 
Edwards regards the words of the passage as symbolic of Jesus’s work of peace and reconciliation.248 
Also, according to Johnson, it shows Jesus legitimating the proclamation of “repentance for 
forgiveness of sins” within which the apostolic mission was conceived (24:47, Acts 2:38, 5:31, 10:43, 
13:38, 26:18).249 
2.3.3.4. Ideological and Social Scientific Criticism of Specific Passage 
Though Luke 23:34 is unlikely to have been part of the original text, its consistency with the 
Lukan narrative and value to the tradition indicate that it is not inappropriate to include it in the canon 
of scripture. 
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If the verse is accepted, the customary contemporary meaning of what is accepted is that at the 
time that Jesus was crucified, he prayed for those who were his perpetrators, and asked that God show 
forgiveness to them for the deeds that they perpetrated against him. He does this because Jesus loves 
his enemies.  
The most significant addendum needed to the traditional reading of this passage, is that the 
passage does not emphasize the physical nature of the passion experience. While contemporary 
accounts emphasize the suffering and brutal torture of the experience, this emphasis is lacking from 
the Gospel accounts. Luke, in particular, could easily be read as deemphasizing the physicality of the 
crucifixion. Rather, the aspects of humiliation are prominent. 
After Jesus is arrested, the men holding Jesus are depicted as “mocking and beating” him 
(22:63). When Jesus is taken before the authorities, he is not physically assaulted. Pilate sends Jesus 
to Herod. Herod and his soldiers, “treated him with contempt and mocked him; then he put an elegant 
robe on him.” (23:11) Pilate, reluctant to crucify Jesus, suggests that Jesus simply be whipped (23:16), 
but his suggestion is rebuffed. He reasons further with the accusers and suggests again that Jesus be 
whipped (23:22), and is again rebuffed. Pilate then gives in to the demands of the people to have Jesus 
crucified. Jesus is never whipped in Luke’s account. As Jesus was led away to be crucified, Simon the 
Cyrenian is impressed “and they laid the cross on him and made him carry it behind Jesus.” (23:26) 
Thus, Jesus did not endure the burden of actually bearing the cross to the site of crucifixion.250 About 
the crucifixion Luke tells us only, “[w]hen they came to the place that is called The Skull, they crucified 
Jesus there with the criminals.” (23:33) He adds no details of the physical or procedural elements of 
the act of crucifixion. What Luke does provide, however, are the details of the degradation that Jesus 
endured. Luke tells us that “the leaders scoffed at him,” (23:35) and describes how; that the “soldiers 
also mocked him,” (23.36) and describes how; that one of the criminals “kept deriding him,” (23:39) 
and then describes how.  
Throughout the crucifixion process, Luke presents a composed and in control Jesus. As he 
walks to the site of the hanging, unencumbered by the cross, Jesus makes a long statement advising 
those mourning him to instead mourn for themselves.251 While he is on the cross, Luke’s Jesus makes 
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251 See, Luke 27:31: 
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three statements.252 First, there is his prayer of forgiveness for his accusers (23:34), second, Jesus gives 
assurance to the thief hanging beside him of entry to paradise (23:43), and third, Jesus commits his 
spirit to the Father (23:46). After yelling this last utterance, “he breathed his last.” (23:46) Luke does 
not even tell us that Jesus “died.” 
What we glean from this description is that the physical suffering of Jesus was not of central 
significance to Luke. What was key was that Jesus was utterly humiliated and disgraced and, as a 
consequence, abandoned--from his arrest, to his trial, to the point before he took his final breaths. 
During this entire ordeal, and suffering of degradation, Jesus retained his dignity and composure. He 
was in control of himself, even when his body was in the control of others. He could retain control 
because of his confidence in God.  
The redactions and language shifts in Luke support this reading. Mark uses the verb ἐβόησεν 
to describe Jesus’s final statement from the cross, which means, “to cry, i.e. speak, with a high, strong 
voice; to cry to one for help, implore his aid; to cry out as a manifestation of feeling; to cry out harshly, 
often of an inarticulate and brutish sound…especially a cry for help.”253 Luke, on the other hand, uses 
the milder term φωνήσας to describe Jesus’s final statement, which means, “to call, call to 
oneself…either by one's own voice, or through another; to send for, summon: with a genitive of the 
place, to call out of (i.e., bid one to quit a place and come to one).254 Luke is emphasizing Jesus’s lack 
of emotional turmoil. 
The most telling cue that we have of Luke’s intent to shift the focus from suffering to valour, 
however, is in the framing of the last words of Jesus as not within the experience of deep suffering. By 
silently deleting255 from Mark’s account Jesus’s cry of dereliction (“My God, my God, why have you 
forsaken me?”),256 Luke portrays Jesus’s last words as those of commitment of his spirit to God. This 
is, on its face, a less gloomy presentation of Jesus’s state of mind. Yet it also speaks to Luke’s shift 
away from the Old Testament reference alluded to by the utterance of forsakenness. The cry of 
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forsakenness alludes to Psalm 22:1.257 This psalm details the psalmist’s disgrace at great length, before 
turning to the psalmist’s trust that Lord will deliver the psalmist. Instead of making an allusion to 
profound humiliation, Luke’s Jesus commits his spirit, and in so doing alludes to Psalm 31:5 (30.6 
LXX)258 which is a psalm emphasizing deep trust in God’s redemption from shame and disgrace, 
rather than the humiliation itself, as in Psalm 22. Luke’s Jesus in the end, as he has been throughout 
his arrest, trial, and crucifixion, is confident and in command. 
When Jesus prays that his persecutors will be forgiven, therefore, his statement is not framed 
here as being rooted in love for his enemies. The statement is not about Jesus’s enemies. Rather, the 
prayer reveals Jesus to the reader. What is revealed is not merely that Jesus had a concern for others 
in his darkest hour of pain and torture. The text is not concerned with the pain and torture of the cross. 
What the prayer reveals of Jesus, instead, is Jesus’s sense of self, his sense of personal empowerment. 
Jesus prays for his persecutors, as an indication that he remains in control and is not diminished at all 
by the persecutors attempts to diminish him. 
2.3.3.5. Conclusions from Exegesis of Crucifixion Text 
The message of this passage, in which Jesus prays for forgiveness for his persecutors while he 
is on the cross, is not that Jesus loved and forgave his torturers. Rather, the point is that Jesus resisted 
the attempts of the powers to degrade him. He possessed such nobility of being that he could pray for 
those who sought to harm him. The gospel writer was conveying to a degraded group that, in like 
manner as Jesus, they are able to possess, display, and retain dignity. Despite the experiences they may 
endure of exclusion and persecution, they need not be diminished as persons. 
2.3.4. Jesus Resurrected: The Heavenly Vision 
The passage being exegeted (6:9-11) depicts a heavenly scene. Jesus is only indirectly depicted. 
The scene occurs following the revelation of “The Lion from the tribe of Judah, the Root of David” 
(5:5) who was “like a slaughtered lamb” (5:6) who had been victorious (5:5) and was now “worthy to 
take the scroll and to open its seals.” (5:9) Because of this prior identification, when the exegeted text 
begins with “When He opened the fifth seal,” the referent “He” is a clear reference to the “slaughtered 
lamb,” who represents the crucified and resurrected Jesus. 
2.3.4.1. Text 
Revelation 6: 9-11 
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9 When he opened the fifth seal, I saw under the altar the souls of those who had been 
slaughtered for the word of God and for the testimony they had given; 10 they cried out with a loud 
voice, “Sovereign Lord, holy and true, how long will it be before you judge and avenge our blood on 
the inhabitants of the earth?” 11 They were each given a white robe and told to rest a little longer, until 
the number would be complete both of their fellow servants and of their brothers and sisters, who were 
soon to be killed as they themselves had been killed. 
2.3.4.2. Historical-Critical Exegesis of Revelation 
Revelation is the 66th book of the bible, the final book of the New Testament. It is written in 
the form of a letter and employs apocalyptic (a unique genre) and prophetic genres of writing. 
2.3.4.2.1. Source and Dating 
Because this section of the text (6:9-11) parallels the Gospel accounts of the Olivet discourse, 
it seems clear that there was reliance upon the Gospels, particularly Luke, as the Seal judgments 
parallel closely the Woes provided by Luke. However, it is unclear as to whether there was use of 
Matthew and Mark as well, use of the source for Matthew and Mark, or if there was only reliance upon 
the oral tradition.259 Charles concludes that the text is dependent upon the Gospel accounts, and that 
the Seal judgments are derived from a “pre-existing eschatological scheme,”260 that existed outside of 
the Gospels. This scheme included the use of the number seven, and reliance upon Old Testament 
formulations of woes (such as Zech 1:8, 6:1-8).261 Charles argues however, that the author’s scheme 
takes on a new form, wherein the author connects the woes to actual historical events. Koester’s view 
is consistent with this, in that he finds the variations in the text make it more likely “that the author 
knew a tradition like that of the Gospels but did not rely directly on the Gospel texts.”262 Also the 
vision in Revelation is expanded to include horses and the kinds of cosmic signs found in the 
prophets.263 There is likely a shared oral tradition that is at the root of the eschatological tradition. 
Revelation is traditionally understood to have been written around 95 CE during the 
persecution, towards the end of Domitian’s reign.264 Koester concludes that the time of composition 
was around 80-100 CE. This dating is consistent with the traditional view. The book was likely written 
after the death of Nero in 68 CE and before the mid-second century, since it is noted by Justin Martyr 
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(c. 155-160), as well as Melito (c. 160-170), and probably also known by Papias (c. 130).265 Because 
of the external references to the work, it had to have been completed by the late first or early second 
century. This corresponds to the reign of Domitian (81-96). Thus, the dating is understood to be within 
that timeframe.266  
2.3.4.2.2. Authorship and Redaction 
Tradition holds that the vision was written by the apostle John. However, this authorship is 
contested.  Koester notes that historical studies suggest different streams of tradition are represented 
in the text, including Johannine, Pauline, and synoptic traditions.267 According to Koester, it is likely 
that the author knew of the early Christian tradition but was not the apostle, but a Jewish prophet.268 
Hagner also concludes that the book was “almost certainly not” authored by the apostle John, but likely 
someone within the Johannine circle.269 
Thomas argues, however, that the rationale for rejecting the traditional authorship is weak. He 
demonstrates that objections to the apostle’s authorship can be traced to Dionysius’s dogmatic 
objections, which he determines are specious. He finds that the “external evidence for authorship by 
John the apostle is earlier, clearer, more definite, and more positive for Revelation than for the 
traditional authorship of any other NT book.”270 Authorship, thus, is uncertain. 
This text, and the entire book of Revelation has no counterpart. No redaction criticism is 
warranted. 
2.3.4.2.3. Reception 
The book of Revelation is addressed to a church that is undergoing persecution; that is 
confronted with seemingly indomitable forces of evil which is crushing them.271 Revelation offers a 
message of comfort and hope for the church. As Hagner states, it “unveils reality in contrast to 
appearances; it provides a true understanding of the present and therefore also of the future. Things 
are not the way they seem to present perception.”272 The writer wants to convey that, though it appears 
to the persecuted Christians that they are the despised and only objects to be crushed, because they are 
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followers of Jesus, the opposite of that is true. God is triumphant, and they, as God’s people, are 
victorious over the powers of evil. 
2.3.4.3. Narrative Criticism 
2.3.4.3.1. Structure 
This section has been linked to the Olivet Discourse of Jesus as recorded in the Synoptic 
Gospels. 273  Charles appears to be the originator of this hypothesis, which holds that there is a 
connection between the Revelation 6 “Seal judgments” and the Olivet Discourse in the Synoptics. This 
connection is viewed most clearly when the accounts are viewed together in summary.274 (See, Table 
2-2) 
Table 2-2  Seal Judgements Compared to Olivet Discourses in Synoptics 
 Matt. 24: 6-7, 9a, 
29 
Mark 13:7-9a, 24-
25 
Luke 21: 9-12a, 
25-26 
Rev 6:2-17, 7:1 
1. Wars Wars Wars Wars 
2. Int’l Strife Int’l Strife Int’l Strife Int’l Strife 
3. Famines Earthquakes Earthquake Famine  
4. Earthquakes Famines Famines Pestilence (Death 
and Hades). 
5. Persecutions Persecutions Pestilence Persecutions 
6. Eclipses of the sun 
and moon; falling 
of the stars; 
shaking of the 
power of heaven. 
Eclipses of the sun 
and moon; falling of 
the stars; shaking of 
the power of 
heaven. 
Persecutions Earthquakes, 
eclipse of the sun, 
ensanguining of the 
moon, falling of the 
stars, men calling on 
the rocks to fall on 
them, shaking of the 
powers of heaven, 
four destroying 
winds. 
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7.   Signs in the sun, 
moon, and stars; 
men fainting for 
fear of the things 
coming on the 
world; shaking of 
the powers of 
heaven. 
 
 
Charles finds that Revelation follows the seven “Woes” of Luke, which themselves follow a pattern 
of seven plagues in Jewish literature,275 but the Revelation combines the third and sixth woes into the 
sixth seal.276 The full passage from which the selected verses under analysis are drawn (6:1 – 7:3), 
gives an account of the six seals, which were Messianic woes, “or signs of destruction of the immediate 
world.”277 According to Charles, this destruction, or consummation, will begin with breakdown of the 
political and social order (1-8), then the cosmic order will also be partially destroyed (12-17).278  
Significantly, Koester concludes that the author of Revelation reinterprets the tradition to 
reflect that the eschatological expectation that proceeds smoothly and without interruption in the 
Gospels, is, in fact, interrupted. He argues that the progression is paused, and that the author places his 
readers within the pause. There is a redemption that must occur during the delay, which is what is 
shown distinctively in the seal visions.279 Koester’s view of the correspondence of the Gospel tradition 
to Revelation, thus, appears, as follows:280 (See, Table 2-3) 
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Table 2-3 Seal Judgements Compared to Olivet Discourses in Synoptics With Interruption 
 Matt. 24: 6-9, 29-
31 
Mark 13:7-9, 24-
25 
Luke 21: 9-12, 25-
26 
Rev 6:1-8:1-5 
1. Wars Wars Wars Wars of conquest 
2. Violent conflict 
between nations 
Violent conflict 
between nations 
Violent conflict 
between nations 
Violent conflict 
between people 
3. Famines Earthquakes Earthquake Famine (grain 
shortage) 
4. Earthquakes Famines Famines Violence, famine, 
disease, wild 
animals 
5. Persecutions Persecutions Disease Persecutions 
6. Heavenly signs 
(sun and moon 
darkened, star fall, 
powers of heaven 
shaken) 
Heavenly signs (sun 
and moon darkened, 
star fall, powers of 
heaven shaken) 
Persecutions Heavenly signs (sun 
darkened, moon to 
blood, stars fall, 
earth shaken) 
7. Son of man comes 
on clouds 
Son of man comes 
on clouds 
Heavenly signs 
(signs in sun moon 
stars; roaring sea; 
people afraid 
powers of heaven 
shaken) 
Threats interrupted: 
vision of 
redemption 
8.   Son of man comes 
on clouds 
Heavenly silence 
and prayer 
 
The work describes a period of intense suffering and tribulation for the inhabitants of the earth.281  
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Pate concurs that the heavenly vision is a “reapplication of the Olivet Discourse/past fall of 
Jerusalem to the future Parousia of Christ/destruction of Rome.”282 The first four seals that precede the 
subject passage concern bloodshed, death and destruction on earth. The fifth seal of this passage shifts 
to a heavenly visage. The sixth seal concerns a period of Christian martyrdom, as seen from heaven, 
which was already partially accomplished.283  
2.3.4.3.2. Themes of the Scene 
2.3.4.3.2.1. Altar 
The altar in the sixth chapter is viewed by Malina284 as denoting the sky. He determines that 
such a view is consistent with the ancient understanding of the astronomical constellation of an Altar 
among the starscapes of the southern sky.  Because the Altar was in the white Milky Way, Malina 
believes, the author clothes the witnesses who are “further below the horizon” or “below” or “under” 
the altar, as clothed in white.285 For Malina, the ancient Mediterranean audience regularly sought signs 
from the sky as an means of understanding occurrences on earth.286 Hence angels were considered 
“sky servants” and appeared regularly in the Gospels.  A moving star, or comet, announced Jesus’s 
birth, and a sky-caused earthquake occured at Jesus’s death.287 
Charles argues that the image involves a heavenly altar, a scene in heaven, which is like the 
altar of incense and the altar of burnt offerings.288 
Reddish, however, sees the location under the altar as a place of honour. The witnesses are near 
God. Reddish relies for his interpretation upon Beasley-Murray, who cites a saying of Rabbi Akiba: 
He who is buried in other countries (other than Babylonia and 
Palestine) is as if he were buried in Babylon; and he who is buried in 
Babylon is as if he were buried in the land of Israel; and he who is 
buried in the land of Israel is as if he were buried beneath the altar, for 
the whole land of Israel is appropriated for the altar; he who is buried 
beneath the altar is as if he were buried beneath the throne of glory.289 
Thus, for Reddish, when the witnesses are portrayed as being beneath the altar, it is the author’s intent 
to portray them as near God’s throne and God. 
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Thomas argues that the altar must be in heaven because that is the only place where 
communication with “the holy and true master” (v.10) can take place.290 As to whether the heavenly 
altar corresponds to the earthly temple’s altar for incense or for burnt offering, Thomas concludes that 
though the altar of burnt offering has merit, because that is where blood was poured, and the use of the 
word slain in the passage is associated with offering, it is not the better choice. The witnesses, he says, 
are not on, but under, the altar.  More importantly, Thomas argues, sacrifices are no longer necessary 
since Jesus’s sacrifice was conclusive. Koester, though, makes a distinction between the two sacrifices, 
holding that, “a martyr’s blood marks a triumph for truth and faithfulness in the face of evil, whereas 
cleansing and redemption are accomplished by the blood of Christ.”291  
Thomas argues further for why the altar of incense and not that for burnt offerings is the more 
likely comparison to the heavenly altar. First, throughout Revelation the altar is connected with 
judgment and praying (5:8, 8:3,4).  Second, the book speaks of heaven as a sanctuary, and the altar of 
incense in the earthly temple was near the sanctuary, the altar of burnt offerings was not.292 
However, Koester makes the strong point, along with Boxall and Mounce, that the heavenly 
altar is a different altar that has multiple functions. It is comparable to neither the altar of incense nor 
the altar of burnt offering.293 
2.3.4.3.2.2. Souls 
The souls are those of the martyrs, as “the souls of the righteous” were regarded as sacrifices 
to God, in the Christian tradition as well as in pre-Christian Judaism. 294  Charles agrees that the 
righteous being viewed as martyrs follows the Jewish tradition.295 “Though his body was slain on earth, 
the sacrifice was in reality made in heaven, where his soul was offered on the heavenly altar.”296  
The tradition is connected to the lives of the apostles. 
Sources say, Stephen was stoned, James was killed with the sword 
Peter was crucified, and Paul was beheaded…The most notorious 
persecution occurred under Nero, when Christians in Rome were “torn 
by dogs and perished, or were nailed to crosses, or were doomed to the 
flames and burnt”…Such traditions inform the vision of the fifth 
seal.297  
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Pate argues that the message of the sixth chapter is that, Jerusalem paid the price for spilling 
the blood of the martyrs, in the destruction of the temple in 70 CE, so Rome will also pay the price for 
the shedding of blood of the followers of Christ.298  
In Charles’s view, the author is looking back to Nero’s persecution and ahead to that of 
Domitian. After that, the author expects the number of martyrs to be completed and then the end would 
come.299 Reddish agrees that the point for the author is that the martyrdom is not over. The author 
writes to prepare the letter’s hearers for further endurance of suffering. The author wants to give 
meaning to their suffering.300 Reddish believes that Revelation’s message is that the lamb’s death 
accomplishes the victory, but the death of the martyrs contributes to the victory.301 
2.3.4.3.2.3. Why slain 
Charles’s construal of the basis for the persecution and martyrdom of those under the altar, is 
that it was for “a word given by God and the witness borne by Jesus.” It is not that the martyrs bore 
witness to something, but that Christ has given a testimony, and the martyrs have the testimony and 
preserve the testimony, which is the equivalent of the clause in 12:17,302 and in 20:4.303 Further, the 
martyrs were those who were persecuted under Nero.304 Thomas agrees that the word of God here is 
the “testimony received from Jesus.”305 It is a testimony they held, not that they preached.306 This was 
the cause of their persecution. 
2.3.4.3.2.4. Prayer 
The prayer is one that contains notes of vengeance for what the martyrs have lost.307 This is 
similar to a prayer in Enoch 47:2, 4 [xlvii. 2,4].308 Also, it alludes to 4 Ezra 4.35, wherein the souls of 
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the righteous in Shoel ask, “How long are we to remain here? When cometh the fruit upon the 
threshing-floor of our reward?”309   
Thomas notes that the heavenly prayer, unlike Stephen’s, is a call for vengeance rather than 
forgiveness. The prayer follows the pattern of imprecatory psalms,310 which, he argues, are not only 
for vengeance, but also partly a protest against iniquity.311 Reddish, however, states that the prayer is 
not for personal vindication, but for the vindication of God’s justice.312 The witnesses did not die in 
vain, God was not powerless to save them. The forces of evil had not conquered. “The prayer of the 
martyrs is that God will reverse the judgment of the world so that the purpose of their dying, as well 
as the sovereignty of God, might be revealed.”313 Reddish agrees that the point is that God has not 
forgotten the faithful witnesses. Their deaths would be vindicated. Even if the world is out of control, 
God is in control of the world and history; at the appropriate time God will act.314 
For Thomas, the essential feature of the prayer is not that it is vengeful, but that it is an outcry; 
it comes in a loud voice, expressing a strong and urgent need.315 This prayer outcry, he argues, is of 
significance because it constitutes the fifth judgment against those on earth.316 Later in the book, all 
the saints, not only the martyrs, are praying (8:3, 7:10-17).317  It is prayer that leads to trumpet 
judgments on earth, which increase in intensity from between chapters 8:3-5 and 9:13. In chapter 14:18 
prayers are mentioned again. Then in chapter 19:11-21 notice is given of the seventh trumpet and the 
seven last plagues. By this point, the martyrdom is complete. When the altar was last heard from in 
chapter 16:7, before this last pronouncement of judgment, the cries of the martyrs vindicates God in 
God’s just dealings with rebellious humanity. Their prayers have been fully answered, and their blood 
fully avenged. Just before the last judgment, in 19:1-2, there is joyful prayer. God’s outpouring of 
wrath, then, is seen as an answer to these heavenly petitions.318 
Even though it may be a source of misery to those who become victims 
of such vengeance, vengeance of this kind has been an integral part of 
God’s dealings with the enemies of righteousness since the earliest 
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history of man (Gen. 4:10) and will continue to be until the 
consummation of human history.”319 
Thus, Thomas sees prayer as a means for participating in the ultimate enactment of God’s 
justice, which does include God’s wrath upon evil. The passages’ reference to the “holy and true,” 
Thomas concludes, supports this view of God’s vengeance. God is holy in apartness from evil, and 
true in his faithfulness to His Word. “God cannot tolerate iniquity. He [sic] must avenge.”320  
2.3.4.3.2.5. Robes 
Charles argues that the giving of robes necessarily implies that the witnesses also have 
heavenly bodies.321 Receipt of their heavenly bodies and having “attained their consummation…is a 
special privilege accorded to the martyrs, just as they exclusively are to reign for the 1000 years.”322 
All of the righteous will ultimately receive such robes. Robes are symbolic of victory of the faithful 
over evil and death and symbolize the eternal life the recipients have been given.  
Thomas says Jewish apocalyptic tradition consistently used white robes to represent the body 
of glory, the resurrection body. Here, a robe implies a body, because one cannot clothe what is 
immaterial.323  However, he notes that the idea that the witnesses in chapter 6 are given bodies prior 
to the eschaton, contradicts the message of scripture that a new body is not given until Christ’s 
return.324 He concludes that the more important point is not whether or not the witnesses are embodied, 
but that they possess their animating spirits.325  
2.3.4.4. Ideological and Social Scientific Criticism of Specific Passage 
It is not an easy task to undertake an investigation of the text of Revelation in search of support 
for the premise of non-violence. This passage is an example of why that is. The traditional reading 
presents us with a Jesus who attends to the cries of the martyred. Then (though the identity of the 
speaker is obliquely omitted) we are to understand that he tells them to rest while he awaits the further 
suffering and torture of others before justice is meted out. Under this reading, even though Jesus 
affirms the yielding to martyrdom, and the implied non-resistant posture of the martyrs to persecution, 
Jesus is at the same time necessarily affirming the violence of the ongoing persecution. He is also 
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affirming that violent retribution will be, at a later time, visited upon those who perpetrated the 
martyrdom. This cannot be a text that supports notions of a non-violent ethos of Jesus. 
Another problem with a reading that adheres to a strictly non-violent Jesus paradigm is that to 
understand texts such as the one examined, pain and suffering must be made central to the Christian 
identity. The Christian narrative must embrace the idea that God was pleased to wound and kill Jesus, 
and Jesus is pleased when those who follow him endure torture and killing out of loyalty to Jesus. The 
obvious facts of torture and death are too readily valorised as being a source of God’s pleasure. The 
inquiry into the subtleties of what bring the Godhead pleasure are too easily abandoned. All the while, 
Christ-followers consciously affirm the opposite truth, that God does not take pleasure in the pain and 
suffering of God’s people. 
To understand the text, we must accept, as a first principle, that the text comes to us on its own 
terms. It does not come to us in a way that we necessarily understand or in a way that seeks our 
approval. We must surrender to the terms of the text and not expect that the text will surrender to our 
terms. 
The terms of the text are these: those who have written and received the text are marginalized 
Others who have undergone, and who are at risk of undergoing further, great and brutal persecution in 
Palestinian Rome. They have lived through a civil war that resulted in the destruction of the Jewish 
temple in Jerusalem. This undoubtedly appeared to them as cataclysmic and world ending. This group 
of outcast, fugitive, prey for the Roman imperium are awaiting the glorious return of a Lord whose 
advent has been delayed far beyond anyone’s expectation. 
Our text, in particular, communicates several points to this audience: you are seen, your 
struggles are seen, and you are not forgotten. Jesus endured unto death, just like you, and overcame. 
You held on to the testimony of Jesus, and that makes you righteous. Great reward awaits you. Justice 
is coming, but not immediately. First, there will be more persecution. 
The fact that Jesus is depicted as a slaughtered lamb, and that he is depicted as consoling and 
expecting martyrdom, is not an indication that God favours suffering. Jesus is depicted as both the 
Lion of Judah/Root of David (the conquering king), as well as the slaughtered lamb; both together. 
The lamb is as easily understood as a literary creation representing victory over defeat—a literary 
creation having seven horns and seven eyes—as it is understood as a normative expression of the 
expectation of suffering unto death for Christians.  
In the context in which it is presented, the scene of the prayerful witnesses is not intended to 
communicate a message related to the use, or non-use, of physical force by Christians. It is not intended 
to convey a message of prescriptive ethical conduct for the Christian. It does not recommend to the 
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Christian the path of suffering and death. What the scene is meant to accomplish is the 
acknowledgement and encouragement of discouraged and disappointed followers of Jesus. 
The scene references the slain lamb, yet the slain condition of the lamb is always accompanied 
by veneration. The slain lamb is victorious (5:5-6). The slain lamb is worthy (5:9). The lamb who was 
slain is worthy “to receive power and wealth and wisdom and might and honour and glory and 
blessing!” (5:12) What the book depicts is that the lamb is alive, which is to have obtained the supreme 
victory over not only the lamb’s persecutors but over death itself. This, however, is not all that is 
conveyed about the lamb. The lamb is seen in the heavenly realm without shame, disgrace, or 
dishonour. In the heavenly vision the lamb that was slain is revered and shrouded in honour that is 
profusely described.  
In the same way, when the Jesus-followers who were persecuted and martyred are depicted in 
our passage, it is as those slain, yet also as those who are venerated, being given a white robe and rest 
from the turmoil that engulfs the earth. The message is that the suffering obtain victory, and that victory 
includes life, it includes being present with God, and it includes the attainment of supreme honour.326 
The honour that the slain lamb and the slain martyrs obtained, is not the result of their 
willingness to surrender to death without resistance. Their honour is the consequence not of their death, 
but of their life. To hold to the testimony of Jesus, which was contrary to and despised by the powers 
and the culture, was to live into a self-defined identity and to live according to their own standards of 
inner dignity, and honour. Regardless of the powers of the world despising and abusing them, to live 
trusting that they had an inviolable dignity that came from their trust in their truth about God. Their 
self-determination of their worth and their truth, resulted in death, but also privileged them to 
experience life, on earth and beyond the realm of earth. 
Thus, the depiction of the righteous under the altar, or “beneath the throne of glory” as Rabbi 
Akiba supposes,327 is not the depiction of those whose blood was accepted as a sacrifice to God, but 
as those who are covered by a heavenly altar upon which Jesus’s cosmic sacrifice had already been 
made. Their committed living, which led to their suffering is at last over. Their suffering, we are meant 
to understand, was an unjust suffering that yet continues. Their suffering, we are assured, will be 
avenged by a holy and true God. This is the message that is meant to be conveyed to the audience of 
                                               
 
326 For more on honor and shame, generally, in Revelation, see, J A Du Rand and Y M Song, “The Ethos of the 
Book of Revelation,” Verbum et Ecclesia 24, no. 2 (November 17, 2003): 381–84. 
327 See, footnote 212, supra. 
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persecuted Jesus followers. It is a message of confidence, endurance, victory, and above all, honour 
that awaits the faithful. 
2.3.4.5. Conclusions from Exegesis of Resurrected Jesus Text 
Construal of the heavenly vision of martyred Jesus followers as a message of embrace of 
suffering and death, is a misconstrual of the text. The text conveys a message of encouragement and 
hope to those who suffered unjustly. The author assures them of Christ’s victory and supreme honour, 
and of the honour that they themselves are due as a result of their commitment to the testimony of 
Jesus. The suffering and death of the Christian is not embraced in this passage so much as it is promised 
vengeance. What is implied is that a life lived in consciousness of a self-determined worth and value, 
such as following Jesus required, is a life that leads inexorably to death and degradation by the powers. 
Nonetheless, life and glory belong to those who so live. 
2.4. Exegetical Conclusion 
Focusing on “non-violence” tends to obscure the very evident cues in the text that point to the 
issue of honour/shame, which are of immense significance in the cultural context of the writers of the 
scripture. Jesus the teacher teaches through the Sermon on the Mount that his hearers cannot be defined 
by the social standards of honour. They must know their self-worth and know that their worth is based 
upon God’s correct valuation and not the incorrect evaluation of broader society. When their 
dignity/honour is challenged and attempted to be diminished publicly, they must act publicly to 
demonstrate the impossibility of their worthiness being diminished. Jesus the criminal under arrest 
teaches through his initiative, and through his refusal of physical force that he will be obedient to the 
plan of God, and that the powers of the world may have power over his physical body, but they have 
no control over his being, identity, and worth. Jesus the crucified one demonstrates the same principle. 
The powers may abuse his body and kill him, but they are powerless over his will, his dignity. Jesus 
prays for his persecutors because he can pray for them. His intact and valorous personhood accords 
him the ability to look upon his persecutors with charity. Jesus the slaughtered lamb is shrouded in 
honour. The martyred witnesses in his heavenly presence are encouraged that, despite their humiliation 
and death, they, like Jesus are righteous and honoured. There is honour and dignity that come from 
holding onto the truth, though it cost one’s life. This is the nature of the freedom that Jesus lived into 
and died to allow all people to experience. 
What the exegesis finally demonstrates, is that once the veil of “non-violence” dogma is lifted, 
possibilities appear in the text for liberative, life-giving interpretations. These interpretations do not 
promote physical aggression as a means of liberation. They promote, instead, self-actualization and 
human dignity. The focus shifts from suffering and abasement, to self-respect, commitment/obedience 
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to truth, agency, and internal cultivation of the power one has to live with dignity in a hostile world. 
In light of the challenges that are facing the global communities in which Christians find themselves, 
the imperative of scripture to the violated, ecologically devastated, and economically excluded is not 
the communication of a message of “non-violence,” nor is it the call to suffering. The good news of 
scripture today is that each of us has a dignity that comes from God that we cannot be stripped of 
regardless of what the world says about us, and regardless of how the world treats us. Our task is not 
to suffer the insults of the powers of the world, but to take action that responds to insults with a 
demonstration of our own awareness of our worth and value; to walk with a full apprehension of our 
divinely apportioned dignity; to make choices to live faithfully to what we know to be true; and to do 
these things and live our lives in this way even if it means persecution and death at the hands of the 
powers. To be Christian, scripture tells us, and especially tells the marginalized, is to live in a way that 
takes action to assert one’s own dignity and inner freedom, in a world that seeks to steal and destroy 
it. 
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3. Theological Conceptions of Non-violence to the 
Fourth Century 
3.1. Review, Overview, and Vocabulary 
This section will present a review of the previous chapter, followed by a brief overview 
of Part II, then a short comment on the lexicon. The historical theological discussion of non-
violence then begins. 
3.1.1. Review 
The objective of this research project is the unmasking of language and ideas in the 
Christian tradition that are regarded as “non-violence” promoting, which function in 
cooperation with systems of oppression that harm the marginalized Other, particularly Black 
persons. The goal of this unmasking is the fostering of Christian imagination, and then 
construction, of a world that allows for the inbreaking of the Kingdom of God wherein all of 
creation flourishes. 
The research began in the previous section with a look at the teachings of scripture, as 
they relate to principles of “non-violence.” What was revealed was that the veil of “non-
violence” leads to a reading of the text that often hides its meaning. Rather than emphasizing 
the use or non-use of coercive force, the scriptures reveal teaching that emphasize Jesus’s 
interest in asserting his own dignity, and his defiance of the powers of the world that attempted 
to diminish his dignity. Scripture reveals a Jesus who moves, acts and speaks with freedom and 
inner power; who so lives into the freeness and power of his being, that threats against him by 
the powers do not elicit his fear nor cause his freedom and dignity to be diminished. The 
message of the exegesis was that, it is not a concern for “non-violence” that is central to 
Christian life and practice, but that the same level of inner worth and freedom that Jesus had, 
is intended as the privilege and responsibility of all Christians. 
3.1.2. Overview 
This section of the research continues the investigation of the Christian discourse of 
non-violence. The section begins with discussion of the vocabulary of “non-violence,” “peace,” 
“anti-violence,” etc. A general description of how the terms are understood and used in the 
paper is provided. Following this, Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 consider the historical theological 
conceptualization of the concept of “non-violence” in the Christian tradition. Chapter three 
examines the first centuries of church history. Chapter four considers the medieval to the early 
middle ages church period. Chapter five considers the middle ages through modernity. Chapter 
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six covers modernity to the twentieth century. What the historical review shows is that “non-
violence” has never been a static theological concept. What is also demonstrated is that there 
has never been a period in the history of the Christian tradition when violence—the use of 
physically coercive force--was not accepted as legitimate, in one way or another. 
3.1.3. The Vocabulary 
The language of peace and non-violence is typically broad and imprecise, being 
characterized, even as confused. 328  Related terms such as “pacifism,” “non-violence,” 
“nonresistance,” “non-violent resistance,” “Christian non-violence,” etc., are often used in the 
public sphere haphazardly and interchangeably. Swartley questions whether the term non-
violence has replaced peace in contemporary interpretations of the New Testament. 329 
Hauerwas notes that while peace is clearly not violent, “a peace that is no more than “not 
violence” surely cannot be the peace that is ours in Christ.”330 While Yoder asserted that “there 
is no such thing as a single position called pacifism, to which one clear definition can be given 
and which is held by all.”331 Thus, Yoder, avowed advocate of peace, was also a self-described 
non-pacifist. Ultimately, as Yoder Neufeld notes, to speak of peace in the Christian tradition 
becomes an inexpressible task because of the “radical spiritual, social and cosmic 
dimensions”332 of Christ’s peace. 
Yoder Neufeld’s articulation of the problem of speaking of Christian peace 
encapsulates my thinking on this subject. Writing about the full dimension of peace would 
warrant several specialized dissertations that go beyond the scope of this one. For the purposes 
of this project, recognizing the limits and expansiveness of the ways in which peace may be 
spoken, “pacifism” is used to refer to the refrain from use of physical force and also the non-
resistance to use to physical force against self or others. Non-violence333 will refer to habitually 
                                               
 
328 Gene Sharp, “The Meanings of Non-Violence: A Typology (Revised),” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 
3, no. 1 (1959): 41. 
329 Willard M. Swartley, Covenant of Peace: The Missing Peace in New Testament Theology and Ethics (Wm. 
B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2006), 6. 
330 Stanley Hauerwas, Performing the Faith: Bonhoeffer and the Practice of Nonviolence (Wipf and Stock 
Publishers, 2015), 170. 
331 Hauerwas, 172 citing, John Howard Yoder, Nevertheless: Varieties of Religious Pacifism (Scottdale, Pa.:  
Herald Press, 1992), p. 12. 
332 Swartley, Covenant of Peace, 8 citing John Yoder Neufeld, Ephesians, 229. 
333 A distinction has been made in the field of peace studies or peace and conflict studies between “non-
violence” and “nonviolence.” “[W]hile both refer to actions without violence, the latter [without a hyphen] also 
implies an explicit commitment to the strategy or philosophy of peaceful resistance.” Madge Micheels-Cyrus, 
“Violence & Non-Violence,” in Berghof Glossary on Conflict Transformation: 20 Notions for Theory and Practice 
(Berlin: Berghof Foundation Operations GmbH, 2012), 118, https://www.berghof-
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refraining from the coercive use of physical force. It may or may not incorporate non-
resistance. The implication of a definition that regards the disuse of physical force as definitive 
of non-violence, is that certain acts that are understood as “non-violent” by contemporary 
activists, e.g., nonviolent action, nonviolent direct action, direct action, nonviolent resistance, 
positive action, etc., may be deemed “violent” acts, to the extent that they rely upon the coercive 
use of physical force, whether or not human beings are injured or killed in the use of such 
acts.334 
When speaking of direct, physical acts of violence, the paper will refer alternately to 
“acts of physical aggression,” “physical violence” and the “coercive use of physical force.” 
The emphasis will be on the physical expression of violence as opposed to other nonphysical, 
and/or non-visible expressions of violence. The physical expression of coercive force may or 
may not include harm to persons. Harm to property is also regarded as “violent.” This is in line 
with the cultural perception of the destruction of property during protest by the marginalized, 
as acts of violence, or as “violent protest.”335 
Finally, the notion of justice is addressed in the research. Like “peace,” “justice” could 
easily merit its own dissertation. In this research project, justice is contemplated as God’s 
justice, rather than juridical determinations of the law. As the introduction to God’s Justice: 
The Holy Bible describes, God’s justice is related to righteousness. The two words come from 
the same root and are inseperable. Justice means “to make things right,” and includes, “care for 
                                               
 
foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Books/Book_Glossary_Chapters_en/berghof_glossary_2012_20_
violence_and_non-violence.pdf. In this paper, because no such commitment to ideology is intended, the hypen 
has been preserved in the usage of the term. 
334 Sharp would make a distinction between acts that result in damage to persons and those that result 
in damage to property. For him, harm to persons constitutes “violence,” while damage to property constitutes 
“sabotage.” See, Gene Sharp and Adam Roberts, Sharp’s Dictionary of Power and Struggle: Language of Civil 
Resistance in Conflicts, 1 edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). The distinction is not observed in 
this research as it is regarded as a subjective distinction. Part III’s discussion of Nelson Mandela’s politics of 
armed resistance reflect that his actions of sabotage were deemed by himself and society as acts of “violence.” 
335 I note that the protest of White persons that intentionally or unintentionally damages property, may 
or may not be characterized by society as violent. The Cantonsville Nine, which included activists Daniel and 
Philip Berrigan, provide an example. During an anti-war, anti-draft protest in 1968, the group “entered the draft 
board office near Baltimore in broad daylight and ransacked the drawers, seizing hundreds of papers as a clerk 
tried to wrest them back. Outside…they dumped the files of would-be soldiers in the parking lot and incinerated 
them…” 250 similar acts of protest throughout the U.S. duplicated the Cantonsville Nine’s acts. See, Maggie 
Astor, “Their Protest Helped End the Draft. 50 Years Later, It’s Still Controversial.,” The New York Times, July 18, 
2018, sec. U.S., https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/19/us/catonsville-nine-anniversary.html. When compared, for 
example, to Martin Luther King, Jr.’s contemporaneious activism, for which he was regularly charged and vilified 
for lawbreaking that incited riots, the brazenness of the trespassing, vandalizing, theft of property from 
government offices, and of public burning, as well as the mimicry of the acts throughout the country, reflect that 
different standards have been applied for White protesters’, when acts are being construed by society as 
“violent” or “not violent.” 
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God’s creation, generosity to the poor, good government, a world without wars, protection for 
the vulnerable, an end to lies and bribes…and much, much, more.”336 It includes, as well, 
making things right with regard to racialized oppression. “Making things right,” in this project 
does not entail consideration of outcomes related to soteriology or the eschatological judgment 
of God. It entails the Spirit of God at work in the world through humanity. “Making it right” is 
God’s way in the world now. 
3.2. Introduction of the Early Church Period 
Christian non-violence has enjoyed a preeminent theological ideological position 
throughout Christian history. Though the church has accepted legitimation of war under 
prescribed conditions (“just war”), engagement in physical violence has often been regarded 
as inappropriate to the practice of the Christian faith. From where is the conception of the 
church as a people of peace and non-violence derived? This question cannot be answered by 
simple reference to dogma and doctrine. Doctrine is rooted in history, and history is contingent 
upon the particularities of context.  
This section will trace the origins of the church’s conceptualization of Christian non-
violence. By looking back to the ways that non-violence and peace were originally understood 
and practiced, the origins of the church’s continuing privileging of the concepts will be made 
clear.  
Further, historical review demonstrates that, nearly from the time of the birth of the 
church, the church’s stance on matters pertaining to violence and refraining from violence has 
been ambivalent. Some forms of physical violence have been forbidden as inimical to faith in 
Christ, while at the same time, other forms of physical violence have received church 
approbation. Even where the church has been clear in its censure of physical violence, its 
doctrinal assertions about violence reflect a consistent tendency toward evolution and change 
over time. 
What the text of scripture reveals about the apostolic church337 is that there was physical 
violence that was not abhorred, but applied as justice warranted, e.g., the deaths of Ananias 
                                               
 
336 Eds., “Introducing God’s Justice: The Holy Bible,” in NIV, God’s Justice: The Holy Bible: The Flourishing of 
Creation and the Destruction of Evil (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2016), iv. 
337 Reference to the apostolic church relies upon the biblical text as historic record, or historiography, 
of events that took place. I do not rely upon the biblical text as factual proof of the events transpiring as written, 
rather as a record that events like those described did occur, and that the events that occurred were perceived 
and remembered, and conveyed in writing in a particular way. The scriptural text as historical reference might be 
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and Sapphira.338 The idea that physically violent acts under all circumstances were contrary to 
the nature of God and to the calling of the church, is not an accurate portrayal of the apostolic 
church. 
In the early church of the second and third centuries, the expected apocalypse had not 
arrived. The church carried on, on the fringes of Roman society. The church’s eschewal of 
physical violence, in favour of enduring persecution was the tradition that was passed down. 
Those in the church continued to endure persecution and martyrdom as they continued in 
faithfulness to the testimony of Jesus. Added to the notion of willing death held by the apostolic 
church, was the idea that killing, under any circumstances, was incompatible with the Christian 
witness. Questions about soldiering were met with the answers of church leaders that soldiering 
and killing could not be performed by the Christian, who was meant to live pursuant to the 
greater commandment of love. Nonetheless, there were ample examples of Christian soldiers. 
There is also evidence that Christians, though still subject to persecution, had grown to 
permeate all levels of Roman society. Greater involvement in the civil life of Rome meant that 
there were no universally applied prohibitions against soldiering and killing. 
By the fourth century the church had transitioned from a fringe cult to the dominant 
religion of the Empire. Symbolism for Christ, Constantine’s chi-rho cross, became the military 
standard of the imperial troops. Ambrose, the Bishop of Milan, was chief counsellor to the 
emperor in matters of ethics and faith, and influenced the emperor’s control of the military; 
giving counsel about the proper and improper use of military violence. Threatened by 
marauding hordes from the north, Ambrose officially abandoned the traditional idea that 
Christians should refrain from killing, yet continued to make killing off-limits to clergy, and to 
morally compel the individual Christian to refrain from self-defence, preferring instead one’s 
death than harm inflicted upon another. Ambrose’s pupil, Augustine, whose home was also in 
the path of invading armies, further developed and systematized the idea of acceptable killing. 
                                               
 
considered then, a kind of creative non-fiction, in the vein of literary journalism, memoir, or personal essay. 
These literary forms are valuable in that they are meant to offer recollections of events that exist in the official 
historical record, from an author’s specific, albeit subjective, point of view. “The [writing] may indeed be 
subjective, but it is still concerned with people who have really lived and events that have really happened, 
presenting history as a matter of personal significance as well as public record in a way that more objective 
reports--providing "just the facts"--could never hope to.” William Bradley, “The Ethical Exhibitionist’s Agenda: 
Honesty and Fairness in Creative Nonfiction,” College English 70, no. 2 (2007): 204, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/25472261. 
338 See, Acts 5:1-11. 
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Augustine’s theory of “just war” articulated specific conditions that would validate the resort 
to warfare and killing by the emperor’s Christian armies, and by Christians. 
Thus unfolds the narrative regarding pacifism and non-violence in the originating life 
of the church. What is seen is an apostolic church that embraced martyrdom, but not non-
violence. Violence could be employed by the state, by those in authority, and by the Spirit, yet 
the individual Christian followed the pattern of non-resistance to persecution.  
It could be argued, from the acceptance of the physically violent nature of the culture, 
generally, that the apostolic church was not pacifist as much as it was pragmatic. The church 
was an ostracized minority religious faction, within an already ostracized minority religious 
faction. It was persecuted by both its local cultural affiliates, the Jewish temple complex 
authorities, and later by the broader imperial community of Romans. First-century Palestine 
was rife with tumult and social unrest, with the Roman army securing peace through ruthless 
and crushing military power. Christians were isolated and without coalition with any other 
marginalized group. Under the circumstances, the possibility and appearance of political 
resistance could have meant annihilation, while withdrawal from public life, and subversive 
communitarianism, could safeguard group survival.  
Added to this was the imminent apocalyptic expectation of Jesus-followers. Questions 
about whether a person should marry or even work were confronting the church, since the end 
of the age was seemingly near. These circumstances do not bespeak a spiritual call to resist all 
violence. What is indicated is that the specific circumstances of the first-century Christians 
mandated habits of church life like surreptitiousness and acquiescence. Already facing the 
wrath of the Jewish elite, they sought to avoid incurring the wrath of the Romans. Witnessing 
the crushing of insurgents in Palestine, during the first Jewish War, they sought to avoid 
insurgency and crushing. Expecting the imminent destruction of all that is, they sought to 
endure whatever suffering was required in this life, in committed hope of their truth found in 
Jesus, and of reward in the life to come. The church became inward looking, not seeking to 
impact the larger world and its injustices but seeking to remain unmolested by those in power.  
The habits of the fugitive church, fugitivity, became enshrined as the doctrine of the 
church of the next generation. Though social instability had decreased for the church, and the 
imminent hope of Christ’s return was absent, the instruction to endure persecution without 
resistance was carried forward. However, because the Jesus-followers were soon 
geographically dispersed and a generation removed from the rebellions, insurgencies, and 
crushings of war-stricken Palestine, alternate rationales for non-resistance were applied. 
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In the work of most of the patristic authors discussed in this section, the rationale that 
emerged for the Christian’s counter-cultural living and non-resistance of persecution became 
that of modelling the love of Christ. Christ’s love, rather than Christ’s boldness or Christ’s 
return, took precedence, and with it developed doctrine that privileged love. From this came 
admonitions against killing and soldiering. Despite this, in the lived experience of Christians, 
soldiering did occur, and unloving ostracism and church persecution of “heretics” was 
common. Also, Christians moved more and more into the cultural mainstream. 
By the fourth century Christianity had become well-enough regarded that it was 
embraced by the emperor and made the official religion of the realm. The bishops, both in the 
East and in the West, now the guardians and tutors of the empire’s faith, switched course on 
the issue of killing and physical violence and deemed it to be unequivocally forbidden only to 
the clergy. Otherwise, particularly for purposes of defending the empire, and thus the faith, 
killing and soldiering was a duty of the Christian, though perhaps a reluctant one.  
3.3. The Apostolic Period 
Non-violence ethics attributed to the pages of scripture derive from the presentation of 
Jesus in the gospels as physically non-violent. Though Jesus is confrontational in his words 
and actions, he refrains from the use of physical force. Jesus is presented as the much-
anticipated messiah, yet his portrayal is of one who is “a humble, non-military messiah who 
does not conquer through physical force;”339 nor does he preach a message of armed revolt. 
Jesus predicts and attempts to prepare his followers for his suffering, he submits willingly to 
his arrest by armed men, and he yields to an unjust state execution. Jesus’s actions did not seek 
to preserve his own life, nor seek political power, nor did he use force to compel anyone to 
comply with his will. Rather, Jesus surrendered his will, and his life, to the mission of salvation 
of humanity. 
Largely because of Jesus’s model of non-aggression, the apostolic church adopted the 
ethical and political position of non-violence. The “non-violence” that was embraced by the 
early church, was the non-violence of absolute pacifism, 340 which principle espoused that 
                                               
 
339 Desjardins, Peace, Violence and the New Testament, 20. 
340 Douglas Bond uses this term, see, Douglas G. Bond, “The Nature and Meanings of Nonviolent Direct 
Action: An Exploratory Study,” Journal of Peace Research 25, no. 1 (1988): 81–89. But see, Wink, who argues that 
the Greek antistēnai likely means “do not resist violently,” thus, that Jesus exhorted his followers to non-violent 
resistance, rather than nonresistance. Collected Readings and Walter Wink, “Jesus’ Third Way: Nonviolent 
Engagement,” in Walter Wink: Collected Readings (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2013), 202–5. 
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followers of Jesus must endure suffering and sacrifice up to and including the point of their 
death. This is a non-violence that refuses to kill. The non-violence of the apostolic church is 
less clear on the issue of war. There was no sharing of the mood of insurrection and rebellion 
that was prevalent during the first century, however there seemed to be no objection to Christian 
soldiering. The non-violence of the apostolic church was a non-violence that primarily 
concerned with refraining from engagement in personal physical violence, and in acts of 
insurrection. The non-violence of the early church was entirely negative in its prescriptive 
orientation, stating what should not be physically done to others inside or outside of the church. 
It does not address what should be done to/for others, particularly those outside the church, in 
the name of promoting peace, beyond injunctions as to live harmoniously as a subsect of 
society.  
3.3.1. Ambivalence About Violence 
There is a clear teaching of non-violence, as well as spiritual and cosmic peace, in the 
pages of New Testament scripture, yet also undercurrents of violence in the stories that 
scripture tells. 341  Thus, it is fair to say that the early church’s teaching on non-violence, 
violence, and peace was ambivalent.342 The text of scripture makes it difficult to characterize 
the apostolic church as non-violent. 
First, though the members of the church did not kill, ostensibly following Jesus’s 
example of refraining from killing, relying upon the act of not killing as an indication of the 
church’s non-violence requires basing the conceptualization of the non-violence of the church 
strictly upon the church’s use or disuse of physical acts of force. This does not provide a full 
account of the milieu of violence that is represented in the corpus of scripture.  
Also, the simple refraining from acts of physical force does not address the root issue 
of why the church refrains from such acts. For Jesus, who hailed from the margins of society, 
                                               
 
341 For example, there is violence in the encounters between the cosmic forces of good and evil, there is 
violence in the parables with respect to acts of both protagonists and antagonists, (e.g., in the parable of the 
talents where the master (who has an ambiguous role as either the empowering protagonist, or as the 
unreasonable task-master, and thus an antagonist), throws his non-profitmaking servant into “the outer 
darkness.”), there is violence in the accepted penalizing of women, there is violence in the cursing and death of 
the fig tree, there is violence in the language that Jesus uses towards his adversaries, and there is eschatological 
violence throughout. 
342 See, Desjardins, Peace, Violence and the New Testament; Warren Carter, “Sanctioned Violence in the 
New Testament,” Interpretation 71, no. 3 (July 1, 2017): 284–97, https://doi.org/10.1177/0020964317698764; de 
Villiers and Henten, Coping with Violence in the New Testament; Biggar, “Specify and Distinguish! Interpreting the 
New Testament on `Non-Violence’”; Biggar, “The New Testament and Violence.” 
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who was a friend of sinners, whose closest friends carried swords, and whom he directed to do 
so, whose instructive stories regularly concluded with the antagonists facing divine judgement 
and wrath, and who commented that legions of angels were at his disposal if he but called, 
there was no apparent aversion to violence in itself. Jesus’s self-articulation for refraining from 
acts of physical force, was so that “the scriptures [would] be fulfilled, which say it must happen 
in this way.” What this means is that Jesus practices non-violence, his surrender to arrest and 
crucifixion, to effect the plan of salvation. His refusal to resist was for the sake of “others,” i.e., 
separated humanity.  
If the church was following the example of Jesus, then its actions should have been 
based on an ethic of not resisting violence directed at it, and should also have been consistent 
with the rationale for Jesus’s action of non-resistance unto death, which was for the sake of the 
lives of “others,” or separated humanity. During the apostolic period, this was not the church’s 
ethics. While it is true that those martyred did not resist their perpetrators, it is arguable as to 
whether or not those martyred went to their deaths as fully surrendered. The text of scripture 
recounts Stephen’s many words upon being arrested prior to his stoning, whereas Jesus offered 
almost no words to his captors after his arrest. On the other hand, Paul, while unresisting of 
arrest, availed himself of every means of securing a trial, “justice,” and prolonging his life. 
While his use of the apparatus of state to his own advantage, and extensions of his life are 
radically opposite of the example set by Jesus, his rationale was the same. Jesus surrendered 
for the sake of “others,” or separated humanity. Paul stayed alive for the same reason. The 
rationale for the surrender of the martyrs of the apostolic period is not a uniform picture. 
Second, there is contrary evidence that killing and war were forbidden during the 
apostolic period. The evidence of scripture does not indicate that being a soldier was to be an 
adversary to the kingdom. In Luke’s gospel the text shows, presumably, sword-carrying 
soldiers among those who went to the Jordan to be baptized by John. When they asked, along 
with tax collectors, “And we, what should we do?” John did not turn the soldiers away, nor did 
he instruct them to abandon their position as soldiers. His instructions concerned integrity of 
service and money: “Do not extort money from anyone by threats or false accusation, and be 
satisfied with your wages.”343 Jesus also does not condemn soldiers. Matthew and Luke recount 
Jesus as being called to heal the slave of a centurion (a military commander of one hundred 
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men), and Jesus willingly going to the centurion’s aid. When the centurion sends word that he 
is not worthy to receive Jesus, but that Jesus simply needs to speak a word for the slave to be 
healed, Jesus commends the centurion’s incomparable faith. “[N]ot even in Israel have I found 
such faith,” Jesus remarks.344 No negative connotation attaches to the centurion’s military 
profession. Likewise, when the centurion at the foot of the cross is identified in the text,345 no 
negative connotation attaches to his service as a soldier—despite the fact that he participated 
in the execution of at least 3 men that very day. Finally, the text explicitly notes, of the post-
resurrection apostolic church, the salvation and baptism of “Cornelius, a centurion of the Italian 
Cohort.”346 Later is recounted the salvation and baptism of the sword-wielding Roman guard 
of the jail where Paul and Silas were held in chains.347  It is difficult to dismiss these examples 
that demonstrate that killing, which is implicit when serving in a police or military role is not 
a bar to entry into and participation in the kingdom of God. 
A final note regarding the apostolic church is that, even if the church were entirely an 
absolute pacifist church, an argument that the above examples make difficult to sustain, the 
traditional depiction of the mode of the church as negatively absolute pacifist, is divergent from 
the gospel example of Jesus’s life and teaching. Jesus’s concern was not for his own longevity 
and security, rather for ministry to the masses of Palestinian Jews. Throughout its short span, 
Jesus’s ministry was consistently depicted as intervening on behalf of those whose human 
dignity was being violated, be they adulterers, tax collectors, lepers, sex-workers, suffering 
from illness, or ritually unclean. His intervention was not only that of personally restoring the 
dignity of individuals and bringing healing, but also that of confronting the power structure 
that was the source of their violation. Jesus did not demur, and was not ‘nonresistant’ to the 
powers of exploitation and oppression. Jesus was in full resistance to the powers and authorities 
of his day. He challenged their authority with his greater authority, including the authority to 
forgive sin, and his authority to interpret the law for himself and others. Jesus was ever willing 
to publicly indict the Jewish elites’ corruption, and did not hesitate to publicly humiliate them 
with his power and authority,348 exercised on behalf of the marginalized and excluded. Jesus’s 
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confrontations of the powers of the Jewish community, can be viewed as the incarnation of 
Jesus’s spiritual confrontation with the powers of evil, and as representational of the ultimate 
confrontation with the power of death. Jesus confronts what has the power to kill him. That 
power eventually dies, while Jesus, who was dead, lives on. In this sense, the remembrance of 
Jesus’s death that is instituted prior to his arrest, may be understood as a remembrance, not 
simply of Jesus’s non-resistance, but of his confrontation with the powers, which preceded his 
surrender. 
While the apostolic church may be represented as a church that followed the non-violent 
example of Jesus, the apostolic church fell woefully short in following the non-violent 
resistance model of Jesus, which functioned to bring life and freedom to the oppressed. 
3.3.2. Conclusion 
The church tradition generally frames the Apostolic church as a church of absolute 
pacifism. This period of the church is viewed as demonstrating a pure adherence to Jesus’s 
teaching of non-resistance, epitomized by the Sermon on The Mount and by Jesus’s surrender 
to crucifixion. The church in its faithfulness, the tradition holds, refrained from killing as well 
as from participation in war. It modelled peaceableness both among adherents and with 
outsiders. The church tradition’s framing does not withstand scrutiny. It requires the setting 
aside of the intrinsic violence of the text, and adopting a view of violence, and hence, non-
violence, that is limited to enactments of physical force. It does not speak to the “why?” of 
Jesus’s refrain from use of physical force, nor account for those occasions where Jesus did use 
physical force, such as during the temple incident, nor account for Jesus’s aggressive speech, 
e.g., with religious elites, Peter, the Canaanite woman, etc. Further, framing the apostolic 
church as an absolute pacifist church, which refrained from killing, ignores the examples in the 
text of the kingdom’s welcome of soldiers and guards, and the demise of Ananias and Sapphira. 
Finally, such a framing fails to follow the complete example of Jesus, who generally 
                                               
 
were hungry (Matt. 12:1-8); Jesus, despite the elites’ plan to entrap him with the law, heals a man on the sabbath 
and re-interprets the law, after which the plots to kill him begin (Matt: 12:9-14). Jesus, as an invited guest of a 
Jewish elite Pharisee, nonetheless pronounces prophetic condemnation (Luke 11:37:37-54), “Now you Pharisees 
clean the outside of the cup and dish, but inside you are full of greed and evil. You fools!” (39-40) and then 
proceeded to lambast them with woe, after woe, for their injustices (42-52). His deeds provoked the fierce 
opposition of the leaders who thereafter, “were lying in wait for him, to catch him in something he might say” 
(54). Jesus healed a disabled woman, over the objection of the temple elite and then rebuked the man for his 
objection. The “opponents” of Jesus were humiliated and put to shame, yet the people rejoiced. (Luke 13:10-17). 
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demonstrates a lack of use of physical force, but at the same time also demonstrates full 
resistance to the ruling powers, not non-resistance. 
Jesus can be viewed as exercising a “non-violence” that is personally non-resistant, for 
the purpose of fulfilling the scriptures and thereby effecting salvation for all. His practices were 
also publicly confrontational, in order to assert his own, and his followers’, worth and dignity, 
to establish that their value was not determined by those who claim to be honourable (and in 
fact are not), and in order to incarnate the spiritual contest between good and evil. Ultimately, 
the peace of the apostolic church fails to mimic this standard of non-violence. It did not refrain 
from physical violence for the purpose of aiding or restoring third-parties to life, dignity and 
flourishing, either physically, spiritually or otherwise. While there was the assertion of dignity 
and self-determination of Jesus-followers through their choice to live counter-culturally, and 
to hold to the testimony of Jesus even if it cost their lives, unlike Jesus, the apostolic church 
did not act to confront the powers that exploited and oppressed.  
For these reasons, it unpersuasive that the apostolic church was a pacifist church, which 
followed the ways of Jesus, in the way that “pacifism” is employed by Christians today.  
3.4. The Patristic Period 
The patristic church fathers’ theology of non-violence was rooted in the church’s 
marginalized identity. As those at risk of persecution, the church deemed it impossible for the 
church itself to participate in persecution. Further, because of the risk of persecution, and in 
the face of possibly oppressive state power, church theology promoted flourishing of the spirit, 
and the fight of spiritual war, rather than material comfort on earth or physical battles and 
warfare. Whereas the early church’s non-violence emphasized the imminent hope of Jesus’s 
return, and the judgment of evil, the patristic church’s non-violence emphasized maintaining a 
particular Christian lifestyle. 349  The church merged its non-violence ethics, which was 
primarily concerned with peaceful interpersonal relations, no killing, and later no military 
service, with an ethics of personal piety and communal care.  
While there is not an extensive treatment of non-violence, violence and war in the 
corpus of the church fathers’ writings, historian Robert Clouse concludes that the early church 
was predominantly interested in the gospel’s teachings on love, which informed their teaching 
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on non-violence and war. “The early church saw an incompatibility between love and killing. 
Consequently, the early Christians would not serve in the Roman army. There is no evidence 
of a single Christian soldier after New Testament times, until about A.D.170.”  The intolerance 
towards Christian soldiering was a shift from the neutral position of the apostolic church, which 
seemed to follow the example of Jesus and John the Baptist and to make no requirement of 
refusal to serve in the military. The patristic church did not support social or political change 
through protest and uprising, and instead regularly signalled support for the Empire. 
Eventually, by the middle of the second century, the church showed an acceptance of military 
service. This signalled the changing relationship, and the inclusion, that Christians began to 
experience within the social order. Between the Apostolic period and the second century, 
however, the Christian church eschewed soldiering, war, and killing. 
3.4.1. Pre-Constantine Church Fathers 
It is quite common to find evidence at this pre-second century juncture, of the church’s 
vehement opposition to service in the military and to killing. Ronald Sider350 has compiled an 
exhaustive reference of the teachings of early church leaders with respect to the use of lethal 
violence. It includes the writing of The Didache, The Epistle of Barnabas, Justin Martyr, Tatian, 
Irenaus, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Juius Africanus, Archelaus, and many others. A 
few examples will suffice to establish the nature of the teaching. 
3.4.1.1. Justin Martyr 
Justin Martyr was born a gentile Samaritan in approximately 100 CE. He received a 
Greek education and subsequently became a Christian disciple. He taught in Rome before being 
martyred for refusing to sacrifice to the Roman Gods.351 Justin was one of the earliest martyrs 
of the church and set a precedent for non-resistance. From a letter to Trypho, who was Jewish, 
in arguing that Jesus was the messiah, Justin wrote the following:  
[We] Christians…having learned the true worship of God from 
the law, and the word which went forth from Jerusalem by 
means of the apostles of Jesus, have fled for safety to the God 
of Jacob and God of Israel; and we who were filled with war, 
and mutual slaughter, and every wickedness, have each through 
the whole earth changed our warlike weapons,—our swords 
into ploughshares, and our spears into implements of tillage,—
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and we cultivate piety, righteousness, philanthropy, faith, and 
hope, which we have from the Father Himself through Him 
who was crucified. Now it is evident that no one can terrify or 
subdue us who have believed in Jesus all over the world. For it 
is plain that, though beheaded, and crucified, and thrown to 
wild beasts, and chains, and fire, and all other kinds of torture, 
we do not give up our confession; but the more such things 
happen, the more do others in larger numbers become faithful, 
and worshipers of God through the name of Jesus.”352 
From this passage Justin Martyr’s understanding of conversion to the Christian faith as 
a holistically transformative experience is clear. What believers in Christ once were, they are 
no longer. Justin is concerned with the true worship of God, and belief in Jesus as the promised 
Jewish messiah. He considers suffering, specifically State terror, as a means through which 
others will come to believe in Jesus and to worship God. Thus, there is no need to fear 
persecution. Martyr’s reference to the long-ago-prophesied end of war, and weapons of war, 
(“swords into ploughshares, and our spears into implements of tillage”) is echoed in the writing 
of later patristics. 
Justin Martyr exemplifies a spiritually-inspired non-resistance to the persecution of the 
state. His might be a considered a non-resistance that copies the non-resistance of Jesus, in that 
it is performed with the intention that others will come to believe in Jesus, and in so doing find 
life and peace. His construal does not, however, fully conform to the paradigm established by 
Jesus. It does not embody Jesus’s confrontational ethos. Justin lifts up inner transformation, 
rather than Christ’s outworking of transformation of the social order. 
3.4.1.2. Clement of Alexandria 
Clement of Alexandria was likely born in Athens around 150 CE. He was educated in 
philosophy and poetry, travelled widely, and settled as a teacher of philosophy in Alexandria 
around 180 CE. 353  Origen was his most well-known student. 354  Clement’s writings are 
extensive, yet they contain very little on violence, war, or military service. Highlighted are  
examples from his works. 
In his Exhortation to the Greeks, Clement sets forth that the Christian is meant to 
engage in warfare that is spiritual, and in so doing the Christian imitates Christ. 
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The loud trumpet, when sounded, collects the soldiers, and 
proclaims war. And shall not Christ, breathing a strain of peace 
to the ends of the earth, gather together His own soldiers, the 
soldiers of peace? Well, by His blood, and by the word, He has 
gathered the bloodless host of peace, and assigned to them the 
kingdom of heaven. The trumpet of Christ is His Gospel. He 
hath blown it, and we have heard. “Let us array ourselves in the 
armour of peace, putting on the breastplate of righteousness, 
and taking the shield of faith, and binding our brows with the 
helmet of salvation; and let us sharpen the sword of the Spirit, 
which is the word of God” [cf. Eph. 6:14–17]. So the apostle in 
the spirit of peace commands. These are our invulnerable 
weapons: armed with these, let us face the evil one. Let us 
quench “the fiery darts of the evil one” with the sword-points 
dipped in water that have been baptized by the Word. . . . Better 
far, then, is it to become at once the imitator and the servant of 
the best of all beings; for only by holy service will anyone be 
able to imitate God, and to serve and worship Him only by 
imitating Him.355 
This passage is also notable in that he uses the image of Christ’s trumpet call not 
sounding the call of the final judgment, but the call to his peacemakers, who are to live arrayed 
in the armour of peace fighting their spiritual battles. The apostolic church’s expectation of 
Christ’s trumpet sounding the end of earthly life, the eschatological expectation, is completely 
absent. 
Later, in his Miscellanies, Clement writes: 
[T]he humane law orders to be relieved from military service: 
[for] military reasons in the first place, lest, bent on their 
desires,356 they turn out sluggish in war; for it is those who are 
untrammelled by passion that boldly encounter perils; and from 
motives of humanity, since in view of the uncertainties of war, 
the law reckoned it not right that one should not enjoy his own 
labours, and [that] another should…receive what belonged to 
those who had laboured. The law seems to also point out 
manliness of soul, by enacting that he who had planted should 
reap the fruit, and he that built should inhabit, and he that had 
betrothed should marry.… Does it not command us “to love 
strangers not only as friends and relatives, but as ourselves, 
both in body and soul?” …Accordingly, it is expressly said, 
“You shall not abhor an Egyptian, for you were a sojourner in 
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Egypt” [Deut. 23:7]; designating by the term Egyptian either 
one of that race, or any one in the world. And enemies, 
although drawn up before the walls attempting to take the city, 
are not to be regarded as enemies until they are by the voice of 
the herald summoned to peace [cf. Deut. 20:10].357 
In this mid-second century writing, Clement does not encourage Christians to refrain 
from soldiering and war, but rather recognizes military service as an obligation, a reversal of 
his previous position in Exhortation to the Greeks. He states the just rationales for the law’s 
release of men from military service, which include: their lack of focus on their military service, 
fairness, and the “manliness of soul” of enjoying the fruit of one’s labour. Further, he states 
that enemies must first be given terms of peace. Yet he does not object to war or to the killing 
of enemies, generally. 
Finally, in Who Is the Rich Man That Shall Be Saved?, Clement describes, again, the 
ideal of manly valour, saying it is the one who is ostensibly weaker that is in fact the man who 
is stronger in spirit: 
But be not deceived, thou who hast tasted of the truth, and been 
reckoned worthy of the great redemption. But contrary to what 
is the case with the rest of people, collect for thyself an 
unarmed, an unwarlike, a bloodless, a passionless, a stainless 
host, pious old men, orphans dear to God, widows armed with 
meekness, people adorned with love. Obtain with thy money 
such guards, for body and for soul, for whose sake a sinking 
ship is made buoyant, when steered by the prayers of saints 
alone; and disease at its height subdued, put to flight by the 
laying on of hands; and the attack of robbers is disarmed, 
spoiled by pious prayers; and the might of demons is crushed, 
put to shame in its operations by strenuous commands.358 
Clement notes instances of physical attack or peril, and then that the prayers of the 
saints, of the pious, weak, and old man, are the means of overcoming. By the prayers of such 
lowly persons “demons are crushed.” Thus, here Clement seems to again urge spiritual 
strength, rather than military or police defence.  
It appears that for Clement military service is not an irregular feature of the life of 
Christians. Rather, that it is accepted, with Clement arguing for a privileging of the spiritual 
life over the life that relies upon physical strength or human victory. Clement does not address 
                                               
 
357 Sider, The Early Church on Killing, chap. “Clement of Alexandria,” sec. Miscellanies, para. 218 citing 
ANF 2:365–67. 
358 Sider, chap. “Clement of Alexandria,” sec. Who Is the Rich Man..., para. 34 citing ANF 2:601. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
91 
non-resistance, nor does Clement speak to the issue of confrontation of the worldly powers for 
redress of wrongs against the marginalized. 
3.4.1.3. Tertullian 
Tertullian was born in Carthage, Roman North Africa in 160 CE. He was educated in 
Latin and Greek and became a Christian convert towards the middle of his life.359 A prodigious 
corpus of writing rather suddenly was begun following his conversion.360 Tertullian was the 
first Christian to write extensively in Latin. Writing around the same time as Clement, he is 
often presented as an unambiguous opponent of violence in the life of the Christian. Evidence 
for this is found in the regular treatment of military service and violence by Tertullian in both 
his earlier and later writings.361  
In his Apology, Tertullian wrote that Christians are enjoined “to pray to God for our 
enemies, and to beseech blessings on our persecutors.”362 In On the Spectacles, he notes of 
God: “He puts His prohibition on every sort of man-killing by that one summary precept, “Thou 
shalt not kill.” [64]363 In On Patience, he says, “If one attempts to provoke you by manual 
violence, the admonition of the Lord is at hand: “To him,” He saith, “who smiteth thee on the 
face, turn the other cheek likewise” [Matt. 5:39]. Let outrageousness grow weary from your 
patience. Whatever that blow may be, conjoined with pain and contumely, it shall receive a 
heavier one from the Lord. [68]”364 Here it is noteworthy that though Tertullian finds the 
Christian to be enjoined from reprisals or violent acts, he accepts without qualm that God acts 
harshly in vindication of the Christian. 
With regard to Christian involvement in military service, Tertullian is particularly clear. 
About this he says in On Idolatry: 
But how will a Christian man war, nay, how will he serve even 
in peace, without a sword, which the Lord has taken away? For 
albeit soldiers had come unto John, and had received the 
formula of their rule; albeit, likewise, a centurion had believed; 
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still the Lord afterward, in disarming Peter, unbelted every 
soldier. [76]365 
He is even more adamant in The Crown: 
Shall it be held lawful to make an occupation of the sword, 
when the Lord proclaims that he who uses the sword shall 
perish by the sword [cf. Matt. 26:52]? And shall the son of 
peace take part in the battle when it does not become him even 
to sue at law? And shall he apply the chain, and the prison, and 
the torture, and the punishment, who is not the avenger even of 
his own wrongs?...Shall he be disturbed in death by the trumpet 
of the trumpeter, who expects to be aroused by the angel’s 
trump?...Then how many other offenses there are involved in 
the performances of camp offices, which we must hold to 
involve a transgression of God’s law, you may see by a slight 
survey…Of course, if faith comes later, and finds any 
preoccupied with military service, their case is different…yet, 
at the same time, when a man has become a believer, and faith 
has been sealed, there must be either an immediate 
abandonment of it, which has been the course with many; or all 
sorts of quibbling will have to be resorted to in order to avoid 
offending God, and that is not allowed even outside of military 
service; or, last of all, for God the fate must be endured which a 
citizen-faith[92] has been no less ready to accept.366 
Tertullian here offers an extended list of the ways that military service is incompatible 
with the Christian faith. Notably, one of the ways he lists involves either awaiting the trumpet 
sounding either of death or of that sounded by the angels, referencing an eschatological hope 
beyond the grave. Tertullian makes an exception for military service for those who became 
believers after they had begun serving already, however even this exception is limited.  
Tertullian’s objection to military service is rooted in following the example of Christ. 
He does not offer objections based upon love, but the argument is implicit. He does not ground 
his argument in the salvation of others, nor does he address issues of confrontation of 
oppressive power. His argument is that peace is required for the Christian for the sake of peace, 
and the sake of following Christ’s example. 
3.4.1.4. Origen 
Origen was born to a Christian family in Alexandria in 185 CE. He was well educated 
in Greek culture and the Bible and was named by the bishop as master of the catechetical school 
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in Alexandria when he was eighteen.367 His extant writings are extensive, and include several 
documents which address violence, including Homilies on Joshua; On the Principles; 
Commentary on John; Commentary on Matthew; and Commentary on 1 Corinthians. His most 
notable work addressing violence and war, however, is Against Celsus, which he wrote in 
response to the pagan Celsus, who many years before had written a detailed attack of 
Christians, which included the objection that they shirked civic responsibility by refusing to 
participate in the military when the empire was rightfully engaged in defending against unjust 
attack. Throughout Origen’s writings, he emphasizes that killing is forbidden the Christian, and 
that Christian warfare is spiritual in nature. 
Because Origen read the Hebrew scriptures in a spiritual, allegorical, manner, he 
determined them to be consistent with the New Testament directives of peaceableness. In the 
Homilies on Joshua he states: 
[T]hose physical wars [in Jewish history] bore the figure of 
spiritual wars…For what good was that description of wars to 
those to whom Jesus says, My peace I give to you; my peace I 
leave to you [John 14:27], and to whom it is commanded and 
said through the Apostle, Not avenging your own selves [Rom. 
12:19], and, Rather, you receive injury, and, You suffer offense 
[cf. 1 Cor. 6:7]? In short, knowing that now we do not have to 
wage physical wars, but that the struggles of the soul have to 
be exerted against spiritual adversaries, the Apostle, just as a 
military leader, gives an order to the soldiers of Christ, saying, 
Put on the armour of God, so that you may be able to stand firm 
against the cunning devices of the Devil [Eph. 6:11].368 
Origen makes it clear that those he is addressing are not only beyond the times of war 
described in the Hebrew bible, but the implication is that they are also beyond the precarity of 
the Christians of the first century. They do not face war or insurrection, or have need or fear of 
physical warfare. It is spiritual warfare that they are charged with.  
Later in Against Celsus Origen again comments that Christians are to follow Jesus in 
the ways of peace: 
And to those who inquire of us whence we come or who is our 
founder, we reply that we are come agreeably to the counsels of 
Jesus, to cut down our hostile and insolent ‘wordy’ swords into 
ploughshares, and to convert into pruning hooks the spears 
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formerly employed in war. For we no longer take up sword 
against nation, nor do we learn war anymore, having become 
children of peace, for the sake of Jesus, who is our leader…369 
Here Origen cites the passage regarding turning “swords into ploughshares,” and notes 
that Christians no longer fight wars, but are children of peace “for the sake of Jesus, who is our 
leader.” His basis for adopting the agenda of peace, then, is the imitation of Christ. 
Origen also taught that Christians were forbidden to engage in military service, and that 
prayer was the Christian’s duty and rightful service. In reply to Celsus’ urging that Christians 
support the king in war, by fighting with him or leading an army, Origen states: 
[T]he more anyone excels in piety, the more effective help does 
he render to kings, even more than is given by soldiers, who go 
forth to fight and slay as many of the enemy as they can…Do 
not those who are priests at certain shrines…keep their hands 
free from blood, that they may…offer the appointed sacrifices 
to your gods...If that, then, is a laudable custom, how much 
more so, that while others are engaged in battle, these too 
should engage as the priests and ministers of God, keeping their 
hands pure, and wrestling in prayers to God on behalf of those 
who are fighting in a righteous cause, and for the king…that 
whatever is opposed to those who act righteously may be 
destroyed! And as we by our prayers vanquish all demons who 
stir up war, and lead to the violation of oaths, and disturb the 
peace, we in this way are much more helpful to the kings than 
those who go into the field to fight for them…we fight on his 
behalf, forming a special army—an army of piety—by offering 
our prayers to God.370 
Origen’s Against Celsus, is significant in several ways. First, in his argument he makes 
the claim that Christians, as “priests and ministers” of God, should be afforded the same recusal 
from military service as priests of other gods. In comparing the two he makes Christians the 
superlative. If the shrine priests do not fight, “how much more so” should Christians not fight. 
This seems to indicate an accepted norm for Christians; that they occupied an elevated place in 
the culture with respect to piety and ethics. At the same time, Origen’s arguments have the tone 
of those that might be made on behalf of a minority community seeking to avoid ostracism 
from the mainstream. It is a defence of the Christian community and lifestyle without any 
negative assessment of the mainstream. It is as though the Christians occupy an elevated status, 
but that their elevated status is precarious. 
                                               
 
369 Sider, chap. Origen, sec. Against Celsus, para. 5.33 citing ANF 4-558. 
370 Sider, chap. Origen, sec. Against Celsus, para. 73 citing ANF 4:667–68. 
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Additionally, Origen’s claims are internally inconsistent. He argues that they should 
not fight and kill, but also that they will labour spiritually, in prayer, for those who are fighting 
and killing. What is more, the spiritual “fighting” that the Christians do on behalf of those who 
are fighting and on behalf of the king, is of greater service than if they physically took up arms. 
Origen wants to maintain the Christian ideal, but also show support for the empire. The ideal 
seems to be fatally compromised by his attempt. 
Finally, Origen argues that Christians should not kill or fight, but says that they will 
fight, and “vanquish all demons” whom he identifies as those “who stir up war, [violate] oaths, 
and disturb the peace.” These grounds constitute a demonstration that Origen is loyal to the 
state and submissive to the state’s authority, unlike the “demons” who are not. While Origen 
is claiming to be following Jesus by refraining from physical violence and war, here he offers 
no rationale that is consistent with a rationale offered by Jesus’s life and teaching.  
Jesus never contemplated that his example should be accepted or rejected because his 
actions conformed to the standards of how imperial religious life was practiced. Origen claims 
that Christian practices should be accepted just because they are the same as imperial practice. 
There is no record that Jesus ever prayed for the success of the imperial army or for combatants, 
who went to war as a matter of course to gain peace. Origen asserts that praying for the army, 
combatants and the king is exactly what Christians do with vigour. Finally, there is no 
indication that Jesus would have defended the state’s purpose of defeating or punishing those 
who “stir up war” or those who “disturb the peace.” Jesus was arrested and convicted of being 
exactly one such person, after all. Jesus’s mission regularly involved disturbing the peace in 
the locations he visited. 
What might be considered consistent with the position of the apostolic church is that 
Origen seemed to write from an awareness of his position as precarious in the culture. Unlike 
the apostolic church, however, his precarious position did not include extreme social exclusion. 
It did not include an expectation of an imminent end to the persecution that resulted from such 
exclusion. Rather, Origen’s expectation was that the elevated position of the Christians, though 
precarious, must be sustained as far as possible. 
Origen was staunchly opposed to Christian violence and Christian participation in war. 
However, it is clear from his writings that though he upheld this Christian prohibition, he did 
not observe it in the sense of being opposed to fighting, killing, and war generally. Nor did he 
uphold in eschatological hope. He allowed that war and military service are necessary activities 
of the state, and for the non-Christian citizen. And he allowed that Christian “fighting” in prayer 
was equivalent, and superior to, physical fighting. He did this with care to preserve his social 
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position, rather than forsaking his social position and denouncing war and violence, for the 
sake of following the example of Christ. 
3.4.1.5. Conclusion 
From Justin Martyr to Origen several things are apparent. First, there was a dispersal 
of the church, and of Christian authority, throughout the Roman Empire, from Palestine to the 
northern region of Africa, to Turkey, to Rome, and beyond.371 The centres of gravity being 
Rome, Antioch, Alexandria, and Carthage in the second and third centuries.372 Second, the 
suffering that the church underwent during this period was deemed to be suffering beneficial 
to spiritual elevation. Unlike Jesus’s persecution, their suffering did not arise out of actions in 
the world seeking dignity and just care for the marginalized. Third, the warnings in James’s 
letter notwithstanding,373 the monied classes gained influence in the church and influenced the 
church’s development.374 After the second Jewish war (135 CE), non-Jewish Christians were 
                                               
 
371 Iraneus noted that “Christianity had spread beyond those fortified boundaries [of the Roman Empire] 
to the far west of North Africa (the regions known in Latin as Gaetulia and Mauretania), throughout the Iberian 
peninsula and ‘the diverse nations of the Gauls and the haunts of the Britons – 
inaccessible to the Romans, but subjugated to Christ’.” Morwenna Ludlow, The Early Church: The I.B.Tauris 
History of the Christian Church (I.B.Tauris, 2008) citing Ireneus, Against the Jews I.7. For more on the spread 
of the early church see, e.g., Roderic L. Mullen, The Expansion of Christianity: A Gazetteer of Its First Three Centuries 
(Brill, 2004); and Mark Edwards, “Christianity, A.D. 70-192,” in The Cambridge Ancient History: Volume 12, The 
Crisis of Empire, AD 193-337, ed. Alan Bowman, Peter Garnsey, and Averil Cameron, Second, vol. 12 (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 573–88. For an insightful discussion of the ecclesial dynamics at play 
between the churches, as demonstrated through the ordination of Origen, see, Lisa Holliday, “From Alexandria 
to Caesarea: Reassessing Origen’s Appointment to the Presbyterate,” Numen 58, no. 5/6 (2011): 674–96. 
372 Ludlow, The Early Church. 
373 James 2: 1-13: 
My brothers and sisters, do you with your acts of favouritism really believe in our 
glorious Lord Jesus Christ? 2 For if a person with gold rings and in fine clothes 
comes into your assembly, and if a poor person in dirty clothes also comes in, 3 and 
if you take notice of the one wearing the fine clothes and say, “Have a seat here, 
please,” while to the one who is poor you say, “Stand there,” or, “Sit at my feet,” 4 
have you not made distinctions among yourselves, and become judges with evil 
thoughts? 5 Listen, my beloved brothers and sisters. Has not God chosen the poor 
in the world to be rich in faith and to be heirs of the kingdom that he has promised 
to those who love him? 6 But you have dishonoured the poor. Is it not the rich 
who oppress you? Is it not they who drag you into court? 7 Is it not they who 
blaspheme the excellent name that was invoked over you? 
8 You do well if you really fulfil the royal law according to the scripture, “You shall 
love your neighbour as yourself.” 9 But if you show partiality, you commit sin and 
are convicted by the law as transgressors. 10 For whoever keeps the whole law but 
fails in one point has become accountable for all of it. 11 For the one who said, 
“You shall not commit adultery,” also said, “You shall not murder.” Now if you do 
not commit adultery but if you murder, you have become a transgressor of the law. 
12 So speak and so act as those who are to be judged by the law of liberty. 13 For 
judgment will be without mercy to anyone who has shown no mercy; mercy 
triumphs over judgment. 
374 “The survival of Christianity in its early days depended on the aid of wealthy benefactors.” Edward 
Moore, “Wealth and Poverty and the Value of the Person: Some Notes on the Hymn of the Pearl and Its Early  
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eager to emphasize the distinction between themselves and Judaism, and made more clear their 
distinct religious claims. Christianity became “Gentile.”375 Hierarchies in church structure, 
erudition of church leaders, and the building up of the church materially resulted. 
By the time of Origen’s letter to Celsus in the mid-third century, doctrine had become 
unmoored from Jesus’s example, from the context of enmity with the ruling elites, and 
unmoored from the expectation of Jesus’s imminent return. The concept of non-violence had 
shifted conceptually from non-resistance to being killed, to bearing arms and engaging in 
military killing.  Upholding the letter of the faith, and the tradition of not serving in the military 
and directly killing, became the predominant basis and rationale for claims of not fighting, the 
chief new goal of non-violence. 
The life of prayer was the way that the church approached a positive relationship with 
the culture. There was no confrontation of the powers, rather, by Origen’s writing in the third 
century, the powers were able to rely upon the full support of the Christians. Further, there was 
no eschatological expectation of the imminent return of Jesus, and of the righteous (and violent) 
judgment of God. In following Christ, the church’s following was not a following of self-
determination unto death that others might have life. Rather it was centred in an ethic of love. 
As Rhee notes, “Numerical growth, increasing penetration into the upper echelon of 
Roman society, and the emergence of a distinct material culture and collective property by 
Christians during this time period meant that Christians began to settle in as permanent citizens 
of the empire, not just to pass through the alien world as temporary sojourners.”376 
3.4.2. Post-Constantine Church Fathers 
Following Constantine’s ascendency to the throne in the early fourth century, the 
discourse of non-violence of the church continued to evolve and lessen in pacifist rigor. 
Acceptance of Christian engagement in war and killing, though often framed as a sudden shift 
following the rise of Constantine, was not sudden. Rather it was “the result of more than a 
century of prior political and military infiltration of the higher offices of state by Christians 
bearing arms.”377 As McGuckin points out, Diocletian’s persecution of Christians in the fourth 
                                               
 
Christian Context,” in Wealth and Poverty in Early Church and Society, ed. Susan Holman, Holy Cross Studies in 
Patristic Theology and History (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2013), 56; Helen Rhee, Loving the Poor, Saving 
the Rich: Wealth, Poverty, and Early Christian Formation (Baker Books, 2012), 77–96.  
375 Rhee, Loving the Poor, Saving the Rich, 87. 
376 Rhee, 95. 
377 John McGuckin, “Nonviolence and Peace Traditions in Early & Eastern Christianity,” Incommunion, 
December 29, 2004. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
98 
century began with those within his own court and army. Christians could be found serving 
important and influential roles in society.378 McGuckin questions whether it was Constantine 
that was the patron of the church, or whether it was the church that was the patron of 
Constantine. 379  Further, the secular physical violence penetrated the ecclesial space and 
resulted in violence between the official “Catholic” church and those deemed schismatic, such 
as the Donatists. 
In any case, it is clear that the theology of the church shifted to accommodate the stake 
the church had in participating in, thus preserving, its dominion in and through the Empire. 
Accordingly, where the grounds for warfare and the means of warfare were deemed morally 
just, Christian participation was not only allowed, but might be required. Ambrose, who was 
the first to articulate a Christian ethic of war, and Augustine who built upon Ambrose’s 
teaching, were key inaugural proponents of this “Christian Just War” tradition. Nonetheless, 
Christian non-violence, which meant to refrain from killing, remained the ideal, despite “just 
war” conditions having been established. 
3.4.2.1. Donatists 
As Shaw has exhaustively documented,380 the fourth century was rife with religious 
violence of the most brutal sort, including “speciﬁc acts of physical hostility – the threats, the 
beatings, the blindings, [and] the cuttings.”381 Not only were Christians adversaries of pagans 
and Jews, but Shaw shows the extensive Christian sectarian violence that transpired, related to 
the condemnation of “heretics.” There is debate about whether the violence was an integral part 
of the culture, or whether the violence was the result of the breakdown of the imperial systems, 
however, that violence is ever-present is not debated.382 
                                               
 
378 For example, "It is also telling that around the same time the canons of the regional council of Elvira, 
Spain, prescribed behaviors of landowners (can. 40, 49), slave owners (can. 5, 41), civic magistrates (duumvir; 
can. 56), and even provincial high priests of the imperial cult (flamen; can. 2, 4), which indicates that those most 
likely belonged to the local Christian communities." Rhee, Loving the Poor, Saving the Rich, 92. 
379 McGuckin, “Nonviolence and Peace Traditions in Early & Eastern Christianity.” 
380 See, Brent D. Shaw, Sacred Violence: African Christians and Sectarian Hatred in the Age of Augustine 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
381 Shaw, 3. 
382 For arguments regarding the normality of violence that emanates from religious authorities, see, 
Ramsay MacMullen, “The Historical Role of the Masses in Late Antiquity,” in Changes in the Roman Empire: 
Essays in the Ordinary (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1990), 250–76; and see, Neil McLynn, 
“Christian Controversy and Violence in the Fourth Century,” Kodai 3 (1992): 15–44, for arguments in favor of 
the view that violence was the result of exceptional circumstances that arose in the face of the breakdown of 
normal structures of authority. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
99 
While some separated themselves from society and lived in secluded devotion to God 
when the church ascended to ruling authority, others publicly contested the church’s alignment 
with the political system. Most notable of these were the Donatists.383 The Donatists were one 
of a number of movements384 that were seen as deviating from orthodox belief. Aside from 
those arising in earlier and later centuries, e.g., Gnosticism, Marcionism, Monophysitism, 
Nestorianism, etc., fourth century heresies included: 
• Arianism, first advanced by Arius (256-336) a priest of Alexandria, which 
denied the divinity of Jesus;  
• Apollinarianism, introduced by Apollinaris (310-390) a bishop of Laodicea in 
Asian Minor who held that human body, but not a human mind or free will, 
these were replaced by divine Logos. 
• Macedonianism, after Macedonius (d. c. 362) Arian bishop of Constantinople, 
which denied the divinity of the Holy Spirit. 
•  Pelagianism, taught by Pelagius (355-425) a monk from the British Isles, which 
denied the idea of Original Sin, and denied that divine grace in the soul was 
required to do good, among other beliefs. 
The Donatists, like the Novatianists of the third century, were a morally rigorous group 
with strict standards for inclusion in the church. They taught that the validity of the sacraments 
depended upon the moral character of the minister of the sacraments, and that sinners could 
not be members of the church if their sins are publicly known. The Donatists sought to create 
a pure church, separated from the corruption of the world. They were persecuted, as were earlier 
generations of Christians, and believed their persecution to be a mark of their identity as the 
                                               
 
383 Instructive is Gaddis’ note on the origination of the name: 
The name “Donatist” of course, was a label created by hostile polemicists. 
Orthodox heresiographers commonly stigmatized sects by naming them after their 
founders (e.g., for the other rigorist movements, “Novatians” after Novatus of 
Rome and “Melitians” after Melitius of Egypt) and thus denying them the name 
“Christian.” The Donatists preferred to call themselves the Church of the Martyrs. 
… I have thought it easiest to continue using the terminology most familiar to 
modern readers, with due recognition of its polemical origins. 
Michael Gaddis, There Is No Crime for Those Who Have Christ: Religious Violence in the Christian Roman 
Empire (University of California Press, 2005), 104, n.6. 
384 For details on the various heretical and schismatic movements, see, Justo L. Gonzalez, The Story of 
Christianity: Volume 1: The Early Church to the Dawn of the Reformation (Harper Collins, 2014); Dr Mark Edwards, 
Catholicity and Heresy in the Early Church (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2013); K. D. Whitehead, One, Holy, Catholic, and 
Apostolic: The Early Church Was the Catholic Church (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000). 
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true church. It has also been argued that the Donatist movement was not only religious in 
character but also related to Roman occupation and poor economic conditions; that it was a 
nationalist protest and rebellion against inequality. 385  For most of the fourth century, the 
majority of the Christian population in North Africa were Donatists.386  
Though the exact date of the beginning of movement is unclear,387 Donatists broke 
away from the “Catholic” church when members claimed that a bishop of Carthage, 
Caecilianus or Caecilian, was not a true bishop, since the bishop that ordained him was 
traditore (Latin: tradere, to hand over), or apostate.388 Believing the church institution was 
corrupt, the Donatists ordained their own bishops, including Donatus, after whom the 
movement was named. They regarded the church leaders of the “Catholic” church as “deserters 
to a religion which was not Christianity, but resembled the paganism of the persecutors fifty 
years before, and was sponsored by the Emperor.”389  
After an altercation with a “Catholic” churchman, and his imperial travel guard, the 
Donatists were persecuted and repressed by the State.390 Donatist leaders were sent into exile. 
The Catholic bishops declared an end to schism in 348 CE.391 The property of the Donatists 
was seized by the church. Then in 362 Emperor Julian allowed the Donatist to return, which 
prompted a wave of violence as the Donatists sought to gain control of church buildings, which 
likely belonged to them before they were expelled.392 The battles for the basilicas was bloody. 
Gaddis notes the oft cited example of the Damasus-Ursinus dispute of 366, which left one 
hundred and sixty dead in the Sicilian basilica in Rome.393  
For all their piety, however, the Donatists were not a strictly non-violent group. There 
was a contingent who were wandering ascetics willing to perform violent, fanatical acts—
                                               
 
385 W. H. C. Frend, The Donatist Church: A Movement of Protest in Roman North Africa (Clarendon Press, 
1971). But see, Arnold Hugh Martin Jones, Were Ancient Heresies Disguised Social Movements? (Fortress Press, 
1966), 6, and Maureen A. Tilley, The Bible in Christian North Africa: The Donatist World (Fortress Press, n.d.), 3.who 
disagree with the claim of nationalism and find the arguments of the Donatists to be primarily religious. 
386 Gaddis, There Is No Crime for Those Who Have Christ, 106; see also, Frend, The Donatist Church 
generally. 
387 W. H. C. Frend and K. Clancy, “When Did the Donatist Schism Begin?,” The Journal of Theological 
Studies 28, no. 1 (1977): 104–9. 
388 So called as one who, during the Diocletian persecution (303-305), escaped martyrdom by handing 
over his scriptures and writings to be burned as a sign of their renunciation of Christianity. 
389 W. H. C. Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church: A Study of Conflict from the Maccabees to 
Donatus (Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2014), 557. 
390 Gaddis, There Is No Crime for Those Who Have Christ, 106–8. 
391 Gaddis, 108. 
392 Gaddis, 119. 
393 Gaddis, 120, n.68. 
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including martyrdom by suicide and ritual martyrdom—in furtherance of their beliefs. The 
'circumcelliones agonistici', or Circumcillions “pursue[ed] the martyr's crown through the agon 
against the visible powers of evil.”394 The persistent acts of martyrdom of this group, and the 
moral influence they gained as a result of their acts, had the consequence of prompting the 
ecclesiastical authorities throughout the Roman world to take measures to retain for themselves 
“the power to decide who might and might not rightly be called a true martyr.”395 Augustine, 
who writes extensively against the Donatists, comments on the murders committed by the 
Circumcellions in resistance to missionary activity by the Roman church in a Donatist region. 
According to Augustine, they “laid ambushes for our bishops on their journeys, struck our 
fellow clerics with the cruellest blows, inflicted upon lay people most serious wounds, and set 
their buildings on fire.”396 
What the schismatic Donatists represent is resistance to the power of the empire, the 
claim of authority outside of ecclesial structure, and a desire for moral and spiritual 
distinctiveness among those who are called Christians. These are themes that will recur 
throughout subsequent centuries. They also represent the absence of a purely non-violent 
theology in the consciousness of the either party to the schism. 
3.4.2.2. Ambrose 
Aside from battling the Donatists, attacks against the western region of the Roman 
Empire by foreign invaders (“barbarians”) informed the post-Constantinian views of Ambrose, 
Augustine and others. Because of these invasions they decreed that forceful acts might be 
faithfully employed by Christians to repel invaders. During the fifth century, the Emperor’s 
subjection to the Bishop, or the state to the church, was unambiguously claimed by the Pope.397 
With the church having asserted ultimate authority over the governance of all, the bishops 
deemed it necessary to authorize the use of physical force to defend both the State and the 
church and its orthodoxy. 
                                               
 
394 Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church, 556. 
395 Gaddis, There Is No Crime for Those Who Have Christ, 119. 
396 Augustine, Enchiridion, XVII, in Fathers of the Church, Vol. 2, translated by Bernard M. Peebles (New 
York: Fathers of the Church, Inc., 1947), 382. 
397 Pope Gelasius articulated this in his Edict XII, reproving Emperor Anastasius, “There are indeed, 
most august Emperor, two powers by which this world is chiefly ruled: the sacred authority of the popes and the 
royal power. Of these the priestly power is much more important, because it has to render account for the kings 
of men themselves at the Divine tribunal. For you know, our very clement son, that although you have the chief 
place in dignity over the human race, yet you must submit yourself faithfully to those who have charge of Divine 
things, and look to them for the means of your salvation.” Stephen M. Feldman, Please Don’t Wish Me a Merry 
Christmas: A Critical History of the Separation of Church and State (NYU Press, 1998), 28. 
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Ambrose, born approximately 339 CE to a Roman Christian family, and was made 
Bishop of Milan in 374 CE.398 During Ambrose’s tenure as bishop, the, now Christian, Roman 
empire was under persistent threat from armies of “barbarians,” as well as from those following 
a heretical Arian Christianity. 399  To defend the orthodox faith, and the Christian nation, 
Ambrose re-formulated Christian teaching to enable the Christian empire to faithfully engage 
in war.400 Ambrose based his theological revisions upon classical philosophic ideas of justice 
and virtue. He also relied upon a literal reading of the Hebrew scriptures to legitimize 
engagement in warfare. Judas Maccabees, Joshua, even Moses were lauded for their military 
exploits. Of Moses, Ambrose wrote, “Thus holy Moses feared not to undertake terrible wars 
for his people’s sake, nor was he afraid of the mightiest kinds, nor yet was he frightened at the 
savagery of barbarian nations. He put on one side the thought of his own safety so as to give 
freedom to the people.”401 
Ambrose concluded that war must be entered for just reasons,402 it must be conducted 
via just means,403and that Christians must engage in violence to defend one another against 
aggression.404 In addition to the concept of non-violence being construed to allow for imperial 
civic duty, it was also allocated to the private realm, and to the priestly office. Violent means 
were endorsed for the defence of others and for the defence of State, (“For anyone who does 
not prevent an injury to a companion, if he can do so, is as much at fault as he who inflicts 
it.”).405 However, unlike Origen’s argument that all Christians, as priests and ministers, should 
                                               
 
398 Philip Schaff, ed., “Ambrose: Selected Works and Letters,” in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series 
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Library, 2009), 203. 
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be exempt from military service, Ambrose’s claim was circumscribed. He advocated only that 
those with clerical office should be exempt.406  
Self-defence continued to be disfavoured. Ambrose wrote:  
Some ask whether a wise man ought in case of a shipwreck to 
take away a plank from an ignorant sailor? Although it seems 
better for the common good that a wise man rather than a fool 
should escape from shipwreck, yet I do not think that a 
Christian, a just and a wise man, ought to save his own life by 
the death of another; just as when he meets with an armed 
robber he cannot return his blows, lest in defending his life he 
should stain his love toward his neighbour. The verdict on this 
is plain and clear in the books of the Gospel. "Put up thy sword, 
for every one that taketh the sword shall perish with the 
sword." What robber is more hateful than the persecutor who 
came to kill Christ? But Christ would not be defended from the 
wounds of the persecutor, for He willed to heal all by His 
wounds.407 
Ambrose asserts that the rationale for prohibiting violence for the purpose of self-
defence is that it risks a Christian “stain[ing] his love toward his neighbour.” Thus, it was the 
risk of the spoliation of virtue—the virtue of love, and the virtue of obedience to God (which 
for Ambrose was the foundation of all virtue),408 that made self-defence incongruous with a 
faithful Christian life. As Swift notes, for Ambrose “resisting an attacker amounts to preferring 
the human to the divine. By destroying the interior disposition of love, it vitiates the natural 
good of preserving one's own life.”409 
Ultimately, there are several key features of Ambrose’s reframing of Christian duties 
of violence (killing) and non-violence. Though Ambrose embraced the classical philosophical 
concept of the common humanity of all, he implemented variations that better served the 
interests of Christians. First, for him, the enemies of orthodox Christianity were enemies of the 
state and could be treated with alternate standards of justice that displayed less or no reverence 
for life. Second, by proscribing self-defence, limiting state coercion, and sanctioning soldiering 
to fight pagan insurrection, Ambrose attempted to ensure that no unjust harm by enemy or by 
fellow-citizen, should come to Roman Christians. Finally, Ambrose ensured the state’s 
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application of just standards when it came to engagement in violence against the Roman 
populace; the state should not unjustly persecute.410 By limiting the Emperor’s penal authority, 
Ambrose effectively imputed Christian ideals of non-violence, the legal protection of life, to 
all Roman citizens, provided they were not Arians, pagans, or Jews.411 
Ambrose’s tactics of non-violence sought to preserve the orthodoxy of the church, and 
to maintain the security of the state.412 His position is a complete about-face from the non-
violence in the life and teachings of Jesus. Jesus would likely have faced persecution and death 
due to his failure to adhere to orthodox teaching, by Ambrose’s standards. Further, the dual-
standard of non-violence, one applied to Christians another to non-Christians, was an 
innovation. Also, unlike Jesus, Ambrose did not advocate the use of personal or institutional 
power to confront injustice perpetrated against those who were marginalized. Ambrose’s basis 
for his teachings of non-violence were also innovative in that he relied more heavily upon the 
major philosophical ideas of his day in formulating his positions, and he introduced war 
ideology from the Old Testament to justify his teaching. There was no eschatological 
dimension to Ambrose’s teaching. 
3.4.2.3. Augustine 
Augustine, born to a devout Christian mother near Carthage in 354 CE,413 obtained the 
office of Bishop of Hippo in 391 CE.414 Augustine’s foundational theologies of non-violence 
and “just war” have been commented upon for centuries and continue to inform the ethics of 
States and of the Christian church with respect to violence and war.415  
For Augustine, war was often compelled and necessary, but not a true good. Richberg 
calls him a “reluctant just war theorist,” who often spoke about the regrettable necessity for 
                                               
 
410 This position of his may have been influenced by the recent persecution of the Roman Christians 
under Diocletian. 
411 Brown, “Ambrose, Bishop of Milan.” 
412 For a contrary view of Ambrose, see, Demacopoulos, who argues that Ambrose actually sought to 
limit, rather than valorize, violence by Christians. George E. Demacopoulos, “Constantine, Ambrose, and the 
Morality of War: How Ambrose of Milan Challenged the Imperial Discourse on War and Violence,” in Orthodox 
Christian Perspectives on War, ed. Perry T. Hamalis and Valerie A. Karras (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2017), 230–82. 
413 Philip Schaff, ed., “The Confessions and Letters of St. Augustine, With A Sketch of His Life and 
Work,” in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series One, Vol. 1, The City of God, Christian Doctrine, American, Digital, 
vol. 1, Early Church Fathers 1 (Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Classics, 1994), 13, 
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf210.html. 
414 Schaff, 15. 
415 Bainton, Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Re-Evaluation, 99. 
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warfare at all.416 “It is the iniquity on the part of the adversary that forces a just war upon the 
wise man,”417 says Augustine. Yet he cautions against military imperialism: 
It is a wicked prayer to wish for someone to hate or to fear so 
that there might be someone to conquer. If, then, by waging just 
wars, not impious or iniquitous ones, the Romans were able to 
acquire such a large empire, should not “the iniquity of 
foreigners” be worshipped like some goddess? Indeed, we see 
how much assistance she has given to the extension of the 
empire, making others into wrongdoers so that there might be 
someone to wage just wars against in order that the empire 
might grow.418 
Like Ambrose, Augustine deemed it possible for service in the military to be compatible 
with the faithful Christian life (“Do not think that it is impossible for anyone serving in the 
military to please God. Among those who did so was the holy David, to whom the Lord gave 
such great testimony”), 419  though the “greater place before God” rested with those who 
exercised the disciplines of Christian devotion (chastity, renouncing the world, etc.).420 But 
both those who serve in the military and those who serve in devotion serve the cause of battling 
the enemy. To Boniface, the high military commander in Africa,421 Augustine wrote, “Some, 
then, fight…against invisible enemies by praying; you toil for them against visible barbarians 
by fighting.”422  
Augustine understood the injunction to “turn the other cheek,” to mean not enjoining 
warfare, but as necessitating a particular “inward disposition” since “[t]he sacred seat of virtue 
is the heart.”423 Jesus’s passion, “sets the example of drinking this cup [of suffering], then 
hands it to his followers, manifesting thus, both in word and deed, the grace of patience.”424 
Patience, then, not non-violence (refraining from killing), was the preeminent virtue, and 
through this virtue God’s vindication would be secured. Non-violence for Augustine entailed 
                                               
 
416 Gregory M. Reichberg, Henrik Syse, and Endre Begby, The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary 
Readings (Wiley, 2006), 70–71. 
417 From City of God, book XIX, chap. 7. Reichberg, Syse, and Begby, 72. 
418 From City of God, book IV, chap.15. Reichberg, Syse, and Begby, 72. 
419 From Letter 189, to Boniface. Reichberg, Syse, and Begby, 74. 
420 Reichberg, Syse, and Begby, 74. 
421 Geoffrey D. Dunn, “Discipline, Coercion, and Correction: Augustine against the Violence of the 
Donatists in Epistula 185,” Scrinium 13, no. 1 (November 28, 2017): 115. 
422 From Letter 189, to Boniface. Reichberg, Syse, and Begby, The Ethics of War, 74. 
423 From Reply to Faustus the Manichean, book XXII, chap. 76, “City of God,” in Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Fathers, Series One, Vol. 2, The City of God, Christian Doctrine, ed. Philip Schaff, trans. Marcus Dods, American, 
Digital, vol. II, 1 (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1995), https://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf102.iv.html. 
424 Ibid. 
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taking no pleasure in violence, and having an internal peaceableness, rather than refraining 
from the use of force.  
The rationale cultivation of an inward disposition towards virtue, of the love of God 
and of eternal things instead of temporal things, also underlies Augustine’s rejection of the 
Christian defence of self. He emphasized that force should be used primarily in the defence of 
others. A passage from Augustine’s On Free Choice of the Will425 is particularly instructive on 
this point. In the passage, a discussion with interlocuter Evdious, Augustine questions whether 
                                               
 
425 Augustine On the Free Choice of Will, On Grace and Free Choice, and Other Writings, ed. and trans. Peter 
King, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 9–13: 
Augustine: …[F]irst of all, I think there should be a discussion whether a charging 
enemy or a murderer attacking from ambush may be killed without lust, but for the 
sake of one’s life, freedom, or chastity. 
Evodius: How can I think that people are free of lust if they fight ferociously for 
things that can be lost against their will? On the other hand, if such things cannot be 
lost, what need is there to resort to killing someone for their sake?  
Augustine: Therefore, the law is unjust which grants permission (a) to a traveller to 
kill a highway robber, so as not to be killed himself; (b) to any man or woman to 
slay a rapist in his onslaught, if possible, before enduring rape. Indeed, the law bids a 
soldier to kill the enemy, and if he holds back from this bloodshed he pays the 
penalties from his commander. Surely we will not dream of calling these laws unjust 
– or rather, not to call them “laws” at all, for a law that is not just does not seem 
to me to be a law. 
Evodius: …[T]he law is well protected against this kind of charge. [Offers defense of 
the justness of the law]. 
Yet even if the law is blameless, I do not see how the people involved can be 
blameless. The law does not force them to kill, but merely leaves it in their power. 
Hence they are free not to kill anyone for things they can lose against their will, 
which they should therefore not love. With respect to life, someone could perhaps 
be in doubt whether it is somehow taken away from the soul when the body dies. 
Yet if life can be taken away, it should be held of little worth. On the other hand, if 
it cannot, there is nothing to fear. With respect to chastity, well, seeing that it is a 
virtue, who would doubt that it is located in the mind itself? Therefore, it cannot be 
taken away by a violent rapist. … In the end, I do not find fault with the law that 
permits such people [attackers] to be killed. Yet I have not found any way to defend 
those who do the killing. …. They have been stained with human blood for the sake 
of things that should be held of little worth. Therefore, it seems to me that a law 
drafted to govern society rightly permits these things, and also that divine 
providence rightly redresses them. The former [human law] has in its scope 
redressing deeds sufficiently to maintain peace among unenlightened people...The 
other faults, however, have different penalties appropriate to them, from which 
wisdom alone, it seems to me, can free them.  
Augustine: I approve and endorse this distinction of yours…that the law that is 
enacted to govern states tolerates and leaves unpunished many things, which are 
nevertheless redressed by divine providence (and rightly so)….Then let us call a law 
temporal if, although it is just, it can justly be changed in the course of time… 
Evodius: Fine.  
Augustine: Well, consider the law referred to as “supreme reason.”425 It should 
always be obeyed; through it good people deserve a happy life and evil people an 
unhappy one; and finally through it temporal law is both rightly enacted and rightly 
changed. Any intelligent person can see that it is unchangeable and eternal. Can it 
ever be unjust that evil people are unhappy while good people are happy? Can it 
ever be unjust that an orderly and responsible society sets up governing officials for 
itself while a dissolute and worthless society lacks this privilege?  
Evodius: I see that this law is eternal and unchangeable. 
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it is just to kill another for the sake of one’s life, freedom, or chastity. He concludes that such 
killing is an attempt to cling to a thing that can be lost—a temporal thing. Killing to hold onto 
what is temporal is a sign of lust,426 or corrupted passion. It is not virtuous. Augustine is 
concerned for the eternal good, above the temporal good, and makes a distinction between the 
human law, which is concerned with temporal good, and the divine law, which is concerned 
with the eternal.427 Virtuous action, whether involving physical harm and violence or not, must 
be concerned with the eternal. 
This reasoning has significant bearing on Augustine’s position supporting the use of 
coercive force against the heretical Donatist faction. Though both “Catholics”428 and Donatists 
engaged in “nearly identical” acts of physical violence, Augustine insisted “that the Donatists 
engaged in illegitimate violence while the [Catholics] engaged in legitimate violence, better 
described simply as correction.”429 The action of the dominant “Catholics” was legitimized by 
its characterization as corrective and not punitive, which distinction turned on the intention and 
motivation of the ones inflicting the forceful act.430 “[S]imply to attack and cause terror or to 
punish was violence indeed, but to act so as to prevent further violence or to seek to rehabilitate 
was correction.”431 For Augustine, in matters of war and violence, “motive was everything.”432 
Because Augustine believed that there were military virtues, and that valorous military 
service was possible and necessary, Augustine delineated an ethics of “Just War.” His writings 
establish three jus ad bellum criteria, or legitimate preconditions for engaging in warfare: 
                                               
 
426 “The Latin word libido…[or] ‘lust,’ refers in Augustine’s works not only to illicit sexual desire but to 
any disordered love which prefers lower or temporal goods to divine or eternal ones.” Lower goods can be lost 
against one’s will, higher good can only be voluntarily surrendered. See, Augustine, Augustine: Political Writings, ed. 
Ernest L. Fortin and Douglas Kries, trans. Michael W. Tkacz (Indinapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1994), 213. 
427 This passage is often also referenced in discussions of the distinction made by Augustine between 
divine law and natural law, which discussion is only tangential to the matter of Christian (non)violence that is 
under consideration in this section. 
428 Dunn, following Tilley, argues that the group opposing the Donatists should, in fact, be referred to as 
Caecalianists, not Catholics, since both sides at the time claimed the appellation of ‘catholic.’ “If we accept the 
term Donatists for one group, named after Donatus (315-355), even though it was Donatus’ predecessor, 
Majorinus (311-315), who became the first of the rival bishops, we ought to call the other group Caecilianists, 
named after Caecilianus (311c. 336). Dunn, “Discipline, Coercion, and Correction,” 117. 
429 Dunn, 117. 
430 I do not describe these particular acts as “violence” since use of the term imputes a negative moral 
color, which is exactly the opposite of what Augustine intended in his distinctions as to legitimacy of particular 
acts of force. See, Shaw, Sacred Violence. for a comprehensive treatment of the widespread sectarian violence in 
North Africa during Augustine’s era; and see, Cam Grey, “Shock, Horror, or Same Old Same Old? Everyday 
Violence in Augustine’s Africa,” Journal of Late Antiquity 6, no. 2 (2013): 216–32, for discussion of the relationship 
between everyday violence and more reified (non)violence. 
431 Dunn, “Discipline, Coercion, and Correction,” 124. 
432 Dunn, 124. 
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proper authority, just cause, and right intention. He also describes features that could constitute 
jus in bello, just conduct during warfare. He regards ambush, and combat ruses, as ethically 
unimportant,433 and states in his letter to Boniface that agreements, even with enemies, must 
be kept, and that mercy should be shown.434 
What is distinctive about Augustine’s formulations of violence and non-violence, is that 
Augustine privileges internal dispositions, rather than outward conduct, as determinative of 
right actions. Further, Augustine had great concern for incorporating the ideals of peace, love, 
and justice into the waging of war. He concluded that war must only be waged to restore peace 
(“the desired end of war is peace, for everyone seeks peace, even by waging war, but no one 
seeks war by making peace,”435) it must have love of God as a motive (and not “love of 
violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and the lust of 
power, and such like,”436) and it must secure justice, which Augustine viewed as represented 
by the cause fought for by only one side or party to a conflict.437  
Ultimately, Augustine made allowances for warfare and violence in the life of the 
Christian, and distinguished the motivations for actions from the acts themselves. It was not 
killing, but killing with the wrong intent or attitude, that was objectionable. Self-defense 
constituted killing with the wrong attitude, as it entailed preferring the temporal, life or chastity, 
to the eternal, the virtue of love. 
3.4.2.4. Conclusion 
While during the apostolic church period there was the practice of non-resistance to 
persecution, the movement away from non-resistance, as ideology, began during the second 
century, and turned toward the refusal to kill. This movement away from non-resistance and 
killing, reached a theological apogee in the doctrinal formulations of Augustine. Though it is 
common to view the move away from the refusal to kill as occurring through the advent of 
Constantine as emperor, the transition was gradual and progressive.  
                                               
 
433 From Question on the Heptateuch, book VI, chap. 10. In Reichberg, Syse, and Begby, The Ethics of War, 
83. 
434 From Letter 189, to Boniface. Reichberg, Syse, and Begby, 79. 
435 From City of God, book XIX, chap. 12. In Reichberg, Syse, and Begby, 79. 
436 From Against Faustus the Manichean, bk, XXII, chap. 74. Reichberg, Syse, and Begby, 73. 
437 Bainton, Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Re-Evaluation, 98–99. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
109 
3.5. Conclusion of Early Church Period Non-violence Analysis 
Restoration of peace, love of God, and securing dignity and justice were all aims of 
Jesus’s mission on earth. Yet, for Jesus, the enemy was not the marginalized whose beliefs 
were unorthodox, whose ethnicity was Palestinian like his, nor those whose faith was not his 
own. Jesus lived, taught, and used his power in defence of such “Othered” persons when they 
were marginalized because of their difference. That the patristics and those following did not 
do the same, is the great divergence between their teaching and Christ’s. 
What this historic overview demonstrates is that during the first 400 years of the church, 
pacifism theologically rooted in Christian love of neighbour is a myth. In the apostolic church, 
the church was threatened with persecution from local Jewish authority and from the imperial 
state. The church refrained from physical violence, in expectation of Christ’s imminent return 
and his destruction of both threats. Their non-violence was the act of expedience and fugitivity. 
Non-violence was not grounded in Christian love.  
This church period’s conduct comes closest to what many conceptualize when it comes 
to the non-violence of the gospel and the non-violence of the church. It is important to 
remember that the period of this church was brief. The church was highly precarious, life was 
unstable, and the expectation of Jesus’s imminent return was high. Also, as much as peace was 
attempted to be fostered, a key component of the Jesus’s work was entirely neglected by this 
church, and that was the confrontation of authority. By failing to confront authority the church 
failed to challenge the systems that created conditions of marginalization in the culture. 
Creation of an alternate counter-culture, in lieu of confrontation of the dominant violent social 
order, was not the example of Jesus. The community life turned inward was an innovation 
meant to secure the lives and wellbeing of church members against their persecutors. 
In the patristic early church, the church was threatened with persecution from the 
imperial state. There was little expectation of Christ’s imminent return or of destruction of the 
power of the state. To manage its place of marginalized precarity, the church embraced the 
doctrine of refraining from violence. The basis was no longer God’s imminent impending 
vengeance but transformed instead to the idea of Christian love. The church was not opposed 
to war generally, but merely to the Christian involvement in war and killing. In the church of 
the empire, unlike in the fugitive church or the marginalized church, the church was not 
threatened with persecution, from either local or state authority. The threat to the church, and 
the state, was of foreign invasion. There was no longer a need to secure its survival by 
withdrawing or by accommodation. Such practices would ensure the opposite, the church’s 
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demise. Accordingly, to secure its survival, the church legitimized violence and killing, as long 
as the grounds for doing so were those that could be understood as just. 
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4. Theological Conceptions of Non-violence from Late 
Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages 
This section will review the period from late antiquity to the Middle Ages. The church 
split during this period. The research follows the development of the Western church. However, 
a short consideration of the Eastern church is also presented in this section. 
4.1. Introduction 
Constantinian peace was soon disrupted in the Western part of the empire by invaders 
from the north. A political and ecclesiastical challenge to authority resulted in unrelenting 
warfare in the West for several hundred years. During this period the church in the West placed 
few limits on warfare. Following Augustine, the church embraced the doctrine that war was 
the necessary duty of the Christian when the region or church is threatened by outsiders. 
Though Christian non-violence was not practiced, Christian peace remained idealized, 
particularly by those in monastic communities. Because of the unrelenting warfare and violence 
in the West, peace primarily came to mean law and order.  
The Eastern part of the Empire was not threatened by the northern invaders in the way 
that the church of the West was during this period. Political and ecclesiastic stability resulted 
in the Eastern church’s development of a more nuanced theology with respect to war. 
Augustine’s theory of the just war was never a guiding principle for the Eastern church. Over 
time as the East faced foreign invasions, allowances were made for Christian engagement in 
warfare to defend the Empire against invading pagans. Soldiering and killing remained evils, 
however, though necessary and pardonable. Those who had killed while soldiering were 
required to penitentially refrain from the Eucharist for a three-year period following the end of 
their military duties. Also, there was no recognition of soldiers as martyrs. This differed from 
the West, where the church taught that soldiers would earn their salvation by acting in the 
service of God in war. 
Ultimately, the church of the West and the church of the East both made theological 
concessions to allow for Christian engagement in killing. The West removed censure nearly 
entirely, composing a theology that could support killing in the name of Christ. As a result, the 
quest for peace became culturally important. The sovereign, clerics, and monasteries all sought 
to maintain control and authority over shaping the contours, and controlling the dispensation, 
of peace. The East made a concession to warfare out of necessity, yet theologically retained a 
prohibition on killing. Ecclesial repentance was prescribed for soldiers in acknowledgment of 
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the church’s standard of peace. In the East and West heretical sects438  arose that refused to 
engage in violence. Both churches deemed the sects’ anti-violence positions to be proof of their 
heretical beliefs and practices. 
4.2. Early Middle Ages and the Western Church 
4.2.1. Monasticism 
Ascetic life has been a feature of Christianity beginning with John the Baptist and Jesus, 
who both practiced solitude, prayer, and renunciation of wealth. With the changes to the 
character of Christianity in the fourth century, was added the rise of monasticism. Monasticism 
was for some “their expression of the rejection of the new order.”439 Preferable to the church 
ruled by imperial bishops was the simplicity and spiritual purity of life lived in separation from 
the empire’s order and systems.  
4.2.1.1. Monasticism and Peace 
Monastery life became a common alternative for lay persons of the Christian faith. 
From the Greek, monos, the term refers to those who live apart from the world.440 Monasteries 
took form in two different settings early in its development. Seclusion was generally sought 
either near or in a town (cenobitic) or deep in the countryside or desert (anchoritic).441 There 
was great variety in the styles and locations of monastic practice, however.442 Despite the 
variations in the practice, the intention of the monastic habit was the same for all: separation 
from the world and the focused seeking after God.443 
                                               
 
438 For the purposes of this paper, sect will follow the definition first articulated by Weber and 
Troeltsch, and built upon by sociologists over time. Sects are those groups that split off from older established 
religious body for the purpose of purifying or re-establishing the old faith. See, Rodney Stark and William Sims 
Bainbridge, “Of Churches, Sects, and Cults: Preliminary Concepts for a Theory of Religious Movements,” Journal 
for the Scientific Study of Religion 18, no. 2 (1979): 117–31, https://doi.org/10.2307/1385935; Charles Sarno and 
Helen Shoemaker, “Church, Sect, or Cult? The Curious Case of Harold Camping’s Family Radio and the May 21 
Movement,” Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions 19, no. 3 (February 1, 2016): 6–30, 
https://doi.org/10.1525/nr.2016.19.3.6. 
439 Darryl J Pigeon, “Cyprian, Augustine, and the Donatist Schism,” Ashland Theological Journal 23 (1991): 
37. 
440 Wand, A History of the Early Church to AD 500, 192; J. William Harmless, “Monasticism,” in The 
Oxford Handbook of Early Christian Studies, ed. Susan Ashbrook Harvey and David G. Hunter (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 493. 
441 Harmless, “Monasticism,” 493. 
442 Harmless notes that the tendency to form a linear narrative of the development of monasticism, 
beginning with Athanasius’ account of Antony in the desert in Egypt leading straight to the Rule of Benedict in the 
Latin West, is “wrong.” Harmless, 497. Rather, the development is “full of twists and turns and gaps in the 
historical record.” Harmless, 498. 
443 Jean Leclercq, “The Monastic Crisis of the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries.,” in Cluniac Monasticism in 
the Central Middle Ages, ed. Noreen Hunt (Springer, 2016), 217. 
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The lifestyles of monastics were therefore ascetic. “Monastic life required from the 
outset, stark renunciations: of family, property, marriage, career.” 444  Monastics usually 
renounced sex as well. 445  For those who lived in community, life was ordered around a 
common schedule. It included time devoted to worship, prayer, work, and study. St. Basil 
established a Rule of order in the fourth century that emphasized monks having a common 
roof, table, worship, and fixed hours for meals.446 St. Benedict’s famous Rule from the sixth 
century, builds upon Basil’s and became the standard for monastery life in the West. Benedict’s 
rule divided the day into separate periods allocated to communal and private prayer, sleep, 
spiritual reading, and his greatest innovation, manual labour. The Greco-Roman norm 
regarding labour was that it was the province of the slave and demeaning to any free person 
who performed it. Benedict’s rule, which restored dignity to labour, was revolutionary. Labour 
was no longer an inescapable drudgery, but an integral part of the spiritual formation of the 
person.447 As White notes, the monks were the artisans who made Europe.448 
Monasteries became locations, in a landscape of total violence, where men and women 
found space to focus on devotional development, where they were independent of the authority 
of political sovereigns, were economically self-sustaining, and where culture and learning were 
fostered. The monasteries were essentially havens of peace and tranquillity in the midst of 
warring hostilities beyond their walls. Because of its potential for nurturing habits of spirit, 
soul, and body that lead to life, though transforming over the centuries, it remained a feature 
of the Christian tradition. 
4.2.1.2. Violence and Boundary Enforcement 
It is important to note, however, that even those who lived as monks and ascetics were 
participants in conduct that was at times physically violent directed towards the unorthodox, 
pagans, Jews, Muslims, and others. Such “ascetic militants,” as Sizgorich describes,449 served 
their communities in these violent roles. The cleric, as well as the monk and that ascetic, rather 
                                               
 
444 Harmless, “Monasticism,” 493. 
445 The influence of gnostic thought resulted in the perception of the physical body, and therefore sex, 
as impure as compared to the purity of the spirit. Also, the life of unmarried celibacy was seen as most desirable 
as it followed the pattern of Jesus and Paul. See, Wand, A History of the Early Church to AD 500, 192–93. 
446 Wand, 196. 
447 For description of the significance of the ideological and technological importance of the redemption 
of labor, , Lynn T. White, “The Significance of Medieval Christianity,” in The Vitality of the Christian Tradition, ed. 
George F. Thomas (New York: Harper, 1941), 87–115. 
448 White, 198. 
449 Thomas Sizgorich, Violence and Belief in Late Antiquity: Militant Devotion in Christianity and Islam 
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 108. 
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than the lay person, was expected to maintain the proper doctrinal boundaries for the 
community. It was this group of religious devotees that was meant to discern which baptism, 
feast or fast was the true baptism, feast or fast, since all were not the same. Theirs was a duty 
to “command right and forbid wrong.”450 Part of this entailed exacting a physical penalty or 
reprisal from those who were found to have transgressed the true faith—whether outsiders or 
Christians. A story of a wayward monk is illustrative. 
In the eighth century, living under Muslim rule, the Syrian 
ascetic Timothy of Kākhushtā corrected a wandering ascetic 
who had fallen into heretical error by chaining him to his pillar 
and having two attendants beat the wanderer “with all their 
might and strength” until he saw the light.451 
The ascetic awareness of the expectation of holding firm boundaries and punishing 
transgression, at times meant that that ascetic went against the will of the community in meting 
out punishment. In these cases, it was common for the community that objected to the violence 
performed to be labelled “weak Christians.”452 
4.2.1.3. Martyrdom and Mutilation 
Additionally, the ascetic of fervent devotion, was commonly portrayed as his own 
physical brokenness of the most graphic sort. Szigorich postulates that the graphic depiction of 
the disfigurement or martyrdom of the aesthetic is a way to make visible that which is 
inherently invisible. For example, in describing the feet of Thomas the Armenian we learn: 
“His feet were like charred columns, being thick and black, 
until after ten years they used to discharge a large quantity of 
matter, and were as if they were not his, since he was smitten 
with severe ulcers, and would not concern himself even to wash 
off that discharge, and to apply a poultice.”453 
As torture unerringly reveals truth, so the graphic rendering of an aesthetic’s, monk’s, 
or martyr’s suffering and physical ablation, distinguishes the true faithful ones from the false.454  
4.2.1.4. Conclusion 
Ultimately the monastics served a stabilizing role in the culture, while not being 
removed from the violence that permeated their world. 
                                               
 
450 Sizgorich, 115. 
451 Sizgorich, 113–14 citing, The Life of Timothy of Kākhushtā, Saidnaya Version, 45, ed. and trans. John C. 
Lamoreaux and Cyril Cairala, PO 48.4 (Turnhout, 2000), 604–9. . 
452 Sizgorich, 110. 
453 Sizgorich, 126 citing John of Ephesus, Lives of the Eastern Saints, 21, PO 17, 291. . 
454 Sizgorich, 125. 
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4.2.2. Monastic, Ecclesial, Civil, and Heterodox Non-violence Evolution 
During the fifth century, the idea of not participating in violence was not operative. 
There was the idea of an imperial peace, which the church accepted as the opportunity for a 
Christian peace, the inauguration of “a new societal order which was to last until the 
Parousia.”455 The imperial peace which the church hoped in was far from non-violent, however: 
normative imperial ideology justiﬁed and indeed demanded the 
use of violence against those thought to threaten peace and 
consensus. Emperors both pagan and Christian sought above all 
to achieve unity and concord, in religion as in secular politics, 
and were willing to use repressive and coercive means to this 
end.456 
As Gaddis points out, the imperial peace valued “hierarchy, authority, stability, and 
unity”457 above all else, and physical force was the means to secure it. When the responsibility 
for bringing and maintaining peace shifted from political to ecclesial spaces, the violence used 
to secure the peace remained consistent. The ecclesia remained the keepers of the idea of peace, 
and the chief arbiters of what violence was for the sake of peace and what violence was a 
disruption to the peace, until the first millennium. At that time, papal peace and monastic peace 
declined, and secular “public” peace replaced it.458 
4.2.2.1. Peace in “Recession” 
Despite the sanction of defensive warfare by Christian authorities, invading forces 
sacked Rome in 410 CE.459 The invasions did not end with Rome’s sacking, but continued 
unabated, until, finally, there was a dissolution of the western Roman Empire in 476 CE when 
the last Roman emperor in the West, Romulus Augustulus (c.460 CE) was deposed. 460 
Throughout late antiquity persistent violence occurred through intra-Christian conflicts, 
Muslim conquests, and the raids of the Vikings. 461  Because of the military urgency, 
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legitimation of the use of physical force to repel the pagan and/or heretical invaders continued 
and expanded.462 
From late antiquity to the early middle ages, pacifism, says Bainton, was “in 
recession”463 and violence and warfare were ubiquitous.464 After successfully making war 
against the empire, the invading Visigoth, Ostrogoth, Lombard, Suevi, Vandal, Frank, Saxon, 
Angle, and Jute hordes, whether adhering to orthodoxy, non-orthodox Christianity, or 
paganism, proceeded to war against one another.465 Bainton notes that the weakness of the 
political structure enabled the church to assume a unifying role. As he sees it, the church 
became the “architect and moulder of our civilization. The church was heir to the unity of 
Rome...Through many centuries she sought to convert, tame, and unite the Northern peoples. 
Her success was Christendom.”466  
Thus, in the West, the church assumed the role of central governing authority, in lieu 
of the authority of an imperial state. The church’s success at forging Christendom467 was 
wrought by the hands of churchmen/tribesmen intent upon conquest and power. Bainton’s 
descriptive pose is worthy of citation in this regard. In his description, the conquering men 
“were bellicose and utterly devoid of any feeling for the beatitude upon the meek…[the cross] 
they regarded…not as a yoke to be placed upon their pugnacity, but as an ensign to lead them 
to battle.”468 The Christian God retained pre-eminence through the adherence of warriors, those 
believing that the Christian God brought them to victory in battle against their non-Christian 
adversaries. The condition emerged that successful warriors were Christian warriors, and that 
successful Christian warriors became rulers and kings. For the Merovingian kings, who united 
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Gaul and ruled for three hundred years between the fifth and eighth centuries,469 “war was 
considered the normal state of affairs. Peace was something a king could grant to a person or 
group.”470  
This view of peace as the respite from battle was offset by that of the institutional church 
and by those who sustained the monastic tradition, which viewed peace as including the repose 
of the soul. It was the church that cultivated and kept alive the notion of peace, as something 
other than order, during the early medieval war-entrenched centuries. 
4.2.2.2. Monastic Attempts at Peace 
The role of the monastics and the ecclesia in pursuing peace was undefined until the 
seventh century. During the seventh century Gregory I (c.540–604), or Gregory the Great, 
married monastic and ecclesial ideals 471  by outlining ascetic practices necessary for the 
cultivation of inward peace, and then instructing that the pastoral call should be preceded by 
seeking peace, as the beginning of other virtues.472 For Gregory, “[t]he pastor who is not an 
ascetic may lose his soul while performing his normal duties of preaching, eradication of 
paganism and heresy, administering his church, defending the helpless, regulating monasteries, 
arbitrating conflicts, and admonishing lay rulers.”473 Under Gregory’s leading, the monastic 
ideal of inward peace was the means employed by the ecclesia to accomplish the work of peace, 
and to make peace more than the secular sovereign’s cessation of warfare and violence. 
In the seventh century, there is evidence of monastic attempts at juridical creation of 
peace terms. In 697 CE, the abbot of Iona, Adomnán, established an ecclesial standard to 
temper the conduct of warfare and violence. The Abbott introduced in Ireland and Britain a 
‘Law of the Innocents’ (the “Cáin Adomnáin” or “Lex Innocentium”), which was aimed at 
protecting women, as well as clergy and children, from the violence of war. The Cáin set forth 
prohibitions restricting what women could be subjected to in society, including soldiering, 
magical curses, rape and sexual assault, and also set out punishment for violations, even 
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violations committed during war.474 Adomnán did not object to the idea that war could be 
waged by legitimate authorities. His objective was to establish a protected status for non-
combatants.475 
Because of the instability and violence common in a society where most thought it 
laudable and virtuous to kill Vikings, Magyars, or Saracen infidels, the concern for peace was 
of interest to many. “Peace was idealized because it was hard to find.”476  
Peaceful monasticism flourished. Monastics decried the failure of the ecclesia to keep 
the peace of King Charlemagne who had died in 814. Many retreated in greater numbers to 
monastic community. 
By 900 the monks had long abandoned any attempt to apply 
their peace to society at large. Indeed, they are fond of 
contrasting their perfect way with the false peace of a 
hopelessly corrupt world…With their version of inner 
tranquillity and personal union with God they stressed the gap 
which existed between them and the external peaces of both 
prelatial Church and secular society…many monks professed 
an ideal of detachment in the midst of increased secularization 
and localization.477 
The Cluniacs, founded in 910 CE, are an example of a monastic order symbolic of peace 
and unity during the chaotic 10th and 11th centuries.478  The Cluniacs followed in the ascetic 
tradition, and aimed at detachment from the world.479 Yet they also had a strong social impact, 
being led to make “demands for clerical liberation from lay control, and for higher standards 
of monastic and clerical conduct,” 480 particularly under abbot Peter the Venerable.481 The 
reforms of the Cluniacs spread throughout the highest echelons of the church under Pope 
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Gregory VII (the “Gregorian” reforms). 482  During the tenth and eleventh centuries Cluny 
amassed wealth and influence, and became the veritable capital of monasticism, with some ten 
thousand monks and six hundred monasteries throughout Western Europe.483 
4.2.2.3. Ecclesial and Civil Attempts at Peace 
The ecclesial and civil authorities also made attempts to pursue peace in the midst of 
the region’s extreme violence. Asserting the need for an effective peace keeper, in 751, Pope 
Zachary crowned monastery educated Pepin the Short, king.484 Pope Zachary’s standard of 
peace was the ecclesial peace, rather than the peace of the Merovingian kings.485 Pepin’s son 
and successor, Charles, founded the Charlemagne dynasty and brought unity to much of the 
Latin speaking world. Pepin, and even more so Charles, understood the kingship not merely as 
a means to prevent local violence, but as enabling Christ’s peace on earth, which the king’s 
power could implement by means of coercive force if necessary. 486  In Charles’ 
conceptualization, “Christian society and imperial political order were intertwined.” 487 
Charlemagne led campaigns into Muslim Spain and into Saxony to the east, where his conquest 
forced Christianization upon the Saxons upon pain of death.488 (see, Figure 4-1) 
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Figure 4-1 Charlemagne's Forced Baptism 
de Neuville, Alphonse: “Charlemagne imposes baptism 
on the Saxons.” in Guizot, François: L'histoire de 
France racontée à mes petits-enfants, vol. 1, Paris, 
1877 (The story of France told to my grandchildren, 
vol. 1, Paris, 1877)489 
 
Charlemagne unified most of western Europe for the first time since the demise of the Holy 
Roman Empire. He assumed the title of Holy Roman Emperor in 800.490  
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“Charlemagne’s clergy were…active participants in the enforcement of peace,”491 
though his peace policies were perceived as overreach by the church. To reassert authority, the 
church adopted, in 829 CE, the Council of Paris. The Council of Paris articulated a vision of 
how a bishop was to fulfil his office. It asserted the difference between the spheres of the 
sovereign and the bishop.492 The Council of Paris made the episcopacy the rightful defender of 
the peace, with mere assistance from the sovereign. The sovereign, however, did not yield to 
this conceptualization of the church. The king maintained that his reign and authority came 
directly from God, not from the clergy, that his first duty was to enforce both the ecclesial and 
the civil the law; and that “the means peculiar to the secular ruler was armed force - a means 
forbidden the clergy.”493 Thus the line between church and clergy, in national identity as well 
as in promulgation of peace policy began to overlap in the infancy of Europe. 
Between the 9th and 11th centuries, theories of peace abounded. 
For this was the time of episcopal treatises, church 
councils…the Peace and Truce of God, Cluniac peacemakers, a 
monastic theology of peace, the peace of Christendom, the 
reform papacy, the demise of the imperial peace, and the rise of 
the localized public peace.494 
A group of bishops assembled at Charroux in 989 CE and instituted the Peace of God 
(“Pax Dei”) accord, whereby all those who carried arms were obliged “to refrain from 
damaging churches, pillaging the poor, or causing bodily harm to clerics.”495 Failure to adhere 
to the new orders would result in anathema for the violators. In 1027, at a Council of Elne496 
another canon was issued, the Truce of God (“Treuga Dei”). The Truce of God “called for the 
cessation of warfare during certain days of the week, on specified religious festivals, and even 
for several weeks during Advent and other periods in the religious calendar.” 497  The 
institutional church, in these ways, used the instruments of the church, including “conciliar 
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decrees, malediction, anathema, excommunication, and interdict,”498 to interpose peace on 
temporal society. Ecclesiastic means of peace during this period were often localized and were 
often implemented in regions where secular authority was weak.499 It is not clear to what extent 
peace was actually effected through these means, however.500 
It might also be argued that peace was pursued ecclesiastically in the West through the 
pursuit of holy war against infidel outsiders in the East. Pope Urban II called for the first 
Crusade in 1095. In his speech he called upon those undertaking local battles to leave their 
local disputes and to join together to aid their brothers in Eastern Christendom, in fighting 
against the Seljuk Turks. The “glorious reward of martyrdom” was offered to those who were 
willing to undertake war in the East.501  
Also, during this time, possibly due to acceptance and promotion of killing and large-
scale martyrdom, Christian culture began to dwell homiletically and artistically on Jesus’s pain 
and suffering. Theology that formerly focused on Christ’s nature and triumph over death, 
shifted to a focus on Jesus’s suffering and pain. Visual images that formerly depicted Jesus 
healthy and alive on the cross, turned to depictions of Jesus wounded and dead or dying on the 
cross. Christians began to view themselves as vulnerable, and as threatened by the Muslim 
Turks, and also by Jews in their midst.  Lipton documents that the Goad of Love, written 
between 1155 and 1180, and retelling the story of the crucifixion, was the first time the story 
had been portrayed as an anti-Jewish Passion.502 “It describes Jews as consumed with sadism 
and blood lust.”503 According to Lipton, the characterization was meant to portray Jews as not 
only enemies of Jesus, but also of living Christians.504 She notes that though there had been 
sporadic episodes of anti-Jewish episodes previously, now anti-Judaism became a cultural 
phenomenon. Vitriolic and extremist anti-Jewish rhetoric began to “permeate sermons, plays 
and polemical texts.”  
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Peter the Venerable has left a record of some of the worst examples of the kind of 
rhetoric Lipton describes. In his tract Against the Inveterate Hardness of the Jews, he writes 
(as if to a Jewish person): 
It seems to me, O Jew, that…I have satisfied every human 
being...to the question proposed. But if I have satisfied every 
human, I have being, then I have satisfied you too, if, 
nonetheless, you are human. In fact, I do not dare avow that 
you are human, lest perhaps I lie, because I recognize that the 
rational faculty that separates a human from…wild beasts and 
gives precedence over them is extinct or, rather, buried in 
you…Now why should you not be called wild animal, why not 
a beast, why not a beast of burden?505  
He goes on to “prove” at length that the Jew is in fact a beast. The horror of Peter’s 
dehumanization of Jewish people is compounded by his advocacy of violence against them, 
that exceeds the violence due against the Muslims. In his Letter to Louis VII. of France he 
writes: 
What would it profit to fight against enemies of the cross in 
remote lands, while the wicked Jews, who blaspheme Christ, 
and who are much worse than the Saracens, go free and 
unpunished. Much more are the Jews to be execrated and hated 
than the Saracens; for the latter accept the birth from the 
Virgin, but the Jews deny it, and blaspheme that doctrine and 
all Christian mysteries. God does not want them to be wholly 
exterminated, but to be kept, like the fratricide Cain, for still 
more severe torment and disgrace. In this way God’s most just 
severity has dealt with the Jews from the time of Christ’s 
passion, and will continue to deal with them to the end of the 
world, for they are accursed, and deserve to be." He counselled 
that they be spoiled of their ill-gotten gains and the money 
derived from their spoliation be applied to wrest the holy places 
from the Saracens.506 
Schaff notes that Peter advised that property of the Jews be seized and used and applied to the 
continuing fight against the Muslims.507 
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Very shortly, the rhetoric turned to large-scale anti-Jewish violence throughout Western 
Europe. On the way to the first crusade, the crusaders, indeed, massacred hundreds, if not 
thousands of Jews in towns on route to the Holy Land.508 It was violence that would continue 
for centuries.  
The strategy of unity-against-a-common-enemy served to promote peace in the West. 
But also, by declaring such warfare holy, the church adopted as doctrine that salvation, 
forgiveness of sin and eternal peace with God, could be found through the act of killing and 
war itself.509 
4.2.2.4. Heterodox Peace 
Besides the secular, monastic, and ecclesial sources of peace making, the ineradicable 
dualist sects that persisted throughout the historic life of the church revived during this period. 
The largest, most threatening, and first dualist sect in the West, the Cathars, 510 explicitly 
rejected the use of violence. The 11th century Cathars, alternatively recognized as Albigenses, 
located within French -Catalan region of Languedoc, Northern Italy, and beyond, have been 
deemed to be a diffused revival of Manichaeism.511 As Barber notes in his history of the sect,512 
their popularity was related to their total opposition to the Catholic church, which they viewed 
as a false and corrupted church. They believed that the sacraments were void of value, since 
God could not have had a material body, nor have been killed nor resurrected. Catholic 
opposition to the sect was, therefore, a matter of faith; their eradication a church imperative. 
The Cathars were subject to inquisition, and later to the first European Crusade. Nonetheless, 
they maintained an absolute prohibition against the taking of human life based upon Jesus’s 
injunctions against killing. “This Church refrains from killing, nor does it consent that others 
may kill.”513  
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Inquisition records after 1210 record Cathar opposition to the 
crusades. According to the Dominican Moneta of Cremona, 
they stressed the long suffering of Christ and the apostles 
before their enemies. They recalled that Christ had taught the 
disciples to bless their persecutors, and had commanded Peter 
to sheathe his sword. They condemned the church for preaching 
and issuing crusade indulgences. Finally, they quoted St. Paul, 
"Be without offence to the Jews and to the Gentiles (i.e., 
Muslims) and to the church of God" (I Cor. 10:31 ).514 
In addition to the Cathars, other sects arose that embodied an opposition to violence 
and warfare. Among these were “the semi-monastic Beguine sisters and their male 
counterparts, the Beghards, in the Netherlands; 515 a lay poverty movement in northern Italy 
called the Humiliati;516 and the Waldensians, founded by Valdes as the Poor Men of Lyons.”517 
The pacifism of these groups was deemed a characteristic of their heretical beliefs. 
Anti-violence sects, particularly the Cathars, had an influence on the monastic 
movement. As sects proliferated, monasteries often became refuges for proponents of an 
alternate Christian witness that included non-violence. “Monasteries became citadels of 
learning in a violent age, enclaves for Christians who refused to take up arms.”518 Members of 
monastic orders, including the famed Francis of Assisi, also took public stances against the 
Crusades of the church. 
Francis of Assisi believed Muslims might be won by 
persuasion, and unarmed he entered the Sultan's camp and 
engaged him in dialogue. In addition, he criticized the conduct 
of the crusader army and at times predicted its defeat…The 
Dominican Raymond Pennafort, who lived among Muslims for 
thirty-five years, declared that God disliked forced worship, so 
coercion had no place in mission work. William of Tripoli, a 
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Dominican in Acre, emphasized the commonalities between 
Islam and Christianity. He rejected the thought of compulsion 
and urged that the church abandon crusades altogether.519 
4.2.2.5. Monastic and Clerical Unity in Fostering Peace 
Greater stability came to the West during the twelfth century, due to “urbanization, 
abundant food supply, material prosperity, scholastic and legal learning, and fewer internal 
wars and external threats.”520 With the increase in stability and prosperity, the ideals connected 
to monastic detachment were seen as less warranted and desirable.521 Monastic influence lost 
ground to the more juridical notions of peace of the ecclesia. Twelfth century Cistercian 
monk,522 Bernard of Clairvaux, addressed the tension between the two by making explicit the 
relationship of monastics and the ecclesia in fostering peace. Monks possess peace, while 
bishops make peace. By making peace among the laity, the clergy establish conditions in which 
monastic peace, repose of the soul, may exist. 
Without the undefiled peace of the cloister, the peace of the 
Church would lack a point of reference. Without the peace of 
the organizational Church, the peace of the cloister would be 
disturbed, and the souls of the laity would be lost through 
ignorance and dissipation.  
The monk is reconciled; the cleric reconciles. The monk rests 
in God; the cleric brings rest to others.523 
The church’s concern for sacramental practice was tied to its role as peacemaker. 
Bernard sought to maintain for the church, which vied with secular rulers for ultimate authority, 
the ownership of the value, source and dispensation of peace. 
4.2.2.6. Ecclesial Regulation of War 
Finally, the Church began to develop a detailed doctrinal position on, and ethical 
constructions of, just war, to temper the extremes of warfare. Churchmen of the day, most 
prominently Thomas Aquinas, (1225-1274) constructed a comprehensive update to 
Augustine’s just war theories. Much has been written on Thomas’ just war theorizations, that 
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cannot be adequately treated here,524 however a brief expression of Aquinas’s ideas regarding 
just war is offered. Aquinas believed that for a war to be just, three conditions were necessary. 
First, there must be just right or just authority to wage war. This principle was intended to 
restrict warfare to those with recognized authority, thereby limiting private occasions for resort 
to armed violence.525 Second, there must be a just cause for war, or proper motive.526 Third, 
there must be right intentions in fighting, not, for example, greed or cruelty.527 “Right intent” 
for Aquinas represented a particular moral character “comprising habits, attitudes, sentiments, 
and prejudices…that disposed belligerents to limit both their recourse to war and their conduct 
of war.”528 Motive and intent were co-determinative so that, “the thing that compels us to do 
something also shapes what it is that one is trying to do.”529 Despite his detailed treatment of 
the topic, Aquinas’s formulations amounted to an ideological moderation of warfare, more than 
a moderation that limited the practice of waging war. 
4.2.3. Conclusion 
In the West, a rivalry was present between the ecclesial authority of the church and the 
secular rulers. The cohesion of the church amidst the rampant violence and brutality of warring 
tribesmen of the North resulted in the ecclesial structure of Christendom gaining cultural and 
political authority between the fourth and eighth centuries. 530  The church remained in a 
position of great authority until the Carolingian kings established a unified Europe for the first 
time since the end of the Holy Roman Empire. By the eleventh and twelfth centuries, as smaller 
polities merged into more centralized principalities, the secular rulers began to co-opt ecclesial 
concepts of peace, like the Peace of God and Truce of God, and to construe them as practices 
of secular public peace. 531  During the 13th and 14th centuries, bishops, kings and nobles 
expanded these polices by engaging in practices of official mediation to avoid resort to armed 
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conflict.532 When nation-states began to form in the fourteenth century, these mediating peace 
practices were conceived of as national peace practices, and stripped of eschatological or 
ontological concerns related to God.533 “Thus, the Western notion of public peace…was the 
result of the gradual secularization of the pax eccclesiae by the new and larger political 
units.”534 
What may be said about the Western church’s non-violence theory in the middle ages 
is that it was shaped by Christian understandings of peace with God, and inward dispositions 
of quietude, in the midst of a virulently violent social context. Monastic pursuit of peace 
influenced ecclesial efforts at peace-making, which ultimately resulted in nation-state co-
optation of the role of peacemakers and peacekeepers. Arising as they did out of the context of 
social disruption and ongoing warfare, the conceptions of peace of the imperial, the 
ecclesiastical, and the monastic authorities, “[v]irtually all…from 500 to 1150 were connected 
to the idea of order. Peace was a conservative reaction to widespread discord and immorality; 
it was a return to right order.”535 Thus, there was a conception of peace, but no concept of “non-
violence” per se. Violence was regulated but not viewed as an evil in itself. 
4.3.  Early Middle Ages and the Eastern Church 
(This is a sketch of the theology of the Eastern Church, that will not continue to be 
developed in the research. I offer it as the time period covered preceded the split in the 
churches. The space constraints, and the fact that the Eastern church has not had the cultural 
influence that the Western church has had influenced by decision to limit consideration of this 
church’s theological development of non-violence ethics.)  
The rise of Constantinian Christianity, and the fall of Rome in 410 CE, created different 
kinds of pressures for the Eastern and Western regions of the church. The differences in the 
composition of the churches, as well as their differing challenges, resulted in their ideological 
distance, which led ultimately to a break between the two regions of the church in 1094. 
In the fifth century, the Eastern Roman Empire was not confronted with ongoing 
foreign invasions in the way that the Western part of the Empire was.536 Up through the seventh 
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century, while the imperial structure was coming undone in the Western part of the Empire, 
the Eastern region continued to be politically and economically stable.537 This stability would 
be challenged beginning in in the seventh century, by wars with Persia and the newly powerful 
Muslim tribal confederation, however, unlike the Western region, the Eastern region remained 
a highly centralised state. 538 The political conditions of the regions had implications for how 
the church approached issues of Christian warfare. 
The Western regions devolved into militarized and martial local rulerships; a 
militarization which the church came to reflect. The East, however, retained the framework of 
empire, with the emperor as a central authority who controlled a central military.539 The church 
remained separate from the state. The church functioned as a consultancy, with the church 
Patriarch assuming an advisory capacity to the emperor.540 The Eastern empire engaged in 
warfare when under attack, but the pervasiveness and acceptance of violence that existed in the 
West was not present.541 
4.3.1. Killing as Sin 
Both Eastern and Western church traditions veered away from Augustine’s just war 
formulations in the centuries after Augustine wrote. The Western church moved away from 
Augustine’s principle that on some occasions war may be justified and veered toward a removal 
of limits on any and all violence and war, including engagement in warfare by the clergy. The 
Eastern church moved away from Augustine’s principle, and could indeed be said to have never 
embraced it. In Eastern church theology, war and killing are never justifiable in the life of the 
Christian. Killing is always a sin, albeit a sin that could be repented of and forgiven. 542 
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Orthodox theologians Clement and Harakas conclude that the Eastern church’s theology of war 
is that it is a “necessary evil,” and though permissible, is not “justifiable.”543 
Though there was no acceptance of just war doctrine related to the just cause for war 
(jus ad bellum) in the Eastern church, a doctrine of just conduct during war (jus in bellum) was 
promulgated. The Strategikon of the late 6th or early 7th century serves as an example. The 
Strategikon was a military treatise which instructed that military campaigns should be 
conducted so as to minimize the loss of life for all combatants. It allowed an encircled enemy 
to escape rather than engaging that enemy in a battle that would be costly to both sides.544 
The Eastern church never deviated from its reliance upon the teachings of the early 
Church Fathers for construction of doctrine regarding non-violence. This “’patristic’ 
foundation…went on to provide the underpinning of Byzantine canon law, and (after the fall 
of Byzantium), the system of law that still operates throughout the churches of the East.”545 
Basil of Caesarea (d. 379 CE), Gregory Nazianzus (d. 390 CE) and John Chrysostom (d. 407 
CE) are considered the holy “Three Hierarchs” of the ancient Church.546 
One of the most influential teachings regarding war and killing was that of St. Basil, 
who wrote in his 13th canon,547 (his teachings as a bishop to his flock): 
Our fathers did not consider killings committed in the course of 
wars to be classifiable as murders at all, on the score, it seems 
to me, of allowing a pardon to men fighting in defence of 
sobriety and piety. Perhaps, though, it might be advisable to 
refuse them communion for three years, on the ground that 
their hands are not clean.548 
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Basil’s canon accepted soldiering while acknowledging the moral taint that it produces, 
thus, his recommendation of a three-year period of cleansing following participation in war. 
Basil’s canon was relied upon throughout the first millennium.  
A significant application of Basil’s teaching occurred in the tenth century. The powerful 
and pious549 Byzantine Emperor Nikephoras II Phokas (956-970 CE) and Patriarch Polyeukos 
(956-970 CE) disputed whether or not the emperor could “establish a law that those who fell 
during wars be honoured equally with the holy martyrs, and be celebrated with hymns and feast 
days.”550 The Church determined that it was not possible to “number with the martyrs” soldiers 
who had fallen during the war. How could it be, they asked, when “Basil the Great excluded 
[them] from the Sanctified Elements for three years since their hands were not clean?”551 At 
which, several priests and bishops “confessed… that they [themselves had] fought with the 
enemy and killed many of them.” Whereupon the synod ordered them “to cease from the 
ministry.”552 This is a vast difference from Pope Urban in the Western church framing Christian 
soldiers as martyrs following their voluntary participation in the church’s eleventh century 
Crusade. In the East, martyrdom for Christian soldiers was denied. 
McGuckin argues that there was a nuanced balance maintained by the Eastern church, 
following Basil. Basil recognized that theoretically, Christian morality turns away from war as 
an irredeemable evil. However, with respect to local insurgencies by pagan “barbarians,” Basil 
had little patience for those who did not fight because of religious scruples. For Basil, “passive 
non-involvement betrays the Christian family (especially its weaker members who can not 
defend themselves but need others to help them) to the ravages of men without heart or 
conscience to restrain them.”553  
Basil’s intention in barring soldiers from the Eucharist for a period was primarily 
symbolic to his society. Typically, in the fourth century, victorious soldiers were applauded by 
the Christian community.  The majority in the community did not partake regularly in the 
Eucharist, and most Christians were not baptized yet and thus not bound by the canons of the 
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Church. Yet, Basil sought to establish standards for the church: honourable warfare ends with 
an honourable repentance.554 
By moving in and out of Eucharistic reception Basil’s faithful 
Christian (returning from his duty with blood on his hands) is 
now in the modality of expressing his dedication to the values 
of peace and innocence, by means of the lamentation and 
repentance for life that has been taken, albeit the blood of the 
violent.555 
Though challenged during the later middle ages,556 the thirteenth canon of Basil was 
ultimately followed into the fourteenth century. 
4.3.2. Sects and Non-violence 
In addition to church canon and tradition, there arose in the church of the East influential 
sects that embraced non-violence rather than war. The Bogomils in Slavic eastern Europe, were 
“the most important sectarian movement”557 in the Byzantine Empire,558 and influenced the 
ideological development of other sects in the West.559 Bogomil origins in the tenth century 
seem to be a diffusion of the earlier Manichaeist heretical sect.560 Bogomils adhered to the 
teaching that distinguished between life in the body and life in the spirit. The body belonged to 
the world, which was created by and remained the realm of Satan,561 while the realm of the 
spirit was exalted. 562  The Bogomils lived ascetically. They were celibates, renounced all 
property, and devoutly followed a liturgical habit built around the Lord’s prayer.563 Because 
their lifestyle intentionally closely approximated the Orthodox church’s ideal of holiness, they 
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were initially considered saintly. Eventually, charges of heresy were made against them in the 
eleventh century, due to their doctrinal deviations from orthodoxy.564 Believing that killing 
prevented reincarnation, which aborted one’s penitential possibility, 565  Bogomils “were 
admonished…to suffer wrong peacefully and to avoid the shedding of blood.”566 It is, however, 
unclear how entrenched the pacifist practice of the Bogomils was.567 
4.3.3. Conclusion 
Historically, faced with challenges arising throughout the era, including Islamic 
aggression, the Crusades and Slavic anarchy in the Balkans, the Eastern church arrived at a 
balance of teachings regarding war and killing. It upheld the doctrine that killing was always 
wrong, however allowed that under local circumstances of pagan insurgency, fighting and 
killing was required. It was insisted that service in war be followed by repentance. The church 
continued to prohibit killing outside of war conditions and continued to maintain that clergy 
who served at the altar of God may under no circumstances spill blood. For the Eastern church, 
there could be no “just violence,” though the “violence of the just” must often be tolerated.568 
This nuanced tradition has been consistently pursued, to the present day. 
4.4. Conclusion of Medieval Period Non-violence Analysis 
For the church of this period, creating peace meant primarily restoring order, control, 
and power. The monastic movement that began as counter-cultural protest, soon became one 
of the wealthiest and most powerful arms of the church institution. There was little emphasis 
on using power to defend and protect those who were “Othered” or who were outsiders. There 
was almost no consciousness by the church of the value of an ethic of non-resistance. Sects 
that were subjected to persecution by the ecclesial and secular powers are the only ones who 
found merit in the dogma of self-sacrifice. Their embrace of doctrines of self-sacrifice was by 
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necessity. The church during this period diverged almost completely from the teachings of 
Jesus.  
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5. Theological Conceptions of Non-violence from 
Late Middle Ages to Early Modernity 
This section will review the period from the middle ages to modernity, roughly 
encompassing the 13th to the 17th centuries. The analysis will encompass the church 
in Europe and the movement into the New World. 
5.1. Introduction 
During the Late Middle Ages, the emergence of a different kind of non-violence 
doctrine is observed. The brutality of war resulted in the emergence of the idea that war, 
in itself, was contrary to Christian belief and practice. Generally, those promoting this 
belief were to be found on the margins of the culture. They were severely persecuted 
and repressed by the State and by the ecclesial authorities. This period sees the second 
spilt in the church. Loss of faith in the integrity of the Catholic church led to reformers 
splitting and establishing churches that operated outside of the authority of the Pope 
and the ecclesial structure. The new Protestant churches were often aligned with the 
civil authority of the nobles, princes, or kings. They were reforming of culture, but not 
counter-cultural. Smaller sects that were counter-cultural, anabaptists, were persecuted 
by those who supported the dominant church theological frames, both Protestant and 
Catholic. The reform movements and the counter-cultural movements varied in their 
promotion of the use of force for transformation. Generally, it was accepted and used 
to advance the cause of group empowerment. 
5.2. Late Middle Ages and the Western Church 
It becomes possible to trace the rise and consistent transmission of the idea of 
“pacifism” beginning in the 14th century, with the writing of John Wycliffe. 
5.2.1. John Wycliffe 
John Wycliffe (1330-1384) is most widely known as the person who first 
translated the Bible from Latin into English. He was much more than a biblical 
languages translator, however. Wycliffe “was acknowledged to be the greatest 
theological scholar and thinker in a centre of learning…there was only one Oxford, and 
at this time Wycliffe reigned there supreme. From there his opinions had emanated over 
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the country.”569 Despite his stature, between Wycliffe’s unorthodox doctrinal positions 
and his stance against church excesses and abuses,570 he came into to ill-repute with 
church authorities. Wycliffe was ultimately tried for heresy and forced to retreat to his 
Leicestershire parish of Lutterworth,571 where he lived until his death. Wycliffe’s ideas, 
however, which reached beyond church doctrine into the realm of the political, had far-
reaching influence throughout Europe.  
Writing in the midst of the 100 Years’ War between England and France (1337-
1453),572 like other intellectuals of the age, Wycliffe criticized the war and killing in 
his writing. His criticism generally issued along two lines. Either it focused on the 
ethical bankruptcy of knights and princes whose avarice motivated their engagement in 
warfare, or it registered “the moral degeneracy of military leaders, clergy, and the 
population at large.”573 His, critique generally addressed the unjust way that war was 
conducted. 
Wycliffe differed from others of his day in that his arguments against warfare 
were based on the illegitimacy of war itself, regardless of the manner in which war was 
waged. In his 1375 De Mandatis Divinis (“On the Divine Commandments”) he based 
arguments against war on the fifth commandment, thou shalt not kill, and argued for 
the reverence of life. Just war criteria were the accepted standard of evaluating warfare, 
and required that there be just authority to declare war, among other things. Wycliffe 
argued in De Officio Regis in 1379 against just authority for the conflict between the 
English and the French. He claimed that a claimant to a throne, such as the English 
monarch’s claim to France’s throne, could never be sure that God had chosen him for 
that throne. Thus, he sinned by fighting and killing in pursuit of an uncertain claim.574 
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For Wycliffe, war was not wrong merely because the motives articulated for 
fighting were corrupt, and the grounds for fighting were uncertain. Wycliffe’s chief 
objection was that waging war was inherently incompatible with Christianity. In 1382 
Wycliffe wrote De Cruciata (“On Crusade”) condemning Pope Urban VI’s planned 
Despenser Crusade (1383) (so called because it was led by the Bishop of Norwich, 
Henry Despenser), in which the Bishop and the Pope battled against papal claimant 
Clement VII.575 The Crusade gradually became an opportunity to attack French and 
Flemish enemies of England.576 Wycliffe’s objection to the crusade, according to Cox, 
was that it disregarded the way of Christ, i.e., humility, poverty and love, and instead 
sought wealth and worldly glory.577 Wycliffe regarded the Crusade as anti-Christian. 
The view of Christianity that was adhered to by Wycliffe was informed by a 
theology that centred caritas (“charity”) and predestination as core tenets of the faith. 
Wycliffe argued, based on his reading of the New Testament, that charity or love were 
primary attributes of true Christians. Accordingly, following Christ’s example, 
Christian love of neighbour entailed the willingness to suffer harm rather than harm 
another. Love of neighbour and violence were completely incompatible.578 Further, 
membership in the true church, though preordained, was impossible to ascertain during 
one’s earthly life. There was no way to know who was saved or damned, nor who was 
truly innocent or guilty. Thus, to kill an enemy without knowing if he were innocent or 
guilty, and possibly kill the innocent, was sin.579  
Cox demonstrates that Wycliffe’s writings over time countered the accepted 
doctrine of just war. His opposition included the just war arguments of just cause, 
approval of a legitimate authority, and just intentions, as legitimate grounds for conduct 
of war. More than this, Cox shows Wycliffe’s rejection of the accepted view of political 
life and institutions as good and as advancing human and social development. Wycliffe 
instead asserted that the role of government (dominium) in human society was the 
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product of the Fall and sin. Political structures led to a desire to dominate and, almost 
inevitably, to war. For Wycliffe, force and violence should play no part in a society 
ruled by the law of Christ, which is centred on love. As Jesus did not resist crucifixion, 
nonresistance is the proper Christian response to violence. 
This can be viewed as the first European ecclesiatic articulation of the ideals of 
“pacifism” as that term is conceptualized today. Wycliffe’s disavowal of war, his anti-
violence and nonresistance connected to and based upon Jesus’s teachings on love, as 
well as his emphasis on the sanctity of life, were innovations. Typically, these ideas 
contributed to his lack of acceptance and to his being charged for heresy.580 
5.2.2. Lollardry 
In the 1380s, Wycliffe was linked to a prior populist insurrection, the Peasant’s 
Revolt of 1381.581 The uprising was not the result of the religious objections (heresies) 
espoused by Wycliffe,582 and Wycliffe repudiated the insurrection.583 Nonetheless, the 
perception held that the rebellion’s leader, John Ball, was a disciple of Wycliffe,584 
teaching his “perverse doctrines…and the insane opinions that he held,” 585  as 
Walsingham, a lucid detractor586 and chronicler of the revolt concluded. Wycliffe’s 
heretofore support by the political order, was soon undermined by the church’s claims 
that Wycliffe’s heresy promoted sedition, which led to the erosion of peace and order 
                                               
 
580 Vasilev argues that Wycliffe and others were influenced by the Cathars of previous 
generations. His arguments as to Wycliffe adhering to a dualist faith are not well supported, however 
there is overlap in the ideology of Wycliffe and the Cathars/Bogomils with respect to ideas about non-
violence. See, Georgi Vasilev, Heresy and the English Reformation: Bogomil-Cathar Influence on Wycliffe, 
Langland, Tyndale and Milton (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2007). 
581 The Peasants Revolt was the first popular rebellion in English History. It was caused by 
“anger and frustration at years of heavy taxation with nothing to show for it, oppressive tolls and 
customs exacted by landlords such as the abbeys…punitive labor legislation, and corruption and 
extortion by officialdom.” Juliet Barker, 1381: The Year of the Peasants’ Revolt (Harvard University Press, 
2014), xv. 
582 Surviving sources do not indicate that any of the rebelling peasants’ grievances were related 
to dissatisfaction with the church, or with Wycliffe’s critiques, including those of the real presence, the 
cult of the saints, or of pilgrimage. Richard Rex, The Lollards (Macmillan International Higher Education, 
2002), 52. 
583 R. B. Dobson, The Peasants’ Revolt of 1381 (Springer, 1983), 1983. However, see Barker, who 
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in the land.587 All the movements involving attempts to create social change, which 
inevitably involved social unrest, were encompassed within the idea of lollardry, which 
in the records of the period was synonymous with “heresy” or “dissent” generally.588 
As Aston notes, “[s]omehow, through deliberate falsification, fixed prejudice, or 
plausible hypothesis, the conviction seems to have become established that Lollardry 
was associated with revolt.”589 It also continued to be associated with Wycliff and his 
beliefs.  Rex observes that this is due to the demographics of the lollards. There was a 
larger group of lollards whose views were similar to those of Wycliffe and his disciples, 
who tended to be geographically clustered together, than of those individual dissidents 
who had no known links to Wycliffe.590 
The beliefs of the Lollards, or Wycliffites, which were repeatedly self-
articulated by those accused of lolladry, centre on two issues: the theology of the 
Eucharist and adoration of the cross.591 However, the Lollards also followed Wycliffe 
in denouncing violence and war. As Brock notes, in a 1395 pioneering move, the 
Lollards presented the first petition to the House of Commons with pacifist aims. They 
declared that “manslaughter by battle or…law…without special revelation592 is express 
contrarious to the New Testament, the which is a law of grace and full of mercy,” since 
Christ taught “to love and have mercy on his enemies, and not for to slay them.”593 
Lollardry was decried as unlawful and schismatic. Adherents were branded 
heretics and subjected to persecution. 
…the burden of disrepute carried in the name [of 
Lollardry] was cumulative. While in 1411 Lollards and 
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from God in the Book of Joshua chapter 1. Jenny Teichman, The Philosophy of War and Peace 
(Andrews UK Limited, 2017), 25. 
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heretics are mentioned alongside homicides and other 
malefactors….By 1425 there was no doubt that Lollardy 
was on a par with treason, felony, "or any such other 
high poynt", and six years later Lollards were described 
as "traitors and enemies of the king". To be called a 
Lollard - as to be called a Quaker or a Ranter - was to 
be abused at the outset in the very derivation of the 
name, but the name had grown in content. Opinion and 
legislation must here have reacted upon each other...594 
Aston notes in this quote that the Lollards’ reputation progressively declined 
over a relatively short period of less than twenty years. Ultimately, they were regarded 
as enemies of the king worthy of death. 
5.2.3. Jan Hus, the Hussites and Peter Chelčický 
Though the influence and teaching of Wycliffe’s beliefs began to decline in 
England during the early 15th century, in Continental Europe Wycliffe’s ideas became 
increasingly influential.595 They had significant resonance in Bohemia, where Jan Hus 
embraced Wycliffe’s criticism of the abuse of church power.596 
The Kingdom of Bohemia was a region that existed between the Eastern 
Orthodox Christian world to the east and the Latin (Catholic) Christian world to the 
west, making it geographically and linguistically far removed from both.597 Hus was a 
preacher and rector of the University of Prague, and greatly influential among the non-
Germans in Prague and the Bohemians at the University. His attacks against church 
power were condemned as heterodox in 1403. This led to a decade of contention 
between Bohemians (Hussites) and Germans (Catholics). Ultimately, in 1415, Hus was 
burned alive at the stake, after being tried and found guilty of heresy.598 Hus’ death was 
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viewed as a martyrdom by his followers. National uprising followed between 1416 and 
1420 by various factions of Hus’s supporters.599  
Hus and his supporters’ arguments were primarily doctrinal and theological in 
nature, encompassing four tenets. These were codified in the 1420 ‘Four Articles of 
Prague’. The Articles concerned: 1) free preaching of the Word of God; 2) communion 
in both bread and wine for all believers; 3) elimination of ecclesiastical secular power; 
and 4) the punishment of serious sins.600 Notably, pacifism was not a core tenet of 
Hussite belief. 
Hus was not a pacifist. The core contingent of his followers were also non-
pacifist. Hus believed that fighting in good causes was a duty of the secular authority, 
though warfare was forbidden to the clergy.601 Clergy, even if attacked by an enemy, 
did not have a right to self-defence, but should rather suffer death, praying for the 
enemy.602 
Nonetheless, a Bohemian Hussite adherent, 603  Peter Chelčický (c.1390-
c.1460), soon became convinced of the centrality of the issue of non-violence to 
Christian belief and practice. He argued that the early church was its “golden age” and 
that that age was pacifist; that Christ’s law was a law of love and forbade killing. 
Further, that Christ came to redeem souls and not to destroy bodies.604 When, in 1420, 
the Prague university masters deemed it permissible for Christians to take up arms in 
defence of God’s truth, against Prince Sigismund, who had declared war on the 
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Czechs,605 Chelčický asserted his pacifist position that all killing was wrong.606 Further, 
since war was a sin, and since the state rested upon the use of force, echoing Wycliffe, 
Chelčický denounced all political power and its exercise of authority as “against the 
divine commandment.”607 The law of force and the law of love were mutually exclusive 
according to Chelčický.608 
These two divisions, the temporal order of force and 
Christ’s way of love, are far removed from each other. . 
. . An action done because of the compulsion of 
Authority is quite different from one done through love 
and from the good will arising out of the words of truth. 
Thus civil authority is as far removed from Christ’s 
truth inscribed in His gospel as is Christian faith from 
the necessity of using such authority. Those in power 
are not led by faith nor does faith need them. . . . For the 
fullness of authority lies in the accumulation of wealth 
and vast gatherings of armed men, castles, and walled 
towns, while the fullness and completion of faith lies in 
God’s wisdom and the strength of the Holy Spirit. Faith 
supported solely by spiritual power stands firm without 
the power of authority, which only brings fear and can 
only attain what it wishes under the threat of 
compulsion.609 
Here Chelčický argues for a faith that resembles the ascetic model; a faith that 
compels action based on love of, and truth from, God, and that is “supported solely by 
spiritual power,” without the power of outside authority. Chelčický’s expectation seems 
to be of monastic-like social conditions which lack civil or ecclesial domination, not in 
seclusion but for all of the society. Chelčický was, “keeping with the rigorous other-
                                               
 
605 This was a chapter in the Hussite Wars wherein the papacy, Sigismund, Holy Roman 
Emperor, and the Catholic nobility battled the Hussite rebels. The university masters switched sides to 
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worldly, ascetic view prevalent in the Middle Ages, demand[ing] of all Christians an 
utter renunciation and repudiation of the world and all its work.”610  
In the 1420s, radical Hussites “held sway militarily and threatened to eradicate 
the office of kingship and any other country-wide institution,”611 in favour of popular 
self-governmence.612 With their military success, the threat of government without a 
sovereign was realized in the region. Yet, the ideal of self-rule by the common people 
could not be sustained. The rebellion faltered. By 1434, nobles had seized authority 
from the revolutionaries. The nobles “set up temporary governmental offices, defeated 
the radicals on the battlefield, and sponsored negotiations for the return of the 
monarch.”613  
With defeated political ideals, many who had rebelled then turned to 
Chelčický’s earlier teachings as an alternate reform possibility. The structured 
community of the Unity of Brethren (Unitas Fratrum) took shape in the 1450s at 
Kunwald, and officially organized as a church in 1467. Starting out as a small group of 
Bohemians and Moravians, by the sixteenth century, they had become “the very heart 
and conscience of the Czech masses.” 614  Though the Unity of Brethren retained 
important traditions and doctrines of the Catholic church, such as the seven sacraments 
and upholding transubstantiation of the Eucharist, the Unity of Brethren sect made the 
unheralded move of instituting its own priesthood and dispensing with the channels of 
apostolic succession. Its move was revolutionary “even in fifteenth-century 
Bohemia.” 615  The church faced periods of severe persecution from the authorities. 
Nevertheless, the Unity of Brethren endured into the next century.  
Initially, the Unity of Brethren was comprised of “a group of simple people 
distrustful of secular learning and of participation in worldly affairs.”616 However, as 
the church grew, learned people and Bohemian nobility became members of the 
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church.617 By 1520 the church was marked by two distinct groups: a “minor” group, 
which observed literal nonresistance and forbade participation in civic government, 
since it necessitated taking an oath and wielding a sword; and a “major” group which 
refused all killing and participation in war, but allowed civic leadership. This spilt in 
the composition of the Unity of Brethren continued until the Thirty Years’ War (1618-
1648).618 As a result of the Thirty Year’s War, in which the burgeoning nation-states of 
central Europe battled for political and religious pre-eminence, the Czech world was 
forcibly re-Catholicized. Dissenters were either killed or forced to become refugees, 
e.g. the Moravian Protestants.619   
What took place in Bohemia and Moravia among the Czech Brethren in the 
fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries has been referred to as the first reformation, in 
that it contained the elements that would come to denote the church reformations that 
followed, including break with papal rule, insistence on the ultimate authority of 
Scripture, seizure of church lands and wealth, and vibrant nationalism and clamour for 
vernacular text and ritual.620 Notably, what did not appear in reformation ecclesiology 
was the theology of non-violence. Though the Unity of Brethren was crushed in the 
seventeenth century, by the time it was erased important echoes of the beliefs of 
Chelčický and those following him had begun to be heard throughout Europe. 
The sixteenth century’s religious upheaval throughout Europe resulted in the 
formation of not only the Protestant Churches of Luther and Calvin, the Anglican 
church of the English, and the newly nominated and reformed “Catholic” church, but 
                                               
 
617 Odložilík, 344. 
618 Wilson’s study of the Thirty Years’ War identifies it as was one of the most destructive 
conflicts in human history, having claimed 8 million lives. It transformed the religious and political map of 
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also the formation of churches by “radical reformers,” 621  most particularly the 
anabaptists.622 
5.2.4. Anabaptism 
Anabaptism origins are diverse. They lead to the founding of what became the 
Anabaptist, Brethren, Mennonite, Society of Friends and other traditions. Despite the 
geographic diffusion throughout diverse nation-states, and despite the differences that 
existed among the various adherents to anabaptism,623 there were consistent political-
theological rationales behind the multiple foundings, and there was a consistent degree 
of doctrinal unity among the different communities.624 Anabaptism itself might be 
understood simply as those Christians who adhered to the practice of adult baptism, as 
opposed to infant baptism, or “spiritual baptism” (whereby water baptism was deemed 
superfluous).625 The first adult baptism in Europe took place in Zurich in 1525.  
Interestingly, though Swiss anabaptism was the progenitor of the historic peace 
churches, the anabaptism that first appeared in Zurich was not entirely rooted in an anti-
violence ethos. Synder demonstrates that Swiss anabaptism was ambivalent on 
questions of violence, as well as on questions of church separation from society and 
involvement with the world.626 However, the non-violence claims that would be the 
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hallmark of the peace churches were early in evidence during the sixteenth century.627 
As Synder shows, sentiments regarding non-violence were contained in a letter of 1524 
from the Zurich radical reformers to Thomas Muntzer of Germany, a reformer who took 
issue with Luther’s reforms. The letter is significant in that it is an early articulation of 
the anabaptism of Conrad Grebel, the letter’s author, and of the Swiss, that theirs is an 
anti-violence faith. The letter makes two points on the issue of non-violence: first, that 
there should be no coercion within the church for any reason, i.e., the church should not 
use the state to put unbelievers to death on grounds of heresy; and second, that believers 
who are true to the Christian faith do not participate in war or use of the sword, and do 
not kill for any reason.628 The letter argued for a church that would be defenseless in 
the world.629 
Following the Peasants’ Rebellion, 630  in 1525, the civil rulers passed anti-
anabaptist legislation that was progressively more stringent. The measures were meant 
to quash not only religious (doctrinal) dissidence, but also the civic insubordination and 
unrest that tended to accompany anabaptist adherence.  When the Peasants’ Rebellion 
was crushed, the magistrates followed it with assertion of firm control over their 
territories. By 1526 the anabaptist church had largely been driven underground.631 The 
reality of persecution informed the developing Swiss anabaptist theology of the church 
as people separated, persecuted, and opposed to the world.632 This was distinct from 
anabaptist theology in other regions, where magistrates, soldiers, and lords were 
counted among the baptized. At the same time anabaptist missionaries were spreading 
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beyond Zurich and entering regions, including that of distant Moravia, where there was 
greater religious tolerance.  
In 1527, Michael Sattler, a Swiss anabaptist leader, crated draft articles of the 
faith tenets of the burgeoning church, at the momentous occasion of the gathering in 
Schleitheim of Swiss anabaptists from Zurich to the Black Forest. The tenets of the 
“Schleitheim Confession,” as the document came to be known, included commitment 
to adult baptism, separation from evil and, therefore, the world,633 and the nonuse of 
violence in all circumstances.634 As Yoder notes, the basis of the nonresistance ethic 
adopted by those at Schleitheim was not scriptural texts found in the writings of Peter 
or Paul, which addressed the powers held by and duties owed to the State. Rather, the 
rationale was obedience to the example of Jesus’s acts and character. The anabaptists 
were not interested in delineating the civic duties of Christians, as the true church was 
expected to be separated from the world. The anabaptists were concerned with making 
the life and example of Jesus the standard of Christian ethics.635  
The ethic of nonresistance was not universally supported following the 
Schlietheim meeting. Balthasar Hubmaier (c.1480–1528) was a proponent of personal 
nonresistance, but never advocated that the state should be nonresistant. Thomas 
Muntzer (c.1489-1525) diverged entirely from the teaching of nonresistance, as his 
leadership of the Peasant’s Rebellion in 1524-25 demonstrates. Hans Hut (c.1490-
1527), an acolyte of Muntzer, argued for nonresistance now, but warned of an 
eschatological time of violent reckoning. Nonetheless, within a decade, those 
anabaptists who remained, who were not martyred, expelled from the region, or 
compelled to recant, came to settle on the ideals set forth at Schleitheim as the most 
practicable for the adherents’ continued survival.636 
The Schleitheim Confession would influence the development of sister 
movements in neighbouring Swiss regions,637 and the movement’s development in 
                                               
 
633 This separation was not that of the Desert Fathers or of the medieval monastics. Rather it 
was, a “tense missionary dualism, representing in the midst of the world a position the world could not 
tolerate.” (Yoder, Koontz, and Alexis-Baker 2009:187) 
634 For full text of the Schleitheim Articles, see, William R. Estep, Anabaptist Beginnings (1523-
1533): 1523-1533 ; a Source Book (De Graaf, 1976), 100–105. 
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other parts of the continent. Dutch anabaptist leader Menno Simmons, the progenitor 
of the Mennonites, relied on the experiences of the utter defeat of violent anabaptist 
radicals to advance the previously micro idea of an anti-revolutionary, anti-violence, 
anti-apocalyptic suffering church. The Hutterites in Moravia, lived in peaceful and 
separated areas, where they were unmolested, provided they did not attempt to 
proselytize those outside of their regions. A century and a half after Schleitheim, in the 
late seventeenth century, Jacob Amman, founder of the breakaway Amish community, 
renewed the anabaptist mission. When intercourse with the world and its ways 
threatened Swiss Anabaptist identity, Amman called again for separation and for 
nonresistance. He criticized the Swiss followers for their laxity, accommodation and 
compromise.638  
The Puritans of England were also influenced by the separatist and adult 
baptism theology during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In a reminiscent 
movement of resistance, a group of sundry “radicals”--Puritans, Independents, 
Familists, Levellers, Brownists, Quakers , Diggers, Quakers, and Fifth Monarchy men-
-united 639  and resisted in God’s name, 640  the encroachment of the royal power 
represented by King Charles I in the mid-1600s.641 That the resistance resulted in the 
use of revolutionary force serves to underscore the variation of beliefs that existed under 
the banner of adult baptizers’ counter culture. The major and minor sects that formed 
insisted upon new manners of pursuing human relationship with God and new kinds of 
political and social relationships. 
                                               
 
Switzerland, who did not. The Hutterites committed to the idea of the true church being those who 
held goods in common, however other anabaptists did not adopt this viewpoint. Further, Melchoir 
Hoffman’s branch of Swiss Anabaptism was repudiated by other “Swiss Brethren” as error, due to his 
‘celestial flesh’ Christology. C. Arnold Synder, “The Birth and Evolution of Swiss Anabaptism (1520-
1530),” Mennonite Quarterly Review 80, no. 4 (October 2006): 644. 
638 Synder, “The Birth and Evolution of Swiss Anabaptism (1520-1530),” October 2006, 645. 
639 See, G. E. Aylmer, “Presidential Address: Collective Mentalities in Mid Seventeenth-Century 
England: III. Varieties of Radicalism,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 38 (1988): 1–25, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/3678964, for an interesting account of the common core of the various 
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640 Bradstock argues that the reading scripture, the text itself, provided a lens through which 
the radicals reinterpreted the world around them. See, Andrew Bradstock, Radical Religion in Cromwell’s 
England: A Concise History from the English Civil War to the End of the Commonwealth (I.B.Tauris, 2010). 
641 This refers to the English Civil War or English Revolution that resulted in a rejection of the 
monarchy and the execution of Charles I. For more details on this period, see Lawrence Stone, The 
Causes of the English Revolution 1529-1642 (New York: Routledge, 2017); and Michael J. Braddick, The 
Oxford Handbook of the English Revolution (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
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5.2.5. Conclusion 
From Wyckoff in England in the fourteenth century to the anabaptists in Zurich 
and beyond in the sixteenth century, a startling idea was birthed in Europe--that war 
and killing were evils in and of themselves. At the same time, the steady establishment 
of political kingdoms, which were tied to the power and corruption of the church, led 
dissident voices to assert the need for political and church reform. Part of that reform 
was the translation of the bible into the local vernacular languages of the people. The 
demands for reform that the towering theological figure of Wyckoff triggered in the 
fourteenth century lit the fuse for the Hussite Revolution of the fifteenth century, and 
exploded in the Reformations of the sixteenth century. Yet, the demands for reform 
demanded by Wyckoff that pertained to his anti-violence ethics did not proceed in 
tandem with his complaints about the authorities. Indeed, a regular feature of the 
Reformation’s protestations involved the reformers’ acts of armed resistance against 
the authorities. Even among the early anabaptizers, there was no consensus about 
adoption of an anti-violence ethics. What is significant is that the idea itself was being 
publicly transmitted with consistency, whether or not adopted. Of even greater 
significance is that the nature of the anti-violence ethics that was promoted found its 
grounding in the teachings of Jesus and the doctrine of love, and not in theories of state 
sovereignty. In other words, the admonition of those against violence was not that 
individuals should be subject to the state’s biblically-legitimate authority, but that Jesus 
taught that individuals ought to show love to the enemy. 
5.3. Humanism 
As Johnson points out,642 just war theory, beginning in the fifteenth century, 
adapted to the new realities of medieval warfare. Medieval warfare depended upon 
soldiers, and the knights who led them into battle. The siege warfare that was the most 
common in early medieval times, ceased in effectiveness as fortifications became more 
impregnable. Technology addressed this problem with the creation of cannons and guns 
for warfare. The new technologies of fighting required more individual soldiers, 
resulting in greater armies, greater casualties and greater destruction than previous 
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kinds of warfare. Warfare made a steady progression: freom the siege to chess-like 
“manoeuvres” that drew opposing sides just to the brink of battle, before the 
outmanoeuvred side surrendered. Then from “manoeuvres” to tactics that drew the 
opponent into armed battle. The objective of warfare was no longer to lay siege and 
force surrender, nor to outmanoeuvre and force surrender, but to defeat through killing 
and wounding. These technologies and tactics dramatically increased the number of 
casualties among soldiers. Further, as the costs of war increased, so did the occurrence 
of war between the more powerful nation-states. All of these fatal conditions pre-
existed the escalation of the internal religious warfare occasioned by the rise of religious 
reformation. Reformation only worsened matters. 
At the time that anabaptism was taking root, humanist ideals were also being 
advocated. The anabaptists sought to inculcate a more authentic practice of the 
Christian faith, and sought reforms, including Christian rejection of all violence, that 
often made them political and religious pariahs. Humanist thought during the sixteenth 
and seventeenth century Reformation period, made similar arguments in favor of peace 
as the anabaptists. However, the humanist rationale was secularized. Though adhering 
to Christian faith, the humanists sought to emphasize the nonreligious benefits of non-
violence. Violence was deemed inimical to cultivating the highest human character, and 
war was deemed to encompass such evil that it lost any redeeming value. Humanists 
thought to reform the civil authorities by appealing to the efficacy of peace for human 
well-being, rather than appealing to a mandate for peaceableness rooted primarily in 
Jesus’s life and teaching. 
5.3.1. Erasmus 
During the early 1600s, at the time when the destructiveness of war was at a 
height, leading thinkers sought ways to limit the recourse to these total wars.643 This 
was akin to the strategies of the Truce of God and the Peace of God of earlier centuries. 
Those attempts sought to put rules around the timing and conduct of war. The 
seventeenth century attempts sought to discourage kings and princes from engagement 
                                               
 
643 The idea of imposing restraints on the conduct of warfare was not advanced until 
subsequent centuries. Turner suggests that the lack of expectation of limitations on the conduct of 
warfare during the sixteenth century explains the surge in anti-war thinking during this period. Johnson, 
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in war altogether. Desiderius Erasmus (1466-1536), of Rotterdam, a towering scholar 
in the period between the Renaissance and the Reformation, was a chief proponent of 
non-violence. Erasmus was convinced of the evils of war. He believed that the costs in 
death far outweighed any good that might be obtained.644 He made arguments from the 
humanist perspective that appealed to man’s better nature. His arguments rested, 
though, on both biblical principles as well as classical sources, such as Plato and 
Cicero. 645   Erasmus espoused the view that princes living according to Christian 
principles, which, in his view, were opposed to war, could bring about radical change 
in the society. Princes may resort to war, but only as a last resort. In The Education of 
a Christian Prince, Erasmus states that the  “good prince will never start a war at all, 
unless, after everything else has been tried, it cannot by any means be avoided…In the 
end, if so pernicious a thing cannot be avoided, the prince’s first concern should be to 
fight with the least possible harm to his subjects, at the lowest cost in Christian blood, 
and to end it as quickly as possible.”646 Erasmus was the most significant of succeeding 
humanist Christian intellectuals, as it was he who, influenced by Christian faith and 
doctrine, developed a vision of enlightened and humane personhood that necessitated a 
move away from the brutality and “stupidity” of war.647  
5.3.2. Grotius 
During the 17th century twenty-eight editions of Erasmus’ writings were 
published, eagerly consumed by intellectuals weary of political and religious war.648 In 
a humanist vein, just war theory was reimagined, conceived less from a theological 
rationale and more from natural law. Dutch Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), who wrote De 
Iure Belli ac Pacis (On the Law of War and Peace)649 was a chief architect of just 
war theory’s revisioning. He contemplated just war as a means of accomplishing a plan 
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647 Yoder, Koontz, and Alexis-Baker, Christian Attitudes to War, Peace, and Revolution, 198–99. 
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Grotius on the Law of War and Peace: Student Edition (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012); 
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for world peace. Grotius shifted the locus of “just cause” from the prince to the “the 
political community, the laws and customs passed down in their traditions, and the 
territory they inhabited.”650  Rulers’ authority rested upon the sovereignty of these 
defined communities. Violating a political community’s borders became the central 
feature of just cause for war, according to Grotius. In this way, violation of justice was 
no longer subjective, such as dissent from a ruler’s religion. Rather, violation of a 
territorial border became an objective fact as grounds for war.651 The ruler was no 
longer the judge of violations, but merely one who declared that the violation had 
occurred and how it had occurred. Further, Grotius reasoned that both sides to a conflict 
could have just cause, thus both sides should conduct warfare with restraint. They 
should do more than simply engage in war according to reasonable scruples, but should 
engage in conduct that observed particular standards rooted in regional custom and in 
the Christian ideal of charity.652 This reasoning was the beginning of conceptualization 
of a law of armed conflicts normed by European cultural standards.Those who followed 
Grotius,653 developed a plan of international law wherein they envisioned manageable 
criteria for warfare and peace, tribunals for enforcement, and ways of compelling kings 
to adopt treaties. Johnson describes these as attempts to create a plan for “perpetual 
peace” among the nations of the world.654 The perpetual peace that these humanists 
envisioned depended upon new political structures for international relations. They 
were structures that presupposed and necessitated not merely defining nation-state 
boundaries, but also that required decreasing the power of nation-state sovereignty.655 
Architects of the newly imagined structures attempted by their rules to “repristinate the 
just war theory—to make war again the servant of the law, the instrument of justice, 
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and the tool of peace.”656  The rules that sought “perpetual peace” became the normative 
political order following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years 
War. They proliferate into the present.In the 18th century, the notion of state sovereignty 
as the basis of just war, was expanded to include an emphasis on human rights, and the 
popular assent to being governed.657 Implementation of these conceptions of individual 
rights and democratic rule would only come through the force of insurrection and war, 
however. Just war formulations generally have been useful as theoretical constructs, 
but they have continually been unsuccessful at deterring war and maintaining sustained 
peace between, and within, nations.658  
5.3.3. Conclusion 
The desire and attempts at reform and revolution in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries turned to the opposite desire in the seventeenth century. The idea of the 
nation-state had solidified and, ideologically, the idea that the state had the exclusive 
right of use of force, against threats from without and within the state, gained sway. 
The ideology moved away from emphasis upon Jesus’s teaching and scripture, and 
towards nonreligious theories seeking maximization of human potential. Erasmus set 
the stage in this regard in the sixteenth century by influencing princes to refrain from 
war, yet acknowledging their right to the conduct of war where necessary. Grotius was 
the leading figure of the seventeenth century to revisit issues of war and to posit in the 
civil authority the right to go to war. However, Grotius sought to establish constraints 
around a king’s authority to declare war that were based on objective factors, such as 
territorial infringement, rather than subjective claims of violation and offense, such as 
disagreement on religious doctrine. Grotius was of the school of those who envisioned 
that a set of rules could govern inter-state, or inter-nation, relationships and lead to a 
period of “perpetual peace.”  
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5.4. Conclusion of Late Medieval to Early Modern Period Non-violence 
Analysis 
The church of the late Medieval period to the modern period was not a church 
that was concerned with creating peace, as much as it was concerned with reform. There 
were regular calls for cessation of Christians using physical force, but these calls were 
largely unheeded. Both those resisting authority and those in authority made use of 
physical force and aggression to accomplish their will. Those resisting authority did so, 
however, with the intention of securing the betterment of those who were marginalized 
by the social order and desiring change. 
From Wycliffe to Grotius the themes of peace and pacifism have repeatedly 
arisen in the context of social reform and governance. Wycliffe introduced to the 
modern era the idea that war and killing were incompatible with Christianity, which 
holds love as its central characteristic. Wycliffe’s beliefs included the idea that force 
and violence should play no part in a society ruled by the law of Christ, which is centred 
on love, and that governmental authority that derived from the use of force was contrary 
to Christian faith and was sin. His views resulted in him being tried as a heretic, but 
they resonated with the masses and were adopted by many throughout Europe. Wycliffe 
influenced Jon Hus of Bohemia, who shared his views on the need for ecclesiastical 
reform, though not his views on pacifism. An acolyte of Hus, however, Peter Chelčický, 
did deem the issue of pacifism central to Christian belief and practice. Decades after 
Chelčický’s arguments were made, the failure of resistance through violent means 
caused some of those seeking reform to turn to Chelčický’s (and Wycliffe’s) vision. 
The Swiss Unity of Brethren, who followed the pacifist ideal of Chelčický became a 
movement of adult baptizers and baptized in diverse locations with diverse beliefs; 
some pacifist and some not. Yet an early document sets forth pacifist beliefs as early as 
1525, and the influential Schleitheim Confession of 1527 adopted officially the tenets 
of adult baptism and the non-use of violence under all circumstances, based on the life 
and teachings of Jesus. The resistance of the anabaptists to church and governing 
authority resulted in their persecution. They were driven to become an underground 
church. From this experience, they adopted the theology of being separated, persecuted, 
and opposed to the world. 
With the rise of humanism, the arguments for peace added a secular dimension. 
Erasmus asserted that war was evil but allowed that the sovereign might resort to war 
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if all other means of resolving a dispute failed. Erasmus appealed to the inefficiency 
and intellectual insipidness of war, rather than, primarily, to Christian doctrine. The 
adoption of secularized rationales for the moderation, and hopefully cessation, of war 
continued apace with Grotius’ re-conception of just war theory. The ambition of his 
attempt to establish objective criteria for the instigation of violence, was the creation of 
a perpetual peace among nations. Grotius and those following him failed in this 
endeavour. The anabaptist vision of pacifism, and the political vision of just 
violence/war both continue to have intellectual and cultural support and have not been 
fundamentally changed since their original articulations. 
What is clear from the history is that, since Wycliffe, the preachers of peace 
have preached against the axis of ecclesial/political power generally.  The claims of 
peace have been raised by reformers, and those in the counter-culture. The Peasants’ 
Rebellion in England (1381), the Hussite Wars (1419-1434), the German Peasants’ 
Revolt (1525), and the English Revolution of the 1600s, attest to the fact that the 
overarching counter-cultural message of the peace proponents, was regularly adapted 
for use by those who employed physical violence to bring about the social, political and 
economic change. Even among the anabaptist churches, there was great variation in the 
teachings on pacifism. 
It can be said, then, that there has not been a time when Peace teaching has 
prevailed in the church in modernity, though the teaching has been raised repeatedly. 
Typically, those raising the prospect of pacifism, were persecuted killed or martyred, 
as the institutional church marked claims of pacifism as incident to other claims that 
were deemed heretical. It can also be said that whenever claims of peace were raised, 
they were never raised separate from calls for general reform and change in society. 
Claims to stop the warring of governments were akin to claims to stop the unjust 
killings, moral depravity, and corruption that was rampant in society. Also, it is clear 
that distinctions have been made between the war and violence of the state and the 
participation in war and violence of individuals. 
Finally, whether motivated by the teaching and example of Christ’s love, or by 
humanist rationality, there has not been, in Christian history, a movement for peace that 
resulted in long-term peace. 
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6. Theological Conceptions of Non-violence in 
Modernity 
6.1. Introduction 
The desire for peace in the Late Medieval Period resulted in the proscription of the 
power of the state, as the period underwent the transformation of nation-state building, and 
revolutions that insisted upon government by the consent of the governed. The desire for reform 
led to the Ecclesial power being diminished, as many left the Catholic church and began new 
church movements. The desire for autonomy and self-determination of religious affairs, led to 
the formation of sects that rejected the official ecclesial power, the reformed ecclesial powers, 
and often the civil authority. It was a time of change, and of ideas of peace without peace being 
obtained.  
The New World was reached by Europeans during the Late Medieval Period. The ideas 
of peace, reform, and self-determination that were transforming Europe, did not find expression 
in New World for the people of that world. Colonial subjugation and Christian triumph over 
the natives were the tenor of the engagement between the peoples. 
Christian philosophers began to theorize in concrete terms that Christians should 
practice “non-violence,” and to contemplate the character of non-violence. For most, following 
the ideas of Kant and Thoreau, non-violence involved a citizen-resistance that upheld the power 
of the State, and that had the goal of influencing the State to cease from perpetrating violence 
of some kind. Tolstoy, writing as a Russian elite, advocated withdrawal of all forms of support 
from the State, in order to precipitate the State’s collapse, since, for Tolstoy, there could not be 
a State that did not embody violence. Non-violence had moved from being an ecclesial 
doctrinal concept to being advocated as a political means of orderly transformation. 
Two world wars within decades changed the conception that a stable political order 
would ensure a stable culture. The church regained the opportunity to offer a conception of 
peace connected to spiritual ideals rather than the political. Niebuhr, Yoder, and King offered 
different visions of what and how peace for the Christian should be pursued. Niebuhr, writing 
between the world wars, found war to be a just necessity for the Christian. Yoder promoted 
non-resistance, and King non-violent resistance. All upheld the State’s inherent legitimacy and 
promoted conduct that was within lawful bounds. Wink, writing in the U.S. during the period 
of U.S. clandestine proxy wars around the globe, also advocated non-violent resistance, but 
accorded deference to those movements against the powers that chose to employ armed 
resistance. Thus, the church’s historic alignment with the interests of the State continues to be 
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reflected in the positions advanced by leading Christian thinkers of the twentieth century. 
Wink’s position, however, suggests the possibility of a potential move away from church/state 
cooperation. 
6.2. The New World 
While the European nation-states were attempting to create rules of peace, in the New 
World that had been stumbled upon by Columbus at the end of the fifteenth century, just war 
principles were not advanced to ensure peace, but to facilitate conquest. Bainton writes about 
the initial European encounter with indigenous peoples of South America, that  
The just war required the announcement of the conditions on 
the fulfilment of which war could be avoided. These were set 
forth in a document called the Requirement in 1513. The 
natives must acknowledge the church as the ruler of the world 
and the king of Spain as its representative, and they must 
permit the preaching of the faith.659 
By the middle of the sixteenth century in the New World, which was controlled by the 
church and Spain, Christian just war theory was under renewed debate among key Spanish 
philosopher-theologians Vitoria, Las Casas, and Sepúlveda. In 1544 Sepúlveda 
wrote Democrates Alter (or, on the Just Causes for War Against the Indians), which became 
the most important text at the time supporting the genocidal methods of Spanish conquest of 
the Americas.660 In this text Sepúlveda adapted just war theory to argue, following Aristotle, 
essentially that, “just war is one waged to enslave those who by nature are destined to be slaves 
and who resist their destiny.” 661   His argument was ideologically persuasive, and well 
remembered by history, however it did not gain official sanction. Following a debate with Las 
Cases, who argued that the Spanish monarch should mandate humane treatment of the 
indigenous, Las Casas’ view gained official support. Las Casas’ arguments in favor of the 
humanity of the indigenous peoples resulted in Emperor Charles V halting further expansion 
of the New World after the conquest of Mexico. 662 Nevertheless, in the territories of the 
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Americas, the impact of the outcome of the debate in Spain was negligible. Bainton notes, “the 
conquistadores thumbed their noses alike at the friars and the government.”663 
As other nation-states followed Spain into colonization of the New World, the 
abdication of peace principles and just war theory continued. In the 17th century the Puritans in 
North America resurrected the biblical idea of the war of aggression that was commanded by 
God. The Christians framed themselves as righteous Israel seizing the land of Canaan from 
Israel’s and God’s enemies.664 In this way, they sanctioned war with the indigenous.665 Wars 
against the indigenous, and seizure of land, continued into at least the 19th century.  
Quakers, of pacifist anabaptist Christian lineage, did emigrate to the New World and 
attempt to live peaceable with indigenous peoples. They began auspiciously in Pennsylvania, 
granted to William Penn by the King of England with the intention of being a non-violent 
commonwealth. However, the émigrés were subject to colonial monarchs who were not 
pacifist. There was also pressure from other arrivals to the new world who had the impulse for 
dominion. In 1756, the Quaker-controlled Pennsylvania legislature voted to go to war against 
their neighbors, the indigenous Delawares, with whom they were hitherto at peace. The vote 
was their compromise, since the bill contained an exemption from fighting for Quakers.666 With 
this vote, the improbability of the idea of pacifism as a governing system and the application 
of just war theory was made clear. From these beginnings, the ideals of peace and just war did 
not gain a strong footing in the colonial expeditions and territories of Christians in the New 
World. 
6.3. 18th and 19th Centuries 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, scientific discoveries, and humanism, 
rationalism, and individualism shifted the discussion of non-violence and peace from the 
theological to the ‘philosophical’ realm. It was no longer axiomatic that the bible was the 
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absolute authority for knowledge and belief. “Enlightenment thinkers ‘thought they had 
possession of a new knowledge and a new way of knowing which gave them a privileged 
position to judge the errors of the past and fashion the achievements of the future.’”667  In this 
cultural climate, the discussion of non-violence and peace was reshaped. Immanuel Kant, Leo 
Tolstoy, and Henry David Thoreau are representative of theorists who expressed the evolution 
of the ethics of the period. 
6.3.1. Kant 
Towards the end of the 18th century, decades after the revolutions for liberation waged 
by the people of America and France, German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) 
formulated what would later be considered the first liberal democratic peace theory 
(“LDPT”)668 in his 1795 work, Toward Perpetual Peace. According to Turner, Kant provided 
the conceptual bridge between the principles of perpetual peace expounded upon by those 
followers of Erasmus’s idealism, and the 19th and 20th century traditions of internationalism 
and international law.669  Historian H. Hinsley, who was the first to frame Kant as a peace 
theorist,670 claimed that Kant’s most important insight was his showing that peace would come 
not mechanically through organizational efforts, as philosophers before Kant maintained. 
Rather, that the mechanical structures must interact with the human rational morality. The 
freedom of states allows for the vainglorious qualities of men, e.g., love of power and 
possession, to create the conditions in which men’s better qualities and use of reason 
flourish.671 It was as recently as 1983 that Doyle advanced the theory tying Kant’s peace 
principles to a new liberal democratic peace theory (“LDPT”), based upon three pillars of 
sustained peace in society: “respect for individual rights” (liberal democratic norms), 
“constitutional restraint” (liberal democratic institutions), and “shared commercial interests” 
between liberal democracies.672 Following Doyle, LDPT developed as a school of thought in 
                                               
 
667 Roger E. Olson, The Journey of Modern Theology: From Reconstruction to Deconstruction (InterVarsity 
Press, 2013), 17 citing James M. Byrne, Religion and the Enlightenment: From Descartes to Kant (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), ix. 
668 Also referred to as liberal peace theory, or democratic peace theory. All are concerned with the idea 
that democracies are more peaceful and cooperative in international relations than other forms of government. 
669 Johnson, Quest for Peace, 198. 
670 Seán Molloy, Kant’s International Relations: The Political Theology of Perpetual Peace (University of 
Michigan Press, 2017), 6. 
671 F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 74. 
672 Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” The American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 
(1986): 1162, https://doi.org/10.2307/1960861. 
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the discipline of international relations673 resting upon the idea that liberal democracies do not 
fight each other, but may fight with non-democracies.674 Thus Kant’s influence as a peace 
theorist brings notions of peace, within the ambit of just war between nations, into the twentieth 
and 21st centuries. 
In Towards Perpetual Peace, Kant’s arguments for creating a sustained peace are part 
of his broader discussion of the human being and humanity’s moral and social potential.675  In 
much of Kant’s corpus, and in this work, Kant expresses ambivalence towards human potential 
and toward peace, and warrants close reading. Molloy notes that “the language and concepts 
employed by Kant are particularly ambiguous and it can be difficult, if not impossible, to 
discern what his position is on any given subject”.676  Waite observes that because of Kant’s 
ambiguities that it is impossible to know Kant’s full stance on peace (“I insist, the serious 
philosophical and hermeneutic problem throughout Toward Perpetual Peace, and indeed in all 
Kant’s major texts, remains. We simply cannot know what his full stand was.”).677 Molloy 
attributes Kant’s inscrutability to a “deep-rooted ambiguity and ambivalence within Kant’s 
work.”678 In light of this, the close attention that Alpert pays to Kant’s position on peace is 
valuable. 
Alpert shows that Kant’s position was deeply nuanced. Though he unconditionally 
forbade, on moral grounds, the rebellion of subjects against states,679 Kant nevertheless leaves 
                                               
 
673 LDPT’s evolution has moved away from Kant’s original theses, and become more specialized, 
concerned with the key maxims of the field concerning the empirical “laws” of evading war between states. 
(Molloy 2017:8) 
674 Fuat Gursozlu, “The Triumph of the Liberal Democratic Peace and the Dangers of Its Success,” in 
The Routledge Handbook of Pacifism and Nonviolence, ed. Andrew Fiala, Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy 
(Routledge, 2018). See also, Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics”; Stuart A. Bremer, “Dangerous Dyads: 
Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 2 (June 1, 
1992): 309–41, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002792036002005; Zeev Maoz, “The Controversy over the 
Democratic Peace: Rearguard Action or Cracks in the Wall?,” International Security 22, no. 1 (July 1, 1997): 162–
98, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.22.1.162. However, Gibler and Owsiak show that peace must precede 
democracy, rather than democracy preceding peace. See, Douglas M. Gibler and Andrew P. Owsiak, “Democracy 
and the Settlement of International Borders, 1919 to 2001,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 9 (October 1, 
2018): 1847–75, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717708599. 
675 Molloy, Kant’s International Relations, 17–18. 
676 Molloy, 5. 
677 Geoffrey Waite, “Kant, Schmitt or Fues on Political Theology, Radical Evil and the Foe,” Philosophical 
Forum 41, no. 1/2 (Spring/Summer  ///Spring/Summer2010 2010): 226, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
9191.2009.00359, emphasis in original. 
678 Molloy, Kant’s International Relations, 179, n.14. 
679 Kant writes: “this prohibition is unconditional, so that even if that power or its agent, the head of 
state, has gone so far as to violate the original [social] contract...a subject is still not permitted any resistance by 
way of counteracting force.” Immanuel Kant, “On the Common Saying, That May Be Correct in Theory But It Is 
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room for resistance to authority.680 What Alpert highlights is the rationale underlying Kant’s 
thought. Kant began with a modified Hobbsian premise, that prior to the social contract, the 
state of nature was lawless. Everyone was not necessarily always fighting, but everyone always 
could be fighting.681 In this state, no authority could mediate the dispute. Before the law 
became sovereign, destructive violence was inevitable. Essential to Kant’s theorization, then, 
is that the social contract exists as a means to end violence.682 “The genetic distribution of 
physical might, or violence, is reorganized through the establishment of the state for the 
purposed distribution of right, or justice.”683 The purpose of the sovereign is that “it provides 
norms by which people can appeal against each other’s unjust actions.”684 The state is given 
coercive power, in order to end the coercion of those who would inhibit freedom. Thus, for 
Kant, for individuals to resist the will legislated by the state is inherently unlawful; it constitutes 
“abolishing the entire legal constitution.”685  
Where the state, which is intended to end violence, itself becomes the purveyor of 
violence, Kant nevertheless requires the obedience of the subject to the sovereign. Yet at the 
same time, his concern for the moral development of humanity leads him to assert a duty of 
individuals to disobey immoral demands. 686  As Alpert notes, Kant endows individuals in 
society with a duty to be active, and not passive, citizens.687 They also have a duty to be non-
                                               
 
of No Use In Practice (1793),” in Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor, trans. Gregor, Mary J., Paperback 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pt. 8:300. 
680 Kant writes: “The proposition, ‘We ought to obey God rather than men,’ means only that when 
human beings command something that is evil in itself (directly opposed to the ethical law), we may not, and 
ought not, obey them.” Immanuel Kant, Kant: Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: And Other Writings 
(Cambridge University Press, 1998), pts. 6:99n, 110n. 
681 Kant, pt. 6:97n. 
682 Because the purpose of the state is to end violence, Kant finds it “unintelligible” that a state might 
declare war against other states, or engage of acts of violence against its own people. He writes:  
The concept of the right of nations as that of the right to go to war is, strictly speaking, unintelligible 
(since it is supposed to be a right to determine what is right not by universally valid external laws limiting the 
freedom of each but by unilateral maxims of force). Immanuel Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace (1795),” in Practical 
Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor, trans. Gregor, Mary J., Paperback (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), pts. 8:356-357. 
683 Immanuel Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals (1797),” in Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor, trans. 
Gregor, Mary J., Paperback (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pt. 6:307. 
684 Avram Alpert, “Philosophy against and in Praise of Violence: Kant, Thoreau and the Revolutionary 
Spectator,” Theory, Culture & Society 33, no. 6 (November 1, 2016): 56, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276416651976. 
685 Kant, “On the Common Saying,” 1999, pt. 6:320. 
686 Alpert, “Philosophy against and in Praise of Violence,” 56. 
687 Kant writes about passive vs. active human reason, for e.g., in The Critique of the Power of Judgement: 
“reason should never be passive, since this passivity means we need to be led by others, are subject to 
prejudices, and hence not autonomous (5:294–295/174–175).”  In his Metaphysics of Morals he describes the 
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violent. They have, additionally, the fundamental duty to preserve a form of government that 
dispels violence. In light of these overlapping duties, individuals must positively act in a non-
violent way to ensure non-violent governance. Accordingly, in the face of the State’s unjust 
use of violence, the people are condoned in using “negative resistance, that is, a refusal of the 
people to accede to every demand the government puts forth as necessary for administering the 
state.”688 
6.3.2. Tolstoy 
Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910), the celebrated Russian novelist, was also one of the most 
influential advocates of non-violence in recent history. His work influenced the movements led 
by Mohandas Ghandi and Martin Luther King, Jr.689 Though often diminished in significance, 
Tolstoy’s writing on non-violence, religion and government constitute the majority of his 
corpus in the second half of his life.690 Tolstoy was born into an aristocratic Orthodox Christian 
family.691 His family’s holdings surpassed even those of the czar of Russia.692 He became a 
soldier who fought in the Crimean War (1853-1856),693 where he personally witnessed the 
atrocity of battle.694  His novels, War and Peace (1869) and Anna Karenina (1878), brought 
him renown, and reflect his developing convictions regarding non-violence. In 1879 Tolstoy 
wrote A Confession, in which he described his ideological move away from the Orthodox 
church, towards his own formulated belief system. 695  His belief system made central the 
                                               
 
inalienable freedom that no law should trespass as the freedom “that anyone can work his way up from [the] 
passive condition to an active one.” (Kant, 1996b: 6:315/ 459).  
688 Kant, “On the Common Saying,” 1999, pt. 6:322. 
689 John Randolph Fuller, “Leo Tolstoy and Social Justice,” Contemporary Justice Review 12, no. 3 
(September 1, 2009): 321, https://doi.org/10.1080/10282580903105871. 
690 J. H. Abraham, “The Religious Ideas and Social Philosophy of Tolstoy,” The International Journal of 
Ethics 40, no. 1 (October 1929): 105, https://doi.org/10.1086/intejethi.40.1.2378292. 
691 Leo Tolstoy, “A Confession,” in Leo Tolstoy: Collection of 78 Classic Works with Analysis and Historical 
Background (Annotated Classics), ed. Rose Polak, trans. Aylmer Maude and Louise Maude, Kindle ed., n.d., chap. 1, 
para. 1. 
692 Fuller, “Leo Tolstoy and Social Justice,” 322. 
693 The Crimean War was a contest of might between Russia on one side and the Ottoman Empire, 
France, and Britain allies on the other side. Though Russia’s support had long aided the Ottoman Empire, the 
nationalism and portent of internal conflict between Greek Christians, Latin Christians, and Muslim Turks in the 
Ottoman Empire seem to have resulted in the great powers’ engagement in a war to determine whose influence 
would control in the event that the Ottoman Empire did not hold. See, Goldfrank’s excellent treatment David M. 
Goldfrank, The Origins of the Crimean War (Routledge, 2014); ; and for an historic overview of the analysis of the 
causes of the war see, Brison D. Gooch, “A Century of Historiography on the Origins of the Crimean War,” The 
American Historical Review 62, no. 1 (1956): 33–58, https://doi.org/10.2307/1848511. 
694 Sobia Tahir, “TolstoyTMs Ideology of Non-Violence: A Critical Appraisal,” no. 4 (n.d.): 347–48. 
695 Tolstoy’s views have been described as “Christian anarchism” due to the radical nature of his claims 
regarding the Lordship, but not deity of Christ (Townsend 98) which is combined with his denunciation of the 
state and its ecclesial collaborators. See, more on this topic see, Terry Hopton, “Tolstoy, God, Anarchism,” 
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teachings of Jesus, particularly as they related to non-violence and wealth. His beliefs also 
entailed condemnation of the state.696  
In his personal life, Tolstoy attempted to bring egalitarianism to his landholdings by 
divesting himself of wealth, and by attempting work at a trade making sandals and shirts. 
However, his gesture towards egalitarianism with his serfs was rebuffed due to suspicion that 
his divestment was, in reality, more a transfer of control to his wife, and though he made 
sandals, his lifestyle was not that of a cobbler, but continued to reflect the opulence of the 
wealthy.697 
Still, Tolstoy’s outlook was revolutionary for its time. In an age when Russian 
aristocrats were battling the czar for control of their own affairs and for control of their 
economic livelihood, Tolstoy battled instead for the welfare of the peasants. At this time, it was 
estimated that 80% of Russians were in the peasant class and that the vast majority of the wealth 
went to those in the government and the church. In many ways, what Tolstoy did would be 
equivalent to Americans advocating giving the land back to the American Indians.698 
As Fuller notes, what is remarkable and significant is that Tolstoy embraced a belief 
system that led him to attempt the radical re-distribution of wealth. Because of his beliefs, 
Tolstoy was shunned, he risked arrest and execution, and he was ultimately excommunicated 
by the Orthodox church due to his divergence from orthodox Christian doctrine.699 
Tolstoy’s beliefs on non-violence stemmed from his understanding of Christianity as 
following the teachings of Jesus, who was “the highest representative of humanity’s 
wisdom.”700 For Tolstoy the essence of Jesus’s teachings was distilled in the Sermon on the 
Mount. Of five key teachings,701 two were paramount: to not resist evil force or violence, and 
                                               
 
Anarchist Studies 8 (2000); Alexandre Christoyannopoulos, Christian Anarchism: A Political Commentary on the Gospel 
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698 Fuller, 323. 
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700 Christoyannopolis, “Leo Tolstoy on the State: A Detailed Picture of Tolstoy’s Denunciation of State 
Violence and Deception”; citing “Patriotism and Government,” in Leo Tolstoy, The Kingdom of God and Peace 
Essays, trans. Maude Aylmer (New Delhi: Rupa & Company, 2005). 
701 The five Commandments taken by Tolstoy from the gospels were these: “1. To refrain from anger 
under any circumstances. 2. Marriage contracted between man and woman is irrevocable and sexual intercourse 
not in a marriage state is for bidden. 3. The taking of an oath is not permissible. 4. Not to resist anything in the 
nature of evil, force, or violence. 5. To love one's enemies, and thus not to inculcate a spirit of sham patriotism; 
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to love one’s enemies. For Tolstoy, love of enemies included not resorting to use of arms, and 
not erecting false barriers between nations and classes.702  
Tolstoy became convinced that the use of force, in defense of oneself and one’s 
property, was a source of great evil in the world. At issue was both the ownership of property 
as well as the use of force. He became convinced that what mattered in life was “hard work, 
poverty, humility, the renunciation of property, and the renunciation of one's rights.”703 As 
having no property was the ideal, the defense of property became indefensible. 
If I now feel tempted to defend others or myself, the property 
of others or my own, by violence, I can no longer give way to 
temptation. I dare not amass riches for myself. I dare not use 
violence of any kind against my fellow-creatures, except, 
perhaps, against a child in order to save it from present harm; 
nor can I now take part in any act of authority, the purpose of 
which is to protect men's property by violence. I can neither be 
a judge, nor take part in judging and condemning.704 
There were no grounds for defense of self or property, and no grounds to aid the state 
in the defense of property. Further, the principle of not resisting violation (of self or property) 
was not merely personal, but also extended to the government. He argued in The Kingdom of 
God is Within You, that the wicked are always those in power, as good people do not seek to 
obtain, and thus do not rise to, power over others. “The wicked will always dominate the good 
and will always oppress them.”705 Those in favor of maintaining the status quo argue that power 
of the State is necessary to restrain evil people. Tolstoy counters that attempts to restrain 
violence by use of force “only punishes certain forms of covetousness, such as robbery and 
swindling, certain forms of profligacy and cruelty, such as conjugal infidelity, murder, and 
wounding…[I]t seems to countenance all the manifestations of covetousness, profligacy, and 
cruelty which do not come under its narrow definition.”706 For this reason the coercion of force 
corrupts public opinion, which is the only true means of dissuading bad acts. As, “[f]orce can 
                                               
 
not to resort to arms, and not to institute false barriers between nations and classes.” Abraham, “The Religious 
Ideas and Social Philosophy of Tolstoy,” 113.  
702 Abraham, 113. 
703 Leo Tolstoy and Constantine Popoff, “What I Believe (or My Religion),” in Leo Tolstoy: Collection of 78 
Classic Works with Analysis and Historical Background (Annotated Classics), ed. Rose Polak, Kindle ed., n.d., chap. 12, 
para. 19. 
704 Tolstoy and Popoff, chap. 12, para. 19. 
705 Leo Tolstoy, “The Kingdom of God Is Within You,” in Leo Tolstoy: Collection of 78 Classic Works with 
Analysis and Historical Background (Annotated Classics), ed. Rose Polak, trans. Constance Garnett, Kindle ed., n.d., 
chap. 10, para. 23. 
706 Tolstoy, chap. 10, para. 70. 
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never suppress what is sanctioned by public opinion.”707 He argues for a stateless social order 
wherein other nations or states are left “in peace.” If interaction is needed or desired with them 
we ought only to influence them by Christian manners and 
Christian teaching, setting them the example of the Christian 
virtues of patience, meekness, endurance, purity, brotherhood, 
and love. Instead of that we begin by establishing among them 
new markets for our commerce, with the sole aim of our own 
profit; then we appropriate their lands, i. e., rob them; then we 
sell them spirits, tobacco, and opium, i. e., corrupt them; then 
we establish our morals among them, teach them the use of 
violence and new methods of destruction, i, e., we teach them 
nothing but the animal law of strife, below which man cannot 
sink, and we do all we can to conceal from them all that is 
Christian in us. After this we send some dozens of missionaries 
prating to them of the hypocritical absurdities of the Church, 
and then quote the failure of our efforts to turn the heathen to 
Christianity as an incontrovertible proof of the impossibility of 
applying the truths of Christianity in practical life.708 
In this passage Tolstoy posits that instead of demonstrating a Christian example in our 
engagement with other cultures and countries, the actions of Christian nations rob, corrupt, and 
debase by their example. 
Tolstoy argues for individuals and nations to live as exemplars of Christ’s teaching, as 
a means of shaping public opinion, as a means of instigating change in society. He notes that 
only by actually living into the practice of non-violence and virtue will humanity collectively 
learn how to live into this way of life. One cannot expect a map of territory that has never been 
seen. 
Tolstoy identifies as evil a Christian government’s refusal of the truth of nonresistance. 
He uses the example of slavery to make his point. For Tolstoy, slavery characterized not only 
the condition of Africans in the West, but also the class of serfs in Russia. Indeed, to Tolstoy, 
slavery has a deceptive way of being perpetuated and is regularly accomplished through a 
diversity of methods.709 This becomes possible because of the instrument of money, which “in 
                                               
 
707 Tolstoy, chap. 10, para. 77. 
708 Tolstoy, chap. 10, para. 84. 
709 These he names as slavery by violence, threats of punishment and death; slavery by deprivation of 
land, depriving persons of sustenance and a livelihood; and slavery by tribute or taxation. In all of its guises, 
slavery constituted the elevation of a small class of people over another, overwhelmingly large, class of people.  
Abraham, “The Religious Ideas and Social Philosophy of Tolstoy,” 114 referencing; graf Leo Tolstoy, The Slavery of 
Our Times (Dodd, Mead, 1900), chap. 11. Tolstoy also articulated a kind of slavery that arises out of the use of 
money. “I understood that money is the impersonal and concealed enslavement of the poor…The root of every 
slavery is the use of the labor of others; and hence, the compelling others to it is founded indifferently on my 
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all societies known to us...has served as an instrument of violence.”710  Tolstoy concluded that 
the condition of slavery is inescapable as long as there is legislative government.711 “The 
essence of slavery lies...in the fact that slavery exists, that there are people that have the power 
to decree laws profitable for themselves, and that as long as people have that power, there will 
be slavery.”712 
Tolstoy understood legislative government to be a deception. He viewed the masses of 
people as passive machines without any option but to carry out the interests of the governing 
class.713 He described the law as “rules, made by people who govern by means of organized 
violence, for non-compliance with which the noncomplier is subjected to blows, to loss of 
liberty, or even to being murdered.” 714  He concludes that the law is nothing more than 
organized violence. Ending the evil of slavery, for Tolstoy, required first ending the evil of 
government. 
This end should not come about by violent overthrow, however. The end of government 
should be realized by a moral revolution. By exposing the fraud that the government 
perpetuates, and as Abraham states, abject refusal to participate in any government enterprise 
that is maintained and supported by governmental violence.715 
It would seem so simple and natural for working people, 
particularly the agricultural workers, who in Russia, as in the 
rest of the world, form a majority to finally understand that they 
have for centuries been suffering from something they have 
brought upon themselves to no advantage... and finally say to 
those they regard their leaders: ‘leave us in peace! If you 
emperors, presidents, generals, judges, bishops, professors and 
                                               
 
right to the slave, or on my possession of money which is indispensable to him. [To avoid this evil] I shall not 
compel others to toil for me, but I shall endeavor to free them from the labor which they have performed for 
me, as far as possible, either by doing without this labor or by performing it for myself.” Leo Tolstoy, “What To 
Do?: Thoughts Evoked by the Censor of Moscow,” in Leo Tolstoy: Collection of 78 Classic Works with Analysis and 
Historical Background (Annotated Classics), ed. Rose Polak, trans. Isabel F. Hapgood, Kindle ed., n.d., chaps. 18, 
paras. 7, 9.  
710 Abraham, “The Religious Ideas and Social Philosophy of Tolstoy,” 114 citing “What Then Must We 
Do?” (A more specific location could not be determined. It is possible that the text was rendered differently in 
other translations consulted.). 
711 Abraham, 114. 
712 Tolstoy, The Slavery of Our Times, chap. 11, para. 7. 
713 Abraham, “The Religious Ideas and Social Philosophy of Tolstoy,” 114. 
714 Tolstoy, The Slavery of Our Times, chap. 12, para. 11. He gives the example of what happens when one 
fails to give the fruits of his labor that are demanded, such as in taxes. “[a]rmed men will come and take from 
him what is demanded, and if he resists he will be beaten, deprived of freedom, and sometimes even killed…the 
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respect…for every nonfulfillment of the established laws there is punishment.” Tolstoy, chap. 12, paras. 6–7. 
715 Abraham, “The Religious Ideas and Social Philosophy of Tolstoy,” 115. 
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other learned men need armies, navies, universities, ballots, 
synods, conservatories, prisons, gallows and guillotines, do it 
all yourselves: collect your own taxes, judge, execute and 
imprison among yourselves, murder people in war, but do it all 
yourselves and leave us in peace because we need none of it, 
we no longer wish to participate in all these useless, and above 
all evil deeds!’716  
In Tolstoy’s vision, such resistance would result in government being overthrown, laws 
being abolished and private property disappearing. Human justice and equality would be 
possible, and would result. 
6.3.3. Thoreau 
Writing during roughly the same period as Tolstoy in Orthodox Russia, was Henry 
David Thoreau (1817-1862), who wrote in the abolitionist-north of the U.S. Thoreau was a 
philosopher, essayist and a Transcendentalist. He espoused engagement in non-violent 
resistance as a way of bringing about radical change, and performing an act of citizenship that 
was of utmost integrity.   
Most, in his estimation, “serve the state…not as men mainly, but as machines, with 
their bodies...Others serve the State chiefly with their heads. A very few, [serve] as heroes, 
patriots, martyrs, reformers in the great sense, and men serve the State with their consciences 
also, and so necessarily resist it for the most part.”717  
Thoreau advocated active conscientious engagement with the State, by resistance to the 
State. He argued that one must demonstrate a commitment to upholding the entity of 
government, while at the same time demonstrating a commitment to radical change. Such 
engagement entails resistance to the function of the state when it functions violently. In his 
specific case, though aknowledging that the specifics of other cases would require different 
strategies, advocacy of the refusal to pay taxes was a strongly viable act of conscientious 
resistance.  
If a thousand men were not to pay their tax-bills this year, that 
would not be a violent and bloody measure, as it would be to 
pay them, and enable the State to commit violence and shed 
innocent blood. This is, in fact, the definition of a peaceable 
revolution, if any such is possible. If the tax-gatherer . . . asks 
                                               
 
716 Leo Tolstoy, “The Law of Love and the Law of Violence,” in A Confession and Other Religious Writings, 
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me, as one has done, ‘But what shall I do?’ my answer is, ‘If 
you really wish to do anything, resign your office’. When the 
subject has refused allegiance, and the officer has resigned his 
office, then the revolution is accomplished.718  
Here we see Thoreau encouraging the engagement of government through the positive 
act of not paying taxes, and not working for the government, as protest to the violence of the 
State. 
Though Thoreau urged conscience-led action against government malfeasance, and 
though he was stridently opposed to slavery, there is some disagreement as to whether or not 
he participated in the abolitionist cause.719 Though he may not have taken action regularly as 
part of the abolitionist struggle, Thoreau did believe that not paying his taxes was his duty as a 
man and as a citizen. Following the U.S. declaration of war against Mexico (1845),720 which 
Thoreau believed was waged under pretense, while its true intent was extending slavery into 
the southwestern region of the U.S., Thoreau condemned the war. His condemnation of the war 
resulted in his arrest for his ongoing nonpayment of taxes. Though he did not remain long in 
jail (one night), his intention of acting in resistance to the expansion of legislated slavery in the 
U.S., which he deemed unjust, was accomplished.721 
Thoreau believed that the only legitimate government was that which “establishes 
justice in the land.”722 For Thoreau, the goal of civil resistance was to use peaceful revolution 
to turn the ship of government in the direction of accomplishing its true purpose, which was 
the ending of violence. For him it was the citizen’s duty to speak up and to perform an act of 
resistance when the government acted contrary to its purpose. 
Thoreau’s support of John Brown evidences that his resistance ideals went even further 
than advocacy of personal conscience-led non-violent decisions. John Brown was a radical 
abolitionist who believed in, and attempted, armed insurrection as a means to coerce slavery’s 
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719 See, Gilman M. Ostrander, “Emerson, Thoreau, and John Brown,” The Mississippi Valley Historical 
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720 The Mexican-American war (1846 to 1848) was ostensibly declared after the U.S. annexed the 
Republic of Texas. Mexico, having never accepted the secession of Texas, regarded the territory as still a part of 
Mexico. 
721 It’s not clear whether or when Thoreau resumed paying taxes. 
722 Henry David Thoreau, “A Plea for Captain John Brown,” in Civil Disobedience and Other Essays, Dover 
Thrift Ed. (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2012), 43. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
169 
abolition. He attacked the U.S. arsenal at Harper’s Ferry, Virginia in 1859, hoping the arms 
could be passed on to the enslaved and a full-scale revolt ignited. Brown’s plan was 
unsuccessful. After the rebellion was crushed, Brown was arrested, jailed, and tried. Within 
two months of the raid, he had been convicted of treason, murder and inciting a slave 
insurrection. He was thereafter hanged. 723  The rebellion caused a media sensation. Slave 
holders were outraged and terrified. Abolitionists decried the methods used by Brown in his 
abolitionist zeal, but claimed his motives to be righteous. Some regarded him as a martyr.  
Thoreau, who previously spoke merely of taking a non-violent stand in accordance with 
conscience, was one of Brown’s vocal and committed supporters. When public opinion and 
news reports began to turn against John Brown in Thoreau’s community, it prompted him to 
make a public speech (his Plea) to balance the public discourse. Turner notes, “More than any 
other action in his lifetime, Thoreau’s public defense of John Brown was a premeditated 
projection of himself into political affairs.”724  
Turner makes the argument that Thoreau, in delivering his speech, was exemplifying 
his belief in the performance of conscience as a means of political transformation. “The aim of 
the performance is to provoke one’s neighbors into a process of individual self-reform that will 
make them capable of properly vigilant democratic citizenship and conscientious political 
agitation.”725 
Alpert suggests that part of the significance of Thoreau’s public performance to balance 
the public discourse, is that by making his public speech, he engaged those in the community 
who felt they were alone in rooting for the success of Brown, though they themselves would 
not participate in physical violence. “Moreover, through his witnessing, he is enabling these 
spectators to see the existence of this community themselves. They no longer have to hide their 
opinions from others in the fear of rebuke or censure. They can attach themselves to Thoreau’s 
city of words. In fact, Thoreau, along with other dissenters who wrote about Brown, was largely 
successful in transforming the mainstream interpretation of the event.”726 
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Thoreau died less than three years after Brown’s execution. Speaking at his funeral, 
friend and neighbor Ralph Waldo Emerson named John Brown as one of the three men who 
had influenced Thoreau most in the last few years of his life.727 The encounter with a man of 
violence,728 though he himself was not such a man, had a profound impact on Thoreau. It 
shaped and influenced the way that history was remembered. 
We receive from Thoreau, then, the conception of non-violent positive activity, which 
could constitute a performance in line with one’s conscience, that is intended to shape the 
community discourse of the event and to create a counter-community. What he adds to the 
evolution of non-violence is that he endorses, not merely living as a Christian and refraining 
from unvirtuous behavior, but taking affirmative steps towards creating justice and causing the 
government to function as it is intended. 
6.3.4. Conclusion 
Kant, Tolstoy, and Thoreau represent the diversity of settings, circumstances and 
conclusions that were being reached regarding non-violence and peace in the generation 
following the upheaval of national revolutions.  
Writing in eighteenth century Europe, in the years following the disruptions of 
reformations and revolutions as he did, Kant adhered to a notion of the state as securing peace 
and order. Ultimately, peace for Kant acknowledged violence as a fact of social existence and, 
through the social contract, conferred upon the state the exclusive right to inflict violence, in 
order to coerce justice. He, like Erasmus believed that violence was the rightful province of the 
state to wield. Kant adds, however, that the state is “unintelligible” when it wields violence, 
since the state’s purpose is fostering the cessation of violence.  He adds, as well, that the people, 
meaning the ruling or legislative class and not private individuals, do have a right to disagree 
and to resist the unjust acts of those governing, when warranted. Kant’s peace theory 
introduced the notion of non-violent resistance as a moral duty in cases where the sovereign 
fails to act in furtherance of its purpose of ending violence. He was ambiguous as to when and 
how such a duty might be enacted, however. 
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A different peace theory was articulated by Tolstoy, who wrote in Czarist Russia during 
the 19th and early twentieth centuries. Tolstoy was raised an Orthodox Christian, but left the 
church and developed a radical vision for a new society. He rejected the notion of the state, 
finding it to be a deceptive means of violence and enslavement, just as he found the teachings 
of the eastern orthodox church of Russia itself to be corrupt. Tolstoy’s formulations of the 
Christian life involved major political commitments. Tolstoy advocated abolition of the state 
and private property, and the governance of society through the law of Christian 
neighbourliness and love. He espoused the overthrow of government by the common people 
without the use of physical force, but through not-acting in furtherance of government’s violent 
ends, e.g., not doing soldiering work, prison work, tax collecting, working as clergy, etc. 
Tolstoy proposed a radical vision of what was possible for Christian peaceableness. 
Thoreau, who wrote at roughly the same time as Tolstoy, but in the U.S., was less 
radical. Thoreau was not a Christian, but a Transcendentalist, and he upheld the authority of 
the state, but believed that the state should be non-violent. Thoreau adds to the 
conceptualization of an ethics of anti-violence that one must take affirmative action in 
resistance to state authority to compel the state to act justly. 
Kant, Tolstoy, and Thoreau demonstrate that consideration of peace was ongoing, and 
that the dimensions of peace contemplated were contrary to the peace-through-war methods of 
nation-state builders. They contemplated peace being achieved without the use of physical 
force, and through the actions of individuals. Tolstoy also contemplated individuals acting in 
concert against, or collectively refusing to act in furtherance of, the goals of the state, which 
for him equated to violence. 
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6.4. 20th Century 
As Olson notes, “WWI sounded the death knell of the nineteenth century European 
intellectual ethos including classical liberal theology.”729 The promise of the Enlightenment, 
that reason would result in unending human progress, was proved false as people faced the 
horrors of war, waged between Christian nations.  In reaction, a neo-orthodoxy arose. There 
was a sense that Christian theology should turn from philosophies such as Kant’s and Hegel’s 
and stick closer to, as Barth referred to it, “the strange new world of the Bible,” which 
recognized a Christocentric norm for life and doctrine. Into this climate many Christians 
desired to formulate an ethics for avoiding another world war, and later to grapple with the 
realities of further war in the world. Niebuhr, Yoder, and Wink, articulate three different 
approaches of Christian theology to the modern condition.730 
6.4.1. Niebuhr 
Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971) initially, because of the barbarous level of death and 
killing that occurred during WWI, advocated pacifism and non-violence. He was a leader of 
the Fellowship for Reconciliation, a group founded in the early months of WWI. However, 
while pastoring a church in Detroit, his views changed. Witnessing the plight of his congregants 
who were pre-union industrial workers, as well as the rise of Hitler’s fascism in Germany, 
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persuaded him that coercive force might be the most principled position for Christians 
committed to peace. Following his reconsideration of non-violence and pacifism, Niebuhr 
wrote the highly influential Moral Man and Immoral Society (1932), which has been described 
by Chernus as “the most influential, and probably the most trenchant, critique of non-violence 
ever written in the United States.”731 
In this book, and in the subsequent essay, “Why the Christian Church Is Not Pacifist,” 
(1940) which I quote from here, Niebuhr articulated an ethics of Christian non-violence. He 
asserted the “absolute and uncompromising ethic” 732  of “love universalism and love 
perfectionism,”733 which entailed Jesus’s embrace of complete non-resistance to evil. This law 
of love, for Niebuhr, “transcends all other laws.”734 Jesus’s standard of complete non-resistance 
is normative, but not applicable to the concrete circumstances of human experience and 
political reality. Human experience, and the political realities that are the communal expression 
of individual human experience, reflect the reality of humanity’s sin; the desire to refute one’s 
insignificance and finitude by acquiring some sense of significance at the expense of others.735 
Humanity is not good, but sinful at heart. History reflects the persistence of human sinfulness, 
and scripture records it, even up to the final scenes of the eschaton in scripture.736 The sinful 
condition of humanity challenges the institution of justice, and justice requires a balance of 
power that can only be achieved by some means of coercion.  
Here Niebuhr, more than any other theorist before him, makes a connection between 
violent force, non-violent force, and coercion, finding that whether violent or non-violent the 
use of force is coercive.  
Once we admit the factor of coercion as ethically justified, 
though we concede that it is always morally dangerous, we 
cannot draw any absolute line of demarcation between violent 
and nonviolent coercion…It is impossible to coerce a group 
without damaging both life and property and without 
imperilling [sic] the interests of the innocent with those of the 
guilty. Those are factors which are involved in the intricacies of 
group relations, and they make it impossible to transfer an ethic 
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of personal relations uncritically to the field of inter-group 
relations.737 
Niebuhr blurs the line between violence and non-violence, finding even the non-
violence of Ghandi to be evidence of the coercive use of collective force, which has the 
potential to cause physical violence, e.g., the consequences to the British merchants and their 
families who are deprived of a livelihood because of Ghandi’s non-violent protest. If children 
starve, that is not unrelated to the protest and constitutes violence, with which Ghandi is 
complicit. “Non-co-operation, in other words, results in social consequences not totally 
dissimilar from those of violence.”738 
Arguing against the use of force, then, is an argument in favour, not of non-violence, 
but of non-resistance. Nonresistance, despite being the method of Jesus, is idealist and utopian. 
This is not a bad thing. However, it is unrealistic. Christian realism requires acceptance of the 
principled use of force against tyranny and aggression, force which cannot be conceived of as 
inherently wrong. “[A] political policy cannot be intrinsically evil if it can be proved to be an 
efficacious instrument for the achievement of a morally approved end.”739 Christian love and 
proper Christian motivation could be measured by its social goal. If it has the general welfare 
of others as its objective, then its aims are just. There are no absolutes. Thus, for him, the 
argument of non-violence proponents, that the means must match the ends, is fallacy. More 
realistic to the human condition and experience was whether a policy’s ends justify the means. 
Niebuhr’s thinking did much to influence the theorization of Christian non-violence in 
the United States. U.S. foreign policy, in particular, was greatly influenced by his realist 
ideology, and could arguably be said to still be guided by his thinking. As Chernus states, 
“[leading foreign policy creators after WWII] took his writings as a religious seal of approval 
on their realist uncompromising stance against the Soviet Union. By the late 1940s, they were 
creating a permanent national security state dedicated to an all-out war against communism.”740 
Decades later this resulted in the U.S. pursuing a nuclear arms agenda whereby, towards the 
close of the twentieth century, men in power brazenly flirted with planetary annihilation. 
Ultimately, Neibuhr objected to pacifism in that it requires one to make no judgements 
at all regarding justice, or “to give an undue preference to tyranny in comparison with the 
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momentary anarchy which is necessary to overcome tyranny.” 741 His is an objection to a 
“heretical” kind of pacifism that “absorbed the Renaissance faith in the goodness of man, 
hav[ing] rejected the Christian doctrine of original sin as an outmoded bit of pessimism.”742 He 
stringently objected to the notion that humans could become reasonable and work together for 
the good of all. 
6.4.2. J.H. Yoder 
When John Howard Yoder’s (1927-1997) ideas entered the Christian non-violence 
discourse the map of the historical terrain had been redrawn to a degree. Two world wars had 
occurred, with unheralded atrocities due to advances in military technology. Fascism and anti-
Semitism at unprecedented levels was accomplished. Instead of a number of globally powerful 
sovereign states, two dominant super-powers ruled the world. A cold war between those two 
powers was underway, shaping the emergence of hostilities around the globe. Most importantly 
for proponents of Christian non-violence, the early part of the twentieth century had provided 
a method for the theory of the earlier proponents of non-violence via Ghandi’s non-violent 
resistance. Niebuhr saw this mass action as coercive, and thus violent, despite its non-violent 
tactics. However, others saw it as a mode of protest that epitomized the ideal means of 
resistance. Yoder disagreed with Niebuhr and offers one of the most penetrating accounts of 
Christian non-violence of the twentieth century. His most influential work, The Politics of Jesus 
(1972) is considered a classic.743  
Yoder wrote from the Mennonite Anabaptist tradition and adhered to a theology of 
pacifism,744 which he understood as the obligation of all Christians. Yoder decries the turn to 
a theology of the natural, that attempts to discern what is, e.g., fitting, relevant, or effective, for 
a mainstream audience, instead of taking Jesus on his own particularized terms. 745  He 
especially wrote against a theological framing of Jesus that portrayed Jesus as apolitical and 
concerned merely with the personal piety of the believer.  
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Yoder, like Niebuhr, places Jesus at the center of his theology, and identifies Jesus’s 
ethics as centered around the cross.746 The ethics that disciples are called to “imitate” include: 
forgiving as Christ has forgiven,747 loving indiscriminately as God does, 748 serving others,749  
and suffering that includes the descriptions of: definitive of apostolic existence,750 giving one’s 
life,751 servanthood in place of dominion,752 suffering though innocent without complaint,753 
suffering as bearers of the kingdom cause.754 
Based upon these values, Jesus set up an alternative community that would live in a 
counter-cultural way according to this ethics. This new community would eschew violence, 
which was an alternative option for seizing power in Jesus’s context, which the Zealot755 
faction favored. Instead, the community of Jesus followers would be committed to love without 
violence. The key to the community’s relationship with the world would be to live in loving 
“revolutionary subordination” to those with whom one is in social relationship, in particular 
with the state. The Christian is to hope that “the loving willingness of...subordination will itself 
have a missionary impact; the unbelieving husband is consecrated through his wife, and the 
unbelieving wife is consecrated through her husband…The voluntary subjection of the church 
is understood as a witness to the world.”756 Christian hope is to be found in the fact of the 
resurrection. That God has power to bring life from death, hope from despair, and victory from 
seeming defeat. In this way Yoder argues for humanity to realize its limited role in ordering 
history. Yoder discredits two assumptions about the future: 
1. …that the relationship of cause and effect is visible, 
understandable, and manageable, so that if we make our 
choices on the basis of how we hope society will be moved, it 
will be moved in that direction.  
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2. …that we are adequately informed to be able to set for 
ourselves and for all society the goal toward which we seek to 
move it.757 
Ultimately, for Yoder, it is God and not humanity who drives human history. Thus, 
there is no issue for the Christian in submitting to power. Indeed, Christians must accept their 
powerlessness. “The key to the ultimate relevance and to the triumph of the good is not any 
calculation at all, paradoxical or otherwise, of efficacy, but rather simple obedience.” 758 
Ultimate good is determined by faithfulness and not by results. 
Yoder calls Christians to adhere to an ethic of loving subordination out of obedience to 
Jesus, in imitation of Jesus. It is a radical pacifism that endorses Christian suffering, and, unlike 
Neibuhr, has no expectation of Christian effectiveness in the world. 
6.4.3. King 
Beginning with 1955-1956 bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama, Martin Luther King, 
Jr. (1929-1968) emerged as a leading figure in the civil rights protest movement in the U.S.759 
King’s activism for desegregation applied the method of non-violent direct action. His methods 
included use of marches, sit-ins, and boycotts to harness the collective power of 
disenfranchised African-Americans, to compel legislative change. Pivotal to King’s ethics was 
his role as a Baptist minister who was a product of the U.S. south, where he was exposed to the 
inequalities and violences faced by African-Americans through Jim Crow governance and 
martial law. 
During his formal education, King investigated different theories seeking ways to 
address U.S. social inequality. He was influenced by Rauschenbusch, Muste, and Neibuhr, but 
his greatest source of influence was Ghandi of India.760 King became convinced that Ghandi’s 
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accomplishment in using Satyagraha (“Satya is truth which equals love, and agraha is force; 
‘Satyagraha’ therefore, means truth-force or love-force.”)761 in his campaigns of non-violent 
resistance were ideal.  King writes, “I came to feel that this was the only morally and practically 
sound method open to oppressed people in their struggle for freedom.”762 Based upon the work 
of Ghandi, King came to understand pacifism not as nonresistance, but as non-violent 
resistance to evil. He states that non-violence became more than merely a method. “It became 
a commitment to a way of life.”763 
King outlines his understanding of non-violent resistance in his 1958 essay, 
“Pilgrimage to Non-violence.”764 It is a philosophy that, for him, has six components.765 First, 
non-violent resistance is not passive; it is not cowardice.  Fighting would be preferable to 
cowardice and would not be necessary because “there is always another alternative.”766 This 
alternative for King is active non-violent resistance. Second, non-violent resistance “does not 
seek to defeat or humiliate the opponent, but to win his friendship and understanding.”767 The 
objective of protest is to prompt moral shame in the opponent, with the goal of reconciliation 
and creation of beloved community. Third, the contest is against the invisible, not the visible.  
It is not the White person but injustice that must be overcome. Fourth, non-violent resistance 
involves a “willingness to accept suffering without retaliation, to accept blows from the 
opponent without striking back.”768 Violence is accepted if necessary, but only as one who 
receives violence, never as one who administers violence. King adopts Ghandi’s view that 
“unearned suffering is redemptive” 769  for the resister. Added to that, suffering has the 
possibility of gaining the attention of, and winning over, an intractable opponent.770 Fifth, non-
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violent resistance avoids internal, as well as external, violence of spirit. Love, not hate, for the 
enemy must be cultivated. Just as God loved sinners, while they were yet sinners, and greatly 
in need of God’s love, Blacks must love Whites, whose souls are greatly scarred “because the 
white man needs [Black people’s] love to remove his tensions, insecurities, and fears.”771 Sixth, 
is based on the belief that “the universe is on the side of justice,”772  thus the resister can have 
hope. 
Cobb, a veteran of the Freedom Movement and former civil rights worker in the deep 
South, where racism and segregation were most entrenched, has commented on the value of 
the method of non-violent resistance. 
Acts of nonviolent resistance contributed mightily to ending the 
mental paralysis that had long kept many black people trapped 
in fear and subservient to white supremacy, reluctant to even 
try to take control over their own lives despite the fact that 
slavery had ended roughly a century earlier. The principled, 
militant dignity of nonviolent resistance also won nationwide 
sympathy for the idea of extending civil rights to black 
people.773 
He emphasizes here not the change in legislation that was made possible by the method, 
but the more important psychic transformation that was made possible. Black people were 
liberated from fear and subservience, and Whites gained new sympathy for the claims for 
equality made by Black people. 
King’s activism was not limited to correction of racial inequality in the U.S. He was 
concerned with the evils of racism in its global manifestations. He witnessed the process of 
decolonization occurring throughout the world and assessed the racial dimensions of the global 
clamor for political independence. King concluded that, just as all other great civilizations have 
fallen as a result of internal decay, “[r]acism can well be that corrosive evil that will bring down 
the curtain on Western civilization.”774  In addition, King was concerned with the intersecting 
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issues of poverty (“The time has come for an all-out world war against poverty.”)775 and war 
(“Wisdom born of experience should tell us that  war is obsolete. There may have been a time 
when war served as a negative good by preventing the spread and growth of an evil force, but 
the destructive power of modern weapons eliminates even the possibility that war may serve 
any good at all.”)776 With respect to poverty and war, King’s concerns extended beyond the 
borders of the U.S. and engaged global conditions. 
Based upon Jesus’s teaching (“Love your enemies . . . that ye may be children of your 
Father which is in heaven”),777 and modeled on Jesus’s example, King’s principles had a 
radical love of enemies at its core. What his work contributed was the implementation of ideas 
of non-violent action with mass mobilization. King used the principles rooted in the Christian 
tradition of love, to promote anti-violence methods, and prove that such methods were 
sufficient to create change in society. 
 
6.4.4. Wink 
Where Niebuhr provided Christian theology with a twentieth century theological ethics 
for engagement in war and violence, Yoder provided the ethics for non-resistance to violence, 
Wink, like King, found a middle ground and advocated an influential ethics of a “third-way.” 
Wink’s “third way” envisions an active resistance to evil using means that are not physically 
violent. 
Walter Wink (1935-2012) was a biblical scholar who was exiled from the academy in 
his earlier years due to his critique of the scholarly objectivism that silo-ed “theory from 
practice, mind from body, reason from emotion, knowledge from experience.”778 Wink’s work 
shows a marked interplay between reason and religious experience. His work is also distinctive 
in its reflection of the consideration of the dynamic struggles underway in post-colonial 
settings. After a period of immersion in Chile’s context in the 1980s, experiencing life in a 
military dictatorship, Wink became physically and psychically unwell. He wrote: 
The evils we encountered were so monolithic, so massively 
supported by our own [U.S.] government, in some cases so 
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anchored in a long history of tyranny, that it scarcely seemed 
that anything could make a difference.779 
Out of his illness and his reckoning with the issues he confronted most visibly in the 
Chilean context, Wink produced a trilogy on “the powers,” as understood from his systematic 
biblical exegesis on the topic. In his first book, Wink examines the use of the terms for power 
in the relevant literature of the period and in the New Testament. In the second book, he 
examines the “disputed passages” in scripture related to the principalities and powers. In the 
third book, Wink applies an interpretation of his theories to scriptural texts and contemporary 
contexts. It is the third book that outlines his “third way” of non-violent resistance to the 
powers. 
Wink works with the conception of the powers as identified in scripture. As he 
describes, the powers 
are both visible and invisible, earthly and heavenly, spiritual 
and institutional. The Powers possess an outer, physical 
manifestation (buildings, portfolios, personnel, trucks, fax 
machines) and an inner spirituality, or corporate culture, or 
collective personality. The Powers are the simultaneity of an 
outer, visible structure and an inner, spiritual reality. The 
Powers, properly speaking, are not just the spirituality of 
institutions, but their outer manifestations as well.780 
The Powers are spiritual as well as the material manifestation of the spiritual, then. 
Also, the Powers are not to be understood simply as evil, nor simply as good. Rather, “[t]he 
Powers are good. The Powers are fallen. The Powers must be redeemed.”781 The engagement 
with corrupted power is therefore a proper Christian endeavour because the Powers “have been 
created in, through, and for the humanizing purposes of God in Christ,” thus they may be 
“honoured, criticised, resisted, and redeemed.”782  
The Powers operating together in “an entire network integrated around idolatrous 
values,” result in what Wink calls the Domination System. The Domination System is a system 
“characterized by unjust economic relations, oppressive political relations, biased race 
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relations, patriarchal gender relations, hierarchical power relations, and the use of violence to 
maintain them all.”783  
It is within the context of the Domination System of the Powers that the gospel is 
revealed. “The gospel is a context-specific remedy for the evils of the Domination System. 
This means that the overthrow of any particular manifestation of oppression can never satisfy 
the demands of the gospel if what replaces one form of domination is simply another.”784 The 
gospel recognizes that the system of domination requires redemption, and that the redemptive 
process cannot involve substitution of one form of domination for another. 
This understanding of the Powers and of the Domination System underlies Wink’s 
appreciation for Jesus’s engagements with the world, and our own. Wink envisions Jesus’s 
engagement with the world as exemplary of a “third way” out of the violence of the Domination 
System. Instead of responding using violence, or with passively doing nothing, Jesus 
demonstrates the use of the third way of non-violent direct action.  
Relying upon an exegesis of the “turn the other cheek” passage of Matthew 5,785 Wink 
argues that Jesus provided a revolutionary paradigm for resistance. By encouraging his hearers 
to turn the other cheek, Jesus was restoring their human dignity, “because this action robs the 
oppressor of the power to humiliate. The person who turns the other cheek is saying, in effect, 
‘Try again. Your first blow failed to achieve its intended effect. I deny you the power to 
humiliate me. I am a human being just like you. Your status does not alter that fact. You cannot 
demean me.’”786 By a debtor surrendering not only the coat, but the other garments that he [sic] 
is wearing, the poor again exercises agency and refuses humiliation. He also issues “a stunning 
protest against the system that created his debt. He has said in effect, ‘You want my robe? Here, 
take everything! Now you've got all I have except my body. Is that what you'll take next?’” In 
doing so the debtor not only sheds his own shame, but cloaks his creditor in shame instead, 
since “[n]akedness was taboo in Judaism, and shame fell less on the naked party than on the 
person viewing or causing the nakedness (Gen. 9:20-27).”787 By offering to carry the heavy 
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pack of a Roman soldier an extra mile, the impressed load-bearer “can recover the initiative 
and assert their human dignity.” It was forbidden for soldiers to impress civilians to labor for 
them beyond certain limits. Thus, by going beyond what was asked, the load-bearer puts the 
soldier in the position of risk of punishment for overworking the civilian. 
From a situation of servile impressment, the oppressed have 
suddenly seized the initiative. They have taken back the power 
of choice. The soldier is thrown off balance by being deprived 
of the predictability of his victim's response. He has never dealt 
with such a problem before. Now he has been forced into 
making a decision for which nothing in his previous experience 
has prepared him. If he has enjoyed feeling superior to the 
vanquished, he will not enjoy it today.788 
For Wink, having the oppressed take steps on their own behalf, even to their detriment, is 
empowering for them and accomplishes effective resistance to the system.  
Jesus’s advice, therefore, represents the espousal of revolutionary non-violent direct 
action tactics. “No one, not only in the first century but in all of human history, ever advocated 
defiance of oppressors by turning the cheek, stripping oneself naked in court, or jeopardizing 
a soldier by carrying his pack a second mile…These sayings are, in fact, so radical, so 
unprecedented, and so threatening, that it has taken all these centuries just to begin to grasp 
their implications.”789 Jesus’s third way, according to Wink, avoids passivity and violence; it 
allows “evil [to be] be opposed without being mirrored, the oppressor resisted without being 
emulated, and the enemy neutralized without being destroyed.” 
Despite his comprehensive theorizations, Wink makes a concession in the end that those 
who engage in revolutionary protest violence, should not be judged as unfaithful. He writes: 
The counterviolence of the oppressed may even in the mystery 
of God’s wrath be something that God is able to employ. Just 
as God used Assyrian military conquest as the rod to punish 
Israel for its apostasy (Isa. 10:5), so the violence of the poor has 
awakened some people to the severity of their poverty. So, 
while I do not believe that Christians have a vocation for 
violence, and should actively oppose its use, we are also not 
permitted to sit in judgment over those who resort to violence. 
God can take care of that.790 
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Further, he also concluded that it is preferable to act, even violently, against evil than to 
passively accept it, writing “…in a situation of extreme oppression, it is far better that we act 
violently than let our fear of sin and guilt paralyze us into no act at all.”791 
Wink’s method of exegesis and reframing the discussion makes a significant 
contribution to Christian non-violence theorization by incorporating the spiritual dimension of 
struggles that underlie contests resulting in physically violent protest. 
6.4.5. Conclusion 
Niebuhr, Yoder, King, and Wink represent a trend in the twentieth century of Christian 
leaders beginning to interrogate the concepts of “non-violence” and “pacifism” using 
traditional theological language. They represent the return of the discussion of peace to the 
church. What is represented are four different approaches that shaped contemporary Christian 
theology, namely, sanction of the use of physical force for the Christian, the non-resistance of 
physical force used against the Christian, committed action without use of physical force of the 
Christian, and committed action without the use of physical force of the Christian, with 
acceptance of the use of force by those Christians who deem it necessary. 
6.5. Conclusion of Modern Period Non-violence Analysis 
The church of the modern period moved from Christ of liberal humanism to a more 
orthodox Christianity that placed the Jesus of the Godhead at the centre of doctrine and 
teaching. The meaning of Jesus at the centre, however, was not consistent when it came to the 
use of physical force in the life of the Christian. War was accepted and endorsed, but there 
were consistent instances of Christian advocacy against war, and against the use of any kind of 
physical force. Non-violent resistance gained a model for effective use through the Christian 
protests of King. 
In the 18th century, humanist Immanuel Kant, presented ideas meant to foster peace 
among nations. Kant’s peace was not grounded in an ethic of love, nor Jesus’ teachings, nor in 
the elevation of human distinctiveness, nor even in the desire for international cooperation. 
Kant’s theory of peace was grounded in the belief that governments’ purpose for existence was 
the creation of peace among hostile individuals who would otherwise exist in a primitive 
violent state of nature. 
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Thoreau’s ideology of non-violence, like Kant’s, was not rooted in Christian ideals. 
Instead, he affirmed the social contract and the government’s central authority. His interest in 
non-violence was based upon his ideals of self-actualization. True “manhood,” or selfhood, 
required that one opposed the State when the state acted against freedom. He went further than 
Kant, in that he not only endorsed the citizen’s refusal of participation in what the government 
compelled that was wrong. Thoreau also introduced the idea of using affirmative acts, such as 
nonpayment of taxes, to deny the needed support for the government to maintain its wrongful 
conduct. This was much in line with Tolstoy’s views. 
Tolstoy wrote with experience of war in his own Russian context. Having witnessed 
war firsthand, and also having experienced life as a member of Russia’s plutocracy, Tolstoy 
was mistrustful of the state. He advocated against the State, and, instead, for a radical 
transformation of the social order.  
Tolstoy continues in the vein of Wycliffe, in connecting his theories of peace with the 
reform of government, though in Tolstoy’s case reform measures were more extreme to the 
point of advocating abolishment of the State. Also, like Wycliffe, Tolstoy grounded his 
conception of peace in the conception of Christian love as taught and modeled by Christ. What 
Tolstoy introduced that shifts the peace conversation, is imagination of radical non-violent 
resistance to, and nonparticipation in, all violent acts of the government, and also the radical 
redistribution of wealth. This is similar to the intention of the anabaptist adherents, particularly 
the Hutterites, who included an economic mission as part of their separation from the world. 
Tolstoy is significantly different, however, in that he, alá Peter Chelčický, did not envision 
Christian withdrawal from the world. He did not envision a world/church dichotomy. Tolstoy 
would have Christians remain in society, yet express objection to the social order, and create 
revolution, by withdrawal of support. He argued for not only refraining from oathtaking and 
holding civic office, as the anabaptists espoused, but also refraining from paying taxes, serving 
in the military, farming, or doing anything that maintained the violent acts of the state. Finally, 
Tolstoy greatly differed from Kant in his estimation of what would occur without the state. For 
Kant, chaos and violence were certainties without the State, as humanity would be reduced to 
life in the state of nature. For Tolstoy peace and equality would result from un-statehood, as 
humanity would be freed from the violence of government. 
What the three together reflect is a strain of non-violence, from Russia to the U.S., that 
would lead to acting directly to withdraw support from the state. Their thought informs the 
work of those in the twentieth century who also argue for resistance. What changes in the 
twentieth century, is the concern for showing support for the state itself. Much of the discussion 
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of non-violence and peace in the twentieth century is written with full acceptance of the nation-
state, and of the legitimacy of States using force to expand or defend their borders. The writers 
of the twentieth century are either looking back or forward to such uses of force, which resulted 
in the occurrence of large-scale, devastating wars, including WWI, WWII, and the war in 
Vietnam. 
Niebuhr’s work is important not only because of its articulation of the prototypical 
rebuttal to Christian non-violence, but also because the arc of his writing demonstrates modes 
of thinking about non-violence. With the atrocities of WWI in mind, he positioned himself, 
initially, against the violence of war. Later, witnessing the inequalities of industrial workers, 
he shifted to consideration of the coercive use of force, then with the rise of totalitarianism, 
shifted further to consideration of war as the necessary and most realistic course for morally 
informed Christians to take. A non-resistance that allowed tyranny was “peace, but it is a peace 
which has nothing to do with the peace of the kingdom of God.” Later, when the threat of war 
and tyranny was past, his position might be seen as shifting again to embrace a gradualist non-
violent coercion. Thus, he could praise the delayed implementation of the judicial decision 
mandating school desegregation in the landmark U.S. case, Brown v. Board of Education, as 
“statesmanship” and “concern for political realities.”  
Niebuhr believed that the Court, by declaring a principle but “wisely postpon[ing] 
application of the principle” until the segregationist states had time to “adjust themselves,” was 
allowing for the general acceptance that would eventually follow.792 His praise of the Court 
was based on the idea that a more rapid implementation might lead to revolt. “Revolt that is so 
widespread that police power cannot suppress it represents defeat of the law and the ideal.”793 
By this, Neibuhr articulates a sentiment that reveals a change from his previous position--that 
“peace with tyranny” is not the peace of the Kingdom of God--to acceptance of “peace with 
delayed human dignity”. Thus, it would seem to be a particular kind of tyranny, or a particular 
degree of tyranny, that is objectionable to Niebuhr, rather than tyranny itself. And for Niebuhr 
it could be argued that the objectionableness of the degree turns on race. 
Yoder, a product of the anti-Vietnam War popular sentiment, presented to the public a 
theological rationale for why war must be avoided, and peace sought. He opposed the idea of 
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Niebuhr that Christ’s message was one of complete (and unrealistic) apolitical non-resistance, 
and instead showed that Christ was deeply political in his actions and teachings. Yoder 
concluded that Christ’s message was one of resistance by radical submission and acceptance 
of suffering. Yoder combined the notion of obedience to the Christian calling of non-violence, 
with the notion of full disregard for the outcome, and with hope for the possibility of the 
intervention of the Spirit to ultimately provide a good outcome; to bring life out of even death. 
As almost a reaction to the “active non-resistance” of Yoder, King moved Christian 
conceptualization forward by implementing the idea of active non-violence. King, unlike 
Niebuhr, honoured a distinction between resistance and violence, and grounded in the idea of 
radical Christian love, King advocated resistance without use of violence. King’s ethics were 
implemented during the civil rights movement and represented the first non-violent mass 
mobilization of people, through use of Christian principles of love. King’s ethics, which were 
informed by Ghandi (who himself was informed by Tolstoy and Thoreau), have had a lasting 
effect on global movements for equality and liberation. 
Wink, writing in the era of American proxy-wars in post-colonial newly-democratic 
nations, was influenced by the violence he witnessed in such contexts; both the injustices 
perpetrated against those seeking change and the internal guerrilla warfare that between those 
seeking different models of changed government. Wink stressed the need for non-passive 
Christian non-violence, and applied the Kingian method of mass mobilized non-violent 
resistance to international post-colonial contexts. Wink ultimately deemed it preferable to 
sanction violence than to sanction passivity in the face of injustice. 
What becomes clear in the modern era is that the political and moral arguments for 
peace that were advanced, were in fact arguments for peace among the nation-states of Europe 
and the U.S. The effect of the violence of colonization in the New World, and of slavery, is not 
addressed or central to any who address concepts of non-violence or peace, with the exception 
of King and Wink, who wrote late in the twentieth century, following global movements for 
equality and liberation. Tolstoy alone was concerned with the condition of slavery and its 
inherent connection to violence and injustice. He shows no particular concern, however, for 
the dimensions of violence present in trans-Atlantic slavery and its sequalae. There were no 
demands for peace married to demands for just treatment that were raised on behalf of the 
indigenous. For most of the theorists, no practice of just war or pacifism grounded in Christ’s 
love would apply to the distant peoples of newly discovered lands. The indigenous in 
possession of land desired by Europeans, obdurate African laborers required to work the land, 
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and truculent Negros and South and Central American “peasants” were consistently regarded 
as obstacles to the “peace” that Europeans sought to secure for themselves. 
Prior to this period, advocates of non-violence and peace were regarded with suspicion 
and subjected to examination, or penal correction. Such claims presented challenges to the 
structures of power. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Christian discussions of peace 
represented much less of a threat to the structures of power. Though Tolstoy wrote about the 
demise of the State, he did so as one securely esconsced in the aristocratic class made possible 
by the State’s hierarchical ordering. None of the men who wrote about peace during this period, 
except arguably King and Wink, did so in a way that risked their collective Western power and 
security. 
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7. Part II SUMMARY: Historical Theological 
Conclusions  
7.1. Introduction 
This section is a compilation of the different “Conclusion” sections from Part II. No 
new research is presented. It is included for ease of reference, for tracking the history and the 
argument that is presented in detail in the four historical theological analysis chapters. 
7.1. Summary of Findings by Historic Period 
7.1.1. Apostolic Period  
The church tradition generally frames the Apostolic church as a church of absolute 
pacifism. This period of the church is viewed as demonstrating a pure adherence to Jesus’s 
teaching of non-resistance, epitomized by the Sermon on The Mount and by Jesus’s surrender 
to crucifixion. The church in its faithfulness, the tradition holds, refrained from killing as well 
as from participation in war. It modelled peaceableness both among adherents and with 
outsiders. The church tradition’s framing does not withstand scrutiny. It requires the setting 
aside of the intrinsic violence of the text, and adopting a view of violence, and hence, non-
violence, that is limited to enactments of physical force. It does not speak to the “why?” of 
Jesus’s refrain from use of physical force, nor account for those occasions where Jesus did use 
physical force, such as during the temple incident, nor account for Jesus’s aggressive speech, 
e.g., with religious elites, Peter, the Canaanite woman, etc. Further, framing the apostolic 
church as an absolute pacifist church, which refrained from killing, ignores the examples in the 
text of the kingdom’s welcome of soldiers and guards, and the demise of Ananias and Sapphira. 
Finally, such a framing fails to follow the complete example of Jesus, who generally 
demonstrates a lack of use of physical force, but at the same time also demonstrates full 
resistance to the ruling powers, not non-resistance. 
Jesus can be viewed as exercising a “non-violence” that is personally non-resistant, for 
the purpose of fulfilling the scriptures and thereby effecting salvation for all. His practices were 
also publicly confrontational, in order to assert his own, and his followers’, worth and dignity, 
to establish that their value was not determined by those who claim to be honourable (and in 
fact are not), and in order to incarnate the spiritual contest between good and evil. Ultimately, 
the peace of the apostolic church fails to mimic this standard of non-violence. It did not refrain 
from physical violence for the purpose of aiding or restoring third-parties to life, dignity and 
flourishing, either physically, spiritually or otherwise. While there was the assertion of dignity 
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and self-determination of Jesus-followers through their choice to live counter-culturally, and 
to hold to the testimony of Jesus even if it cost their lives, unlike Jesus, the apostolic church 
did not act to confront the powers that exploited and oppressed.  
For these reasons, it unpersuasive that the apostolic church was a pacifist church, which 
followed the ways of Jesus, in the way that “pacifism” is employed by Christians today.  
7.1.2. Patristic Period 
From Justin Martyr to Origen, several things are apparent. First, there was a dispersal 
of the church, and of Christian authority, throughout the Roman Empire, from Palestine to the 
northern region of Africa, to Turkey, to Rome, and beyond.794 The centres of gravity being 
Rome, Antioch, Alexandria, and Carthage in the second and third centuries.795 Second, the 
suffering that the church underwent during this period was deemed to be suffering beneficial 
to spiritual elevation. Unlike Jesus’s persecution, their suffering did not arise out of actions in 
the world seeking dignity and just care for the marginalized. Third, the warnings in James’s 
letter notwithstanding,796 the monied classes gained influence in the church and influenced the 
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triumphs over judgment.” NRSV 
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church’s development.797 After the second Jewish war (135 CE), non-Jewish Christians were 
eager to emphasize the distinction between themselves and Judaism, and made more clear their 
distinct religious claims. Christianity became “Gentile.”798 Hierarchies in church structure, 
erudition of church leaders, and the building up of the church materially resulted. 
By the time of Origen’s letter to Celsus in the mid-third century, doctrine had become 
unmoored from Jesus’s example, from the context of enmity with the ruling elites, and 
unmoored from the expectation of Jesus’s imminent return. The concept of non-violence had 
shifted conceptually from non-resistance to being killed, to bearing arms and engaging in 
military killing.  Upholding the letter of the faith, and the tradition of not serving in the military 
and directly killing, became the predominant basis and rationale for claims of not fighting, the 
chief new goal of non-violence. 
The life of prayer was the way that the church approached a positive relationship with 
the culture. There was no confrontation of the powers, rather, by Origen’s writing in the third 
century, the powers were able to rely upon the full support of the Christians. Further, there was 
no eschatological expectation of the imminent return of Jesus, and of the righteous (and violent) 
judgment of God. In following Christ, the church’s following was not a following of self-
determination unto death that others might have life. Rather it was centred in an ethic of love. 
As Rhee notes, “Numerical growth, increasing penetration into the upper echelon of 
Roman society, and the emergence of a distinct material culture and collective property by 
Christians during this time period meant that Christians began to settle in as permanent citizens 
of the empire, not just to pass through the alien world as temporary sojourners.”799 
While during the apostolic church period there was the practice of non-resistance to 
persecution, the movement away from non-resistance, as ideology, began during the second 
century, and turned toward the refusal to kill. This movement away from non-resistance and 
killing, reached a theological apogee in the doctrinal formulations of Augustine. Though it is 
common to view the move away from the refusal to kill as occurring through the advent of 
Constantine as emperor, the transition was gradual and progressive.  
Final Conclusion of the Period 
                                               
 
797 “The survival of Christianity in its early days depended on the aid of wealthy benefactors.” Moore, 
“Wealth and Poverty,” 56; Rhee, Loving the Poor, Saving the Rich, 77–96.  
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Restoration of peace, love of God, and securing dignity and justice were all aims of 
Jesus’s mission on earth. Yet, for Jesus, the enemy was not the marginalized whose beliefs 
were unorthodox, whose ethnicity was Palestinian like his, nor those whose faith was not his 
own. Jesus lived, taught, and used his power in defence of such “Othered” persons when they 
were marginalized because of their difference. That the patristics and those following did not 
do the same, is the great divergence between their teaching and Christ’s. 
What this historic overview demonstrates is that during the first 400 years of the church, 
pacifism theologically rooted in Christian love of neighbour is a myth. In the apostolic church, 
the church was threatened with persecution from local Jewish authority and from the imperial 
state. The church refrained from physical violence, in expectation of Christ’s imminent return 
and his destruction of both threats. Their non-violence was the act of expedience and fugitivity. 
Non-violence was not grounded in Christian love.  
This church period’s conduct comes closest to what many conceptualize when it comes 
to the non-violence of the gospel and the non-violence of the church. It is important to 
remember that the period of this church was brief. The church was highly precarious, life was 
unstable, and the expectation of Jesus’s soon return was high. Also, as much as peace was 
attempted to be fostered, a key component of the Jesus’s work was entirely neglected by this 
church, and that was the confrontation of authority. By failing to confront authority the church 
failed to challenge the systems that created conditions of marginalization in the culture. 
Creation of an alternate counter-culture, in lieu of confrontation of the dominant violent social 
order, was not the example of Jesus. The community life turned inward was an innovation 
meant to secure the lives and wellbeing of church members against their persecutors. 
In the patristic early church, the church was threatened with persecution from the 
imperial state. There was little expectation of Christ’s imminent return or of destruction of the 
power of the state. To manage its place of marginalized precarity, the church embraced the 
doctrine of refraining from violence. The basis was no longer God’s imminent impending 
vengeance, but transformed instead to the idea of Christian love. The church was not opposed 
to war generally, but merely to the Christian involvement in war and killing. In the church of 
the empire, unlike in the fugitive church or the marginalized church, the church was not 
threatened with persecution, from either local or state authority. The threat to the church, and 
the state, was of foreign invasion. There was no longer a need to secure its survival by 
withdrawing or by accommodation. Such practices would ensure the opposite, the church’s 
demise. Accordingly, to secure its survival, the church legitimized violence and killing, as long 
as the grounds for doing so were those that could be understood as just. 
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7.1.3. Early Middle Ages 
Ultimately the monastics served a stabilizing role in the culture, while not being 
removed from the violence that permeated their world. 
In the West, a rivalry was present between the ecclesial authority of the church and the 
secular rulers. The cohesion of the church amidst the rampant violence and brutality of warring 
tribesmen of the North resulted in the ecclesial structure of Christendom gaining cultural and 
political authority between the fourth and eighth centuries. 800  The church remained in a 
position of great authority until the Carolingian kings established a unified Europe for the first 
time since the end of the Holy Roman Empire. By the eleventh and twelfth centuries, as smaller 
polities merged into more centralized principalities, the secular rulers began to co-opt ecclesial 
concepts of peace, like the Peace of God and Truce of God, and to construe them as practices 
of secular public peace. 801  During the 13th and 14th centuries, bishops, kings, and nobles 
expanded these polices by engaging in practices of official mediation to avoid resort to armed 
conflict.802 When nation-states began to form in the fourteenth century, these mediating peace 
practices were conceived of as national peace practices, and stripped of eschatological or 
ontological concerns related to God.803 “Thus, the Western notion of public peace…was the 
result of the gradual secularization of the pax eccclesiae by the new and larger political 
units.”804 
What may be said about the Western church’s non-violence theory in the middle ages 
is that it was shaped by Christian understandings of peace with God, and inward dispositions 
of quietude, in the midst of a virulently violent social context. Monastic pursuit of peace 
influenced ecclesial efforts at peace-making, which ultimately resulted in nation-state co-
optation of the role of peacemakers and peacekeepers. Arising as they did out of the context of 
social disruption and ongoing warfare, the conceptions of peace of the imperial, the 
ecclesiastical, and the monastic authorities, “[v]irtually all…from 500 to 1150 were connected 
to the idea of order. Peace was a conservative reaction to widespread discord and immorality; 
it was a return to right order.”805 Thus, there was a conception of peace, but no concept of “non-
violence” per se. Violence was regulated but not viewed as an evil in itself. 
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Final Conclusion of the Period 
For the church of this period, creating peace meant primarily restoring order, control, 
and power. The monastic movement that began as counter-cultural protest, soon became one 
of the wealthiest and most powerful arms of the church institution. There was little emphasis 
on using power to defend and protect those who were “Othered” or who were outsiders. There 
was almost no consciousness by the church of the value of an ethic of non-resistance. Sects 
that were subjected to persecution by the ecclesial and secular powers are the only ones who 
found merit in the dogma of self-sacrifice. Their embrace of doctrines of self-sacrifice was by 
necessity. The church during this period diverged almost completely from the teachings of 
Jesus. 
7.1.4. Late Middle Ages to Modernity 
From Wyckoff in the fourteenth century to the anabaptists in Zurich and beyond of the 
sixteenth century, a startling idea was birthed in Europe; that war and killing were evils in and 
of themselves. At the same time, the steady establishment of political kingdoms, which were 
tied to the power and corruption of the church, led dissident voices to assert the need for 
political and church reform. Part of that reform was the translation of the bible into the local 
vernacular languages of the people. The demands for reform that the towering theological 
figure of Wyckoff triggered in the fourteenth century, lit the fuse for the Hussite Revolution of 
the fifteenth century, and exploded in the Reformations of the sixteenth century. Yet, the 
demands for reform demanded by Wyckoff that pertained to his anti-violence ethics did not 
proceed in tandem with his complaints about the authorities. Indeed, a regular feature of the 
Reformation’s protestations involved the reformers’ acts of armed resistance against the 
authorities. Even among the early anabaptizers there was no consensus about adoption of an 
anti-violence ethics. What is significant is that the idea itself was being publicly transmitted 
with consistency, whether or not adopted. Of even greater significance is that the nature of the 
anti-violence ethics that was promoted found its grounding in the teachings of Jesus and the 
doctrine of love, and not in theories of state sovereignty. In other words, the admonition of 
those against violence was not that individuals should be subject to the state’s biblically-
legitimate authority, but that Jesus taught that individuals ought to show love to the enemy. 
The desire and attempts at reform and revolution in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 
turned to the opposite desire in the seventeenth century. The idea of the nation-state had 
solidified, and ideologically the idea that the state had the exclusive right of use of force, against 
threats from without and within the state, gained sway. The ideology moved away from 
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emphasis upon Jesus’s teaching and scripture, and towards nonreligious theories seeking 
maximization of human potential. Erasmus set the stage in this regard in the sixteenth century 
by influencing princes to refrain from war, yet acknowledging their right to the conduct of war 
where necessary. Grotius was the leading figure of the seventeenth century to revisit issues of 
war and to posit in the civil authority the right to go to war. However, Grotius sought to 
establish constraints around a king’s authority to declare war that were based on objective 
factors, such as territorial infringement, rather than subjective claims of violation and offense, 
such as disagreement on religious doctrine. Grotius was of the school of those who envisioned 
that a set of rules could govern inter-state, or inter-nation, relationships and lead to a period of 
“perpetual peace.”  
Final Conclusion of the Period 
The church, from the late Medieval period to the modern period, was not a church that 
was concerned with creating peace, as much as it was concerned with reform. There were 
regular calls for cessation of Christians using physical force, but these calls were largely 
unheeded. Both those resisting authority and those in authority made use of physical force and 
aggression to accomplish their will. Those resisting authority did so, however, with the 
intention of securing the betterment of those who were marginalized by the social order and 
desiring change. 
From Wycliffe to Grotius the themes of peace and pacifism have repeatedly arisen in 
the context of social reform and governance. Wycliffe introduced to the modern era the idea 
that war and killing were incompatible with Christianity, which holds love as its central 
characteristic. Wycliffe’s beliefs included the idea that force and violence should play no part 
in a society ruled by the law of Christ, which is centred on love, and that governmental authority 
that derived from the use of force was contrary to Christian faith and was sin. His views resulted 
in him being tried as a heretic, but they resonated with the masses and were adopted by many 
throughout Europe. Wycliffe influenced Jon Hus of Bohemia, who shared his views on the 
need for ecclesiastical reform, though not his views on pacifism. An acolyte of Hus, however, 
Peter Chelčický, did deem the issue of pacifism central to Christian belief and practice. 
Decades after Chelčický’s arguments were made, the failure of resistance through violent 
means caused some of those seeking reform to turn to Chelčický’s (and Wycliffe’s) vision. The 
Swiss Unity of Brethren, who followed the pacifist ideal of Chelčický became a movement of 
adult baptizers and baptized in diverse locations with diverse beliefs; some pacifist and some 
not. Yet an early document sets forth pacifist beliefs as early as 1525, and the influential 
Schleitheim Confession of 1527 adopted officially the tenets of adult baptism and the non-use 
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of violence under all circumstances, based on the life and teachings of Jesus. The resistance of 
the anabaptists to church and governing authority resulted in their persecution. They were 
driven to become an underground church. From this experience, they adopted the theology of 
being separated, persecuted, and opposed to the world. 
With the rise of humanism, the arguments for peace added a secular dimension. 
Erasmus asserted that war was evil but allowed that the sovereign might resort to war if all 
other means of resolving a dispute failed. Erasmus appealed to the inefficiency and intellectual 
insipidness of war, rather than, primarily, to Christian doctrine. The adoption of secularized 
rationales for the moderation, and hopefully cessation, of war continued apace with Grotius’ 
re-conception of just war theory. The ambition of his attempt to establish objective criteria for 
the instigation of violence, was the creation of a perpetual peace among nations. Grotius and 
those following him failed in this endeavour. The anabaptist vision of pacifism, and the 
political vision of just violence/war both continue to have intellectual and cultural support, and 
have not been fundamentally changed since their original articulations. 
What is clear from the history is that, since Wycliffe, the preachers of peace have 
preached against the axis of ecclesial/political power generally.  The claims of peace have been 
raised by reformers, and those in the counter-culture. The Peasants’ Rebellion in England 
(1381), the Hussite Wars (1419-1434), the German Peasants’ Revolt (1525), and the English 
Revolution of the 1600s, attest to the fact that the overarching counter-cultural message of the 
peace proponents, was regularly adapted for use by those who employed physical violence to 
bring about the social, political and economic change. Even among the anabaptist churches, 
there was great variation in the teachings on pacifism. 
It can be said, then, that there has not been a time when Peace teaching has prevailed in 
the church in modernity, though the teaching has been raised repeatedly. Typically, those 
raising the prospect of pacifism, were persecuted killed or martyred, as the institutional church 
marked claims of pacifism as incident to other claims that were deemed heretical. It can also 
be said that whenever claims of peace were raised, they were never raised separate from calls 
for general reform and change in society. Claims to stop the warring of governments were akin 
to claims to stop the unjust killings, moral depravity, and corruption that was rampant in 
society. Also, it is clear to identify that distinctions have been made between the war and 
violence of the state and the participation in war and violence of individuals. 
Finally, whether motivated by the teaching and example of Christ’s love, or by 
humanist rationality, there has not been in Christian history a movement for peace that resulted 
in long-term peace. 
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7.1.5. Modernity 
Kant, Tolstoy, and Thoreau represent the diversity of settings, circumstances and 
conclusions that were being reached regarding non-violence and peace in the generation 
following the upheaval of national revolutions.  
Writing in eighteenth century Europe, in the years following the disruptions of 
reformations and revolutions as he did, Kant adhered to a notion of the state as securing peace 
and order. Ultimately, peace for Kant acknowledged violence as a fact of social existence and, 
through the social contract, conferred upon the state the exclusive right to inflict violence, in 
order to coerce justice. He, like Erasmus believed that violence was the rightful province of the 
state to wield. Kant adds, however, that the state is “unintelligible” when it wields violence, 
since the state’s purpose is fostering the cessation of violence.  He adds, as well, that the people, 
meaning the ruling or legislative class and not private individuals, do have a right to disagree 
and to resist the unjust acts of those governing, when warranted. Kant’s peace theory 
introduced the notion of non-violent resistance as a moral duty in cases where the sovereign 
fails to act in furtherance of its purpose of ending violence. He was ambiguous as to when and 
how such a duty might be enacted, however. 
A different peace theory was articulated by Tolstoy, who wrote in Czarist Russia during 
the 19th and early twentieth centuries. Tolstoy was raised an Orthodox Christian, but left the 
church and developed a radical vision for a new society. He rejected the notion of the state, 
finding it to be a deceptive means of violence and enslavement, just as he found the teachings 
of the eastern orthodox church of Russia itself to be corrupt. Tolstoy’s formulations of the 
Christian life involved major political commitments. Tolstoy advocated abolition of the state 
and private property, and the governance of society through the law of Christian 
neighbourliness and love. He espoused the overthrow of government by the common people 
without the use of physical force, but through not-acting in furtherance of government’s violent 
ends, e.g., not doing soldiering work, prison work, tax collecting, working as clergy, etc. 
Tolstoy proposed a radical vision of what was possible for Christian peaceableness. 
Thoreau, who wrote at roughly the same time as Tolstoy in the U.S., was less radical. 
Thoreau was not a Christian, but a Transcendentalist, and he upheld the authority of the state, 
but believed that the state should be non-violent. Thoreau adds to the conceptualization of an 
ethics of anti-violence that one must take affirmative action in resistance to state authority to 
compel the state to act justly. 
Kant, Tolstoy, and Thoreau demonstrate that consideration of peace was ongoing, and 
that the dimensions of peace contemplated were contrary to the peace-through-war methods of 
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nation-state builders. They contemplated peace being achieved without the use of physical 
force, and through the actions of individuals. Tolstoy also contemplated individuals acting in 
concert against, or collectively refusing to act in furtherance of, the goals of the state, which 
for him equated to violence. 
Niebuhr, Yoder, King, and Wink represent a trend in the twentieth century of Christian 
leaders beginning to interrogate the concepts of “non-violence” and “pacifism” using 
traditional theological language. They represent the return of the discussion of peace to the 
church. What is represented are four different approaches that shaped contemporary Christian 
theology: namely, sanction of the use of physical force for the Christian, the non-resistance of 
physical force used against the Christian, committed action without use of physical force of the 
Christian, and committed action without the use of physical force of the Christian, with 
acceptance of the use of force by those Christians who deem it necessary. 
Final Conclusion of the Period 
The church of the modern period moved from Christ of liberal humanism to a more 
orthodox Christianity that placed the Jesus of the Godhead at the centre of doctrine and 
teaching. The meaning of Jesus at the centre, however, was not consistent when it came to the 
use of physical force in the life of the Christian. War was accepted and endorsed, but there 
were consistent instances of Christian advocacy against war, and against the use of any kind of 
physical force. Non-violent resistance gained a model for effective use through the Christian 
protests of King. 
In the 18th century, humanist Immanuel Kant, presented ideas meant to foster peace 
among nations. Kant’s peace was not grounded in an ethic of love, nor Jesus’ teachings, nor in 
the elevation of human distinctiveness, nor even in the desire for international cooperation. 
Kant’s theory of peace was grounded in the belief that governments’ purpose for existence was 
the creation of peace among hostile individuals who would otherwise exist in a primitive 
violent state of nature. 
Thoreau’s ideology of non-violence, like Kant’s, was not rooted in Christian ideals. 
Instead, he affirmed the social contract and the government’s central authority. His interest in 
non-violence was based upon his ideals of self-actualization. True “manhood,” or selfhood, 
required that one opposed the State when the state acted against freedom. He went further than 
Kant, in that he not only endorsed the citizen’s refusal of participation in what the government 
compelled that was wrong. Thoreau also introduced the idea of using affirmative acts, such as 
nonpayment of taxes, to deny the needed support for the government to maintain its wrongful 
conduct. This was much in line with Tolstoy’s views. 
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Tolstoy wrote with experience of war in his own Russian context. Having witnessed 
war firsthand, and also having experienced life as a member of Russia’s plutocracy, Tolstoy 
was mistrustful of the state. He advocated against the State, and, instead, for a radical 
transformation of the social order.  
Tolstoy continues in the vein of Wycliffe, in connecting his theories of peace with the 
reform of government, though in Tolstoy’s case reform measures were more extreme to the 
point of advocating abolishment of the State. Also, like Wycliffe, Tolstoy grounded his 
conception of peace in the conception of Christian love as taught and modeled by Christ. What 
Tolstoy introduced that shifts the peace conversation, is imagination of radical non-violent 
resistance to, and nonparticipation in, all violent acts of the government, and also the radical 
redistribution of wealth. This is similar to the intention of the anabaptist adherents, particularly 
the Hutterites, who included an economic mission as part of their separation from the world. 
Tolstoy is significantly different, however, in that he, alá Peter Chelčický, did not envision 
Christian withdrawal from the world. He did not envision a world/church dichotomy. Tolstoy 
would have Christians remain in society, yet express objection to the social order, and create 
revolution, by withdrawal of support. He argued for not only refraining from oathtaking and 
holding civic office, as the anabaptists espoused, but also refraining from paying taxes, serving 
in the military, farming, or doing anything that maintained the violent acts of the state. Finally, 
Tolstoy greatly differed from Kant in his estimation of what would occur without the state. For 
Kant, chaos and violence were certainties without the State, as humanity would be reduced to 
life in the state of nature. For Tolstoy peace and equality would result from un-statehood, as 
humanity would be freed from the violence of government. 
What the three together reflect is a strain of non-violence, from Russia to the U.S., that 
would lead to acting directly to withdraw support from the state. Their thought informs the 
work of those in the twentieth century who also argue for resistance. What changes in the 
twentieth century, is the concern for showing support for the state itself. Much of the discussion 
of non-violence and peace in the twentieth century is written with full acceptance of the nation-
state, and of the legitimacy of States using force to expand or defend their borders. The writers 
of the twentieth century are either looking back or forward to such uses of force, which resulted 
in the occurrence of large-scale, devastating wars, including WWI, WWII, and the war in 
Vietnam. 
Niebuhr’s work is important not only because of its articulation of the prototypical 
rebuttal to Christian non-violence, but also because the arc of his writing demonstrates modes 
of thinking about non-violence. With the atrocities of WWI in mind, he positioned himself, 
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initially, against the violence of war. Later, witnessing the inequalities of industrial workers, 
he shifted to consideration of the coercive use of force, then with the rise of totalitarianism, 
shifted further to consideration of war as the necessary and most realistic course for morally 
informed Christians to take. A non-resistance that allowed tyranny was “peace, but it is a peace 
which has nothing to do with the peace of the kingdom of God.” Later, when the threat of war 
and tyranny was past, his position might be seen as shifting again to embrace a gradualist non-
violent coercion. Thus, he could praise the delayed implementation of the judicial decision 
mandating school desegregation in the landmark U.S. case, Brown v. Board of Education, as 
“statesmanship” and “concern for political realities.”  
Niebuhr believed that the Court, by declaring a principle but “wisely postpon[ing] 
application of the principle” until the segregationist states had time to “adjust themselves,” was 
allowing for the general acceptance that would eventually follow.806 His praise of the Court 
was based on the idea that a more rapid implementation might lead to revolt. “Revolt that is so 
widespread that police power cannot suppress it represents defeat of the law and the ideal.”807 
By this, Neibuhr articulates a sentiment that reveals a change from his previous position--that 
“peace with tyranny” is not the peace of the Kingdom of God--to acceptance of “peace with 
delayed human dignity”. Thus, it would seem to be a particular kind of tyranny, or a particular 
degree of tyranny, that is objectionable to Niebuhr, rather than tyranny itself. And, for Niebuhr 
it could be argued that the objectionableness of the degree turns on race. 
Yoder, a product of the anti-Vietnam War popular sentiment, presented to the public a 
theological rationale for why war must be avoided, and peace sought. He opposed the idea of 
Niebuhr that Christ’s message was one of complete (and unrealistic) apolit ical non-resistance, 
and instead showed that Christ was deeply political in his actions and teachings. Yoder 
concluded that Christ’s message was one of resistance by radical submission and acceptance 
of suffering. Yoder combined the notion of obedience to the Christian calling of non-violence, 
with the notion of full disregard for the outcome, and with hope for the possibility of the 
intervention of the Spirit to ultimately provide a good outcome; to bring life out of even death. 
As almost a reaction to the “active non-resistance” of Yoder, King moved Christian 
conceptualization forward by implementing the idea of active non-violence. King, unlike 
Niebuhr, honoured a distinction between resistance and violence, and grounded in the idea of 
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radical Christian love, King advocated resistance without use of violence. King’s ethics were 
implemented during the civil rights movement and represented the first non-violent mass 
mobilization of people, through use of Christian principles of love. King’s ethics, which were 
informed by Ghandi (who himself was informed by Tolstoy and Thoreau), have had a lasting 
effect on global movements for equality and liberation. 
Wink, writing in the era of American proxy-wars in post-colonial newly-democratic 
nations, was influenced by the violence he witnessed in such contexts; both the injustices 
perpetrated against those seeking change and the internal guerrilla warfare that between those 
seeking different models of changed government. Wink stressed the need for non-passive 
Christian non-violence, and applied the Kingian method of mass mobilized non-violent 
resistance to international post-colonial contexts. Wink ultimately deemed it preferable to 
sanction violence than to sanction passivity in the face of injustice. 
What becomes clear in the modern era is that the political and moral arguments for 
peace that were advanced, were in fact arguments for peace among the nation-states of Europe 
and the U.S. The effect of the violence of colonization in the New World, and of slavery, is not 
addressed or central to any who address concepts of non-violence or peace, with the exception 
of King and Wink, who wrote late in the twentieth century, following global movements for 
equality and liberation. Tolstoy alone was concerned with the condition of slavery and its 
inherent connection to violence and injustice. He shows no particular concern, however, for 
the dimensions of violence present in trans-Atlantic slavery and its sequalae. There were no 
demands for peace married to demands for just treatment that were raised on behalf of the 
indigenous. For most of the theorists, no practice of just war, or pacifism grounded in Christ’s 
love, would apply to the distant peoples of newly discovered lands. The indigenous in 
possession of land desired by Europeans, obdurate African laborers required to work the land, 
and truculent Negros and South and Central American “peasants” were consistently regarded 
as obstacles to the “peace” that Europeans sought to secure for themselves. 
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8. Theological Analysis from the Margins: Violence and 
Black Being 
8.1. Introduction 
Up to this point this project has examined the ways in which scripture has been 
interpreted related to Jesus’s engagements with use of coercive force, and also the ways in 
which non-violence has been incorporated into Christian discourse throughout the history of 
the church. Jesus demonstrated restraint in his sanction of physically coercive acts, though his 
restraint was not an end in itself. Jesus emphasized living out the reality of a self-determined 
dignity that did not require the use of coercive force, and that did not fear in the face of the use 
of coercive force against him by others. Because of this it is possible to read scripture as not 
focused on the use of force, but rather as focused on the use of personal power. Jesus compels 
followers to live out expressions of valour, loyalty to one’s truth, and to the support and defence 
of marginalized Others.  
Our review of history has shown that the church has not been consistent in following 
Jesus’s example. First, even if we consider that a key feature of Jesus’s mission was turning 
people away from the coercive use of physical force, the historic record shows that the church 
has not consistently imitated this. Nor has it used coercive force in support and defence of the 
marginalized Other, thereby honouring Jesus’s command to love. The church, from its 
inception in the Apostolic era, has sanctioned the violence present in the culture. From the 
violence enacted by the State via the Roman armies that pursued peace through war, to 
crusading militias, literal witch hunts, to the overt violence enacted by States during the world 
wars of the twentieth century. This is not even to consider the violence inherent in the culture 
and structure of society, such as the implicit and often explicit acceptance of the 
marginalization of women, the acceptance of the slave economy, native genocide, racial 
supremacy, and the persistent drive towards conformity with a Christian ideal that is intolerant 
of cultural difference. The sanction of coercive physical force in culture, and even more so of 
cultural and structural violence in culture, went unchallenged and unquestioned until the 
modern contemporary era, almost the entirety of church history. 
The fact that the Christian tradition has so regularly embraced violence in its diverse 
guises without question and without, in many cases, considering the violence to be violence, is 
cause for interrogation. Though it is not appropriate to read twentieth century ethics into the 
first or fifth or tenth century context, the response to the first century’s acceptance of the slave 
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economy, and patriarchal and hierarchical authority, or to the third century’s diminution of the 
personhood of women, of the fifth century’s elevation of the official Christian worldview above 
and in militant opposition to all others, cannot be glossed over as minor points of doctrinal 
concern, or as cultural and conceptual aberrations. First, to continue to gloss over the violence 
that is woven into the fabric of the church perpetuates the notion that there was a period in 
church history in which there was no violence that was accepted or practiced by the church--a 
time of “church purity”; which notion is an unhelpful fiction. Second, denying church violence 
prevents the church from reckoning with historic and deeply entrenched issues of bias and 
inequality in the church’s founding, which prevents a serious grappling with the ways that these 
issues persist into the present. 
Yet, to do the work of naming the violence that grows like a weed together with the 
wheat of the Christian faith, requires that “violence” be adequately conceptualized. What does 
it mean to say that the church has been steeped in “violence” from its inception? The goal of 
this chapter is to undertake a conceptualization of “violence.” 
This chapter will first provide an overview of social scientific perspectives on violence. 
Because of the vastness of the fields of social science, two fields have been selected for 
consideration of the meaning of violence in human life, namely anthropology and psychology. 
Following this analysis, the chapter theorizes violence broadly. Within this theorization it 
shows how violence is uniquely apparent in the victimization of Black persons. It does this by 
presenting a typology of violence that includes as a type “existential” violence, which works 
physical, psychological, and ontological harm against those raced as Black. The chapter then 
argues that the existential violation to Black being is addressed by Jesus. Jesus’s response is 
not primarily concerned with the use or non-use of physical force by the marginalized, but is a 
response that offers healing and restoration to the violated by restoration of human dignity and 
power. It accepts the possibility, and perhaps likelihood, of suffering, without suggesting that 
there is inherent value in and need for suffering. 
8.2. Social Scientific Scholarship on Violence and Human Being 
Understanding the ways that “violent” phenomena have been observed by social 
scientists provides a helpful way of beginning to understand how the concept of violence 
functions. Towards this end, a limited overview of the social scientific treatment of “violence” 
will be undertaken in this section. 
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8.2.1. Social Scientific Fields of Investigation: Anthropology and Psychology 
This section will present an overview of the study of violence from specialized fields 
of anthropology and psychology. There are numerous social scientific specialized fields of 
study that might inform this project. An investigation into all of them exceeds the scope of the 
paper. Thus, I have chosen two fields representing those that might contribute significantly to 
the goal of understanding violence. Anthropology was chosen because it relates to 
understanding human being outside of fixed social structures; unlike, for example, political 
science or economics. Further, the subfields of anthropology encompass cognate disciplines, 
such as biology and sociology, that allow for a nuanced picture of how violence functions in 
human life in community at a fundamental level.  
Psychology was chosen because a significant premise of this project is that violence is 
related to the psychological life of the human. The project, in the second chapter, discussed 
these psychological aspects with respect to scripture and human dignity. I argued that the ways 
much of scripture has been understood as relating to non-violence, in fact relates to one’s 
psychology of being. I argued that Jesus was interested in individuals living into their own sense 
of themselves as worthy and dignified. Later in this chapter and the next chapter, the connection 
between psychology, violence, and Blackness will be drawn. Accordingly, the concept of 
violence from the perspective of psychology is relevant to the overall project. 
8.2.1.1. Anthropology 
The discipline of Anthropology has as its goal the study of humans, as well as human 
behaviour and societies, in the past and present.808 As such, it has much to contribute to the 
theoretical understanding of what violence has meant to humans individually and in society. 
The discipline is divided into four main branches, biological (or physical), socio-cultural, 
linguistic and archaeological.809 
                                               
 
808 See, generally, John Monaghan and Peter Just, Social and Cultural Anthropology: A Very Short 
Introduction, Ninth Edition (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
809 Sarah Accomazzo, “Anthropology of Violence: Historical and Current Theories, Concepts, and 
Debates in Physical and Socio-Cultural Anthropology,” Journal of Human Behavior in the Social Environment 22, no. 
5 (June 26, 2012): 537, https://doi.org/10.1080/10911359.2011.598727 citing J. D. Moore, Visions of Culture: An 
Introduction to Anthropological Theories and Theorists (AltaMira Press, 2008), 33. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
206 
8.2.1.1.1. Method and Overview of Anthropology Analysis 
The literature on the topic of violence in the field of anthropology is extensive. As a 
result, what is presented here is an overview of the most prominent theoretical concepts, rather 
than a comprehensive engagement with the entirety of the corpus of the literature in the field.  
Theoretically, there have historically been two methodological streams of investigation 
in the field of anthropology. Objective lines of theory are influenced by the biological sciences 
and attempd to find explanations, causes, and laws for human social behaviour. Objective 
theories view ‘‘social life as transactions in goods and services.’’810 Subjective lines of theory, 
on the other hand, are connected to the humanities, and are more concerned with interpretation 
and finding meaning.  
Currently, despite the increasing complexity of theoretical perspectives that have 
arisen, which reflect the increasing complexity of global culture, anthropologists agree on two 
points. First, that theories must reflect the more complex and nuanced current understandings 
of culture. 811  Second, that “theories are culturally and politically constructed, so 
anthropologists must examine their own cultural and political contexts when developing theory 
about culture.”812 
Anthropological acknowledgment of the cultural and political constructs that underlie 
theorists’ work, is an exemplar of the ideological underpinning of conceptualizations that will 
be discussed in the next section of the chapter. 
8.2.1.1.2. Biological (or Physical) Violence Theories 
The study of “violence” within the discipline of anthropology is relatively recent, 
having begun in earnest during the 1960s. 813  Prior to that time, research was typically 
concerned with “violent” societies’ contrast with “peaceful” societies.814 Research conducted 
using the categorizations of “violent” and “peaceful” was often grounded in the evolutionary 
theories first espoused by Charles Darwin. Aggressiveness and competition were viewed as 
                                               
 
810 Accomazzo, “Anthropology of Violence,” 538 citing Robert Layton, An Introduction to Theory in 
Anthropology (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
811 Accomazzo, “Anthropology of Violence,” 538 citing Moore, Visions of Culture: An Introduction to 
Anthropological Theories and Theorists. 
812 Accomazzo, “Anthropology of Violence,” 538 citing Adam Kuper, Anthropology and Anthropologists: 
The Modern British School, Third (London: Routledge, 2014); Layton, Theory in Anthropology and; Moore, Visions of 
Culture: An Introduction to Anthropological Theories and Theorists. 
813 Accomazzo, “Anthropology of Violence,” 537 citing Layton, Theory in Anthropology. 
814 Deborah A. Thomas, “Violence - Anthropology,” in Oxford Bibliographies Online (Oxford University 
Press, January 2012), Intro., https://doi.org/10.1093/OBO/9780199766567-0027. 
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inherent human traits that allowed for the strongest of the human species to survive. Applied 
to cultural investigations of anthropologists, 815  the evolutionary theory “suggested that a 
continuum of cultural progress exists and that all cultures fall somewhere on this continuum, 
with ‘most primitive,’ including savagery and barbarism, at one end, and ‘most civilized’ at 
the other.”816 Violent expressions of a culture were understood as indicating that the culture 
was further behind on the evolutionary continuum. 
Other theorists, however, detoured from the conceptualization of violence in culture as 
evolutionary delay. The idea of functionalism 817  was introduced, which emphasized that 
culture is not the result of evolutionary stages but that “culture provides a medium to meet the 
basic biological, physiological, and social needs of humans.”818 The functional idea of culture 
was eventually incorporated into the evolutionary idea of culture. The fusion of functional and 
evolutionary culture produced theories which espoused that violence served a function in 
societies; it was used by advancing societies to gain status and resources.819 
Beginning in the 1950s, an increase in scientific inquiry resulted in anthropology 
turning to theories based upon empirical data. Empirical studies of aggression and conflict in 
animals and humans were performed. These studies revived the rationale of an evolutionary 
benefit resulting from aggression in humans, due to aggression allowing some humans greater 
access to resources. Biological anthropologists used studies of animal behaviour, such as 
baboons and chimpanzees, to draw conclusions about the biological nature of human violence 
and aggression.820 Some scholars have argued that the propensity to aggression is not a negative 
trait, but has positive aspects not only for resource allocation, but for relationships. De Waal, 
for example, states, “[w]e need to think of aggression as one way in which conflicts of interest 
are expressed and resolved, and be open to the possibility that its impact on future relationships 
ranges all the way from harmful to beneficial.”821 
                                               
 
815 See, e.g., Lewis Henry Morgan’s classic work Ancient Society, published in 1877. 
816 Accomazzo, “Anthropology of Violence,” 539 citing Moore, Visions of Culture: An Introduction to 
Anthropological Theories and Theorists, 23. 
817 See the work of Bronislau Malinowski (1926). 
818 Accomazzo, “Anthropology of Violence,” 540 citing. 
819 Accomazzo, 540 citing; Moore, Visions of Culture: An Introduction to Anthropological Theories and 
Theorists. 
820 See, e.g., studies of Periera (1992), De Waal (1992), Patton (2000). 
821 Frans B. M. De Waal, “A Critique of the Seville Statement on Violence,” in Aggression and Peacefulness 
in Humans and Other Primates, ed. James Silverberg and J. Patrick Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 
37. 
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Most post-modern physical anthropologists, however, do acknowledge that violence 
cannot be explained solely by theories based on evolutionary and biological grounds; that for 
humans, culture and the environment always play a role.822  
Theories of violence grounded in biological and evolutionary anthropology that 
emphasize violence and war as inherent to the human species, are both helpful and unhelpful 
in conceptualizing violence. They are helpful in that they allow the conceptualization to move 
beyond a good/bad subjective binary, and become an objective aspect of human nature. Once 
conceived as such, the potential for violence, becomes easier to accept as a manageable human 
trait, as opposed to a behaviour that must be eliminated from the Christian life. Nonetheless, 
theorization of this kind can be less helpful in that it restricts the conceptualization of violence 
to physical aggression. This chapter develops the argument in the next section, that violence 
should not be conceptualized in such a limited way, as doing so prohibits the appreciation of 
the myriad ways that human non-aggressive behaviour functions violently against other 
humans, particularly against Black persons. 
8.2.1.1.3. Socio-cultural Violence Theories 
Promoting views that were both anti-theoretical and anti-evolutionary,823 Franz Boas is 
regarded as having created the sub-field of socio-cultural anthropology. In the early 20th 
century, he contended that cultures were not recognized by fixed evolutionary stages. Instead, 
he argued for a cultural relativist view that regarded each culture as complex, formed by many 
different processes within specific and diverse contexts.824 He proposed a humanistic, not 
empirical, method of study that emphasized cultural immersion. Ethnography and fieldwork 
arose out of Boas’ methodological innovations. 
Socio-cultural methods of anthropology, because they emphasize cultural relativism, 
initially reflected an unwillingness to assign the label of “violence” to observed cultural 
phenomena. 825  Later, research did name phenomena as “violence” and study of such 
                                               
 
822 Accomazzo, “Anthropology of Violence,” 542. See also, Lee Cronk and William Irons, “Two Decades 
of a New Paradigm,” in Adaptation and Human Behavior: An Anthropological Perspective, ed. Napoleon Chagnon, Lee 
Cronk, and William Irons (Hawthorne, NY: Aldine De  Gruyter, 2000), 3–26; De Waal, “Critique of Seville 
Statement”; Bruce M. Knauft et al., “Violence and Sociality in Human Evolution [and Comments and Replies],” 
Current Anthropology 32, no. 4 (1991): 391–428; and James Silverberg and J. Patrick Gray, “Violence and 
Peacefulness as Behavioral Potentialities of Primates,” in Aggression and Peacefulness in Humans and Other Primates, 
ed. James Silverberg and J. Patrick Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 37–56. 
823 See, Accomazzo, “Anthropology of Violence,” 538, 540. 
824 Accomazzo, 543, citing; Layton, Theory in Anthropology. 
825 One result of a reluctance to name occurrences as violent has been the failure to acknowledge 
particular acts of violence, such as genocide, that were occurring in the midst of anthropological study. See, 
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phenomena increased. Though maintaining a focus on physical violence, theories “moved away 
from attributing violence to “traditional” or “tribal” societies and began to acknowledge that 
violence occurs in all societies.”826 Also, theories began to be articulated of “violence” as 
culturally relative, and as involving questions of legitimate and illegitimate use of force. 
Anthropologists began to consider the forces of economics and politics as committing their 
own kinds of violence, and slowly began to acknowledge the impact of colonialism and 
globalization.827 
Another important development was the 1986 publication of Anthropology of 
Violence828 by David Riches. In this volume Riches offers a definition of violence that has been 
highly influential,829 as well as highly contested. He defines violence as: “an act of physical 
hurt deemed legitimate by the performer and illegitimate by (some) witnesses.”830 A significant 
theory of Riches is that violence is both expressive, communicating a message to those 
involved, and instrumental, serving a specific purpose; that violence is utilized rationally and 
strategically and with the intention of sending a message. Politically, he found, violence is 
easily manipulated, and enables the perpetrator to gain attention quickly.831 
Also developing theoretically, as a result of globalization, was the realization that the 
studies previously undertaken of small stable societies did not accurately reflect larger, more 
complex societies. The larger societies had more violence and colonial disruption.832 Theories 
of colonialism’s impact on culture, and theories of symbolic and structural violence gained 
                                               
 
Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois account of anthropologist Richard Geertz who omitted noting signs of impending 
genocide in Bali in 1965, due to not wanting to engage in “politics of advocacy.” Scheper-Hughes, 2004, 6. 
826 Accomazzo, “Anthropology of Violence,” 544. 
827 Accomazzo, 544, 545. 
828 David Riches, The Anthropology of Violence (Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell, 1986). 
829 Neil L. Whitehead, “On the Poetics of Violence,” in Violence, ed. Neil L Whitehead, School of School 
of American Research Advanced Seminar Series (Sante Fe, N.M.; Oxford: School of American Research Press ; 
James Currey, 2005), 57. 
830 Accomazzo, “Anthropology of Violence,” 545, citing; Riches, The Anthropology of Violence, 8. 
Whitehead notes the limits of this definition, writing that it is “reductive and misleading.” Further, that such 
definitions of violence “fail to address a wide variety of violence that has no immediate material correlates, such 
as sorcery or verbal aggression, because they use only physical injury as the linking element between examples of 
violence.” Whitehead, “On the Poetics of Violence,” 57. 
831 Accomazzo, “Anthropology of Violence,” 545. 
832 Accomazzo, 545-546, citing; Alexander Laban Hinton, “The Dark Side of Modernity: Toward an 
Anthropology of Genocide.,” in Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology of Genocide, ed. Alexander Laban Hinton 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002), 1–40; Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe 
Bourgois, “Introduction: Making Sense of Violence.,” in Violence in War and Peace: An Anthology, ed. Nancy 
Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois, Illustrated, vol. 5, Wiley Blackwell Readers in Anthropology (Hoboken, 
NJ: Wiley, 2004), 1–32; Pamela Stewart and Andrew Strathern, Violence: Theory and Ethnography (London: A&C 
Black, 2002). 
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traction.833 Ultimately, violence was theorized as more than the occurrence of merely physical 
phenomena, and understood as encompassing underlying and interrelated social and cultural 
constructs. 
The theories of colonial violence, symbolic violence, and structural violence have all 
contributed to a post-modern anthropological conception that violence occurs in conditions of 
both war and peace and that the invisible, everyday violences, as exemplified in the concept of 
structural violence, are often the results of the larger, overarching political, economic, and 
institutional forces that shape the visible violence that occurs between individuals and families, 
such as domestic violence, rape, or one gang member’s shooting another.834 
Finally, socio-cultural anthropology has identified the concept of extraordinary state 
violence. Violence of this type “is authorized, public, visible, and rewarded.”835 Extraordinary 
state violence is characterized by both invisible/structural violence and visible/physical 
violence. An example might be that of a government killing and torturing civilians in pursuit 
of a rebel faction.836 Recent theorists have proposed a “continuum of violence” to account for 
the interconnectedness of all forms of violence, from the visible to the invisible to the 
extraordinary.837  
                                               
 
833
 Bourdieu in particular gave much attention to the topic of symbolic violence. He suggests that 
symbolic power rests with the powerful who assign meanings to observed symbols, regardless of whether they 
understand the meaning of the symbols to those inside the culture. Further, Bourdieu provides an account of 
“symbolic violence” which argues that there is a shared dynamic between a perpetrator, a victim, and a witness 
whose shared worldview in which patterns and customs are taken for granted, make them unaware that violence 
is occurring. Ultimately, symbolic violence elicits the complicity of the victim, by making the violence part of the 
established social system; it becomes a cultural norm, e.g., male domination of women. See, Pierre Bourdieu, 
“Outline of a Theory of Practice,” in On Violence: A Reader, ed. Bruce B. Lawrence and Aisha Karim (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2007), 189–98; and see, Pierre Bourdieu, “Symbolic Violence,” in Violence in War and 
Peace: An Anthology, ed. Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois, Illustrated, vol. 5, Wiley Blackwell Readers 
in Anthropology (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2004), 272–74; see also, Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1977). 
834 Accomazzo, “Anthropology of Violence,” 547, citing; Paul Farmer, “On Suffering and Structural 
Violence: A View from Below,” in Violence in War and Peace: An Anthology, ed. Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe 
Bourgois, Illustrated, vol. 5, Wiley Blackwell Readers in Anthropology (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2004), 281–89; 
Philippe Bourgois, “The Continuum of Violence in War and Peace: Post-Cold War Lessons from El Salvador,” in 
Violence in War and Peace: An Anthology, ed. Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois, Illustrated, vol. 5, 
Wiley Blackwell Readers in Anthropology (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2004), 425–35; Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois, 
“Making Sense of Violence.” 
835 Michel Foucault, “Right of Death and Power Over Life,” in Violence in War and Peace: An Anthology, ed. 
Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois, Illustrated, vol. 5, Wiley Blackwell Readers in Anthropology 
(Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2004), 81, see also, Michel Foucault, “Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison,” in On 
Violence: A Reader, ed. Bruce B. Lawrence and Aisha Karim (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 445–71. 
836
 See account of Bourgois of the Salvador Civil War in 1981, Bourgois, “Continuum of Violence.” 
837 Accomazzo, “Anthropology of Violence,” 547. 
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Cultural anthropology’s analysis of violence is helpful and supports the argument that 
identifies the phenomena of complexities that underlie the conceptualization of violence that 
will be articulated in the next section of this chapter. Of particular relevance is the theory of 
Riches, that violence expresses and is intended to send a message. This lends support to the 
theory advanced previously in the paper, that Jesus’s teaching on self-worth and dignity 
interrupts the causal chain that prompts individual physical violence. By authorizing the 
alternate means of self-claimed dignity and worth, the marginalized express power. The power 
of those with the potential to exercise great physical force is taken away. In the absence of the 
method of self-claimed dignity and worth, Riches identifies physical violence as a viable means 
of expression sending a message. 
8.2.1.1.4. Linguistic Violence Theories 
Linguistic Anthropology is a close relative of the subfields of Anthropological 
Linguistics and Sociolinguistics.838 Linguistic anthropology, “is dedicated to the study of the 
role of languages in the…activities that make up the social life of individuals and 
communities.”839 As Piers Kelly describes, “linguistic anthropologists are concerned with the 
way in which we systematically connect language to other aspects of our lives: the way we 
organise ourselves as social creatures, how we signal belonging and exclusion, or how we 
express our values.”840 
Language can be used in ways that assume the inferiority of others, and by its use and 
prevalence, language can brand inferiority upon the being of others, such as the language of 
slurs or derogatory speech. This may be understood as a kind of violence in speech.841 In other 
ways language diminishes, as well. Such as where, a woman is regarded as a “woman 
playwright” or as a “lesbian writer,” or the even more marginalizing “black woman 
playwright.”842 
                                               
 
838 Both anthropological linguistics and sociolinguistics are subfields of Linguistics. These fields are 
primarily concerned with scientifically studying the structure of language itself. The difference has been described 
as primarily one of method. Anthropological linguistics methodologically tends towards ethnography, while 
sociolinguistics methodologically tends towards data collection to discern patterns and correlates. 
https://yammeringon.wordpress.com/2015/12/16/anthropological-linguistics-vs-sociolinguistics-vs-linguistic-
anthropology-argh/ 
839 Alessandro Duranti, Linguistic Anthropology, 2nd ed. (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 1. 
840 Piers Kelly, “What Is Linguistic Anthropology?,” Brave New Words (blog), January 18, 2018, 
https://bravenewwords.info/2018/01/18/what-is-linguistic-anthropology/. 
841 See, e.g., Jane H. Hill, The Everyday Language of White Racism (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008). 
842 Elaine Aston, Feminist Views on the English Stage: Women Playwrights, 1990-2000 (Cambridge, England ; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 125. 
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There is also a psychological way that language inherently operates violently. In 
discussing the acquisition of language in children, renowned linguist Julia Kristeva has argued 
that violence is unavoidable, when “we create a discontinuity…[when] we break up a sign for 
an object that can only be constituted by becoming an object of desire…we…disturb the 
patient’s continuous and analogical sensoriality…[and we] impose on [the patient] our desire 
for a name, for an object”.843 She sees the act of demanding that desire be found in the object 
and communicated by a name as an act of violence.  
This is similar to the function of naming identified by anthropologist Lévi-Strauss. 
Lévi-Strauss located violence in the presence and gaze of the foreigner within the native 
culture, which led to disclosure of that-which-is-taboo-to-speak. He finds the written word to 
be an equivalent violence against the uttered word. This violence is accidental.844 Derrida, 
much like Kristeva, however, determined that the violence of disclosing the name, is not the 
significant violence. The first violence is that of naming in itself, of “arche-writing,” which 
reduces the unique and essential difference inherent to the individual to a symbolic system.845 
“Anterior to the possibility of violence in the current and derivative sense, the sense used in 
[Lévi-Strauss’s study] ‘A Writing Lesson,’ there is…the violence of arche-writing, the violence 
of difference, of classification, and of the system of appellations.”846 This system disallows the 
“purity” of the person to stand.847 
Scholarship in this regard, however, is lacking. There appears to be limited research in 
linguistic anthropology with respect to violence qua violence. The research named, in addition 
to other research, has taken place in the related fields of linguistics848 and philosophy;849 both 
have engaged issues involved with language and violence extensively. The scholarly vacuum 
                                               
 
843 Julia Kristeva, “Is Sensation a Form of Language,” in The Portable Kristeva, ed. Kelly Oliver (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2002), 127. 
844 James K. A. Smith, The Fall of Interpretation: Philosophical Foundations for a Creational Hermeneutic 
(InterVarsity Press, 2000), 122. 
845 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Spivak Chakravorty, Corrected (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1997), 115–28. 
846 Derrida, 119. 
847 Smith, The Fall of Interpretation, 122. 
848 The linguistics subfield of sociolinguistics birthed its own subfield of Critical Discourse Analysis, 
which engages issues that relate to violence in language. Critical discourse analysis investigates “opaque as well as 
transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language.” 
R. E. Wodak, “Power, Discourse, and Styles of Female Leadership in School Committee Meetings,” in Discourse 
and Power in Educational Organizations, ed. David Corson (Cresskill, N.J: Hampton Pr, 1995), 204. It studies real, 
and often protracted, instances of social interaction which take on at least partially linguistic form. Jan Blommaert 
and Chris Bulcaen, “Critical Discourse Analysis,” Annual Review of Anthropology 29 (October 2000): 448. 
849 Notably, Paul Ricoeur, Jaques Derrida, and Slavoj Žižek. 
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in linguistic anthropology seems to speak to the problem of the narrow ways in which violence 
has been historically understood. 
8.2.1.1.5. Archaeological Anthropological Violence Theories 
Archaeology has served to establish, contrary to certain political philosophical claims, 
that there was violence in ancient societies. 
There is ample scholarship of archaeological anthropological studies of violence. This 
scholarship has been defined “either by their subject specialism, or by a specific temporal or 
geographical focus,” and is often centered around the study of warfare.850 When warfare in past 
societies is studied, the studies have investigated the societies’ material culture, such as 
weaponry, or the motivations for and consequences of the societies’ engagement in warfare.851 
Frequently, there has been an “equation of violence with war, and its conflation into the 
latter.”852 Such a conflation is evidence of the lack of theorization of violence in the field of 
archaeology,853 though the study of “violence” abounds.  
Studies related to non-warfare violence are not completely absent, however, as Martin 
and Frayer’s investigation of hunter-gatherer through state societies in the New and Old Worlds 
demonstrates. This study places a particular emphasis on osteological data, which is the study 
of bones.854 There have also been studies showing political violence in the archaeological 
record, such as the violent imagery that was created relating to Rome’s “bad” emperors,855 and 
Rome’s bloody spectacles of martyrdom.856 Archaeology has also accounted for ritual, or 
                                               
 
850 Sarah Ralph, ed., Archaeology of Violence, The: Interdisciplinary Approaches (State University of New York 
Press, 2012), 2, https://muse-jhu-edu.ez.sun.ac.za/book/21784. 
851 Ralph, 2. In this regard, Ralph references the work of Elizabeth N. Arkush and Mark W. Allen, eds., 
The Archaeology of Warfare: Prehistories of Raiding and Conquest (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2008); 
John Carmen and Anthony Harding, eds., Ancient Warfare (Stroud: The History Press, 2010); Sheila Dillon and 
Katherine E. Welch, eds., Representations of War in Ancient Rome, 1 edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009); Axel E. Nielsen and William H. Walker, eds., Warfare in Cultural Context: Practice, Agency, and the 
Archaeology of Violence, 1 edition (University of Arizona Press, 2014) and; Ton Otto, H. Thrane, and Helle 
VANDKILDE, eds., Warfare and Society: Archaeological and Social Anthropological Perspectives (Aarhus ; Oakville, CT: 
Aarhus University Press, 2006). 
852 Simon James, “Facing the Sword: Confronting the Realities of Martial Violence and Other Mayhem, 
Present and Past,” in The Archaeology of Violence: Interdisciplinary Approaches, ed. Sarah Ralph, Reprint edition 
(Place of publication not identified: SUNY Press, 2014), 98. 
853 James, 98. 
854 Ralph, Archaeology of Violence, The, 3. 
855 See, Eric R. Varner, “Violent Discourses: Visual Cannibalism and the Portraits of Rome’s ‘Bad’ 
Emperors,” in The Archaeology of Violence: Interdisciplinary Approaches, ed. Sarah Ralph, Reprint edition (Place of 
publication not identified: SUNY Press, 2014), 121–42. 
856 See, John Carman, “‘Persuade the People’: Violence and Roman Spectacle Entertainment in the Greek 
World,” in The Archaeology of Violence: Interdisciplinary Approaches, ed. Sarah Ralph, Reprint edition (Place of 
publication not identified: SUNY Press, 2014), 158–68. 
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religious violence. More recently, Costa has studied acts of domestic racialized terrorism, such 
as in Rosewood or Tulsa in the U.S. He notes that the archaeological record has been 
approached materially, “only in collections of objects, burned ceramics and glass, or twisted 
metals about forgetfully subaltern groups.857 
Recently, Hall has argued for the necessity of an “archaeology of violence” to address 
the “‘traumatic gap’ that emerges as the unrepresentable space between words and images.”858 
Archaeological practice must find ways to theorize the ordinary modern materials, such as 
chairs or photographs, that, as a result of extreme violence inflicted by the materials, take on 
haptic properties that are greater than the objects themselves.859 
It appears that most archaeological explorations of violence, excluding the new 
theorization of Hall, relate to physical violence, if not war specifically. In this regard, Bernbeck 
provides an important critique of archaeology’s failure to account for structural violence.860 
8.2.1.1.6. Conclusion of Anthropology Scholarship Overview 
It appears from a review of the anthropological study of violence, that violence is 
understood primarily as aggression and as the use of coercive physical force. Cultural 
anthropology alone provides a scholarly account of the violence of systems and structures. 
Cultural anthropology makes the important contribution of acknowledging the significance of 
colonialism to the phenomena of violence. What may be said, then, is that the typology of 
violence that will be identified in a subsequent section of this chapter, finds support in the 
scholarship of cultural anthropologists. 
8.2.1.2. Psychology  
Psychology, as a discipline, largely attributes the causes of violence to individual and 
familial dysfunction or pathology,861 according to Bryn King in her overview of psychological 
theories of violence. The pathways to violence are considered at an individual level. Questions 
are asked about the internal characteristics of perpetrators, their immediate circumstances, and 
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the type of violence committed.862 The theoretical corpus regarding the psychological causes 
of violence is extensive and diverse. 
Huesmann, who describes violence as “simply an extreme form of aggressive behaviour 
in which the target is physically harmed,”863 concludes that violence is “like a contagious 
disease,”864 since an individual’s experience or mere observation of violence influences the 
individual to behave violently themselves, unless one has internalized a script that socializes 
one away from violent behaviour. Huesmann lists multiple social and biological factors that 
researchers have shown result in extreme aggression, including genetic predispositions, 
environment, central nervous system trauma and neurophysiological abnormalities, early 
temperament or attention difficulties, family violence, poor parenting, inappropriate 
punishment, environmental poverty and stress, and peer group identification.865 He determines 
that “no one factor by itself” can explain the different levels of aggressiveness that appear in 
different persons.866  
Huesmann’s work supports the conclusion of King, in that the variables that Huesmann 
identifies as influencing violent behaviour are recognizable as either those one is born with, or 
as those that are cultivated as a result of one’s environment. Huesmann’s work is also relevant 
to this study in that he acknowledges that learing/internalizing an alternate script can result in 
less violent behaviour. This supports the main argument that Jesus was attempting to provide 
a new script and to create the possibility for the positive consequences that result from this, 
including decreased violence. 
8.2.1.2.1. Violence as General Aggression 
The widely accepted General Aggression Model (“GAM”) of aggression and violence, 
defines aggression as “any behaviour intended to harm another person who does not want to 
be harmed,”867 and violence as “any aggressive act that has as its goal extreme physical harm, 
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such as injury or death.”868 GAM incorporates several psycho-social processes and concepts 
into an overarching theoretical framework, allowing complex psychological hypotheses to be 
formulated and tested. GAM recognizes that a personality which engages in violence is 
influenced from two sources: human nature, and experiences that an individual undergoes 
(environmental influences).869 Aggressive episodes are then understood in 3-stage cycles:  
(1) person and situation inputs, (2) present internal states (i.e., 
cognition, arousal, affect, including brain activity), and (3) 
outcomes of appraisal and decision-making processes.870 
In other words, input, interpretation, and output. DeWall, et al., suggest that GAM has 
application in interpersonal violence contexts, as well as other contexts as disparate as 
intergroup violence, climate change, and suicide prevention.871 
DeWall, et al, seem to suggest that application of the GAM framework has the potential 
to eradicate violence in many if not most circumstances. However, the study itself indicates 
that the hypothesis for resolution of intergroup conflict is highly variable, and not likely to be 
effective in highly charged group conflict situations, for example in international politics, or 
the Israeli Palestine conflict. 
Within GAM theory, Jesus’s teaching might be understood as addressing the second 
step, “interpretation,” since his emphasis on dignity and self-worth re-interprets the “input” of 
cultural dishonor. However, Christian theology has traditionally regarded Jesus’s teaching as 
merely addressing the “output” of physical violence. Application of GAM to Jesus’s “non-
violent” teaching appears to be an area for future research. 
8.2.1.2.2. Violence as a “Wicked” Problem 
Kazdin has contributed that the psychological aspects of interpersonal violence should 
be understood as a “wicked” problem. The concept of “wicked” “is a way to characterize 
complex problems and their unique features.” 872  Wicked problems include the following 
characteristics: 
• There is no single, definitive, or simple formulation of the problem;  
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• Multiple stakeholders and participants are likely to be involved, and this leads 
to multiple formulations of what “really” is the problem and therefore what are 
legitimate or appropriate solutions;  
• The problem is not likely to be the result of an event (e.g., violence in the media) 
or a small subset of events but rather a set of intersecting trends that co-occur 
and co-influence each other;  
• The problem is embedded in other problems, including other wicked problems 
(e.g., poverty, substance abuse);  
• Values, culture, politics, and economics are likely to be involved in the problem 
and possible strategies to address the problem;  
• There is no one solution, no single, one shot effort that will eliminate the 
problem;  
• The problem is never likely to be solved;  
• Information as a basis for action will be incomplete because of the uniqueness 
of the problem and the complexities of its interrelations with other problems; 
and  
• The uniqueness of the problem means it does not lend itself easily to previously 
tried strategies. 
Essentially, the concept of the “wicked” problem creates a categorization for problems 
that are complex, with multiple stakeholders, have intersecting causes, are impacted by social 
values, have multiple solutions, are never likely to be solved, have incomplete information 
available, and that have been unsolved by previously tried strategies. The value in this 
conceptualization being applied to violence, is that it “sensitizes us to some of the challenges 
of violence that are tacit, and in that way helps prepare for strategies to deal with them.”873  
8.2.1.2.3. Conclusion as to Psychology and Violence 
Kazdin’s approach to violence, as a “wicked” problem seems much more accepting of 
the various factors that contribute to violence, and of the difficulties present in confronting 
those factors, than the application of GAM suggested by DeWall, et al. Yet, DeWall etal.’s 
approach more closely aligns with Jesus’s teaching, as it acknowledges the person as the middle 
step between input and outcome. In any case, nearly all of the psychological approaches to 
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violence (to a lesser extent the “wicked” conception of the phenomenon) rely upon a definition 
of violence that is rooted in notions of physical harm. Accordingly, they are of limited use in 
the broader analysis of this research. However, the work is helpful to the extent that it 
acknowledges the complexities of eradicating violence, due to human susceptibility to violence 
as a contagion and due to the complexity and “wickedness” of violence in society. 
8.2.2. Conclusion of Social Scientific Analysis 
The review of the literature of anthropological and psychological fields of study reveals 
that, in the social sciences, violence is primarily understood as physical aggression or the 
coercive use of physical force. Cultural anthropologists alone have identified the social and 
political elements, including colonialism, that constitute phenomena of violence. This void in 
the canon of scholarship in itself suggests the reifying role that academic knowledge plays in 
the invisibilisation of violence in society. Within anthropology, cultural anthropologists have 
identified the ways that social structures constitute violence. However, within the same field 
this knowledge is not absorbed. The academy of the social sciences fails to fully interrogate 
culture, and fails to appreciate, as cultural anthropologists have pointed out, the role that they 
themselves play in creating and maintaining systems that are violent and that do violence. 
Instead the violence goes unseen, unreported, unlearned, and untaught. It remains a consistent 
invisible force in the social ecology. The ongoing non-acknowledgement of the violence 
embedded in the social structure, means that often only the results are studied, while the root 
of the phenomena goes unaddressed. 
The social science scholarship has great implications for the subject matter of this 
project. First, it provides evidence that the view of structural and cultural violence, invisible 
violence, that is argued for in this paper, is confirmed by those who study human social 
interaction. The research itself confirms the nature of the violence that is named. Second, the 
study of the social scientific purview of violence makes clear the utter radicality of Jesus’s 
teaching in the first century, as argued in Chapter Two. Jesus made a connection between 
psychology and violence that seems to be unnamed some two thousand years later. Those in 
the academic study of psychology and violence primarily identify violence as being related to 
human proclivity towards aggression, as a result of natural/biological and environmental 
factors. Jesus’s teaching, in contrast, makes a connection between one’s inner life, and inward 
sense of self-worth, and how an intact and uplifted psychological perspective can lead to a 
diminution in one’s engagement in acts of physical violence. For the post-modern scientist 
there is genetic grounds for violence. For Jesus, there is a psychology that is able overcome the 
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power of social forces, and also to overcome the internal natural/biological impulses triggered 
by those social forces. Ultimately, the psychological reorientation results in overcoming the 
inclination to use aggressive or coercive physical force. Further, because it insulates the 
individual from socially determined notions of worthiness and unworthiness, it disarms the 
powers that create violent structures and that instrumentalize violent systems to diminish and 
destroy the human beings that it deems to have disposable lives. Jesus’s psychology was far 
ahead of its time. 
8.3. Conceptualizing “Violence” Broadly 
The preceding review of the state of social scientific scholarship makes plain the need 
for a more robust conceptualization of “violence” in the academy. Work has been performed 
in this regard in an interdisciplinary fashion within the humanities. Here I will pull together 
various strands of theory to weave a theorization of violence that is adequate to the task of 
addressing the vast array of violences with which the marginalized, particularly the Black 
marginalized, contend. 
As should be clear from the analysis of the social scientific scholarship, violence is a 
contested concept.874 This is largely due to the pervasive existence of ideological structures in 
any given society,875 which define the very concept of violence.876 Ideology is the “linking 
mechanism between actions and meanings.”877 It implies that the meanings assigned to actions 
are legitimate in the society, and structure society’s morality.878 Societal ideological structures 
influence the development of the social system, and community, in general, but it is also results 
for the individual in “the internalization of that social system…([meaning] the developmental 
growth [of] a person within a meaning system, and the subsequent determination of normative 
stages of development.)”879 It influences the individual’s ethics. For example, religion, and in 
the West, Christianity, has been an ideological structure with immense influence, as has the 
economic structure of capitalism. Structures such as these inform a culture’s conception of acts 
that are within or outside of the boundaries of socially and politically acceptable behaviour. 
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“Violence,” as well as its usual obverse, “peace,”880 do not merely describe behaviour, but 
function as evaluations of the behaviour, or acts, described. These words “are labels that make 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ moral statements regarding particular acts, thoughts, and institutional 
structures.”881  
Staudigl882 has described violence as “a social phenomenon, within the horizon of its 
ordering, within which we negotiate, define and debate what counts and is recognized as 
violence and what does not.”883  Tite’s and Staudigl’s observations are buttressed by the 
assertion of Lawrence and Karim that “violence is always and everywhere historically 
contingent; it can never be morally or politically neutral.”884 Thus, there is no “violence” per 
se. 885  A culture’s ideological influences, relative to its historical, political, and social 
constructs, are what allow certain phenomena to be understood as morally reprehensible and 
as “violence.” 
While certain phenomena are encoded as “violence” by society’s ideological structure, 
the phenomena that are determined to reflect “violence” are identified by specific acts. 
Lawrence and Karim articulate that “[t]here is no general theory of violence apart from its 
practices.”886 Endreß and Rampp have likewise determined that examining the phenomenon of 
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violence requires addressing the question of “how violence presents itself, how it is perceived, 
and how it happens.”887 The details of violence are “essential” to attend to.888 
8.3.1. Violence Is Identified as “Product” or “Process” 
In elucidating the fundamental nature of violence, scholars have also determined that 
the phenomenon of violence, the specific acts, must be understood as either product or as 
process. Viewing violence as product entails regarding an act or occurrence as episodic, 
sporadic and as an exception to the norm. The understanding of violence as process, 
accommodates an open view of violence. It reflects the nature of violence’s porous boundaries. 
Violence as process recognizes violence as “cumulative and boundless,” and as “spill[ing] 
over.”889 Concurring with Lawrence and Karim, Endreß and Rampp conclude that violence as 
process is a fitting conception; “violence ought to be thought of not as a static but rather a 
highly dynamic and processual phenomenon.”890 
Coady has been an ardent proponent of the definition of violence as “product,”891  which 
he refers to as the “restricted definition” of violence. For Coady, several factors make this view 
the ideal one. First is that the linking of violence and physical force is consistent with the 
language adopted by the Oxford English Dictionary, which defines violence as, “The deliberate 
exercise of physical force against a person, property, etc.; physically violent behaviour or 
treatment.”892 Second, the connection of violence with physical force is typically the base line 
that other views expand upon. More importantly, the view of violence as force provides a 
straightforward and unambiguous definition of the term, which allows instances of violence to 
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be easily identified. Further, Coady claims, this definition is neutral, and does not involve moral 
considerations. 
There are disadvantages to the “product” or “restricted” view of violence, however. The 
“product” view of violence, while conceptually clear, does not sufficiently account for the 
multitude of harms that persons regularly experience that violate their human integrity. These 
include psychological harms, social harms, and economic harms, to name a few. Other 
meanings that recognize the harms that might be accounted for by the term “violence” broaden 
the concept, making it more appropriately complex. While it may be argued that this 
complexity creates ambiguity that empties the term “violence” of concrete meaning, 893 the 
greater complexity is favoured in this paper, as it is warranted by the true complexity of the 
phenomenon of violence. 
The “product” view of violence holds that violence is an episodic exception to the norm. 
The idea that violence is an episodic exception, and that there is a normal state of society that 
is not violent, is challenged by a reading of politics and history through raced, gendered, and 
postcolonial hermeneutics. Because the dissertation considers the concept of violence through 
the lenses of the marginalized, and these groups often comprise those whose lives are on the 
margins, the concept of violence necessarily incorporates the views that have been expressed 
by marginalized women, Black persons, and those in regions that have been formal colonies of 
the West. Once the views of the marginalized are incorporated, the rationale for adoption of 
the “process” description of violence is clear; violence is not limited to overt instances of 
physical force, and must reference the invisible “forces” that comprise the norm, and that 
constitute initial invisible and provoking inflictions of violence to individuals. 
8.3.2. Violence as Process, Process as Cultural Hegemony 
Understanding the “process” of violence, is aided by reference to Gramsci’s concept of 
cultural hegemony. Italian intellectual Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) extended theories of 
Marxist materialism to the realm of ideology. Gramsci introduced the concept of cultural 
hegemony, whereby intellectual and moral leadership of civil society, which consists of 
schools, families, labour unions, etc., is gained by a predominating social class through means 
of influence, rather than means of coercion or force. “Owners and managers of media…can 
produce and reproduce the content, inflections, and tones of ideas favourable to them far more 
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easily than other social groups because they manage key socializing institutions, thereby 
guaranteeing that their points of view are constantly and attractively cast into the public 
arena.”894 
Cultural hegemony is the means by which the normative, default understanding of the 
social realm becomes an understanding that the norm is neutral or non-violent. The hegemonic 
ideal of the normal, non-violent status quo, reflects the ideals of those members of the social 
class that dominate culture and that have institutional power. This class of persons in the West 
is generally male, White, possessed of some economic wealth, Christian (Protestant), and 
heterosexual. Cultural conceptions of normativity with regard to violence, which are inculcated 
by such persons, render transparent the violence that is mediated through, and inherent to, 
gendered, racialized and colonial understandings of the ordering of the culture. 
8.3.3. Violence as “Instrumental” or “Non-Instrumental” 
The description of violence as process, is augmented by the idea that the specific acts 
that are constitutive of violence are either instrumental or non-instrumental. Instrumental 
violence, or violence as pure means, “refers to a concept in which the implementation 
of…violence occurs as a means to an end…a party enacts violent measures solely to achieve a 
particular result.”895 Dodd regards such phenomena as “stupid” violence; there is a “stupidity 
of violence” where “it involves nothing more significant than what can be captured and 
organized in a technical fashion.”896 
Non-instrumental violence, on the other hand, refers to violence that is intrinsically 
meaningful. It occurs when the specific act of violence “itself contains inherent 
value…Intrinsic violence places positive value on a violent act irrespective of the outcome at 
a specific moment of implementation.”897 Dodd describes this type of violence as itself a source 
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and origin of meaning.898 One example of intrinsic violence provided by Roberts is that of 
sexual rape, wherein the rapist does not rape instrumentally, in order to derive sexual pleasure, 
but rapes because he finds intrinsic value in the forced intrusion of another.899 
A more instructive example might be located in the practice of religion. In Violence: 
Thinking Without Banisters, philosopher Richard Bernstein discusses the work of Jan 
Assmann,900 and points out the possibility of an intrinsic violence within monotheistic religion. 
This example is significant in that it highlights the institution of religion, which contributes to 
the shaping of culture in particularly invisible ways. Since religion is often regarded as 
compartmentalized away from the secularized operations of daily life and politics. Without 
question religion has been essential to the formation of the modern/colonial world, and 
complicit in the violence of that world. The theory of non-instrumentality helps to reveal the 
fundamental violence of religion, that seems to spill over into political, philosophical, and 
social knowledge systems that have shaped the development of Western culture. 
Assmann’s work investigates the historic distinctions between Jewish and Egyptian 
culture. He names as a Mosaic "first distinction,"901 "the distinction between true and false in 
religion that underlies more specific distinctions such as Jews and Gentiles, Christians and 
pagans, Muslims and unbelievers."902 Analysing Assmann’s contribution, Bernstein concludes 
that if the Jewish “Mosaic distinction” is “as rigorous and as absolute as Assmann indicates, 
and if it introduces a new kind of religious truth--'absolute, revealed, metaphysical, or fideistic 
truth'--that is radically opposed to all false religions, then it would seem that the Mosaic 
distinction is intrinsically violent.”903  
Berstein appraises Assmanns’ Mosaic distinction as intrinsically violent because of the 
way that it distinguishes the Mosiac religion from other religions, which entails opposing other 
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religions. Further, the Mosaic distinction’s violence is in its constitution of religion as meaning-
making; it is the source of meaning for Abrahamic faith traditions. Thus, the religious Mosaic 
distinction is an example of the ways in which violence may be conceived as intrinsic to 
structure. Intrinsic (non-instrumental) violence, more subtle than instrumental violence, can be 
as detrimental as it is transparent. 
8.3.4. Conclusion 
Violence is known according to specific acts, is best understood as process and not 
product, and may be either instrumental or non-instrumental, with both having damaging 
outcomes. This theorization is helpful in establishing a broad framework for thinking 
conceptually about violence. The framework does not account for every instance of violence, 
nor for every violent practice, neither is it desirable for a theory to do so. As Enderß and Ramp 
have observed, prematurely narrowing down the phenomenal domain “can lead to the danger 
of overlooking central aspects. Instead…it is sensible to begin by conceiving violence as 
openly as possible in order to do justice to its historical manifoldness.”904 The next section of 
this chapter will examine the work of Johan Galtung to construct a framework upon the 
theoretical ground that has been discussed. 
8.4. Galtung Typology of Violence 
The open view of violence, which follows the practices of violence and does not dictate 
its parameters, aligns well with the theorization advanced by Johan Galtung, who founded the 
discipline of Peace Studies. Galtung established a path-breaking typology of violence that 
systematized the ways in which violence is conceived. Galtung’s typology allocates violent 
phenomena to broad categories as well as to specific types within those broad categories of 
violent occurrences. Unlike the theories of “violence” identified in the previous section, 
Galtung’s theorization was intended to be prescriptive. He reasoned that “the concept of 
violence must be broad enough to include the most significant varieties, yet specific enough to 
serve as a basis for concrete action.”905 His goal was to understand violence as a means of 
effectively working towards peace. The previous discussion of the limitations of a “product” 
view of violence, and of cultural hegemony’s masking of violence towards women, Black 
persons, and the colonized, will be revisited here. Because Galtung acknowledges the function 
                                               
 
904 Endreß and Rampp, “Introduction,” 3. 
905 Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” 168. 
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of “culture” in his typology, it is possible to map many of the violent features previously 
mentioned within his typology. 
This section will first discuss Galtung’s typology of violence, and will introduce two 
new types of violence to the typological structure. Following this, Galtung’s typology will be 
subjected to an ideological critical review to determine its meaningfulness to women, Black, 
and colonized persons. 
8.4.1. Galtung’s Definition of Violence 
Galtung offers a delimitation of the general theory of violence as that which is an 
ideologically influenced negative evaluation of particular existing phenomena. He posits that 
the negative phenomena that constitutes violence must entail more than instances of application 
of physical force, or what he calls “narrow violence”906 (the “product” view). Such a limited 
definition, and narrowed concept, of violence is prone to allowing “highly unacceptable” 
conditions and situations to be regarded as conditions of peace.907 
Galtung proffers the alternate definition, that: “violence is present when human beings 
are being influenced [against their will]908 so that their actual somatic and mental realizations 
are below their potential realizations...Violence is…the cause of the difference between the 
potential and the actual.”909 In other words, when one’s experience in the body or mind is 
caused to be diminished from what it had the potential to be, the phenomena that caused the 
diminishment is a violent phenomena; it is violence. 910  Later Galtung offers a clearer 
                                               
 
906 Galtung defines the concept of narrow violence as “somatic incapacitation, or deprivation of health, 
alone (with killing as the extreme form), at the hands of an actor who intends this to be the consequence.” 
Galtung, 168. 
907 Galtung, 168. 
908 Addition of the language “against their will” is offered by Coady and rectifies a shortcoming of 
Galtung’s definition. E.g., if a young child expresses needs or desires that make demands upon its parents that 
cause their actual realization to be diminished from their potential, the child might be said, under the original 
Galtung definition to have engaged in violence. Coady, “The Idea of Violence,” 7. 
909 Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” 168. 
910 See, also, Derrida, Of Grammatology, where he theorizes violence in naming; that to be named is a 
first, “originary violence of language.” It is to think “the unique within the system, to inscribe it there, such is the 
gesture of the arche-writing: arche-violence, loss of the proper…of a self-presence which has never been given 
but only dreamed of and always already split, repeated, incapable of appearing to itself except in its own 
disappearance.” Derrida, Of Grammatology, 112. Derrida’s “first violence” does not contradict Galtung’s. 
Galtung’s definition does not require that the violence inflicted be known to the violated person; merely that 
there be a difference between the potential and the actual experience of such a person, a diminished experience. 
Derrida’s “first violence” would constitute a diminution in the somatic and mental realizations of the person who 
was named, in that they lost their unique self-ness, and were inscribed within the system by being named. 
Further, Galtung recognizes a violence that exists whether or not there is a subject who acts to cause the harm. 
He understands such anonymized acts as indirect violence. 
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redefinition, “I see violence as avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to 
life, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible. Threats of 
violence are also violence.”911 This is an improved conceptualization. First, it is more readily 
accessible linguistically. Second, it emphasizes unmet human needs, which are universal 
categories that lend themselves to concrete identification and remedy. Unlike “somatic and 
mental realizations,” which are amorphous, mutable, and unmeasurable. 
8.4.2. Galtung’s Framework of Violence 
After offering a widely-encompassing definition of violence, Galtung distinguishes six 
dimensions that order consideration of various phenomena that are constitutive of violence.912 
Galtung’s six dimensions inform the categorizing of violence in his typology. The six 
dimensions, or questions, that bound the consideration of violence are: 
1. Whether or not there is a subject (person) who acts. As Galtung notes, this is a 
matter of primary importance. It leads to the assessment that whether or not there 
is an identifiable subject who commits a specific action, individuals are often 
exposed to potential risk of harm and to actual harm. This identification of 
violence as deriving from a subject who acts and as also deriving from acts that 
do not derive from a specific subject’s actions, underlies the distinction between 
Galtung’s categories of personal (direct) and structural violence. 
2. Whether acts use negatives or positives to influence. Galtung points out that a 
person can be influenced to comply or conform, not only by means of punishment, 
following a perceived transgression, but also by means of rewarding the person 
who does what is perceived as right. An example that Galtung uses of positive 
influence is that of consumer society rewarding those who consume, while not 
positively punishing those who do not. The reward-orientation of the system is 
arguably better in that it gives pleasure rather than pain, and arguably worse in 
that it is more manipulative and less overt.913  
                                               
 
911 Johan Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” Journal of Peace Research 27, no. 3 (August 1990): 292. 
912 Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” 168–72. 
913 Galtung, 170. I note that this particular example does not immediately relate to an instance of 
violence, however it does reflect the ways that cultural manipulation towards what is perceived as an economic 
good, often fails to raise the question of whether and what kinds of harm might be incident to such 
manipulations. E.g., the expansion of the Walmart empire, and availability of cheap goods to consumers, fails at 
the outset to even question the harmful trade and labour practices upon which the growth and stability of the 
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3. Whether or not there is an object that is harmed. Can there be violence, Galtung 
questions, if no physical or biological object is hurt? By raising this question 
Galtung points to the violence of threatened physical harm. Such as when a 
person, group, or nation is displaying the means of physical violence, with the 
intention of coercing another to comply.914 The legal concept of assault recognizes 
this conception of a violation. Another example might also be the arrangement of 
state security forces, with militarized combat equipment, physically aligned in 
opposition to protesters. Also, there is the example of domestic violence. Though 
direct physical or psychological harm may not be occurring continuously in the 
home, the potential for direct physical or psychological violence permeates the 
home environment. The threatening environment itself constitutes violence. Thus, 
threats of harm, and the coercion accomplished by such threats, are meaningful to 
conceptualizations of violence. 
4. Whether harm is physical or psychological. Galtung is interested in establishing 
that psychological violence is as significant a phenomenon as physical violence, 
which “narrow” definitions of violence often elide. He uses as examples of 
psychological violence “lies, brainwashing, indoctrination of various kinds, 
threats, etc.” 915  Galtung seems to mention these examples of psychological 
violence within the context of war and politics. These examples of psychological 
violence (lies, brainwashing, indoctrination, etc.) gain added meaning, however, 
when applied to hegemonic ideas of gender, race, and coloniality. For this reason, 
a reframing of the distinction between physical and psychological harm seems 
warranted. Instead of physical/psychological language, the terms “tangible” and 
“intangible” capture the broader scope of what is intended. Tangible/intangible 
draws attention to the diversity of bodies, human, nonhuman, and inanimate, that 
are potential objects of violence. Also, it widens the notion of “psychological” 
violence, which seems to imply a consciousness of an inward harm that is 
inflicted, whether by the actor or the subject of the harm. Further, it seems to imply 
                                               
 
Walmart empire is predicated, and continues to fail to curb the harms that Walmart’s empire perpetuates. This 
speaks to one of the subtleties of structural violence. 
914 Galtung, 170. 
915 Galtung, 169. 
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an introspection to that which is not visible to the eye, which limits the notion’s 
applicability to animal (human or nonhuman) life. To speak of intangible harm, 
however, is to recognize harms that may not be readily cognizable, but are 
nonetheless real, whether they be, for example, harms to the conscious existence 
of Black persons, or harms to the ozone layer. 
5. Whether harm is intended or unintended. Galtung highlights the connection that 
exists between notions of intentional causation and guilt. This connection, he 
argues, underlies Christian ethics and jurisprudence. Galtung concludes that 
ethical systems based upon intentionality are inadequate to capture, or prevent, 
harms other than personal, direct occasions of violence.916 There is culpability for 
unintended harm, which he captures in the idea of structural violence. 
6. Whether harm is manifest or latent. Manifest harm is observable. It includes harm 
such as direct violence, but also includes harm that can be characterized as 
potential, or threatened, though not instantly occurring. Latent violence makes 
visible that violence which is “not there,” or even explicitly threatened, but which 
might easily come about. Galtung offers the example of a racially charged 
conversation that results in a punch. The difference between latent violence and 
threatened violence, would seem to be that threatened violence is anticipatory, 
whereas latent violence is not. Threatened violence is meant to, and does, 
anticipate the consequence of direct violence in the event of noncompliance or 
non-cooperation with the threat. Latent violence, on the other hand, is not 
anticipated, and results from an unstable situation in the instant. Galtung states, 
latent violence is indicated, “where the level of actual realization [of harm] is not 
sufficiently protected against deterioration by upholding mechanisms.”917 
It is the function of these dimensions918 in a multiplicity of combinations, within which 
phenomena of violence operate. 
                                               
 
916 Galtung, 171–72. 
917 Galtung, 172. 
918 Galtung allows that there are many more dimensions that could be included in addition to these, but 
provides no examples. Galtung, 172. 
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8.4.3. Galtung’s Categories of Violence 
Galtung’s outline of the framework of issues that orient our evaluation of phenomena 
that constitute violence now enables a description of Galtung’s categories of violence. Galtung 
categorizes violence as direct,919 structural,920 and cultural.921 Galtung sees the categories of 
violence as interrelated, but also as temporally differentiated. “Direct violence is an event; 
structural violence is a process with ups and downs; cultural violence is an invariant, a 
'permanence', remaining essentially the same for long periods, given the slow transformations 
of basic culture.”922 
 
 
                                               
 
919 Galtung, 169. 
920 Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.” Galtung acknowledges institutional violence as an 
alternate way of discussing structural violence, however he distinguishes the terms. His preference is for 
structural violence in that it is more open-ended, and not tied to any social institution. See, Johan Galtung, Essays 
in Peace Research (Copenhagen: Humanities Pr, 1975), 24. 
921 See, Galtung, “Cultural Violence.” 
922 Galtung, 294, (citation omitted). 
Direct 
Violent Act
Direct 
Violent Act
Direct 
Violent Act
Direct 
Violent Act
Direct 
Violent Act
The Arrows represent the STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE that creates the conditions 
and connects the incidents of DIRECT VIOLENCE. The Structure of Arrows may be in 
motion, may stop, may reverse motion. It is a process. CULTURAL VIOLENCE makes the 
shape of the violence structure a Circle and determines the shape and colour of the boxes that 
identify direct violence. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
231 
Figure 8-1 Galtung's Violence Types 
  
8.4.3.1. Direct Violence 
Direct violence is determined by whether or not there is an identifiable subject who 
acts. If there is an identifiable subject who acts, then the violence that occurs is regarded as 
personal or direct violence. This violence often receives more focus because of its 
newsworthiness, or episodic newness.923 Also, direct violence registers more readily because 
the object of personal violence “perceives the violence, usually, and may complain—[whereas] 
the object of structural violence may be persuaded not to perceive this at all.”924 
8.4.3.2. Structural Violence 
Where there is caused to be a difference between actual human realization and potential 
human realization, and that cause is not attributable to an identifiable subject who acts, the 
violence represented by the difference between potential and actual, is structural violence. 
Structural violence “is built into the [societal] structure and shows up as unequal power and 
consequently as unequal life chances.”925 When structural violence functions, resources are 
unevenly distributed, and, more significantly, “the power to decide over the distribution of 
resources is unevenly distributed.”926 “If people are starving when this is objectively avoidable, 
then violence is committed, regardless of whether there is a clear subject-action-object 
relation.”927 Galtung alternately refers to structural or indirect violence as social injustice.928 A 
violent structure, he claims, “leaves marks not only on the human body but also on the mind 
and the spirit.”929 
Galtung situates exploitation at the centre of structural violence. “This simply means 
that some, the topdogs, get much more (here measured in needs currency) out of the interaction 
in the structure, than…the underdogs.” 930  The exploitation of structural violence is 
accomplished by and because of penetration, segmentation, marginalization, and 
fragmentation. Penetration, “implant[s] the topdog inside the underdog.” Segmentation “ 
                                               
 
923 Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” 173 see also fn 22. 
924 Galtung, 171. 
925 Galtung, 171. 
926 Galtung, 171. 
927 Galtung, 171. 
928 Galtung, 171. 
929 Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” 294. 
930 Galtung, 293. 
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giv[es] the underdog only a very partial view of what goes on.” Marginalization, “keeps[s] the 
underdogs on the outside. Fragmentation, “keep[s] the underdogs away from each other. The 
four accomplish structural violence, but constitute structural violence in themselves; they are a 
variation of “structurally built-in repression.”931 
Imperialism is a specific example of structural violence. Imperialism establishes “a 
dominance relation between…nations” wherein a power nexus exists between “the [elite] 
center in the Center nation” and “the [elite] center of the Periphery nation,” primarily for the 
mutual benefit of those in the center of both nations, but also benefitting those in the periphery 
of the Center nation.932  In such a structure, “[a]lliance-formation between the two peripheries 
is avoided, while the Center nation becomes more and the Periphery nation less cohesive - and 
hence less able to develop long-term strategies.”933 
Galtung’s typology has an underlying aim of communicating that assumptions that 
structural violence amount to less suffering than personal violence are ill-founded.934  
8.4.3.3. Cultural Violence 
Cultural violence draws attention to the ways that acts of direct violence and of 
structural violence are legitimized and made acceptable in society.935 Cultural violence has as 
its source meaning-making aspects of a society’s culture, which include “the symbolic sphere 
of our existence - exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science 
and formal science (logic, mathematics).” 936  Cultural violence makes direct violence and 
structural violence look and feel normal and right.937 
Cultural violence is accomplished by means of internalization. Through external 
mechanisms of positive and negative reinforcement, the internal conscience of the person is 
shaped to uphold the existing social system.938 Using the symbolic grammar of language, art, 
religion, etc., cultural violence changes the “moral color” of an act “from red/wrong to 
green/right or at least to yellow/acceptable.”939 It also functions by mystification; by “making 
reality opaque, so that we do not see the violent act or fact, or at least [we see it] not as 
                                               
 
931 Galtung, 294. 
932 Johan Galtung, “A Structural Theory of Imperialism,” Journal of Peace Research 8, no. 2 (1971): 81, 84. 
933 Galtung, 84. 
934 Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” 173. 
935 Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” 292. 
936 Galtung, 291. 
937 Galtung, 291. 
938 Galtung, 303 fn. 3. 
939 Galtung, 292. 
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violent.”940 Cultural violence, in its conscience-forming enlistment of ideas, might also be 
understood as ideological violence. 
An example of cultural violence may be found in the conceptualization of racial 
superiority. Such a theory is constructed through pervasive language, media, scientific and 
religious representations that promote the theory of a superior race. Because the idea of a 
superior race becomes accepted and normalized, the concurrent dehumanization of the 
inferiorized race is also accepted and normalized. The acceptance and support of the theory of 
a superior race constitutes cultural violence against those not of the race presented as superior. 
This cultural violence then undergirds the justification and legitimation of acts of structural 
and/or direct violence against the dehumanized “Other.” 
When Galtung places his categories of violence in communication with basic human 
needs, which he identifies as survival, well-being, identity, and freedom,941 the outcome is the 
production of a matrix of how cultural violence appears in symbolic languages of religion, 
ideology, science, etc. (See, Table 7-1 below) 
 
Table 8-1  Violence Matrix 
 Survival Well-Being Identity Freedom 
Direct Killing Maiming, 
Siege, 
Sanctions, 
Misery 
Desocialization, 
Resocialization, 
Secondary 
citizen 
Repression, 
Detention, 
Expulsion 
Structural Exploitation 
A 
Exploitation 
B 
Penetration, 
Segmentation 
Marginalization, 
Fragmentation 
8.4.3.4. Additions to Galtung’s Typological Categories 
The usefulness of Galtung’s typology is that it is not an exhaustive mapping. It provides 
a framework for conceptualizing how violence operates in society. To his categorization of 
direct, structural, and cultural violence, evident in society, racialized and colonial lenses 
produce the additional categories of foundational violence and existential violence. 
                                               
 
940 Galtung, 292. 
941 Prior research of Galtung identified these as primary human needs. See, Johan Galtung, “The Basic 
Needs Approach,” in Human Needs: A Contribution to the Current Debate, ed. Katrin Lederer, Johan Galtung, and 
David Antal, vol. 12, Publication of the Science Center Berlin, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1980), 55–125. 
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 Existential Violence 
 
8.4.3.4.1. Foundational Violence 
Joan Cocks recently augmented Galtung’s taxonomy of violence by elucidating the 
concept of foundational violence, which she determined was not encompassed by Galtung’s 
robust typology. Foundational violence is the term Cocks employs to describe the “secret and 
transparent violence that occurs when a new [political] order of things comes into being.”942 
Following Derrida, Cocks argues that there is a double violence to the founding of political 
sovereignties, such as settler colonial states. First, newly founded sovereignties effectively 
deem themselves Authorities by fiat. “Authority that establishes itself as legitimate has no right 
to do so, since right does not create authority but is created by [the Authority].” 943  The 
installation of Authority, then, as it “inaugurates a new law…always does so in violence. 
                                               
 
942 Joan Cocks, “The Violence of Structures and the Violence of Foundings,” New Political Science 34, no. 
2 (2012): 222, https://doi.org/10.1080/07393148.2012.676400. 
943 Cocks, 223 quoting; Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law,” in Acts of Religion, ed. Gil Anidjar, First ed. 
(New York: Routledge, 2001), 269 (emphasis in original). 
Direct
Known 
perpetrator; 
visible act; 
visible harm
Structural
Unidentified 
perpetrator; 
inequality in 
decision making 
and resource 
allocation
Cultural
Internalization 
process; uses art, 
religion, language, 
etc. shape moral 
norms
Foundational
Politics and 
diplomacy; new 
political order 
obliterates former 
Authority
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Always, which is to say even when there have not been those spectacular genocides, expulsions 
or deportations that so often accompany the foundation of states.”944 
This violence descriptor moves beyond Galtung’s typology in several ways. First, 
where Galtung’s categories hinge on a definition of violence that assumes the difference 
between potential and actual realization of commonly held values of human life, foundational 
violence recognizes that the founding of nations involves “the decimation of one sense of what 
is valuable in life by another, clashing sense.”945 Second, with respect to cultural violence, 
Galtung speaks of the cultural or ideological mystification that the symbolic language of words 
or images employs to veil or sanitize a violent social order. Foundational violence, though, 
acknowledges the cultural violence in the “eradication of one set of meanings animating a way 
of life to clear the ground for another set.” There is a “first-order decimation of meaning-laden 
practices as well as the second-order mystification of the decimation.”946 Third, foundational 
violence requires the replacement of one world by another, which goes beyond the idea of 
structural violence, which entails sustained asymmetrical relationship.947 Finally, Foundational 
violence must be distinguished from Galtung’s typological categories because it “entails not 
only the negative power of destruction but also the positive power involved in creating 
something new, and because the destructive power of foundational violence sometimes occurs 
in “peaceful” guise.”948 The guise of peacefulness and diplomacy is exemplified in the use of 
treaties between the newly authoritative United States and indigenous Indian tribes. Through 
treaties Indian tribes were completely dispossessed of land. “The government’s recognition of 
Indian tribes as sovereign subjects was the necessary condition of their dispossession by 
consent.”949 The treaty was a carrot that allowed the Indian tribes to avoid the stick, which was 
the threat of overwhelming physical force if they did not consent. 
Cocks uses the example of the treaties between the U.S. and Indian tribes to illustrate 
that “peaceful deliberation, contracts between consenting parties, promises of eternal 
friendship, and the reciprocal recognition of sovereign independence are sometimes not the 
                                               
 
944 Cocks, “The Violence of Structures and the Violence of Foundings,” 223 quoting; Derrida, “Force of 
Law,” 269 (emphasis in original). 
945 Cocks, “The Violence of Structures and the Violence of Foundings,” 223. Cocks does allow that this 
difficulty may be avoided by referencing Galtung’s later definition that incorporates human needs criteria. See her 
fn. 88. 
946 Cocks, 224. 
947 Cocks, 224. 
948 Cocks, 224. 
949 Cocks, 226. 
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counter to violence but the form that violence takes.” 950 By demonstrating the aspects of 
difference between foundational violence and the violence categories determined by Galtung, 
Cocks has revealed an additional means by which violence often exists without violence.951 
The conception of foundational violence is significant to understanding 
modernity/coloniality’s underlying violations. 
8.4.3.4.2. Existential Violence 
Building upon the taxonomy of violence theorized by Galtung, and supplemented by 
Cocks, a final additional mode of violence may be named, that is existential violence. 
Existential violence operates through the dialectic of anti-Black racialization. It may be 
understood as an intersecting of direct, structural, cultural, and foundational violences, in and 
through the construction of race, which results in the alteration and diminishment of the 
ontology of Black being. 
8.4.3.4.2.1. Žižek and Black Inferiority 
Slavoj Žižek has posited that one’s “being” is a socio-symbolic being. Thus, when 
Black being is treated as racially inferior to White being, actual inferiority is created at the level 
of Blacks’ “socio-symbolic identity.”952  White racist ideology “is not merely an interpretation 
of what blacks are, but an interpretation that determines the very being and social existence of 
the interpreted subjects.” 953  White racist ideology, Žižek argues, “exerts a performative 
efficiency”; it inferiorizes Blacks.954 
8.4.3.4.2.2. Fanon and Black Inferiority 
Žižek’s intuiting of an inferiorization of Black being echoes sentiments expressed by 
Frantz Fanon. In Black Skin White Masks, 955  Fanon articulates the internalization of the 
existentialist violence of colonialism (where colonialism serves as a hueristic for race 
contestations, wherein colonials are Europeans or Whites, and the colonized are natives, or 
Blacks). He reveals the compound and intersectional nature of the violences committed against 
Black/colonized persons. 
                                               
 
950 Cocks, 226–27. 
951 Cocks, 226. 
952 Slavoj. Žižek, Violence : Six Sideways Reflections (New York: Picador, 2008), 72. 
953 Žižek, 72. 
954 Žižek, 72. 
955 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, trans. Richard Philcox, Revised edition (New York : Berkeley, 
Calif.: Grove Press, 2008). 
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Fanon differs from Žižek in that he does not explicitly articulate a theory of ontological 
being. However, he does, in some sense, adopt this view in his writing. Fanon recounts the 
dimensions of said violence by detailing the idea of superiority/inferiority that exists and 
operates in White and Black persons, respectively. 
Fanon contests the psychological theory, propounded by a European, that the condition 
of an inferiority complex in adult colonized natives is related to the natives’ individual 
childhood disposition. On the contrary, says Fanon, “[t]he feeling of inferiority of the colonized 
is the correlative to the European’s feeling of superiority. Let us have the courage to say it 
outright: It is the racist who creates his inferior.” 956  Thus, he makes real the inferiority 
experienced by the colonized, and concludes that it is a construction of Europeans. 
Fanon goes on to describe incidents of the superiorizing and inferiorizing that is enacted 
along racial lines. He speaks as a Black subject of French colonialism and personalizes 
inferiorization and his correlative distress: 
Understand, my dear boy, color prejudice is something I find 
utterly foreign. . . . But of course, come in, sir, there is no color 
prejudice among us. . . . Quite, the Negro is a man like 
ourselves. . . . It is not because he is black that he is less 
intelligent than we are. . . . I had a Senegalese buddy in the 
army who was really clever. . . . 
 
Where am I to be classified? Or, if you prefer, tucked away? 
[Fanon’s reaction to the White reaction to himself.] 
 
A Martinican, a native of ‘our’ old colonies. 
 
Where shall I hide? 
 
Look at the nigger!. . . Mama, a Negro!. . . Hell, he’s getting 
mad. . . . Take no notice, sir, he does not know that you are as 
civilized as we. . . . 
 
My body was given back to me sprawled out, distorted, 
recolored, clad in mourning in that white winter day. The 
Negro is an animal, the Negro is bad, the Negro is mean, the 
Negro is ugly; look, a nigger, it’s cold, the nigger is shivering, 
the nigger is shivering because he is cold, the little boy is 
trembling because he is afraid of the nigger, the nigger is 
shivering with cold, that cold that goes through your bones, the 
handsome little boy is trembling because he thinks that the 
                                               
 
956 Fanon, 69 (emphasis in original). 
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nigger is quivering with rage, the little white boy throws 
himself into his mother’s arms: Mama, the nigger’s going to 
eat me up.957 
Fanon demonstrates how mundane daily interactions function violently against the Black 
psyche because of superiorizing and inferiorizing.  
Returning to the typology of Galtung, the compound and intersectional nature of the 
violences imposed are clear. The presumption of a superiority, and the production of an 
inferiority, and of an inferiority complex, arises through personal exchange. It may be 
characterized as a psychological wounding. Thus, the inferiorization, through personal 
exchange, constitutes personal (or direct) violence, whether intentional or unintentional. 
However, inferiorization is also built into the structure of society, thus it is structural violence. 
It reflects a moral outlook, shaped culturally by language, historicity, and science, that accepts 
superior and inferior racial difference, supports superior and inferior racial difference, and does 
not see, invisibilizes, the harms evident and resulting from superior and inferior racially ordered 
social systems. Thus, it is culturally violent.  
The inferiorization also rests upon foundational violence. In the colonial world, the 
authority of the colonizer occurred as a consequence of the erasure of the pre-existing order. 
As Fanon states,  
The black man has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the 
white man. Overnight the Negro has been given two frames of 
reference within which he has had to place himself. His 
metaphysics, or, less pretentiously, his customs and the sources 
on which they were based, were wiped out because they were 
in conflict with a civilization that he did not know and that 
imposed itself on him.958 
Here Fanon notes the ways the sign-making myth-making cultures of Black persons were 
eviscerated through the colonial encounter. Importantly, Fanon moves here from discussion of 
purely psychic harm to ontological harm to Black personhood. 
Both Žižek and Fanon describe an internal diminishment to the inner and psychic being 
of Black persons. Fanon’s comment about ontological vulnerability expresses the described 
condition well. Through the experience of multiple violences directed against the 
colonized/Black person, inferiorization, an existential diminishing, can become constitutive of 
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Black being. Existenatial violence accounts for the effect of the compounded violations to the 
the Black/colonized person that are not registered in any single category of violence previously 
identified. 
8.4.4. Conclusion 
A typological description of violence, then, has several manifestations. It includes 
direct acts that cause a diminishing of one’s experience in the body or mind, indirect structural 
acts of such diminution, internalized acceptance of and support for such acts of diminished life 
experience, and, also,  acts of obliteration and pretense connected to founding political entities. 
It encompasses all of these violences together as they relate to Black life, in its diminishing 
psychic impact. 
8.5. The Violence of Cultural Hegemony 
Now that the terrain of violence has been mapped, the chapter turns to an examination 
of the ways in which violence has operated in society to do harm to women, the colonized, and 
to Black persons. 
8.5.1. Cultural Hegemony Violates Women 
As amply demonstrated in feminist theory generally, women have been conceived 
historically solely in reference to, and as a counterpoint to, men, who were the default and norm 
of humanity. The woman had no ontology in herself but was that which was not-man, other-
than the man.959 Not only was woman the other, but she was the subordinate other to man. The 
governing idea throughout the ages was that woman lacked comparable rationality to man, 
rationality being understood as the definitive characteristic of human beings. Because of 
woman’s deficient capacity for rationality, women were deemed to be inherently and 
essentially different and lesser humans. This background demonstrates the manner in which 
the ontological integrity of the woman was violated as a matter of intellectual and quasi-
scientific fact, and established as the hegemonic norm. 
Daly has pointed out the unchallenged misogyny in theology, “from Augustine to 
Aquinas, to Luther, to Kant, to Barth.”960 She asserts that women have been alienated from 
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their deepest identities, and have accepted this alienation in return for the security found in 
accepting very limited identities. What is needed, Daly argues, is the confrontation of the 
human threat of nonbeing, which patriarchal social structures have made particularly 
debilitating for women.961  
Ackermann agrees with Daly’s theological assessment of misogyny in the tradition. She 
concludes that as a result, some women have internalized the oppressed image to such an extent 
“that they are unaware of being deprived.”962 Others are unable to feel whole. The feeling of 
guilt has become “the basic problem of woman’s existence.”963  
“This confrontation with the anxiety of nonbeing is revelatory, 
making possible the relativization of structures that are seen as 
human products, and therefore not absolute and 
ultimate…Courage to be is the key to the revelatory of the 
feminist revolution.”964 
In addition to existential diminishment, women have been subject to political 
compromise. Pateman describes the violation of political subjectivity that was inflicted upon 
women. According to Pateman, the Enlightenment project is not properly understood as 
inaugurating a “social contract,” but rather a half-social half-sexual contract. This half-social, 
half-sexual contract was ostensibly meant to bring about an era of freedom from the structure 
of paternal control for all adults. However, the actual political effect of the advent of the era of 
the freedom of man, was that woman became more subordinated.  
Civil freedom is not universal. Civil freedom is a masculine 
attribute and depends upon patriarchal right. The sons overturn 
paternal rule not merely to gain their liberty but to secure 
women for themselves. Their success in this endeavor is 
chronicled in the story of the sexual contract. The original pact 
is a sexual as well as a social contract: it is sexual in the sense 
of patriarchal - that is; the contract establishes men's political 
right over women - and also sexual in the sense of establishing 
orderly access by men to women's bodies. The original contract 
creates what I shall call, following Adrienne Rich, 'the law of 
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male sex-right'. Contract…is the means through which modern 
patriarchy is constituted.965 
Pateman’s argument is that the woman became politically compromised through the man’s 
claim of freedom. Woman was no longer subordinate to her father, similarly to her male 
siblings, but was now deliberately subordinated to the fraternity of men generally. 
This lack of an autonomous existence, the ontological diminishment, and the 
installation of women in a subordinated place in the social order, reflects a hegemonic cultural 
condition that constitutes the normalcy of violence without violence directed against women. 
Male cultural hegemony created the condition of inequality--patriarchy--and continues to 
uphold and defend the status quo of the freedom of men being predicated upon the domination 
of women. Women are normatively enjoined from the freedom enjoyed by men in civil society 
to fully actualize their personhood. 
8.5.2. Cultural Hegemony Furthers the Violations of Colonialism966 
Peruvian sociologist Anibal Quijano introduced the concept of “coloniality,” as the 
“invisible and constitutive side of ‘modernity.”967 It was the legacy of the period of colonialism 
that thrived between the 16th and 18th centuries. By coloniality Quijano referred primarily to 
two axes of power that arose in the “space/time” called America. One axis was the difference 
between the conquered and the conqueror along differences of “race,” which included natural 
notions of superiority and inferiority. The other, intersecting, axis was a “new structure of 
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control of labour and its resources and slavery, serfdom, [and] small independent commodity 
production” on the basis of capital and world market.968 
This [race/labor] articulation was constitutively colonial, based 
on first the assignment of all forms of unpaid labor to colonial 
races (originally American Indians, blacks, and, in a more 
complex way, mestizos) in America and, later on, to the 
remaining colonized races in the rest of the world, olives and 
yellows. Second, labor was controlled through the assignment 
of salaried labor to the colonizing whites.969 
The race/labour colonial axis resulted in capital acquiring a social and geographic 
identification, which was concentrated in Europe, or the West, among Europeans, or Whites. 
Consequently, Europe and Europeans “constituted themselves as the centre of the capitalist 
world economy… Global capitalism was, from then on, colonial/modern and Euro-centred.”970  
The centralized control of capital led to the domination of political and cultural 
development. New geocultural identities were assigned. “America” and “Europe” emerged, 
then later “Africa,” “Asia” and, finally, “Oceania.” Control was effected in three ways. First, 
cultural practice that was deemed useful was appropriated from the colony to the European 
centre. Second, colonized forms of knowledge production, symbolic universes, and meaning 
making were violently repressed. Third, the colonized were forced to submit to and learn 
European culture in furtherance of reproducing European domination. “Europe’s hegemony 
over the new model of global power concentrated all forms of the control of subjectivity, 
culture, and especially knowledge and the production of knowledge under its hegemony.”971 
The encounter with between the colonized and the colonizer was necessarily violent. 
Aimee Cesaire’s description in his Discourse on Colonialism, provided here at length, offers a 
clear and comprehensive encapsulation: 
…[C]olonization = "thing-ification."  
…They talk to me about progress, about "achievements," 
diseases cured, improved standards of living. 
I am talking about societies drained of their essence, cultures 
trampled underfoot, institutions undermined, lands confiscated, 
religions smashed, magnificent artistic creations destroyed, 
extraordinary possibilities wiped out.  
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They throw facts at my head, statistics, mileages of roads, 
canals, and railroad tracks. 
I am talking about thousands of men sacrificed to the Congo-
Ocean. I am talking about those who, as I write this, are 
digging the harbor of Abidjan by hand. I am talking about 
millions of men torn from their gods, their land, their habits, 
their life-from life, from the dance, from wisdom. 
I am talking about millions of men in whom fear has been 
cunningly instilled, who have been taught to have an inferiority 
complex, to tremble, kneel, despair, and behave like 
flunkeys…. 
They pride themselves on abuses eliminated.  
I too talk about abuses, but what I say is that on the old ones - 
very real - they have superimposed others - very detestable. 
They talk to me about local tyrants brought to reason; but I note 
that in general the old tyrants get on very well with the new 
ones, and that there has been established between them, to the 
detriment of the people, a circuit of mutual services and 
complicity.972 
Césaire identifies violence as a part of the founding of the colonies; brutality in daily 
encounters; relations of domination and submission. He identifies the “thing-ification” of the 
being of the colonized; culture erased, lands confiscated, populations displaced, and economies 
destroyed. In all, a totalizing violation against the individuals and communities that have been 
the objects of colonization.973 
What Césaire describes as “thing-ification,” was a fundamental aspect of European 
hegemony within the colony. It was construction of a temporality that deemed the colonized to 
be inferior-raced, “Othered,” peoples belonging to a “past,” while the modern and the rational 
were exclusively European. The categories of difference that were assigned included, “East-
West, primitive-civilized, magic/mythic-scientific, irrational-rational, traditional-modern--
Europe and not-Europe.”974 Thus, a circularity of power could be understood: knowledge 
equalled European, which equalled colonial dominance, which equalled global hegemony, 
which equalled control of knowledge.  
Scholars of Indigenous Studies go further in making a distinction between colonialism 
and settler-colonialism, in practice and in post-colonial decolonization discourse. Veracini, 
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who founded the journal Settler Colonial Studies, makes the distinction clear. He identifies that 
for the colonizer it is possible for the native to remain; even for some colonized persons to 
become more privileged than others. The colonizer’s aim of “you work for me,” allows for this 
structuring. Yet, the colonizer knows “‘that the most favoured colonized will never be anything 
but colonized people’ and that ‘certain rights will forever be refused them’.”975 The settler-
colonial, on the other hand, does not have the aim of creating labourers, but the aim that 
indigenous people should “go away.” “The successful settler colonies ‘tame’ a variety of 
wildernesses, end up establishing independent nations, effectively repress, co-opt, and 
extinguish indigenous alterities. By the end of this trajectory, they claim to be no longer settler 
colonial.”976 The distinction lies, ultimately, in that “colonialism reinforces the distinction 
between colony and metropole, settler colonialism erases it.” 977  The distinction has 
implications for the violence that is enacted by the (settler-)colonial against the native, as well 
as the reactions of the indigenous to the violence that they face.  
If the fundamental demand is for labour, opposition must aim 
to withhold it (or to sustain an agency that could allow 
withholding it)…multiple resistential strategies and their 
combination are possible: direct anticolonial attack, sabotage, 
self-mutilation, insubordination, evasion, non-compliance, 
ostensible collaboration, mimicry, just to name a few. If the 
demand, by contrast, is to go away, it is indigenous persistence 
and survival that become crucial.978 
Thus, Veracini points out that direct action might be called for to resist colonial demands for 
labour, but simple survival might be the goal against settler-colonial attempts to eliminate the 
indigenous. 
Quijano also describes an after-life of coloniality; the entrenched patterns of power that 
remain after the official ending of colonial political regimes. These patterns encompass culture, 
labour, economics, and knowledge production. Coloniality shapes the knowledge of the self-
image of formerly colonized peoples. As Maldonado-Torres states, “modernity as a discourse 
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and as a practice would not be possible without coloniality, and coloniality continues to be an 
inevitable outcome of modern discourses.”979 
In recognition of the continuing effects of coloniality, a counter-hegemonic 
periodization has been introduced to rebut the notion of the end of colonialism and its violations 
of the colonized. Neil Lazarus suggests designation of the periods of colonial, postcolonial, 
and neo-colonial to situate the relationship between the West and the constructed non-West. 
He argues that this will allow the perpetually bankrupted moral justifications for Western 
interventions abroad to be made visible.980 Wallerstein explains the justifications referenced by 
Lazarus as including, the 16th century’s “evangelizing” mission to the Americas, the 19th 
century’s “civilizing” mission in Africa,  the 20th century’s “development” mission in the 
global south, and the 21st century’s mission of “human rights and democracy” globally.981  
Veracini argues that such recurring interventions and depredations, are the result of a 
decolonization that displaces colonialism rather than settler-colonialism. When the colonizer 
is expelled, such as in the case of colonial decolonization, the displacement is theoretical. “[I]n 
practice structural inequalities remain.”982 Further, the possibility of a colonial return is always 
there. However, a settler-colonial decolonization must take place where the colonizer remains 
and lives under the new social order, wherein land and resources return to indigenous control, 
and indigenous ways of life and indigenous sovereignty is privileged. The colonizer must be 
reformed from being a colonizer. To this end “the struggle against settler colonialism must aim 
to keep the settler-indigenous relationship ongoing.”983 Because there has been an insufficient 
or non-existent effort at reforming the colonizer and the colonizing relationship in many places, 
exploitations of the formerly-colonized are ongoing. 
As Sexton concludes: 
Democratizing the settler colony as belatedly enfranchised 
citizens and subjects, or simply creating distance between 
colonizer and colonized without cancelling both terms, is to 
forfeit the possibility of genuine freedom for all while 
contributing to the destruction of ‘the lands, waters, and 
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ecosystems upon which [native] people [and ultimately all life] 
must survive’.”984 
When the colonial period ended in the mid-20th century, amidst “insurgent demands for 
decolonization and self-determination,”985 and after the apartheid period ended in the late-20th 
century, hegemonic discourse shifted. Democratic rule was embraced for all--as long as the 
resulting democracy was open to outsider intervention. Outsider intervention, however, often 
created new issues and struggles that elicited even greater outside intervention from the West.  
As Western hegemonic discourse becomes disenchanted with democratic notions of 
majority rule, another shift has transpired. In the interest of creating flourishing free markets, 
neoliberalism has become the newest iteration of European hegemonic discourse, advocated 
by those in universities, think tanks, media, corporations, and state agencies like treasury 
departments and central banks. The influential institutions representing global finance and 
trade, i.e., the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization, have 
been staunch proponents of neoliberalism, dictating terms calling for deregulation, 
privatization, and withdrawal of the state from provision of social benefits.986 Such policies 
often result in dire consequences for those who live in entrenched poverty in the former 
colonies. 
The effects of colonization, as well as the effects of neo-colonialist neoliberal policies, 
have had devastating impact on those in colonized regions. This impact, however, is deemed 
by those in the mainstream as non-violent. It is sought to be preserved, by means of force if 
necessary, by the normed middle-class, White, (male) citizen of the West. 
8.5.3. Cultural Hegemony Fosters Anti-Black Racism 
The body of literature detailing the anti-Black nature of modernity is vast and 
continually growing. One of the most cogent categories of explanation of the violations that 
have accrued against Black life, within modernity’s cultural norms, has been articulated within 
the category of thought known as Afro-pessimism.  
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8.5.3.1. Orlando Patterson and Social Death 
Afro-pessimism builds upon the work of sociologist Orlando Patterson. In his important 
book Slavery and Social Death, Patterson reframes the conceptualization of slavery. While 
slavery has historically often been accounted for in terms of (forced) labour relations, Patterson 
argues that it is more accurately understood as a relation of property. The slave herself, not 
merely her labour-power, as with the worker, is made an object or a commodity to be used or 
exchanged. In this way the slave is excluded from the category of human.  
Slavery, for Patterson, entails a “social death,” which is constituted by “the permanent, 
violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonoured persons.”987 Several issues 
are key to this definition. First, slavery was permanent and inherently violent. It was a perpetual 
and inheritable designation. Initially in the British colonies in the Americas there was little 
difference between White and Black laborers. White indentured persons were referred to both 
as servants and slaves interchangeably. Ultimately, however, the “Otherness” of those who 
were not White, English, Christian, or free, resulted in them being vested with the 
distinguishing mark of perpetual and inheritable servitude.988 The permanent status of “slave” 
required and was maintained by an intrinsic and gratuitous violence against the “slave.” 
Violence was existentially and physically wielded as the “person” was transmuted into a 
“slave.” Violence was further necessary to maintain the “slave” in the condition of slavery, and 
to maintain the institution of slavery itself.989  
The corollary of the permanence of the designation of “slave,” is the second key 
characteristic of the definition: permanent enslavement was possible because of the “slave’s” 
natal alienation. Patterson argues that loss of natal claims to parents and community, and 
without claims to pass on to one’s own children, is what allowed the master to claim lifetime 
power over enslaved persons.990  Slavery’s violation entailed the slave losing “ties of birth in 
both ascending and descending generations…[it was an] alienation from all formal, legally 
enforceable ties of “blood,” and from any attachment to groups or localities other than those 
chosen for him by the master.”991 
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The third key characteristic was the “general dishonour” inflicted upon the slave. Slaves 
were always persons who were dishonoured in a generalized way, “because of…the indignity 
and all pervasiveness of his indebtedness, his absence of any independent social existence, but 
most of all because he was without power except through another....[The slave] had…no public 
worth. He had no name of his own to defend. He could only defend his master’s worth and his 
master’s name.” 992  General dishonour for the slave involved the slave’s social stigma 
independent of conduct.  
Patterson also describes the manner in which the attribution of dishonour in the slave 
is directly related to the ascription of honour to the master.993 Violation of the dignity of Black 
life was fundamental to securing the dignity of White life. Indeed, Patterson shows that cultural 
formation stagnated where White life could not be ascribed as honourable through the 
degradation of Black life. In societies where there was no class of free White witnesses of the 
dishonour of slaves, but only a class of masters and a class of slaves, the masters either 
abandoned claims of honour, and lived as the master in degraded slave conditions, or the master 
returned to an imperial centre and, by ostentatious display of wealth, secured the desired honour 
of the master class.994 
This analysis resonates with the paper’s argument that Jesus’s teaching was intended to 
address issues of shame and honour, and reflects the perennial relevance of such a heuristic. 
8.5.3.2. Social Death Outside of Enslavement 
The concept of race, physically and juridically, became entrenched in the U.S., as well 
as in colonized lands outside the West. Though permanence of servitude and natal alienation 
ceased as determinative characteristics of Black life, Black life would continue to be 
characterized by existential violence of dehumanization, physically violent control 
mechanisms, and general dishonour. The conceptualization of free Black life as social death 
remained appropriate. 
Following the demise of the slave trade and slavery in the 19th century Western world, 
freedom, as that term is normatively politically understood, did not seamlessly follow for the 
formerly enslaved. While formerly enslaved persons did experience an improvement in their 
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social condition, vestiges of an imputed diminished humanity remained. As Sadiya Hartmann 
makes clear: 
It is not…that the differences between slavery and freedom 
were negligible; certainly such an assertion would be 
ridiculous. [Yet, one must] examine the shifting and 
transformed relations of power that brought about the re-
subordination of the emancipated, the control and domination 
of the free black population, and the persistent production of 
blackness as abject, threatening, servile, dangerous, dependent, 
irrational, and infectious. In short, the advent of freedom 
marked the transition from the pained and minimally sensate 
existence of the slave to the burdened individuality of the 
responsible and encumbered freed person.995 
Hartman notes that the end of enslavement shifted the contours of Black diminishment, rather 
than relieved the Black person of the diminishment. 
Saidiya Hartmann’s most recent book project examines how the violation of slavery 
continue into the present day. 
If slavery persists as an issue in the political life of black 
America, it is not because of an antiquarian obsession with 
bygone days or the burden of a too long memory, but because 
black lives are still imperilled and devalued by a racial calculus 
and a political arithmetic that were entrenched centuries ago. 
This is the afterlife of slavery—skewed life chances, limited 
access to health and education, premature death, incarceration, 
and impoverishment. I, too, am the afterlife of slavery.996 
8.5.3.3. Afro-pessimism 
From the period of the Enlightenment, culturally hegemonic ideals have privileged the 
notions of liberty, equality, and human dignity.997 However, arising as they did within a context 
of gender exclusion, anti-Black racialization, and colonial subjugation, these normative ideals 
mask the reality of both their non-applicability to broad segments of the population, and their 
inherent violation of those who were excluded from being recognized as “subjects” who might 
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be possessed of the dignity and liberty that were considered core elements of the universal 
notion of the meaning of human being (“man”).998 
Because Black life has been violently dehumanized, controlled, dishonoured, 
“Othered,” and, thus, imprinted with social death, via the functioning of the normal, ostensibly 
non-violent political apparatus of state, Afro-pessimism presents a pessimistic theorization of 
race. 999  Led by critical theorists Frank Wilderson and Jared Sexton, 1000  Afropessimism 
radically posits that the violence/anti-Blackness of the political structure is irredeemable. It 
argues that anti-Black violence is an integral part of the very structure of society, and that 
societal systems can be understood only as corollaries to anti-Blackness. As has been noted, 
the violence of antiblackness produces black existence; there is 
no prior positive blackness that could be potentially 
appropriated. Black existence is simultaneously produced and 
negated by racial domination, both as presupposition and 
consequence. Affirmation of blackness proves to be impossible 
without simultaneously affirming the violence that structures 
black subjectivity itself.1001 
Thus, the systematic nature of the disenfranchisement, dispossession, and killing of 
Black life, is not merely evidence of a flawed system, but such oppression is constitutive of the 
political, economic, and justice systems themselves. Afro-pessimism argues that society as it 
is should not be preserved or reformed, since reform requires reliance upon an anti-Black 
legitimizing norm, and constitutes displaced hope in institutions—schools, courts, prisons, 
churches, etc.—that foster and sustain anti-Blackness. “Afro-pessimism posits that the only 
way out is to negate that negation [of Black life].”1002 
                                               
 
998 Sylvia Wynter maps the development of the human being explicitly construed as “Man.” See, Wynter, 
“Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/ Power/ Truth/ Freedom.” 
999 Sexton notes the hostile with which the pessimistic theorization of race has been greeted; “the felt 
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1001 R.L., “Wanderings of the Slave: Black Life and Social Death,” Mute, June 5, 2013, 
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1002 “Introduction,” in Afro-Pessimism: An Introduction (Minneapolis, MN: Racked and Dispatched, 2017), 8–
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Significantly, Afro-pessimism positions the Black being at the centre of analysis as 
uniquely constituted, even with respect to other persons of colour. This is not to construct a 
hierarchy of oppression. This is the assertion that Black being exists as a dehumanized 
conceptual object, unlike any other. Wilderson argues that the reason for this distinction is two 
fold. First, the difference of Blackness (and slavery) is that the violence of modernity against 
Black life is without utility or rationale;1003 it is intrinsic violence.1004 Where non-Black post-
colonial subjects are concerned, violence has been inflicted “to secure and maintain the 
occupation of land.”1005 Under a Marxist paradigm, violence against the working class is “to 
secure and maintain the extraction of surplus-value and the wage.”1006 Against indigenous 
peoples, violence is a means of “usurpation of cartography, of space.”1007 From a feminist 
perspective, society’s violence against women may be understood as a means of securing and 
maintaining patriarchal control. 1008  This is not the case, however, with Black persons. 
“Violence against Black people is a mechanism for the usurpation of subjectivity, of life, of 
being.”1009  
Making a second point about the distinction of violence against Black being, Wilderson 
goes further. He postulates that the violence that is intrinsic to the making of the non-being of 
the Black is necessary for the psychic well-being, and the epistemological security, of the 
collective unconscious of the non-Black community.1010 (This is similar to the argument made 
by Patterson regarding slavery, that the honour of the master is directly related to the dishonour 
in the slave.) Wilderson illustrates the point anecdotally, referencing film and history. In the 
film Twelve Years a Slave, he states, the beating of the slave Patsy, is made to look like 
“ordinary sadism and jealousy on the wife’s part and so it actually almost becomes a…love 
triangle.” However, in the book, “the violence against the slaves…actually has no utility, it has 
                                               
 
1003 “Blacks and the Master/Slave Relation,” in Afro-Pessimism: An Introduction (Minneapolis, MN: Racked 
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no rationale.”1011 He then recalls the four hundred or so plantations that formerly existed in 
California between Berkeley and San Jose, one of which his father was from. On the 
plantations, entire families--children, wives, and husbands--would “all participate in the 
regular beating of slaves…It sustains the psychic health of the people…”1012 
To argue for an Afro-pessimistic unique situatedness of Blackness is also to 
acknowledge the life- and dignity-stealing violence perpetuated against Black being singularly 
by all other persons in society.1013 It is a violence that erases the Black being in a way that 
others are not erased. 
Wilderson discusses the discrepancy between the life of violated Blackness and that of 
non-Blackness in the context of the freedom struggle in South Africa. Wilderson is an African-
American who lived and worked in South Africa, and with the ANC, between 1989 and 
1996.1014 Immersed in the culture, he gained insight on the political, economic, and social 
climate during the last days of Apartheid. He writes of a particular incident in 1992, “not long 
after the massacre at Boipatong.”1015 A member of the COSATU central committee, a member 
each from the ANC and NEC, together with Ronnie Kasrils, white ANC member and a leader 
of MK, co-chaired a Tripartite Alliance Rolling Mass Action meeting in Johannesburg. There 
were eighty to ninety Black South Africans, and five or ten White or Indian South Africans 
present. Wilderson was the sole African-American delegate. He notes the anxiety and quiet 
tension evident in Kasrils body as the extended period of loud, aggressive singing went on, 
with the refrains of “Chris Hani is our shield! Socialism is our shield! Kill the Farmer Kill the 
Boer!”1016 Wilderson describes Kasrils’ distorted face as being “pulled by opposing needs—
the need to bring the state to heel and the need to manage the Blacks.” A plan was brought 
forward to drive a fleet of buses filled with demonstrators to the border of the Ciskei, to hold a 
rally, and then forcibly march through the erected fence and liberate the people inside the 
“homeland.” The meeting co-chairs became concerned, Wilderson reports. After conferring 
together in whispers, Kasrils left the room and returned with an intelligence report “that should 
                                               
 
1011 “Blacks and the Master/Slave Relation,” 24. 
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1013 “Introduction,” 12. 
1014 Frank B. Wilderson, “Biko and the Problematic of Presence,” in Biko Lives!: Contesting the Legacies of 
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give us pause.” If such a mass action occurred, Kasrils informed the group, General Joshua 
Oupa Gqozo would open fire with live ammunition. 
To Comrade Kasrils’ horror the room erupts in cheers and 
applause. This, I am thinking, as I join the cheering and the 
singing, is not the response his “intelligence” was meant to 
elicit.1017 
What the episode made clear for Wilderson was the fundamental difference of absence 
to Blackness, that non-Black persons do not experience. He says, 
The divergence of our joy and what appeared to be his anxiety 
was expressed as divergent structures of feeling that I believe to 
be…symptomatic of irreconcilable differences in how and 
where Blacks are positioned, ontologically, in relation to non-
Blacks…Perhaps the bullets that were promised us did not 
manifest within our psyches as lethal deterrents because they 
were manifested as gifts; rare gifts of 
recognition…acknowledgment that we did form an ensemble of 
Human capacity instead of a collection of kaffirs or a bunch of 
niggers. We experienced a transcendent impossibility: A 
moment of Blackness-as-Presence in a world overdetermined 
by Blackness-as-Absence.1018 
Wilderson states is that it was not a death wish, but the prospect of being seen, even as 
a threat warranting death, that elicited the joy in the room. Being seen, even negatively, was 
preferable to being the unseen and the absent. He concludes that: 
a threat [of death] in response to the gesture of our collective—
our “living”—will, made us feel as though we were alive, as 
though we possessed what in fact we could not possess, Human 
life, as opposed to Black life (which is always already 
“substitutively dead,” “a fatal way of being alive”)—we could 
die because we lived.1019 
The violence of the society that unsees and marks as absent, is a violence that is unique 
to Black being. Thus, the argument that Black being must be centred in conceptualizing the 
marginalization of the Other gains purchase. 
Afro-pessimist theory is engaged here as it represents an unflinching willingness to 
name and to intellectually confront the cultural hegemonic violence embedded in society, that 
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cannot be appreciated without interrogation of the imagination that created racial slavery in 
modernity and the construction of Black being. Further, the foundation discussion of slavery 
and social death provides insight for the subject of the next chapter, which concerns a 
metaphysical account of the violation to the human will of the Black person, which has so far 
been named as a psychological and existential/ontological violence. The discussion of anti-
Blackness of culture demonstrates a violence against Blackness that is made to embed the 
thinking, feeling, and being of Black persons, and also the thinking, feeling, and being of White 
persons who enact, maintain, and are mystified as to the violence. The history of Black people 
that continues to bear vestiges of inferiority and to expose them to psychic and physical trauma 
must not fail to be recognized as intrinsic violence. 
8.5.3.4. Anti-Blackness, Afropessimism and the Black Theological 
Tradition 
To make explicit the connection between Afropessimist theory and theology, it is 
important here to recognize the ways in which the tradition of Black theology has understood 
and responded to the anti-Blackness of modernity. Further, to explicate the ways in which 
Afropessimism is the most recent iteration, and inevitable terminus, of theologies of Black life. 
8.5.3.4.1. Origins of Black Theology 
Black Theology, or theologies of Black life must, first, be understood as those that arise 
out of the experiences of those who have been raced as Black. Its origins must, then, be situated 
in the geographies where the transmutation to Black beingness occurred; it must begin with the 
experience of former Africans in the Americas. Understanding Black theology in the Americas 
requires, further, acknowledgement of the impact of the intertwining forces of Christianity and 
geopolitics on the construction of Blackness. Because Brazil, the Caribbean, and the U.S. were 
predominant sites of Black disembarkation from slave ships, and because, these sites were 
variously controlled by the Spanish, Dutch, English, and French, and because the practice of 
trading in human cargo spanned several centuries, the experiences of Blacks in the Americas 
varies widely. It is clear, however, that throughout the disparate locales and eras, that enslaved 
existence entailed fatal toil, and also resistance to captivity.  
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Resistance of the enslaved was evident throughout the period of captivity. From slave 
ship suicide, to plantation escape and marronage,1020 to full scale rebellion and insurrection,1021 
there was an impetus to escape bondage. Acts of freedom-seeking evidence a belief system, 
whether or not related to faith in the Christian God, that upholds the sanctity of humanness as 
entailing free being. The Christian conception of freeness as part of the imago dei was, thus, 
incarnated in the actions of enslaved persons; actions that were considered transgressive of 
juridical laws of the day, but that were driven by the human will to be free. 
The connection between the acts of the enslaved and Christian theology were made 
explicit when Christian abolition was joined to the struggle of the enslaved in resisting the 
practice of human enslavement. During the first Great Awakening there were larger 
conversions of Africans to Christianity than in times preceding the evangelicalism of the Great 
Awakening.1022 The enslaved adapted evangelical Christianity to suit their circumstances. They 
“[made] Christianity their own, developing a liberation theology that identified with the 
enslaved Israelites as the chosen people of God and the story of the exodus.”1023 Sinha has 
demonstrated1024 that the actions of the enslaved Christians shaped the abolition movement and 
dictated its goals. Enslaved and formerly enslaved Black Christians, as well as Whites, used 
scripture to elucidate the evils of slavery and to Christianize the cause of ending slavery.  
Rejecting the disparate treatment received within denominational settings, seeking 
dignity, Blacks founded their own Christian denominations. Later, after slavery’s legal end in 
the U.S., leaders such as Henry McNeal Turner (1834-1915), continued to push for equal 
treatment using arguments rooted in Christian doctrine. Turner, “used the scriptural mandate 
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for justice one finds in the Hebrew Bible and the teachings of Jesus the Christ in the New 
Testament to fight against modern injustice. Turner critiqued white and African American 
Christians alike who did not actively pursue a transformed society.”1025 Throughout the post-
civil war and civil rights eras, there was resistance (alongside of accommodation1026) in the 
ethos of the Black church,1027 which differed from the ethos of the Christianity practiced by 
Whites. 
8.5.3.4.2. Formal Black Theology 
8.5.3.4.2.1. Howard Thurman 
The immensely influential mystic and theologian, Howard Thurman (1899–1981) 
expressed the Black/White Christian theological divide in a comment to Ghandi in the 1930s 
during a journey to India: “I make a careful distinction between Christianity [as practiced by 
Whites] and the religion of Jesus.”1028 Thurman’s work of explicating his “religion of Jesus,” 
in Jesus and the Disinherited,1029 indeed serves as a bridge across both the different racialized 
understandings of the Christian faith, and a bridge between the informal constructive theologies 
of earlier centuries of Black religious thought and twentieth century constructions of Black 
Christian theology. For Thurman, the biblical narratives present a Jesus with three predominate 
characteristics: Jesus was Jewish, Jesus was poor, and Jesus was a member of the group of 
oppressed Palestinians under Roman imperial rule. Thurman’s Jesus preached a gospel of the 
kingdom of God that sought to transform the inner being of the oppressed, so that, transformed, 
they might impact the larger Roman world. Inner transformation, and focus on sacrificial love 
and redemptive suffering, in furtherance of the ultimate good of building of community, was 
key to Thurman’s theology. Thurman’s bridging gospel empathized Christology (of Jesus’s 
lowly estate) and ecclesiology (of community between the disinherited and the privileged) as 
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hallmarks of the Christian good news. The liberative work of the gospel was primarily the work 
of inner liberation from mental bondage. 
8.5.3.4.2.2. James Cone 
Publication of James H. Cone’s seminal Black Theology and Black Power1030 in 1969, 
and A Black Theology of Liberation1031 in 1970, was a late-twentieth century extension of the 
Black Christian tradition of constructive theology. Writing in a post-Martin Luther King, Jr. 
context of Black Power protest, Cone became the first professional Black theologian of 
liberation, making links between Black oppression and the Christian scriptural mandate against 
oppression. For Cone, the heart of the message of the Bible is that God, through Jesus, is 
principally concerned with the liberation of the materially poor in society, which, in 
contemporary application, meant that Jesus primarily offered a message of liberation to Blacks. 
God so strongly identified with the oppressed, argued Cone, that God becomes one with the 
oppressed. Cone asserted, therefore, that ultimately, God, and Jesus, must be understood as 
Black.  
[Jesus] meets the blacks where they are and becomes one of them…”Oh, but surely 
Christ is above race.” But society is not raceless, any more than when God became a despised 
Jew. White liberal preference for a raceless Christ serves only to make official and orthodox 
the centuries-old portrayal of Christ as white…But whether whites want to hear it or not, Christ 
is black, baby, with all the features which are so detestable to white society.1032 
Christianity, for Cone, requires equally strong solidarity with the oppressed. “It is the 
job of the church to become black with [Jesus] and accept the shame which white society places 
on blacks.”1033 In Cone’s early scholarship, 1034 then, paramount to the Christian faith was 
Christology that held Jesus to be Black, ecclesiology which held the body of the church to be 
the collective community of black bodies, and a privileging of the message of physical 
liberation above soteriological spiritual freedom. 
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8.5.3.4.2.3. Womanist Theology 
Later, the work of theologians of differing marginalized backgrounds identified distinct 
strands of liberative theology. Among these distinctives is the theology advanced by, for, and 
about, Black women. Black womanist theologians, including the founding voices of Jacquelyn 
Grant, Katie Geneva Cannon and Delores Williams, drew attention to, not only the racism of 
the larger White culture, but to the failure of theology to address the sexism and oppression 
that marked the experiences of Black women; sexism which was pervasive even within Black 
theological circles ostensibly concerned with liberation. Womanists have argued that Black 
women have a “tri-dimensional” experience of the oppressions of race, gender, and class.1035 
Williams has likened the layers of oppression to that experienced by Hagar, Abraham’s 
Egyptian slave in the biblical narrative. Hagar experienced slavery, hunger, fugitivity, forced 
surrogacy, and sexual and economic exploitation. Yet, she was not released from bondage like 
the Hebrew slaves, instead her deliverance can be read as her survival and as the care.1036 
“Hagar was not engaged by a God who liberated her from the deplorable social circumstances 
to which she was captive, but rather by a God who provided resources for her to negotiate a 
quality of life that empowered Hagar to survive the brokenness of her social circumstances.”1037  
Grant mediates the womanist positions of Christ as liberator and Christ as caretaker. She shows 
the ways in which the Black Christ suffers with black women in all of their particularity, and 
the ways that Christ’s resurrection delimits suffering so that it does not finally triumph. Christ, 
then, is liberator from suffering, caretaker during suffering, and co-sufferer with the suffering. 
For Grant, “Christ, found in the experience of Black women, is a Black woman.” 1038 
Additionally, womanists have privileged an ecclesiology that emphasizes the self in the 
community. As Marshall Turman notes, womanism reflects a concern for the ecclesia, the 
communal body.  There is an “ethic of responsibility that…disregard[s] the self as primary 
concern in order to address the collective reality…an ethic…requir[ing] that individuals always 
approach the task of justice making as a self-in-community. In this way, moral agency is never 
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activated as an independent endeavour, but, as a “fitting” response, moral agency is always 
accountable to what proves to be right and good for the entire community.”1039  
Finally, one of the most significant aspects of womanist theology is the privileging of 
the experiences of Black women, and of radical subjectivity as grounds of normatizing 
epistemology. “Womanist scholars of religion redeﬁned the term epistemology as the unction 
to search for truth, interrogating the foundations upon which truth itself is established, and for 
reimagining truth in a world that denies its existence.”1040 The self is the womanist benchmark 
for critically engaging others.1041  
Womanists, then, speaking from the authority of the Black woman’s individual 
subjective experience, identify Jesus as one who is ultimately concerned with the particularity 
of Black women’s struggles, and who practices justice-making for the particular one, but also 
the community. 
8.5.3.4.3. Critiques of Black Theology 
Aspects of formal Black Theology have drawn various critiques. Long argues that the 
adoption of Christianity and of theological discourse, and its linguistic structures, is an adoption 
of European imperialistic mores. Black Theology’s articulation is, thus, not sufficiently 
constructive of religious thought intended for, and derived from, Black life. 1042 Anderson 
critiques the ontologics of Black Theology, arguing that “Blackness” has been presented as 
merely a privation of “Whiteness,” which represents the Enlightenment sensibilities of heroic, 
epochal, culture-advancing genius; and that “blackness [merely] signifies the blackness that 
whiteness created.” 1043  He posits that essentialist “ontological blackness” is theologically 
empty of meaning, and lacks transcendence, without Whiteness, oppression, resistance, or 
survival, thus it is incapable of, in itself, offering revelatory communication of Gospel truth. 
Carter makes a similar charge against essentialized Black Theology. For Carter, “black 
theology remains beholden to the logics of modern racial reasoning…[such an] ontology 
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disallows transcendence and thus recapitulates the inner logic of modern racial reasoning”1044 
Carter argues that Black theology fundamentally constitutes a response to a reformulated anti-
Semitism; that the supersessionism implicit to the modern Christian imagination now (also) 
appears as anti-Black racism. The supersessionist impulse is not merely a mark of 
marginalization, it is heresy. Therefore, theologies that do little to disrupt the Christian 
severance of Jesus from Jewishness, fail to address the root of the problem of race. 
 The most trenchant critique of essentializing models of Black Theology, 
however, has been offered by Marshall Turman, a womanist theologian. Marshall Turman 
argues that the womanist project asserts the experience of Black womanhood as, in itself, 
primary to identity. This primary in itself identification mimics that of the in itself, 
“inconceivable,” “just is” element of Jesus’s identity, as determined by the Council of 
Calcedon.1045 Jesus’s is-ness, his being, was a reality before there was an incarnation. Jesus’s 
incarnation, his being within socio-political time/space, is only of secondary reality. The 
inconceivable Jesus has precedence over the conceivable/conceived Jesus. The same 
precedence exists for the “just is”-ness of the Black woman, over and above her socio-political 
being. As Marshall Turman argues: 
a womanist ethic of incarnation contends that sociohistorical realities [essentialized 
Blackness] must be negotiated with a primary in-itself that is prompted by divine activity “in 
the flesh.” In fact, it asserts that the lone privileging of sociohistorical realities in the search for 
justice is able to paradoxically reproduce the same empirical problematic that weakens the 
viability of Social Gospel methodology.1046  
8.5.3.4.4. Black Theology and Afropessimism  
It is at this point that Afropessimist theorization may be understood as a continuation 
of the development of constructed Black theologies grounded in Black life and experience. 
While it might appear that Marshall Turman’s conception of “just is,” in itself, being is the 
antithesis of Afropessimistic nonbeing, closer reflection reveals that not an antithesis, but that 
the arguments are opposite sides of the same coin. Marshall Turman recognizes that, and Black 
women, possess the mark of human is-ness, that cannot be reduced to an externally inscribed 
category. She nonetheless acknowledges that the concrete social-historical realities do play a 
                                               
 
1044 J. Kameron Carter, Race: A Theological Account, 1 edition (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 158. 
1045 Marshall Turman, Toward a Womanist Ethic of Incarnation, 158. 
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secondary role in one’s identity. In other words, it is the Black woman, whose concrete reality 
is secondary to the “in itself” reality that she self-articulates. Afropessimism may be read as 
making the same assertion in the obverse. It may be read as saying that there does exist an is-
ness to those raced as Black, however the reality of the Black man’s is-ness is implacably 
subsumed by his social-historical concrete reality. The secondary reality (of time and space) 
has rendered invisible and unreal the primary reality, though the primary reality remains 
primary and remains real. In other words, the intellectual labour of philosophy and theory of 
Black persons makes real the is-ness of Black being that has, nevertheless, been burdened with 
social nonbeing. Like Marshall Turman’s womanist construction, Afropessimist theory affirms 
the is-ness of radical subjectivities, and implicitly makes that identity primary, while not 
denying the concrete realities of the social-historical. Where Afropessimism differs, however, 
is in the meaning that is assigned to this primary/secondary identification. Marshall Turman’s 
womanism argues for a reconstruction of the corrupted systems of church and state. 
Afropessimism, on the other hand, argues, in the vein of Carter, that a systems change is 
insufficient. A metaphysical alteration of the entire underlying social structure is necessary, 
and further, that such an alteration is not likely, or possible. In other words, womanism argues 
for removing oppression from the social order. Afropessimism argues that removal of 
oppression from the social order is impossible without destroying the social order since 
oppression is so deeply imbedded within it. In this light, Carter might be read as Afropessimist 
in that, while he identifies the source of the deleterious concrete realities that confront Black 
persons, and he locates that source as theological in origin (supersessionism), Carter presents 
his findings without superfluous hope that the diagnosis offered will lead to a cure.1047 
8.5.4. Cultural Hegemonic Violence Conclusion 
When the phenomenon of violence is registered through the experiences of women, 
those formerly colonized by Western nations, and Black persons, it becomes clear that the 
experience of violence is not fully accounted for by a narrow “product” definition of the term. 
The idea that violence is imbedded in structures, institutions, and occurs as a normative feature 
                                               
 
1047 For more on Afropessimism and Christian hope see, Vincent Lloyd, “Afro-Pessimism and Christian 
Hope,” in Grace, Governance and Globalization, ed. Martin G. Poulsom, Stephan van Erp, and Lieven Boeve, Studies 
in Edward Schillebeeckx (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017), 191–205; Vincent Lloyd, “For What Are Whites 
to Hope?,” Political Theology 17, no. 2 (March 3, 2016): 168–81. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
262 
of cultural hegemonic life of society, reveals the nature of violence as, indeed, “cumulative,” 
“boundless,” and “spilling over.” 
8.6. Conclusion of Theorization of Violence 
This chapter reflected on the meaning of violence. It showed the ways that social 
science has understood violence in the life of human beings from the perspective of 
anthropology and psychology. The branch of cultural anthropology provides grounds for 
conception of violence as encompassing more than mere physical aggression or use of force. 
Rather, scholars have determined that violence involves underlying and interrelated social and 
cultural constructs. Psychological scholarship has also argued for conception of violence as 
multifaceted and complex, as a “wicked” problem. The psychological scholarship’s more 
relevant contribution, for the purposes of this paper is the notion of a three-stage cycle of 
aggression, which includes inputs, internal processing, and outputs. This provides support for 
the argument of Part One of the paper that Jesus was interested in addressing, not the human 
output of violence, so much as he was interested in re-orientating human interpretation of 
inputs, the psychology of violence. 
Violence, broadly conceptualized, requires acceptance that violence is not only a 
“product,” a narrowly defined act of force that is episodic or sporadic, but that violence is 
“process.” It is cumulative and boundless and spills over. The process of violence lends itself 
to understanding by types or categories of manifestations. Galtung’s typology of violence 
names direct, structural, and cultural violence, to which might be added the types of 
foundational violence and existential violence. Existential violence is a violence committed to 
the being of Black persons, as discussed by Fanon, Césaire, and the school of Afro-pessimism. 
It damages one’s self-ness; one’s self-understanding and self-expression. Existential violence 
arises for Black persons specifically because of their experiences of slavery and social death 
that continue into the present. The violence of gender and colonial oppression are also 
discussed in this chapter. 
Connection to Larger Project: 
What this discussion of violence shows is that violence is a broad concept, and that the 
being of Black persons, especially female, formerly colonized black persons, is the subject of 
violence whether or not there is the presence of coercive physical force.  The social death that 
attends to those who were marked as slaves (despite actual condition of enslavement) is an act 
of violation that is ongoing. To discuss non-violence under these circumstances is to fail to 
address the ways that continuing to exist in the face of powers that seek to extinguish the 
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individual’s unique humanity, is to be non-violent. Black existence that does not implode or 
explode is non-violence. This brings to the fore the fact that much of the self-damaging 
pathology that is witnessed in communities that have been “Blackened,” excluded from social 
life or marked for social death, might be viewed as the result of the existential violence that 
these communities are subjected to without relief. Even where there is no use of force—no 
guns, no knives, no rape, no killing by gangs, where there is widespread addiction, unrestrained 
licentiousness, emotionally-rooted obesity, and the like; where there is diminished life without 
physical violence, in other words, the pathology is a response to a diminishment of existence. 
It is an inward directed violence responding to the unnamed existential violence that the social 
order directs against Black being.  
In which case, what good news does a non-violent-Jesus narrative offer? The non-
violent-Jesus narrative does not speak to issues of existential violence. However, the Jesus-
Who-Resists paradigm that I propose does. The Jesus-Who-Resists acknowledges the 
violences to dignity, which are as damaging as violence to the body. The Jesus-Who-Resists 
registers that life, salvation, and wholeness do not come from possessing physical weapons, 
nor is true life taken away by physical weapons. Jesus-Who-Resists urges the cultivation of an 
inward being, that is lived into by one’s actions. Jesus-Who-Resists recognizes the 
dehumanizing messages and methods of the culture. He tells his followers not to be followers 
of cultural norms that diminish them, but to accept that they are children of God, loved by God. 
He endows his followers with the authority and power to be, as they are, without shame, 
debasement, or humiliation. From this place of dignity one can receive the input of 
disparagement or degradation, and not allow the input to have meaning as to the truth of who 
one is; one can offer an output, a response, that does not necessitate the use of physical force. 
One can demonstrate through one’s actions the lie of the input, and the truth that one believes 
about oneself. 
The following table (See, table 7-2, below) provides a comparison of the different 
approaches to offense. 
Table 8-2 Comparison of (Non)Violent Responses 
 Violence Non-violence Pacifism Jesus 
Resistance 
Hit in the face by 
someone who 
Hit the perpetrator 
back. 
Gather with 
others and 
protest to the 
Walk away; 
accept the 
battery as 
Demonstrate 
that you are not 
afraid, will not 
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intends to 
humiliate you. 
perpetrator that 
hitting is bad. 
suffering to be 
endured; hope 
God 
intervenes. 
back down, or 
be made 
ashamed, e.g., 
look them in 
the eye, don’t 
cow, stick out 
your chin out 
and dare them 
to hit you 
again. 
     
“Nigger/Kaffir!” Punch the 
perpetrator in the 
face. 
Answer the 
perpetrator, 
“Do not dare 
call me that!”; 
publicize the 
perpetrator’s 
words to 
shame them. 
Ignore the 
insult; let 
people call 
you names; 
endure 
suffering. 
Demonstrate 
that you are not 
impressed with 
their words, n 
or are you 
shamed, e.g., 
reply, “You 
mean to say, 
‘Lazy 
nigger/kaffir!’, 
since I am  
about to sit 
down right here 
in the sunshine, 
sip my cool 
drink, and 
enjoy the 
breeze on this 
fine day.” 
I use the second example to paint a realistic picture of how outlandish Jesus’s 
suggestions must have sounded to his hearers. My point is to show that Jesus’s emphasis in his 
Sermon was on the power of the individual to refuse to give the perpetrator of violence the 
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power to humiliate, dishonour, or dehumanize. To show how Jesus’s resistance disables the 
weapons of humiliation.   
This example also shows the limited nature of Jesus’s instructions. He was not speaking 
to the matter of corporate and state use of force, or even violence, per se, at all. Jesus was 
offering to his hearers, what continues to be necessary today, a way of acclaiming dignity in 
the face of those who despise you. 
Violence is, ultimately, a vast web. It has been most destructive for Black people in its 
existential dimensions. Jesus-Who-Resists presents a theology that allows resistance, that 
allows creativity, that takes into account individual particularities of circumstance, and that 
refuses to accept the normativized terms of honour and shame, worth and worthlessness. 
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9. Theological Analysis from the Margins: Violence and 
Human Will 
9.1. Introduction 
The last chapter demonstrated the vastness of the concept of violence. It showed how 
violence appears invisibly in the normalized operation of everyday life. The chapter 
demonstrated that Black life, beginning with slavery and the social death of the enslaved, has 
suffered not only physically from violence but existentially from violence. I argued that the 
Jesus-Who-Resists is deeply concerned with the violence that dehumanizes, rather than with 
overt acts of force. 
This chapter considers how violence, particularly existential violence, provokes violent 
protest, and why violent protest against existential conditions, is a faithful expression of the 
zoë life for which humanity is created. Relying upon the metaphysical deconstruction of the 
will of medieval theologian/philosopher Duns Scotus, it will be shown that Black persons’ 
physical violence during acts of protest is an expression of the human will that was disordered 
by slavery, seeking to re-orient itself to proper function. It is a will that is free to will. I argue 
that the force of the effort of the will to re-orient itself metaphysically, may at times spill over 
into physical expression of force. This is not a bad or immoral result. The initial violence that 
disordered the will is the bad and immoral act. The restoration of the will of Black persons to 
proper function is a human good. 
The chapter first discusses the significance of freedom to human being. It then considers 
theologian/philosopher Duns Scotus’s metaphysical deconstruction of free will--how it 
actually operates inside the human. I then analyse how the process of enslavement disrupts the 
operation of free will as outlined by Scotus. I show how the disordered will-ing of Black 
persons has been accepted as normal. I then discuss the ways that protest against continuing 
dehumanizing treatment is an example of the will being re-oriented to proper function. I discuss 
how this process of reorientation requires force of will that oftimes finds expression in 
physically forceful ways. 
9.2. Black Humanity and Unfreedom 
The histories of slavery and domination in the U.S. and South Africa have directly 
contributed to present-day inequalities, most clearly seen in the material conditions in which 
persons of African ancestry live. Yet these inequalities extend beyond materiality and 
encompass inequalities of personhood. The Afro-pessimism arguments of the last chapter are 
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summarized well by Sexton when he asserts of the radical existential violence of the 
enslavement of Blacks, “[s]lavery is not a loss that the self experiences – of language, lineage, 
land, or labour – but rather the loss of any self that could experience such loss.”1048 
The want of humanness in the African resulted in human dignity being denied to Blacks 
as people. An ontological and psychological perennial moment of crisis for Black beings was 
the result. This crisis has been characterized as an internal struggle of being resulting in a 
social-psychological “double-consciousness”: 
One ever feels his two-ness—an American [or Modern], a 
Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; 
two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength 
alone keeps it from being torn asunder.1049 
This struggle in the soul of the Black person, centres on the question of how one 
properly realizes one’s self-ness, after legislated enslavement has ended, given one’s dual 
formation as both a modern subject, and also as a Black non-subject object. The ontological 
and psychological crisis of being for Black persons constitutes an incongruity between existing 
as human in theory, yet being unable to apprehend the essential human attribute of a free will. 
The internal and external freedom incongruity operates not only as an external diminishment 
of the human, but also fractures the will itself, so that the human dignity that is derived from 
the ability to will freely is impaired in the metaphysical constitution of Black persons. 
9.2.1. Theological Constructions of Freedom 
9.2.1.1. Freedom is Inherent to the Human 
Humans are created to be and to become. Their existence is good, and their existence 
is progressive. Humans grow, individually, and collectively in communities. Humans grow into 
beings who are able to create that which is another (humans) and that which is other (cultural 
artefacts). Human growth leans towards the harmonious flourishing of the created world. The 
human capacity to create (which is of greater complexity than that of other beings) implies that 
human beings must have the mental and physical capacity to manifest their propensity to grow, 
and to create. They must have the capacity both to reason and to act. Like physical variations, 
the capacity for this “auto-creativity” varies, however the ability to reason and to act, “to will,” 
is central to human personhood.  
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The human capacity “to will” is made meaningful by understanding it as human 
freedom. To be free, or to be one who wills, entails, first, an inner disposition of being. To be 
free, or to be one who wills, is to be one who has inward desires and whose desires become the 
subject of one’s inner ruminations. It also means to be one who makes decisions regarding their 
desires. One’s will-ing derives from ones desiring. The essence of freedom, then, more 
fundamental than freedoms claimed as part of social-political community, is one’s ability to 
will in accordance with one’s desires. The will’s freeness is seen in the infant who turns her 
head in refusal of the breast, and in the toddler’s utterance of, “No.” To be human entails having 
a will that is free. 
As Kane has described it, freedom is not merely acting or choosing according to one’s 
wishes, but having power over what it is that one wills.1050 Where persons have the ability to 
exercise many choices over their lives, there might, nevertheless, be a lack of freedom. This 
arises where “[o]ther persons [are] pulling the strings, not by coercing or forcing us to do things 
against our wishes, but by manipulating us into having the wishes they wanted us to have.”1051 
Such manipulations (regularly performed by advertisers, parents, and other authority figures) 
are regarded, by those manipulated, as detrimental and wrong because such manipulations are 
perceived as interfering with one’s agency, one’s ability to do or to be the self that individuals 
themselves determine is good. 
Yet natural and social influences upon the human will are inescapable. In light of these 
influences, it has been argued that an unrestricted freedom of the will is illusory. That genetic, 
psychological, and social factors are so influential as to be wholly determinative of what a 
person can will, (“determinism”). 1052  The determinist view has been tempered by 
compatibilist views, which assert that the human will may not function with complete 
freedom, due to social and natural forces, yet there is some freedom of the will that is 
integral to human being.1053  
                                               
 
1050 Robert Kane, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will (Oxford University Press, 2005), 2. 
1051 Kane, 2. 
1052 For an extensive overview of determinism, see, Carl Hoefer, “Causal Determinism,” in The Stanford 
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9.2.1.2. Duns Scotus and Freedom of the Will 
Christian theology, which has structured Western philosophical writing on free will to 
a large extent,1054 has tended toward compatibilism. A balance is sought between the view that 
God is the source and sustainer of all of creation, the foreknowing and ultimate cause of all that 
occurs, and the view that human beings have freedom and, thus, moral responsibility. The apex 
of theological reflection on human free will occurred during the medieval period in Europe. 
The contributions of Duns Scotus1055 continue to influence modern thought.1056 
Theologian/philosopher Duns Scotus (1266-1308) wrote near the turn of the 14th 
century and married the philosophic traditions of Aristotelian intellectualism with the Christian 
theological traditions and moral teachings of the Franciscans. Scotus understood the will as 
having primacy in the human being, and as being superior to the intellect.1057 Ultimately, for 
Duns Scotus self-restraint and self-dominion were the highest form of rational freedom in 
humans.1058 
Scotus argued that the will determines its own acts by its own control, and is unique in 
this way among other human faculties. He wrote of the will’s self-motivation, that 
nothing is so in the power of the will as the will itself… It is in 
the power of the will that by its command another power act[s] 
or refrain[s] from acting, for example, that the intellect refrain 
                                               
 
1054 Timothy O’Connor, “Free Will,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, 
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1056 O’Connor, “Free Will,” pt. 4. 
1057 Mary Beth Ingham, “Self-Mastery and Rational Freedom: Duns Scotus’ Contribution to the ‘Usus 
Pauper’ Debate,” Franciscan Studies 66 (2008): 369. 
1058 Ingham, 369. 
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from considering…that object whose consideration is necessary 
for issuing the command.1059 
The freedom to will-as-it-will, derives from the will’s metaphysical constitution. 
Following Anselm, Scotus argued that the will possesses a two-fold disposition,1060 called dual 
affections. On one side, there is the affection for justice (affectio iustitiae), the inclination 
towards that which is worthy of affection for the sake of the thing itself and not related to any 
personal gain. On the other side, there is the affection for the advantageous (affectio commodi), 
which is an inclination towards personal enjoyment of, or use of, external goods.1061 
Of the two affections, the affection for the advantageous is defined as a “natural” 
affection, while the affection for justice is defined as a “free” affection. 1062  By these 
categorizations Scotus was emphasizing the distinction between the will as desire, and the will 
as agency. The natural will, desire, is marked by unsatiety, while the free will, agency, is able 
to moderate the good.  
The natural will, according to Scotus, is the will’s inclination towards its own perfection, 
or optimum realization. The natural will functions in correspondence with the intellectual 
nature’s appetites; it is the natural desire for happiness.1063 For Scotus, however, the natural 
will, the affectio commodi, is so inclined towards the advantageous that it cannot moderate 
pursuit of the advantageous. The nature of the affectio commodi is to seek what the intellect 
presents as the best good, and it is not free to do otherwise.1064 Functioning alone, the affectio 
commodi would elicit beneficial objects to the greatest degree possible. In this way, the 
affection for the advantageous, operating in conjunction with the intellectual appetite, is not an 
                                               
 
1059 Ingham, 365–66 citing 67 Quodlibet 16 n. 4, from God and Creatures: The Quodlibetal Questions, ed. F. 
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(CUA Press, 2004), 157. 
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Allan B. Wolter (Washington, D.C., 1986), 183-185. 
1063 González-Ayesta, 39–51. 
1064 González-Ayesta, 43. 
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operation of free will. The will is not free when it can seek only its own good things and can 
do nothing other than this. 
Because the natural will is hampered in this way, the affectio commodi, the affection 
for the advantageous, can only desire; it has no power to elicit an act. Elicitation of action is 
only possible through the affectio commodi’s function in tandem with the affectio iustitiae. The 
affectio iustitiae, the affection for justice, is not hampered by the necessity to heed the 
intellect’s determination of good. The affectio iustitiae is constituted by the ability to act freely; 
it may incline the will to act either in favour of an object (velle) or in rejection of an object 
(nolle). Further, its defining nature is that the affectio iustitiae is able to neither favour nor 
reject an object, but to refrain from choosing altogether (non velle). 1065  Because it can 
affirmatively not will, the acts of the affectio iustitiae cannot be determined by any cause or 
object external to itself and its own act of choosing.1066 Thus, Scotus brings explication to the 
maxim that “nothing is so in the power of the will as the will itself.” Scotus describes the 
freeness of the affection for justice as having “the ability to grasp and to choose the good in 
itself and so can rein in the affection for the advantageous.”1067 
The affectio commodi, wills toward the personally beneficial while being moderated by 
the affectio iustitiae which elicits actions in furtherance of greater good, or principled good, or 
love. “It is just because the [dual-affectioned] will possesses the affection for justice that it is 
free to accept, reject or refrain from acting regarding the inclination of the affection for the 
advantageous.”1068 
The formal distinguishing of the freedom of the will is here intended only to emphasize 
the fact that, for Scotus, the will is free, and is the most free of any aspect of human personality. 
The freeness of the human will is uniquely and necessarily capable of self-restraint. Because 
of the freeness of the will, one is able to live lovingly, meaning in a restrained and ordered way, 
and “such ordered loving constitutes true human happiness.”1069 
9.2.2. Metaphysics of Black Unfreedom 
The above discussion has shown how freedom, one’s ability to will in accordance with 
one’s authentic desire, is understood as inherent to the human person, though one’s authentic 
                                               
 
1065 Ingham and Dreyer, The Philosophical Vision of John Duns Scotus, 149. 
1066 Ingham and Dreyer, 150. 
1067 González-Ayesta, “Duns Scotus on the Natural Will,” 46. 
1068 González-Ayesta, 48. 
1069 Ingham and Dreyer, The Philosophical Vision of John Duns Scotus, 157. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
272 
desires may be influenced by external forces. Duns Scotus posits that the human will is free, 
and that the human will seeks the good, both personal good and good in principle. As this 
section will show, however, the violence to which the humanity of the African person was 
subjected, forecloses possibilities of freedom that would ordinarily inure to human persons. 
9.2.2.1. Black Beings’ Exclusion from Human Ontology 
The trajectory of thought on human freedom grounded in the work of Scotus does not 
account for the racialized reimagination of the human that occurred beginning in the 15th 
century. It does not account for the degraded position to which the African person was assigned 
through the creation of racialized slavery. During the early period of modernity, slavery 
emerged as an economic tool of colonialism which progressed from being “an experience… 
(which anyone can be subject to)” to an “ontology…[which] becomes the singular purview of 
the Black.”1070 The novel ideology was developed that the possession of the physical features 
of Africanness was sufficient to cast one as always already outside of social community (of 
Christian civilized Europeans), and outside of human community (as beings distinct from 
European man lacking dignity or rights), without the necessity of a prior occurrence of a 
transgressive act, such as conquest during war, criminal conviction, etc.1071 [S]lavery, for those 
Africans who were denominated as slaves and for those who were not, 1072 became the Black 
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functioned within society as if that history did not register a distinction between the two.  
This is equally true of South Africa. There are distinctions that can be readily identified between the 
practices of slavery in South Africa and those of the U.S., which the analysis of slavery is based upon in this paper. 
Most notably, in South Africa “Europeans were not all masters, [and] non-Europeans were not all servants.” 
(Susan Newton-King, Masters and Servants on the Cape Eastern Frontier, 1760-1803 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 40.) Further, those who were enslaved were not only Africans, but also those “shipped 
from all the ports of the Indian Ocean,” (R. J. Ross, Cape of Torments: Slavery and Resistance in South Africa 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), 2). As Marx concludes, this lack of absolute boundaries along racial 
lines, and the blurring of hierarchy and status for European persons, may have been an underlying factor in 
introduction of juridical segregation and apartheid. (Marx, Making Race and Nation, 63.)  
Further, to the extent that U.S. and European hegemony has greatly influenced the social and political 
ordering of Brazilian, South African, and most former colonial societies, despite their historical particularities and 
distinctions, countries with significant numbers of historically subjugated Black persons operate as if slavery and 
Blackness are and have always been one and the same. Thus, the arguments that follow can be said to apply to a 
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person’s “banishment from ontology.” 1073 …[T]he gratuitous violence of the Black’s first 
ontological instance, the Middle Passage, “wiped out [his/her] metaphysics…his [her] customs 
and sources on which they are based”…Jews went into Auschwitz and came out as Jews. 
Africans went into the ships and came out as Blacks. The former is a Human holocaust; the 
latter is a Human and a metaphysical holocaust.1074 
9.2.2.2. Slavery’s Defacement of Free Will 
Slavery’s ontological violence led Wilderson to conclude that it is not exploitative 
labour that is constitutive of slavery, rather, following the definition of Patterson,1075 “slavery 
is the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonoured 
persons.”1076 Slavery, then, which constituted the ontological condition to which all Blacks 
were assigned regardless of condition of servitude, had three elements: violent domination, 
natal alienation, and general dishonour.1077 
Most importantly, as part of general dishonour, slavery entailed relationships 
determined by power and domination. The slave was powerless with respect to the master and 
with respect to other individuals.1078 The “brute force” of violence was relied upon to transform 
the African free person into the slave and to maintain that transformation.1079 To underscore 
this point Patterson quotes an 1829 judicial decision which held that the intentional wounding 
of a hired slave by his hirer did not constitute a crime. The decision makes clear the cultural 
acceptance of the violent use of force against the African. It also provides crucial insight with 
respect to our discussion of freedom. Thus, I include the full quotation. 
With slavery ... the end is the profit of the master, his security 
and the public safety; the subject, one doomed in his own 
person, and his posterity, to live without knowledge, and 
                                               
 
multitude of contexts, despite their historic dissimilarities to the U.S. context with respect to practices of 
slavery. 
1073 Wilderson, Red, White & Black, 18. This ontological shift was disavowed juridically in the 19th 
century, as there were court decisions which acknowledged the humanity of slaves. A Tennessee court in 1846 
ruled, “[a] slave…is made after the image of the creator. He has mental capacities and an immortal principle in 
his nature, that constitute him equal to his owner but for the accidental position in which fortune has placed 
him.” Helen T. Catterall and James J. Hayden, Judicial Cases Concerning American Slavery and the Negro 
(Washington, D.C.: William S Hein & Co, 1926), vol. 2, p. 530. However, the human dignity of the slave did 
continue to be parsed. As in the 1861 Alabama case where the court concluded, “in reference to acts which are 
crimes [slaves] are regarded as persons. Because they are slaves, they are…incapable of performing civil acts, 
and, in reference to all such things, they are things, not persons.” Catterall and Hayden, vol. 3, p. 247. 
1074 Wilderson, Red, White & Black, 38–39 citing Fanon, BSWM, 110. 
1075 Patterson, Slavery and Social Death, 13. 
1076 Wilderson would maintain that slave “persons” are more accurately denoted as “beings,” as they 
were not considered persons. 
1077 See, Section 7.5.3.1, supra, for the full discussion of Slavery and Social Death. 
1078 Patterson, Slavery and Social Death, 4. 
1079 Patterson, 3. 
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without the capacity to make anything his own, and to toil that 
another may reap his fruits. What moral considerations such as 
a father might give to a son shall be addressed to such a being, 
to convince him what it is impossible but that the most stupid 
must feel and know can never be true-that he is thus to labour 
upon a principle of natural duty, or for the sake of his own 
personal happiness. Such services can only be expected from 
one who has no will of his own; who surrenders his will in 
implicit obedience in the consequence only of uncontrolled 
authority over the body. There is nothing else which can 
operate to produce the effect. The power of the master must be 
absolute, to render the submission of the slave perfect.1080 
Here the court articulated that the slave “was doomed in his own person”; that the slave 
must “live without the capacity to make anything his own”; that the slave labouring “for the 
sake of his own personal happiness” was an impossibility that could never be true; that the 
exertions of the slave “can only be expected from one who has no will of his own; who 
surrenders his will” through compulsion by the application of absolute force. This language 
reveals the violent domination integral to maintenance of slavery. It also lays bare that the 
ontology of the slave is an ontology in which human freedom is forbidden. 
Freedom was previously described as the ability to will in accordance with one’s 
authentic desires, and as inherent to the human being. “To be” entails rationality and choice in 
the service of growth and becoming. In Scotus’ terms the will is most properly free when it is 
able not only to will in the affirmative or to will in the negative, but to refrain from willing 
altogether. The will to self-restraint is the essence and highest operation of free will. 
If the slave is “doomed in his own person,” then the slave’s very being is precarious. 
Free will in this case becomes precarious in the contest between desiring the independently 
good and desiring the personal good of existence. If the slave is denied “the capacity to make 
anything his own,” then the possibility of the slave will-ing, in service to auto-creativity 
(growth and becoming) is also denied.1081 The court determined that it is “impossible” for the 
                                               
 
1080 Patterson, 4 citing John Spencer Bassett, Slavery in the State of North Carolina (Johns Hopkins Press, 
1899), 23–24.  
1081 Thomas Aquinas, who is not discussed in this essay, finds great significance in the free will’s origin 
and end. Spiering argues that Aquinas, following the Aristotelean meaning of the maxim liber est causa sui, 
incorporated two senses of the maxim. A free being’s actions are of itself, or caused by itself, (“a se”), and also 
that the actions of the free person are because of oneself or for one’s own sake (“propter se”). Freedom means 
acting in a way that is self-caused and that is self-determined or self-interested. Spiering concludes that for 
Aquinas, and medieval reasoning generally, concern must be shown for both the origins and the ends of action. 
See, Jamie Anne Spiering, “‘Liber Est Causa Sui’: Thomas Aquinas and the Maxim ‘The Free Is the Cause of 
Itself,’” The Review of Metaphysics 65, no. 2 (December 1, 2011): 351, 359–75. In the case of racialized slavery, 
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slave to live (where the slave’s labour is determinative of the slave’s life) “for the sake of his 
own personal happiness.” Therefore, it must also be impossible for the will of the slave to elicit 
action in furtherance of good things, that include personal advantageousness. Finally, where 
brute force is authorized to be employed specifically to ensure that the slave has “no will of his 
own”; that he “surrenders his will” to his master, the free will of the slave must be understood 
to have undergone intentional and radical diminution. 
While free will might be said to remain within the self of the African despite the 
African’s ontological recasting of being, what remains of the will is a version of freeness that 
is malformed. Read in accordance with Scotus’s conceptualization of freedom, the tandem 
work of the affection for the beneficial (affectio commodi) and of the affection for the just 
(affectio iustitiae) may be seen as impaired. The damage lies in that the affection for the just 
fails to work in tandem with and to moderate the inclination towards the personally 
advantageous. This results in two related conditions; in some cases, the self-will may be 
destroyed, in others, the self-will may be adulterated. 
Where there is destruction of the will, psychic and physical pain inflicted upon the slave 
compels the intellect to prioritize survival and the cessation of pain as the greatest good. The 
affectio commodi desires and wills with the intellect that the inflicted pain cease, but the affectio 
commodi is not capable of eliciting any act to further this desire. The affectio iustitiae, wherein 
lies the power of the will to elicit acts in favour of, against, or to refrain from willing, becomes 
physiologically impeded from willing freely. Inflicted pain and torture overcome the will’s 
freeness, and compel the slave to will the act that will elicit the cessation of pain and allow 
survival. The slave’s will is forcibly compelled until the slave’s will is aligned with the will of 
                                               
 
denying the slave the capacity to make anything of his or her own denies the freedom of the slave (“a se”) and for 
the slave (“propter se”).  
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the one who has the power to remove pain.1082 The “breaking” of the will of the slave was 
indeed the intention of the infliction of brutal force.1083 
In cases of the deformity of the will, the will of the slave is not broken. Nonetheless, 
the will undergoes significant damage. The damage to the freeness of the will lies in the 
metaphysics of the slave’s will-ing, which became a kind of incurvatus in se. In such cases the 
intact but damaged free will elicits acts that, though freely chosen, are against the self’s own 
desire for the good of growth and becoming. The acts elicited instead favour the desire for the 
good of existing, though existence will be without human dignity, as dignity necessitates auto-
creativity (growth and becoming). The damage to the will is reflected in the self’s will-ing 
towards the lesser, rather than the greater good. In Scotus’s formulation, the affectio iustitiae, 
the affection for justice, is free in the way that it is free--to will in favour, to will against, or to 
                                               
 
1082 This damage to the will has been described in psychological literature as “mental defeat.” 
Mental defeat is defined as the perceived loss of all autonomy, a state of giving up in 
one's own mind all efforts to retain one's identity as a human being with a will of one's 
own. People who experience mental defeat differ in how they describe this experience. 
Common examples include the feeling that one is not a human being any longer (e.g., “I 
am an object,” “I was destroyed as a human being”), not having a will of one's own any 
longer (e.g., “He could tell me to jump off a building and I'd jump off a building”), not 
caring about oneself any longer (e.g., “I don't really care whether I die or not”), or 
having a complete breakdown of all inner resistance to the perpetrator (e.g., “I was like 
a ball that they played with. I let everything happen to me from outside”). Anke Ehlers, 
Andreas Maercker, and Anne Boos, “Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Following Political 
Imprisonment: The Role of Mental Defeat, Alienation, and Perceived Permanent 
Change.,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology 109, no. 1 (2000): 45, 
https://doi.org/10.1037//0021-843X.109.1.45. See also, Charlotte E Hazeldine-Baker et 
al., “Understanding the Link between Feelings of Mental Defeat, Self-Efficacy and the 
Experience of Chronic Pain,” British Journal of Pain 12, no. 2 (May 1, 2018): 87–94, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2049463718759131; and Laura Jobson and Richard T. O’Kearney, 
“Impact of Cultural Differences in Self on Cognitive Appraisals in Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder,” Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, May 2009, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S135246580900527X. Troop makes the distinction between 
mental defeat and behavioral defeat, “where an individual may give up physical resistance 
to minimize further injury or to bring an assault to an end…[D]isplays of behavioural 
defeat are deliberate and can indicate a sense of control.” Nicholas A. Troop and Syd 
Hiskey, “Social Defeat and PTSD Symptoms Following Trauma,” British Journal of Clinical 
Psychology 52, no. 4 (November 2013): 367, https://doi.org/10.1111/bjc.12022. This 
distinction is relevant, as it is not unreasonable to suppose that in some instances the 
mental defeat that was perceived by those inflicting torture upon slaves, was in fact 
feigned by the slaves, and agency in this way was retained.  
1083 This goal is recognized in psychological literature. A study by Ehlers notes that “…one of the goals 
of torture is to break the will of the tortured person.” Anke Ehlers, Andreas Maercker, and Anne Boos, 
“Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Following Political Imprisonment: The Role of Mental Defeat, Alienation, and 
Perceived Permanent Change.,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology 109, no. 1 (2000): 45, 
https://doi.org/10.1037//0021-843X.109.1.45 citing Duncan, Forrest. A Glimpse of Hell: Reports on Torture Worldwide 
(London: Biddles, 1996). 
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refrain from willing--so that the highest good of human freedom might be attained, the good 
of self-restraint.1084 Here, the important point is not whether self-restraint is the willed choice 
of the slave, but that the free will is ordered such that it can will that which results in greater 
humanity, rather than lesser. It can, and is perfected when it does, will the highest good for 
itself. Through physical and psychic violence, the will of the slave becomes malformed; it is 
bent away from seeking the good that is of the higher order. Instead, pain contorts the will 
towards will-ing the good of the lesser order, e.g., to self-will the good of existing over that of 
becoming. When the will is shaped so that it cannot will towards its highest good, but can only 
will against its own perfection, it is indicative that the freedom of the will is damaged. 
In both instances, where the slave undergoes a broken will, and where there is the 
bastardized will-ing of lesser humanity, the brokenness of the will of Black persons becomes 
normativized. The abnormal functioning of the will can come to be regarded as a free will that 
is optimally functioning. Both the will that is completely effaced through slavery and the will 
that is disordered through slavery, become self-reproducing of disabled will-ing, unless and 
until there is an intervening event in the operation of the will.1085 
What may be concluded is that African persons were overdetermined to be lesser or 
other than human, and instead deemed Black, during the historical moment when the concepts 
of humanity and human dignity were formally constructed. To be Black was to be ontologically 
                                               
 
1084 Ingham, “Self-Mastery and Rational Freedom,” 369. 
1085 The self-reproduction of the disordered will might also be understood within an African ubuntu 
ontological conceptualization. As du Toit and Forster write: 
A central element of ubuntu in relation to identity, is the understanding that 
personhood…is never understood without reference to the community of dignity…. 
identity is developed through interaction, over time.  As a person participates with 
others and the environment, the person’s identity (who the person is in society, who 
the person sees him or herself to be, and the community’s relation to the person) 
changes…Thus participation [in community], from birth, through life, and beyond this 
life, is key to the identity and role of the human person. C. W. Du Toit and Dion A. 
Forster, “Identity in Relationship: The Ethics of Ubuntu [in African Theology] as an 
Answer to the Impasse of Individual Consciousness,” in The Impact of Knowledge Systems 
on Human Development in Africa: Proceedings of the Thirteenth Conference of the South 
African Science and Religion Forum (SASRF) of the Research Institute for Theology and Religion 
Held at the University of South Africa Pretoria, 7-8 September 2006, ed. C. W. Du Toit 
(Pretoria: Research Institute for Theology and Religion, University of South Africa, 
2007), 261. 
Because personhood is understood as being-in-community, and personhood is defined by participation in 
community, being in the community of “les damnés de la terre” (the damned of the earth), within an environment 
that overdetermines that damnation, creates personhood that is constituted by damned-ness, or wretchedness. 
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constituted as a being that is a slave--natally alienated, generally dishonored, and subject to 
permanent violent domination. Part of the consequence of this ontological disfigurement of 
African personhood, was that the human will was disfigured. The will of the Black being, 
instead of will-ing its own optimal good, towards the perfection of personhood and humanity, 
instead came to will the lesser good, towards mere survival. 
9.3. Freedom of the Will and Violent Resistance 
As light must illumine, so the will of humans must be free to will. Because the properly 
functioning human (will), being free, cannot be unfree, and cannot not will, when the freeness 
of the will is impinged, the will must function in resistance to, it must will against, 
impingements upon its freedom.1086 To be human being is to be so constituted.1087 To have 
freedom, or to have death, is often literally the human condition.1088 Since free will-ing is 
inherent to the human, when there is cognizance of unfreeness the free will acts in 
                                               
 
1086 Nielsen argues that for this reason freedom has a telos. Freedom’s intended end is the location of a 
space “in which it can flourish and express itself concretely in social and political life with others.” Cynthia 
Nielsen, “Duns Scotus and Multidimensional Freedom,” in Foucault, Douglass, Fanon, and Scotus in Dialogue 
(Proquest Ebook Central: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 105. 
1087 This may be the active principle when the biblical text speaks of one “doing the very thing that [one] 
hates.” (Romans 7:14 NRSV) The law, which are rules restricting freedom, provoke the will to resist. “For I 
delight in the law of God in my inmost self, but I see in my members another law at war with the law of my mind, 
making me captive to the law of sin that dwells in my members.” (Rom. 7: 22-23 NRSV) It is only by the Spirit of 
God, that the human will is able to resist the will to resist. In Scotist terms this might be viewed as the moral 
freedom (not mere metaphysical freedom of Thomas) that enables the human to will toward the perfection for 
which humanity was created by God. 
1088 The phrase “give me liberty of give me death” is attributed to Patrick Henry, uttered in his 1775 
speech to revolutionary minded political delegates in the American colonies. See, Judy Hample, “The Textual and 
Cultural Authenticity of Patrick Henry’s ‘Liberty or Death’ Speech,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 63, no. 3 (October 
1, 1977): 298–310, https://doi.org/10.1080/00335637709383390. It is the principle of the imperative of human 
freedom that is protected and defended by modern social and political systems, and that leads to revolution and 
foundings in pursuit of freedom. 
The imperative for human freedom, however, can lead not only to death through warfare, but through, 
suicide. After a detailed analysis using set theoretical models of freedom and unfreedom, Madhu concludes, 
“[s]uicide is a dramatic case point that illustrates unfreedom. The act of suicide is just one among many other 
forms of unfreedoms… Unfreedom is suicidal. It will wipe away life from the planet.” P. Madhu, “Suicide as 
Unfreedom and Vice Versa,” SSRN.Com, February 19, 2011, 15, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1764389. Suicide as 
an act of unfreeness in communities experiencing marginalization not explicitly related to race, e.g., LGBTQ 
communities, is of particular noteworthiness. See, Brian Mustanski and Richard T. Liu, “A Longitudinal Study of 
Predictors of Suicide Attempts Among Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Youth,” Archives of Sexual 
Behavior 42, no. 3 (April 1, 2013): 437–48, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10508-012-0013-9. Mustanski and Liu 
determine that hopelessness, the feeling that “I might as well give up because I can’t make things better for 
myself,” is a significant factor in LGBT youth suicide. 
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resistance.1089 The perception of unfree-ness triggers resistance. Where there is no perception 
there is no resistance. 
Where free will-ing equalled death for Black persons, the will was broken, and lost its 
freeness. The will lost the ability to will acts that resisted impositions upon its freeness. Where 
free will-ing equalled not death but cruel misery for Black persons, the will was shaped to 
prefer for itself less-than-freeness, which was to will for itself diminished humanity.  
Thus, for Black persons, to live was to will a diminished or dehumanized life. Such a 
disfigurement of the will requires an insensitivity to, or nonrecognition of unfreeness. The 
Black persons’ experience of life as an ongoing survival strategy, leads to the perception of 
willed unfreeness as freedom, a misperception that is reinforced by systems and structures of 
power. When free-willing becomes impossible and unfamiliar, the lack of freeness also 
becomes imperceptible. When there is a failure to fully perceive the lack of freeness, then the 
will towards freeness is not triggered, resistance of unfreeness is not triggered and acts toward 
freedom are not prompted. Any act of resistance against restricted freedom, then, are evidence 
of a will that is able to perceive a lack of freedom, and that is capable of eliciting acts towards 
the good of optimizing its own freeness. In other words, acts of resistance against restricted 
freedom, are evidence of a properly ordered will. 
Those whose lives have been marginalized by structural inequality and injustice relative 
to the material conditions of their housing, education, employment, health, bodily safety,  
policing and incarceration, etc., have been culturally conditioned to regard the degraded 
conditions of life as normal and to accept these conditions. As Steve Biko has commented: 
[T]he black [person] is subjected to two forces…[The Black 
person] is first of all oppressed by an external world through 
institutionalized machinery, through laws that restrict [them] 
from doing certain things, through heavy work conditions, 
through poor pay, through very difficult living conditions, 
through poor education, these are all external to [the Black 
person], and secondly, and this we regard as the most 
important, [Black persons] in [themselves] ha[ve] developed a 
certain state of alienation…[Conditions for blacks are entirely 
inferior to conditions for whites.] The homes are different, the 
                                               
 
1089 Examples of resistance that this research does not address include the resistance of feigned 
compliance, the subversion of the master’s authority, and the redirection of the will’s freeness towards self-
willed acts, or acts of creativity, such as music, dance, art, cooking, sewing, carpentry, masonry, engineering, 
sexual expression, acts of anger or destruction, etc. Further research is warranted as to extant and ways in 
which the slave’s impaired will, found external outlets for free-will-ing. 
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streets are different, the lighting is different, so you begin to 
tend to feel that there is something incomplete in your 
humanity, and that completeness goes with whiteness1090. 
As Biko’s comment reflects, degraded material conditions of life can come to be viewed 
as a reflection of the quality of Black personhood in itself. Again, the perception of a lacking, 
or “incomplete” Black personhood is reinforced by social structures and systems. 
When a specific event occurs, related to the degraded material conditions of Black 
living and being, and that event results in protest by Black persons, it is indicative that despite 
conditioning and historic deformation, the human will of the Black persons has been, or is 
being, properly re-ordered. Protest indicates perception of unfreeness, and also indicates the 
will’s elicitation of acts in resistance to unfreeness and towards the good of optimizing the 
will’s own freedom. The protest and resistance of Black persons, then, is a sign of a 
rehabilitation of the dignity and humanity of Black personhood. 
The Black person’s rehabilitation of human dignity through protest follows from their 
ability to perceive unfreeness, which is directly related to the intellectual apprehension of 
freeness. But how does a Black person go from nonrecognition and misrecognition of freeness 
to clearly recognizing freedom’s freeness? One apprehends freedom by habituation to freedom; 
being in its close proximity. Freedom is apprehended through encounter with ideas through 
books or media, or through association with peers, those who are like oneself, who live in 
freedom, or by associating with those whose wills elicit acts in the interest their own highest 
good.1091  
I also do not diminish the possibility of the knowledge of freedom being divinely 
revealed. If we are exhorted as Christians to take action that claims and asserts our human 
dignity, then the Spirit must be expected to aid the human will in desiring and doing just that. 
                                               
 
1090 Steve Biko, I Write What I Like: A Selection of His Writings (Heinemann, 1987), 110–11. 
1091 By this I am contemplating those who lives, by virtue of their wealth, race, religion, ethnicity, gender, 
sexual orientation, or some combination of these, enjoy opportunities for choice-making, and will-ing, that 
appear to be desirable. It must be noted that among those with desirable apparent freedom, it may be the case 
that there is nonetheless a disorder of the will. The fact of the persistence of unequal systems and of politics of 
oppression, indicate that the will of many with apparent freedom is not functioning towards its highest moral 
good, which is that of self-restraint. The will’s ability to choose that which is advantageous (affectio commodi), and 
to not will that which is good in itself (affectio iustitiae), indicates a will that is free in a way that is unlike the Black 
person’s will, which has a diminished ability to choose that which is the highest good. However, the human will’s 
optimal function, it’s perfection, is found in not only having the ability to choose, but in making the choice for 
self-restraint, for choosing that which is good in itself rather than that which is merely personally advantageous. 
Thus, the desirable apparent freeness that is apprehended in non-Black others by Black persons, may be seen as 
itself, also, not fully free. 
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Thus, the revelation of freeness must be possible. Not only possible, but the testimony of at 
least Nat Turner, leader of historic rebellion of slaves, was that his rebellion was an act that 
was inspired by the visions from the Spirit.1092 For most, however, this is likely not the way 
that the will towards free-willing is apprehended. By living near, working for, studying with, 
watching video images of, those whom one recognizes as akin to oneself, who are oriented 
towards eliciting acts in furtherance of their desires for their own highest good, one is caused 
to apprehend qualities of freeness that were previously not known or recognized.1093  
Once there is knowledge of freeness, cognition of the dimensions of one’s own un-
freeness arises. At the apprehension of one’s own unfreeness, and in the absence of external 
police and penal measures that discourage self-will-ing, a force of will intensifies sufficient to 
shift the orientation of the will. The will shifts from will-ing what is less good to properly 
willing one’s greatest good. The intensity of force necessary to accomplish such an existential 
reorientation of the will, is an intensity that will not be constrained from elicitation of forceful 
external acts. Which is to say that because a violent inner force is requisite to the freeing of 
free will, the acts of the will elicited through that force might also be violent. Further, the 
intensity of the force necessary to overcome impediments to free will-ing is determined by the 
extent of the perceived restriction upon the will’s freeness. The greater the stifling of freeness, 
the more intense, and aggressive, the inclination towards resistance. 
The highest act of the will is self-restraint, in the interest of moral perfection.1094 Thus, 
the possibility and ideal hope, is that as the will is properly reordered to seeking the greater and 
not the lesser, that appropriate restraint will be exercised in one’s actions, whatever actions are 
willed. Under the circumstances of rehabilitating the will, however, it may be that the will’s 
right-ordering, becoming inclined to will more than marginalized existence, reaches the limit 
                                               
 
1092 See, Stephen B. Oates, The Fires of Jubilee: Nat Turner’s Fierce Rebellion, Reprint edition (Harper 
Perennial, 2014). 
1093 There is much that could be said regarding the role that recognition plays in the experience of 
freeness, however such a discussion exceeds the scope of this essay. I note, however, Vosloo’s argument that the 
desire to be recognized, can be satisfied through acts of mutual recognition, an example of which is the symbolic 
gesture, e.g., Willy Brandt (1913-1992), former Chancellor of Germany, kneeling at the foot of the Jewish 
Memorial in Poland. Acts of mutual recognition, he argues, offer strong potential for peace and mitigation of 
eruptions of violence. Robert Vosloo, “Between the Prose of Justice and the Poetics of Love? Reading Ricœur on 
Mutual Recognition in the Light of Harmful Strategies of ‘Othering,’” Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies 6, no. 2 
(2015): 105–17. 
1094 Ingham, “Self-Mastery and Rational Freedom,” 369. 
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of the will’s capacity. Attaining the highest act of the will, which is self-restraint, might go 
beyond the newly re-ordered will’s ability. 
9.4. Conclusion of Freedom of the Will and Violence 
Modern European knowledge systems fostered conceptions of the human, of “Man,” 
that excluded African persons, and that resulted in the denial of the humanity of Africans. 
Additionally, the freedom of Black persons was effaced. First, freedom was defaced through 
the bondage in which Africans were held. Defacement of freedom also occurred by the psycho-
social violence wrought against the ontology of the African person, and against the will of the 
African person. Ontologically the African went from being a human to being a slave. The will 
of the African went from being ordered to incline towards its own perfection and greatest good, 
to being inclined toward mere survival, and toward the lesser good of mere existence. When 
persons of African descent protest against inequality and marginalization it is an instance of 
rehabilitation of the will. The inner force that is necessary to accomplish proper ordering of the 
will, may possibly result in outward expressions of physical force, or violence. This violence 
may be the necessary cost of the restoration of Black persons’ human dignity. 
Key Implications: 
This presents the urgent task of revisioning of the Christian command to love. The love 
command has two parts. The first is to love God utterly, which is not of concern to this 
discussion. The second part is that which must be re-visioned. In the second love command 
Jesus instructs that the great task of the Christian, after loving God, is to love one’s neighbour 
as oneself.  Matthew and Mark, where this verse appears, use the exact same language, “You 
shall love your neighbour as yourself.” (Matt. 22:39, Mark 12:31) Typically the verse is seen 
to focus on love of the neighbour. The biblical texts of various translations nearly all cross-
reference the verse with verses that highlight Jesus’s teaching on “the neighbour.” This is not 
improper. It is, however, incomplete. Such an interpretation eliminates the significance of the 
latter part of the verse. Both the Gospel teaching and the Hebrew teaching of the law, upon 
which the commandment is based, are concerned not only with the neighbour who is to be 
loved, but with the individual who is to do the loving.1095 The command is not simply to “love 
                                               
 
1095 The Gospel command is based upon Lev. 19:18, “17 You shall not hate in your heart anyone of your 
kin; you shall reprove your neighbour, or you will incur guilt yourself. 18 You shall not take vengeance or bear a 
grudge against any of your people, but you shall love your neighbour as yourself: I am the Lord.” In Leviticus, the 
focus is the conduct of the individual, and the ways that treatment of the neighbour impact the individual. Jesus’s 
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your neighbour,” as Church tradition is guilty of too frequently abridging it. It is to love the 
Other “as yourself.” This makes the love of self the basis of the command to love the Other. 
Without a love of self it is not possible to render to the Other the love that they are due. The 
love of myself allows me to love you. 
This has implications for the reading of the “non-violence” in the Sermon on the Mount 
as connected to the instruction to love the enemy. Typically, the passage is understood as 
meaning that the Christian should use no force against the Other because the Christian must 
love the Other. This reading fails to emphasize the self-love and self-concern upon which love 
for the enemy depends. It does an injustice to the meaning of text. When Jesus speaks of 
“turning the other cheek,” etc. and when Jesus says to “love your enemies,” he makes his 
assertations for the benefit, the good, the maximizing of the humanity of the individual who is 
the actor towards the Other. Thus, it is not merely, “love your enemies,” it is “love your 
enemies… so that you may be children of your Father in heaven.” 
That church tradition has failed to offer this fuller reading of the text is meaningful. It 
reflects what those who have read and rendered the text have deemed the most significant 
aspect of the teaching. Those who have translated and interpreted the text have been primarily 
those who are propertied, White, European men; persons for whom no instruction or 
encouragement is necessary to assert and claim self-worth and dignity. For such interpreters 
the emphasis may be rightly placed upon the first clause of the texts; the emphasis may rightly 
attempt to cultivate a deep concern for the Other. However, Jesus’s teaching was not directed 
at those who occupied a place of privilege in the society. His concern was for those whose 
honour and dignity, through family, church, political and economic relationships (which were 
all connected and intertwined), were daily threatened. Jesus’s teaching was a lesson to the 
people in who they were, and how they were to relate to Others in light of their own identity 
as beloved, worthy, children of God. 
Finally, another key feature of the section should be highlighted, the brilliance of 
Scotus’s theorization. The insight of Scotus is in his determination that the highest operation 
of the will is the possibility of non velle, to will neither yea or nea, but to refrain from willing 
altogether. It speaks to the possibility that Jesus proposes that the essence of the fullness of 
dignity is that dignity does not entail the will-ing of a response issued in the same manner as 
                                               
 
restatement of the command in the gospel retains this emphasis on the individual by the inclusion of the words 
“as yourself.” 
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the provoking offense. It is not a will-ing of a debasing response that allows the offense to 
stand. The fullest expression of dignity is being not willing to will at all in situations that seek 
one’s own complicity in one’s debasement, but to freely will differently, and ideally, towards 
one’s self-realization as worthy. 
Connection to Larger Project: 
The argument of this chapter, that the re-orientation of the will is positive and self-
healing of humanity, finds alignment with the previously asserted argument that Jesus is deeply 
concerned with, and promotes the reclamation of, one’s human dignity. 
Because Jesus is concerned with people attaining their full humanity and with 
individuals resisting the attempts of the powers to diminish them, it follows that the overflow 
of a self-healing humanity would be supported by Jesus. This is even more apparent when the 
reading of key texts of scripture is expanded to highlight the significance of the self to the 
teaching about the Other. It becomes clear that the re-orientation of one’s will, towards human 
flourishing of the individual is consistent with Jesus’s teaching. 
Jesus does not have more concern for the function of a violating social order than he 
has for individuals being and becoming fully themselves in community. Indeed, Jesus’s 
directives to resist the powers’ dehumanization anticipates and requires transgression of the 
social order. 
While Jesus never utilized lethal coercive force during his tenure on earth, the teaching 
of scripture leaves open the exact means and methods that are potential sources of resistance 
to the powers. Jesus uses specific examples of resistance, but only as a means of urging that 
concrete acts be undertaken in one’s everyday life. He does not use the examples of offering 
one’s face for further slapping, going naked in the streets, and giving even more when you are 
exploited, to assert that the particular acts and responses that he offers are those that are 
required when such situations arise. Jesus leaves room for creative defiance, that more 
important than being grounded in the non-use of force, is grounded in the claim and assertion 
of dignity and self-respect—the level of self-respect that is implied by being able to walk naked 
through the streets without shame, which is a deep affront to the pietistic social order of Jesus’s 
era. Jesus leaves room for individuals to determine what the best course of action is under the 
particular circumstances of debasement that they are facing. What is crucial is that action be 
taken to assert one’s dignity, not that non-forceful action be taken, or passive acceptance be 
shown. Thus, the overflow of will-ing in the healing of the self, will-ing that leads to action 
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that reflects self-determination of one’s value and worth, is consistent with a Christian ethics 
of love. 
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10. Theological Analysis from the Margins: Violent 
Protest in South Africa 
10.1. Introduction 
The journey through Part III began with consideration of the expansiveness of the 
concept of violence. It showed how violence at the structural, cultural, and existential level was 
normalized in the social order. It described how Black life is specifically subject to violence, 
being subjected to the direct, structural and cultural violence and then by bearing violence in 
Black being itself because of the mostly invisible violations of systems and culture. I argued 
that the Jesus-Who-Resists is deeply concerned with the violence that dehumanizes, moreso 
than with the overt use of force.  
The last chapter demonstrated the ways that the violence to Black being entailed an 
impairment of the functioning of the will. I argued that when the will is seeking to be re-
oriented to proper function, the force necessary for that re-orientation, may spill over into a 
physical expression of force. I further argued that this is not a moral wrong. Instead, Jesus is 
greatly interested in the will of the individual properly functioning in freeness, and with 
enabling the individual to act in furtherance of their own dignity. I argued that the aim of Jesus 
was not non-violent action, but action that claims and asserts dignity in spite of the powers that 
seek to deny dignity and affirm worthlessness. 
In this final chapter, I make the argument that physical violence in South Africa during 
moments of protest exemplifies the assertion of the will acting in furtherance of human dignity, 
in a context of humiliation. That such protest, far from being occurrences that should be 
overlooked or “excused,” by the Christian church, or that are outside of the bounds of Christian 
integrity, is a faithful attempt to lay claim to long denied human dignity that must be affirmed. 
The chapter begins by describing the context of inequality that exists in South Africa 
currently. It then discusses recent protest actions that have occurred, before providing a brief 
background of the social and protest history of the country. The heart of the chapter reviews 
the positions of South African icons Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela and Stephen Bantu Biko, who 
both accepted the possible use of coercive physical force in South Africa’s struggle for 
freedom. I discuss the use of violence in the South African context as a faithful engagement 
with the history of the country, and the ongoing dehumanization of the people. 
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10.2. History of Colonization and Subjugation 
Like first century Palestine, the contemporary context of South Africa involves multiple 
layers of violence. There was foundational violence with the arrival of Europeans to southern 
African shores. Erasure of cultures, of what was right and accompanying social orders, both 
for the indigenous and for those imported as slaves. Violence progressively increased in South 
African history and eventually encompassed direct, structural, and cultural violence perpetrated 
by and between ethnic groups, and most egregiously against Black Africans. Hundreds of years 
of violence climaxed in the mid-20th century with the imposition of Apartheid rule. Under 
Apartheid there was extreme direct violence, in addition to the extreme cultural and structural 
violence of Apartheid. The policing and jailing of those deemed subversive, the shooting of 
unarmed protesters, and the forced removals of entire communities to new areas are typical 
examples. There was structural violence in the establishment and maintenance of the system of 
“apartness” that enshrined as law the non-equality of life chances and control of resources. 
There was cultural violence symbolically mediated through the church, through schools, and 
through the arrangement of space and structures. The culture of violation included the general 
obliviousness of the White majority to the violences being perpetrated. The foundational, 
direct, structural, and cultural violence combined to effect an existential violence against Black 
persons, in particular.1096 The existential violence resulted in severe impairment of the will of 
those raced as Black. 
10.3. Current Context of Inequality  
Apartheid ended in 1994, and twenty-eight years later, in 2018, the effects of Apartheid 
continue. Apartness largely remains. Over 7 million people, nearly all Black South Africans, 
live in township dwellings, which consist, primarily, of shacks.1097 Over 60% of the population 
do not have piped water inside their dwellings.1098 Economic disparities also endure.  A study 
in 2013 revealed dire inequality, not merely in income, but of wealth. “[T]en percent of the 
                                               
 
1096 Steve Biko, and the Black Consciousness movement were interventions against the existential 
violence. Biko’s program of Black consciousness countered the violence perpetrated to Black self-hood. Biko 
might, indeed, be regarded as a Christ-figure and his message as one of healing and deliverance. It could be 
argued that it was the threatening counter-violence engaged in by Biko, and his words, that resulted, ultimately, 
in the State’s repressive, lethal violence against him. 
1097 Statistics South Africa, “Community Survey 2016 Statistical Release,” Stats SA Statistics South Africa 
(Pretoria, 2016), 59. 
1098 Statistics South Africa, 64. 
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population own more than 90 percent of all wealth while 80 percent have no wealth to speak 
of.”1099  
Educational disparities reflect similar inequalities.1100 A 2007 study showed 41% rural 
Grade 6 children, largely Black South Africans, were functionally illiterate.1101 2011 study 
showed that 50% of children whose home language is not English or Afrikaans, could not read 
by Grade 4.1102 Other data shows that only 44% of Black and Coloured youth graduated high 
school, while 88% of Whites graduated. 1103  “We could also look at…a host of other 
[educational studies]– they all show the same thing–systemic inequalities and 
underperformance.”1104 
Added to these disparities are the staggering instances of gun violence, as well as 
gender-based violence, including rape. 
These statistical quantifications of inequality have the potential to inure us to the reality 
of the lives represented by the numbers. We are numbed to the diminished humanity that results 
when a child lives in a shack, with no running water, and has not been empowered to read, 
while at the same time she witnesses the material beauty and brilliance of a neighbouring South 
African’s lived experience. Without question, the South African context involves a ferocious 
complex of violences--direct, structural, cultural, foundational, and existential. 
10.4. Context of Protest 
10.4.1. Contemporary Protest 
Against this complex of violences, physical violence as a feature of South African 
protest has become ubiquitous.1105 The ongoing struggle for provision of public services to the 
poor, often results in transit trains, schools, roads and other public properties being obstructed 
                                               
 
1099 Research Project on Employment Income Distribution and Inclusive Growth and Anna Orthofer, 
“Wealth Inequality in South Africa: Evidence from Survey and Tax Data” (Cape Town, 2016), 4. 
1100 See, Nic Spaull, “Education in SA – Still Separate and Unequal (Extended Version of CityPress 
Article),” Nic Spaull (blog), January 12, 2014, https://nicspaull.com/2014/01/12/education-in-sa-still-separate-and-
unequal-extended-version-of-citypress-article/. 
1101 Spaull, referencing SACMEQ study of 2007. 
1102 See, Spaull, referencing prePIRLS study of 2011. 
1103 See, Spaull, referencing General Household Survey of 2011. 
1104 Spaull. 
1105 See, Business Tech. June 21, 2016. “This Is What’s Driving Angry South Africans To Violent Protest.” 
Retrieved October 21, 2017. https://businesstech.co.za/news/lifestyle/126775/what-the-government-doesnt-want-you-to-
know-about-violent-protests-in-sa/  
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and destroyed by protesters in the articulation of grievances.1106 Such protests have become 
customary. Within this decade, however, at least two significant events occurred which have 
become touchstones in the protest history of South Africa. First, in 2012, union members 
engaged in a wildcat strike, protesting for a wage increase to R12,500 per month (about 
US$880/month).1107 The workers’ protest was met by police infliction of a lethally forceful 
response.1108 Second, in 2015 students galvanized and formed a protracted nationwide protest 
movement. 
In March 2015, Chumani Maxwele, a student at the University of Cape Town, staged a 
protest in which he collected feces from a communal toilet in the Black African township of 
Khayelitsha and threw it at a statue of British industrialist, John Cecil Rhodes, that was installed 
in the centre of the university campus. 1109 His action birthed the #Rhodesmustfall protest 
movement to decolonize higher education. In solidarity, students around the nation, and 
internationally, joined the protest. #Rhodesmustfall, or #RMF, quickly and successfully 
culminated in the removal of Rhodes’s statue from the university’s campus in April 2015.1110 
Nonetheless, the student protest movement on university campuses continued to gain 
momentum. 
Months after the #Rhodesmustfall movement began, a related movement was organized 
in response to a planned fee increase at South African universities. Throughout the nation, 
                                               
 
1106 Online searches for ‘news’ of the terms “service delivery protest South Africa” returns thousands of 
results, which document the ongoing occurrence of protests every year for the period between 2012 and 2017. 
When search parameters are examined by year the results returned show marked yearly increases during this 
time frame as well. See, e.g., Times Live. June 13, 2017. “Cape Town Commuters rebel as Metrorail Fails.” Retrieved 
September 20, 2017. https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2017-06-13-cape-town-commuters-rebel-as-metrorail-
fails/; EWN Eye Witness News. May 26, 2016. “Violent Service Delivery Protests on the Rise.” Retrieved 
September 20, 2017. http://ewn.co.za/2016/05/26/86-percent-service-delivery-protests-characterised-by-violence---
Municipal-IQ; IOL News. May 15, 2015. “14 740 service delivery protests in 2014/15.” Retrieved September 20, 
2017. https://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/14-740-service-delivery-protests-in-201415-1859009; IOL News. 
September 16, 2014. “Service Delivery Protests Twice close N2 [Highway].” Retrieved September 20, 2017. 
https://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/service-delivery-protests-twice-close-n2-1751386; News24. October 23, 
2013. “Violent Delivery Protest in Bekkersdal.” Retrieved September 20, 2017. 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Violent-delivery-protest-in-Bekkersdal-20131023; Mail & Guardian. 
August 14, 2012. “One Dead in Cape Town Service Delivery Protest.” Retrieved September 20, 2017. 
https://mg.co.za/article/2012-08-14-one-dead-in-cape-town-service-delivery-protest.  
1107 Peter Alexander, “Marikana, Turning Point in South African History,” Review of African Political 
Economy 40, no. 138 (December 1, 2013): 607, https://doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2013.860893. 
1108 Alexander, 608. 
1109 Fairbanks, Eve. 2015. "Why South African Students Have Turned On Their Parents' Generation," The 
Guardian, November 18. Retrieved October 21, 2017. 
1110 BBC. April 9, 2015. “Rhodes statue removed in Cape Town as crowd celebrates.” Retreived 
October 21, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32236922  
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South African university students resisted this pronouncement. By gathering, organizing, 
sitting-in, and marching, students declared that a university fee increase was not acceptable. 
Their protests reached an apex in October 2015, when thousands of students, from multiple 
universities, marched on the South African Parliament demanding that university 
#feesmustfall. Riot police quelled and disbursed the protesters using stun grenades, rubber 
bullets, tasers, and truncheons.1111 
The following school term, January 2016, the University of Cape Town’s campus was 
again alight with protest. This time the protest was due to a shortage of student housing that 
resulted in some students resorting to shelter in township shacks. As part of the protest, a shack 
appeared in the centre of campus, and was emblazoned with the name “Shackville.” The 
#shackville protests built upon the momentum of the previous protests, and soon viscerally 
linked the #shackville, #feesmustfall, and #rhodesmustfall issues. In February 2016, a bonfire 
was lit near the erected shack, and paintings of colonial forbearers were taken from the walls 
of university dormitories and placed on the bonfire to burn.1112 Security services was called 
and used stun grenades to disperse the protesters.  After the dispersal, a car and a student shuttle 
bus were also set on fire.1113 
Damage, burning, breaking, inclusive of vehicles, libraries, and buildings,1114 and total 
disruption became routine and expected features of protest on South African University 
campuses in 2015-2016. Protest demands encompassed continued decolonization, 1115  free 
                                               
 
1111 See, Simon Allison, “South African Police Fire Teargas at Students in University Fees Protest,” The 
Guardian, October 21, 2015, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/21/riot-police-tear-
gas-student-protest-south-africa-university-fees-cape-town, and see also, ; Lynne O’Connor, “FeesMustFall 
Arrested Students to Face Serious Charges,” ENCA, October 22, 2015, Digital edition, /south-africa/students-
held-cape-town-central-police-station-released. 
1112 See, Raborife, Mpho. 2016. “UCT Students Set Paintings Alight,” News24, February 16. Retreived 
October 21, 2017 (http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/uct-students-set-paintings-alight-20160216).  
1113 http://www.groundup.org.za/article/rhodes-must-fall-protesters-destroy-uct-artworks/ 17 Feb 2016. 
Accessed 20 Nov 2016. 
1114 See, Chabalala, Jeanette. 2016. “Burning Books, Buildings, Cars: University Fee Protests Reach 
Boiling Point,” Biznews.com, September 7. Retrieved October 21, 2017 
(https://www.biznews.com/leadership/2016/09/07/burning-books-buildings-cars-university-fee-protests-reach-
boiling-point/). 
1115 Beginning in 2015 students protested and occupied buildings at the University of Cape Town 
demanding the removal of the statue of Cecil John Rhodes from its prominent place on campus grounds. The 
statue was viewed as emblematic of the colonial legacy surviving at the institution, which contributed to the 
ongoing alienation of Black students. The protest soon spread to other institutions of higher learning in South 
Africa. See, e.g., Glazebrook, Dan. 2015. “Decolonizing Education: Rhodes Must Fall,” RT, November 23. 
Retrieved September 20, 2017 (https://www.rt.com/op-edge/323094-decolonizing-education-cecil-rhodes/); and 
Sosibo, Kwanele. 2015. “#RhodesMustFall Protest Spreads To Other Campuses,” Mail & Guardian, March 26. 
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education,1116 and an end to sexual assault of womxn,1117 among others. Such was the extent 
of the turmoil, that affected universities closed down for extended periods, including the 
University of Cape Town, which was largely closed for 6 weeks.1118 Because of the negative 
media portrayals, the official State news agency initiated a media-ban of all “violent 
protest.”1119 Ultimately, this ban was deemed illegal.1120 
In contemporary South Africa, whether protest action relates to social issues, as with 
service delivery, economic issues, as with unions, or education, as with Rhodes/Fees/Rape 
Culture Must Fall, violence has become a tool routinely used by social activists. 1121  The 
engagement in physical violence destabilizes the social order. Roads are blocked, schools and 
universities are shuttered, trains and buses are destroyed, which means alternate routes of 
                                               
 
Retrieved September 20, 2017 (https://mg.co.za/article/2015-03-26-rhodesmustfall-protest-spreads-to-other-
campuses). 
1116 See, Baloyi, Basani and Gilad Isaacs. 2015. “South Africa's 'Fees Must Fall' Protests Are About More 
Than Tuition Costs,” CNN, October 28. Retrieved September 20, 2017 
(http://edition.cnn.com/2015/10/27/africa/fees-must-fall-student-protest-south-africa-explainer/index.html); and 
Daily Maverick. Jan 12, 2016. “Fees Must Fall: Reloaded.” Retrieved September 20, 2017. 
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-01-12-fees-must-fall-reloaded/#.WcIt3sgjGUk. 
1117 Protests against “rape culture” on university campuses and in communities in South Africa made use 
of hashtags such as #RUReferenceList, which named alleged serial rapists and abusers on Rhodes University’s 
campus, #Campusrape, which raised challenged the way that policies on university campuses responded to 
complaints of sexual assault, and #rememberKwezi, which recalled the name of the woman whom South Africa’s 
sitting president, Jacob Zuma, was acquitted of raping in 2006. See, e.g., Seddon, Deborah. 2016. “’We will not be 
Silenced’: Rape Culture, #RUReferencelist, and the University Currently Known as Rhodes,” Daily Maverick, June 
1. Retrieved September 20, 2017 (https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2016-06-01-we-will-not-be-
silenced-rape-culture-rureferencelist-and-the-university-currently-known-as-rhodes/#.WcI30cgjGUk ); Corke, 
Emily. 2016. “#Campusrape: Universities Overhaul Policies Amid Rape Culture Protests,” Ewn Eye Witness News, 
May 17. Retrieved September 20, 2017. http://ewn.co.za/2016/05/18/Universities-overhaul-policies-amid-protests-
over-rape-culture; Dayimani, Bulelwa. 2016. “#1in3 Silent Protest Leads to Rape Victims Speaking Out,” 
DestinyConnect.com, August 6. Retrieved September 20, 2017 (http://www.destinyconnect.com/2016/08/08/1in3-
silent-protest-encourages-victims-speak/). 
1118 See, Nathan Adams, “UCT Had to Shut Again,” The Daily Voice, October 18, 2016, digital edition, 
https://www.dailyvoice.co.za/news/western-cape/uct-had-to-shut-again-6416337, and see also, Lizeka Tandwa, 
“Universities Divided on Campuses Reopening,” News24, October 26, 2015, digital edition, 
https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Universities-divided-on-campuses-reopening-20151026. 
1119 See, “SABC Bans Broadcast of Protests, Destruction of Property,” ENCA, May 27, 2016, digital 
edition, /south-africa/sabc-bans-broadcast-of-protests-destruction-of-property. 
1120 See, Genevieve Quintal, “SABC Ban on Protest Coverage Overruled by ICASA,” Rand Daily Mail, July 
11, 2016, digital edition, sec. Political, https://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/politics/2016-07-11-sabc-ban-on-
protest-coverage-overruled-by-icasa/. 
1121 There has been speculation that the violence of university protests is instigated not by student 
activists, but by members of the national political opposition party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (“EFF”). The 
EFF denies this charge. See, https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1308343/if-you-believe-eff-is-behind-protests-
youre-a-fool/ It is clear that some student leaders on various South African university campuses have also been 
members of the EFF, see, http://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/universities-who-is-behind-the-havoc, and thus 
activism and EFF membership seem to be co-occurring features of student leaders on campuses. Whether the 
EFF practices instumentalization and politicization of students’ grievances, and creates physically violent 
conditions that would otherwise be absent, is contested. 
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transport become dangerously overcrowded, longer commute times and later arrivals home 
then compromise the safety of commuters. These are violences that are endured by the 
marginalized that generally go unnoticed. Protest leads to destruction of property, and often 
involves injury to persons involved. This is generally the point at which society takes notice of 
violence and reacts with additional violence against those damaging or threatening damage to 
property. 
The turn to physical violence, like the inequality that underlies much protest by Black 
persons in countries around the world, is inseparable from the racialized, gendered, and 
colonial histories of the context of South Africa.  
10.4.2. South Africa’s Tradition of Protest 
South Africa’s tradition of protest goes back nearly as far as the beginning of 
colonization in the country. This section will present a brief overview of the protest moods that 
contribute to the contemporary protest moment, and then discuss two significant personages 
who influenced the development of Black self-determined protest in the 20th century, Nelson 
Mandela and Steve Bantu Biko. 
This section spans the settlement of the Cape to the Twentieth Century’s ending of 
Apartheid. 
10.4.2.1. Settlement Protest in the African Cape Colony 
Because indigenous peoples were not subject to the laws and governance of the settlers, 
there was no organized protest per se to European law and authority. Nonetheless, indigenous 
resistance to the settlers1122 often took the form of armed attack and cattle raids in retaliation 
for raids conducted by the settlers.1123 These interactions are more properly characterized as 
warfare among differing societies, rather than protest movements occurring as a facet of the re-
ordering of one society. Violence and warfare were accepted by all parties as normative for 
                                               
 
1122 Conflict between the indigenous and the settlers began early and continued fairy steadily as the 
trading post evolved into a colony. As Marks notes, a Khoi war with the Europeans first arose in 1659, due to 
the Khoi being accused of harboring escaped slaves. Shula Marks, “Khoisan Resistance to the Dutch in the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” The Journal of African History 13, no. 01 (January 22, 1972): 64, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021853700000268. Another war began in the early 1670s, due to the rivalries fostered 
by settlers among the native people groups (by now inclusive of distinct communities in locations further north 
east, including the Chainouqua, Hessequa, Nama, Attaqua, and Cochoqua) as well as continued encroachment by 
settlers. 66. 
1123 Marks, “Khoisan Resistance to the Dutch in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” 69. 
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establishing dominance and control of the means of production of economic materiality, which 
typically meant land and cattle. 
The enslaved in the Cape colony under Dutch control, a minority of whom were 
indigenous Africans, engaged in limited acts of protest and resistance. The peoples imported 
from distant lands of South India lacked a cohesive cultural identity as slaves. They were often 
isolated on farmsteads with small labour forces and, therefore, prevented from taking collective 
action. 1124  Despite this, there were acts of individual slave resistance. There was “the 
spontaneous attack by a slave on his master or the knecht (overseeing servant) in the face of 
punishment, but also planned acts of sabotage, murder or theft.”1125 Resistance also commonly 
took the form of escape, aided by native Africans, since the enslaved were generally unfamiliar 
with the surrounding territory.1126 
10.4.2.2. Nineteenth Century Protest in the Cape Colony 
The law in the early 1800s, under British rule, proactively enabled native Africans and 
enslaved Asian-transplants to gain access to justice and more equal relations with Europeans, 
e.g., legislation ended the slave trade, reduced work hours and introduced the office of 
Guardian of Slaves, etc.1127 Nevertheless, protest against inequality did occur among the native 
and enslaved peoples. There were occasions of revolt and banditry, 1128  and also protest 
communicated through labour practices. These included “flight, theft, destruction of private 
property, [and] ‘go slows.’ These multiple patterns of resistance…concerned the control of the 
very character of work in a developing economy, the organization of space and time…and the 
transmission of social knowledge about the wider world.”1129  
Another different stream of protest was exemplified during the nineteenth century by 
the Voortrekkers’ formal physical and political separation of themselves from British imperial 
rule. British control of the Cape, beginning near the turn of the nineteenth century, brought 
great change to the region. This included language, religious practices, social customs, 
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education, urban vs. rural lifestyle, and laws prohibiting slavery.1130 Finding the governance of 
the British to constitute untenable encroachments on their liberty and property rights, thousands 
of Dutch settlers, Voortrekkers, fled British colonial boundaries, and settled their families on 
frontiers previously unsettled by Europeans, in areas northerly and easterly of the Cape 
colony.1131 The British did not prevent them from leaving. This “Great Trek,” as it came to be 
known, resulted in the formation of independent Boer Republics that bordered the British 
colony: Natalia Republic, established in 1837, the South African Republic (or Transvaal), 
established in 1852, and the Orange Free State, established in 1854.1132 
In the next decades of the nineteenth century protest took the form of war. Britain 
annexed the Transvaal in 1877. This had the effect of ending the border disputes that had been 
the subject of battles between the Transvaal and the Zulu kingdom. Britain, as colonial 
authority over the Transvaal, went to war against the Zulu in 1879, and defeated them. The 
Zulu kingdom was then also brought under the control of the British.1133 
In 1880 the Transvaal Republic rebelled against colonization and regained its 
independence in the First Boer War. The discovery of gold in the area, however, led Britain to 
wage another war to gain control of the Transvaal, as well as the Orange Free State, which 
stood between British territory and Transvaal territory. This Second Boer War (1899-1902), 
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inflicted much death, devastation and destruction,1134 before being won by the British. By 1902 
the former independent Boer republics had been ruthlessly brought under British dominion, as 
was all native African territory. In 1910 the Union of South Africa was created, which 
consolidated the former Cape Colony, Natal Colony, Transvaal Colony, and Orange Free State 
Colony into one entity existing as a dominion of Great Britain. 
The history of brutal warfare, in resistance to domination and control, between the 
Dutch and the English, and between Europeans and Africans, is a large factor in the 
“normatization” of violent resistance in South African culture. 
10.4.2.3. Early Twentieth Century Protest in South Africa 
Black South African protest methods of the early 20th century reflected the British 
political and ideological dominance of the early 19th century, which was marked by the 
implementation of “civilizing” colonial reforms. 
The early strategy of the South African Native National Congress (“SANNC”), which 
later became the African National Congress (“ANC”), provides a notable example. British 
ideology, which was rooted in civil rights, the rule of law, and respectable Christian character, 
dominated early 19th century South Africa and influenced subsequent generations as to ideas 
of what constituted proper conduct of citizens. By the early 20th century, though the disputes 
of the early 19th century regarding territory and political control had been resolved, questions 
of racial hierarchy and inclusion continued to be contested. In 1912, the SANNC was formed 
in response to discriminatory laws enacted by the newly formed Union of South Africa.1135 In 
response to the onslaught of legislative depredations, “[n]early all the leaders and greater chiefs 
supported the movement for a congress that would give them an effective means of making 
their grievances known to the government and South Africa at large.”1136 The primary native 
African strategy of resistance to ongoing discriminatory treatment involved organizing for 
protest. 
                                               
 
1134 See, Emily Hobhouse’s Report to the Committee of the Distress Fund for South African Women 
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The act of organization was an expression of the inculcation of the discourse of the 
British Empire. It was, after all, the British organized protest of slavery that led to the abolition 
of the slave trade a century earlier. By choosing organization as a strategy, those who were 
politically located among the lower echelon of colonized subjects, demonstrated an 
internalization of the British idea of organized protest as a means of obtaining redress of 
wrongs. 
Furthermore, leadership of the SANNC, and later the ANC, embraced a Constitutional 
approach to protest.1137  As Hofmeyr notes, “[t]he approved methods of struggle were to 
ventilate grievances at public meetings and through the press, and make representations for 
redress by means of resolutions and deputations.”1138 The African leaders, who were the most 
privileged class of native Africans, were convinced that their respectability would be respected 
by those in power, and their demands given fair consideration.1139 There was a “belief that 
African grievances could be settled through peaceful discussion and that Africans could 
advance gradually to full political rights.”1140 Thus, despite being subjected to discrimination, 
exclusion, and cruelty, native African protest of the early 20th century, which included the filing 
of resolutions and peaceful discussion, embodied the British ideology of civility, respectability, 
and the rule of law. The protest strategy was almost entirely ineffective. 
There were also instances of less conservative protest by the non-elite class of native 
Africans. These included labour strikes,1141 the Transvaal Native Congress (an affiliate of the 
ANC) strikes for wage increases and against pass laws,1142 and passive resistance marches by 
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the Native and Coloured Women’s Association (“NCWA”). 1143  However, native African 
leadership consistently repudiated methods of protest that deviated from the genteel norm that 
they established.1144 
During the period between the World Wars, Black Consciousness was being birthed 
internationally, 1145 and was influential in revitalizing the dormant Black protest culture in 
South Africa. Those who would lead the late twentieth century struggle for freedom were born 
during this period. Parented by a generation of men steeped in idealized notions of British 
respectability, they had no struggle with attaining legitimization as “civilized” Africans. Rather 
their struggle was to see realized European political ideals of freedom, justice, equality, etc. for 
the mass of Black South African peoples. By the time that the Apartheid government came to 
power in 1948, a new generation, with different strategies of protest were leaders of native 
Africans. 
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10.4.2.4. Post-WWII Protest Strategy in South Africa 
Where constitutional struggle had been the main strategy pursued in the early 20th 
century, following World War II, and the advent of a platform of explicitly racial 
discriminatory legislation, the protest movement embraced the principles of mass mobilization 
and passive resistance. This program of civil disobedience led to the Campaign for the Defiance 
of Unjust Laws in 1952, which garnered dramatic support among the most marginalized people 
in South Africa.  
After extensive organizing at the grassroots level, a Congress of the People was 
convened in 1955.1146 The Congress was meant to gather “the widest possible representation 
from the whole country to draw up a charter of freedom, embodying the peoples' demands.”1147 
Proposals were submitted from organizational leaders throughout the country. These were 
organized and compiled into what became the Freedom Charter, which was significant for its 
articulation of the will of the people as to governance.1148 
The civil disobedience of the ongoing Defiance Campaign was responded to with 
ruthless opposition by State security forces. In 1960, a nationwide march against the Pass Law 
resulted in 69 persons being killed and hundreds injured after the police fired upon unarmed 
protesters who had gathered in Sharpeville. 1149 As a result of Sharpeville, State suppression in 
South Africa grew severe with the arrest of opposition leaders, and the banning of opposition 
political parties. Thus, the Defiance Campaign came to an end. 
Though anti-colonial movements, which advocated for Black African governance of 
Black African people, bore fruit in countries all over the African continent throughout the mid-
20th century,1150 and though the rights of Black people were being fought for and expanded in 
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the U.S. Civil Rights movement, organized mass protest activity in South Africa quieted 
following the state repression and removal of organizational leadership in the 1960s.  
During this period Steve Biko embarked on a mission to communicate a message of 
Black Consciousness to Black South African youth. These seeds of Black consciousness 
sprouted and grew into organized resistance against Black oppression. In 1976 high school and 
secondary school students in Soweto staged a march and protest, which turned into a scene of 
staggering bodily assault. Police responded to the gathering of protesters with lethal force, 
triggering what came to be called the Soweto Uprising. Some students were killed, some were 
injured, and property was vandalized and burned. The event in Soweto inaugurated the most 
sustained period of resistance to Apartheid since the period that culminated in the Sharpeville 
Massacre over a decade before. 
Students began to incorporate violence into protest. The violence was used strategically 
in some cases, but in some cases viewed as warranted retaliation for the brutal treatment meted 
out by the police. I quote here at length one student leader from 1976 to describe how the drive 
for retaliation was experienced at the time: 
For the last four months of protest in Soweto and other areas, 
apart from the destruction of the White man’s property in the 
Black man’s ghetto, Blacks have neither killed nor harmed any 
Whites. We took our demonstration right into the heart of 
Johannesburg City, we shed no White blood. We proved our 
degree of discipline, dignity, and value of human life whether it 
be Black or White. 
…But, the White South African Police have shot and killed 
hundreds of my Black brothers and sisters; they shot, wounded 
and maimed thousands of Black school children and adults; 
their prison cells are teeming with hundred thousands [sic] of 
Black students and leaders detained or imprisoned for having 
dared to oppose the Monster-Policy Apartheid. 
….Our fathers know what [good things] the White man has 
done for them…Our fathers may forgive Whites. But, there is 
only one thing that I, as a Black student and Youth of this 
country, know. That is: the White police shot and drove a bullet 
through the head and brain of my 10-year old brother. That the 
White police shot and killed hundreds of my colleagues; that 
they shot, wounded and maimed my father, mother, brother, 
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and sister at the graveyard; that they terrorize the streets of my 
ghetto and I can find no peace to rest my head.1151 
Here, student leader, Khotso Seatlholo, communicates his frustration with protracted 
protest that did not yield mutual respect, but instead yielded the death of his 10-year old brother 
at the hands of the police, as well as similar death to hundreds of others. The embrace of 
violence in protest during the struggle period between 1976 and 1994 certainly reflects that his 
sentiment was shared by others. 
10.4.2.5. Conclusion of History of Protest Tradition 
The protest tradition in South Africa is long. It shows that for nearly as long as South 
Africa has been occupied by Europeans who imposed oppressive conditions, Black and 
indigenous persons have resisted being oppressed though various means. These means included 
fleeing enslavement, using the law to seek redress, and organizing mass boycotts and protest. 
They also included, in the late nineteenth century, going to war. The model of warfare to 
resolve disputes with the state was used by all interested parties during the period of 
industrialization when the modern formation of the nation took form. Industrialization 
worsened the dehumanizing life conditions of Black people. It divided the population into elites 
and workers, and created an industrial lifestyle for African workers that enforced as policy their 
imposed diminished social status. Attempts for redress were unheeded. Conditions worsened 
until the informal policy was legislated into law in 1948. Conditions worsened further for 
Blacks in South Africa at a time when Black Consciousness was blooming all over the world. 
The violent repression of attempts by Blacks to assert their human dignity in the 1950s and 
1960s were met with a conscientized Black leadership that was “prepared to die” rather than 
live in humiliation. The dignified resistance of these leaders led to them being exiled, jailed, 
and killed. The awakened consciousness of Black persons, their will to be free, was left without 
any guidance as to how to channel the will-ing of the will to freedom, when freedom appeared 
impossible, except the guidance that trickled down from the master classes on how to endure 
and love.  
The Black elites who had been resurrected into the cultural social life from social death, 
were inculcated with the values of the masters of the social order. Their protest arose from an 
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expectation that the values of the masters—liberty, justice, equality--would be fully applicable 
to them. Their protest did not consider, however, that the values that they had been taught, were 
selective. Liberty, justice, and equality were values reserved for the propertied, White, man. 
Hard work, obedience, submission, suffering, forgiveness, and love were the values that most 
others were expected to adopt; with long-suffering being of particular importance for Blacks.  
The leaders born to elites, who experienced a measure of freeness from birth, were those 
who were found by the message of Black Consciousness and who sought to lead the people to 
experience the freedom that they knew and dared to claim more of. Without leaders, following 
their purge in South Africa, violence in protest, and violence as protest, ensued throughout the 
1970s and 1980s. 
10.4.3. Protest Icons of the Twentieth Century and Violence 
Stephen Bantu Biko and Nelson Mandela, are two leaders from the mid-twentieth 
century struggle whose ideas have been integral to movements for social justice both in former 
years as well as in the present. In this section of the research I will show that Biko and Mandela 
espoused a philosophy that foremost sought to claim the human dignity of the people. They 
concluded that the planned use of violence, could be utilized under existential warrant. 
10.4.3.1. Nelson Mandela 
Nelson Mandela is revered as an iconic visionary of political peace and reconciliation. 
What is less often recalled about Mandela is his advocacy of protest against oppression through 
use of physical aggression. Yet his position on the employment of tactics involving physical 
violence was explicit and unambiguous.  
The victory of the National Party in 1948, and the enforcement of apartheid as official 
government policy meant that “racial hatred had just been legally permanentized, officially 
legitimized, and politically institutionalized.”1152 This action by the political powers provoked 
the progressive adaptation of the Black protest movement during this period. Instead of 
Constitutional struggle of the previous generation, the movement embraced the principles of 
mass mobilization and passive resistance. The Defiance Campaign Against Unjust Laws 
implemented in 1952 involved “persistent mass actions of civil disobedience.”1153 It “aimed to 
clog the jails, bring the administration of unjust laws to a halt, and to demonstrate to the people, 
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the effectiveness of mass non-violent action.”1154 The movement was made up of volunteers 
from the common masses of people, who were available to act.  During the campaign their role 
was to “distribute leaflets, to organize strikes, or do whatever the campaign requires. 
They…volunteer to face the penalties of imprisonment and whipping which are now prescribed 
by the legislature for such acts.”1155 As Boesak notes, the adoption of mass protest action was 
a recognition that “obeying apartheid laws was not a sign of civil politics but complicity in 
their own oppression and lending legitimacy to laws that destroyed their humanity. They now 
understood that…mass civil disobedience was in fact the dignity they owed themselves and the 
generations to come.”1156 As a leader within the African National Congress (“ANC”) in the 
1950s, Mandela implemented strategies of “militant African nationalism and mass 
action…[with] tactics of boycotts, strikes and civil disobedience.” 1157  This became the 
predominant strategy of resistance to Apartheid by Black Africans up to the 1960s. 
However, it became clear that such actions were inadequate to reform the economic 
and political structure. In 1960, the South African police opened fire on a crowd of thousands 
in Sharpeville, outside Johannesburg. The next day, on March 30, 1960, the Apartheid 
government declared the country’s first state of emergency and a week later, banned the Pan-
African Congress and the African National Congress. The Sharpeville Massacre was forceful 
evidence of the lack of effectiveness of non-violent protest. Like the first generation of 
constitutional civil protest actions, non-violent resistance did not result in dialogue, discussion, 
or change. Further, the strategy of mass action was made impossible by sweeping state 
crackdown on strikes and demonstrations, and by the banning of organizations, such as the 
ANC, that planned such actions. As Mandela later wrote, “all lawful modes of expressing 
opposition…had been closed by legislation…the Government had decided to rule by force 
alone.” 1158  Thus, after 12 years, 1949 to 1961, the methods of exclusively non-violent 
resistance were jettisoned. 
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In 1961, Umkhonto we Sizwe or “MK” (“Spear of the Nation”), was created as the 
armed wing of the ANC. Nelson Mandela was a founder and chief proponent of this branch of 
the political party. When Mandela was later arrested and tried for crimes of violent insurrection, 
he gave an extensive statement.1159 In his statement he explained his reasons for turning to 
armed resistance. He identified, first, that community leaders were compelled to channel the 
rage being experienced by growing numbers of  people in the Black community in order to 
prevent wanton expressions of “terrorism.”1160 
Secondly, Mandela argued that armed resistance was the best means of communicating 
a message. The message was that Blacks were human, possessed of human value and human 
dignity. It was also the message that Black people would not allow or accept the dehumanizing 
violences of the social order. 
[W]e felt that without violence there would be no way open to 
the African people to succeed in their struggle against the 
principle of white supremacy. All lawful modes of expressing 
opposition to this principle had been closed by legislation, and 
we were placed in a position in which we had either to accept a 
permanent state of inferiority, or to defy the Government. We 
chose to defy the law…. 
Our problem…was not whether to fight, but was how to 
continue the fight…fifty years of non-violence had brought the 
African people nothing but more and more repressive 
legislation, and fewer and fewer rights….it could not be denied 
that our policy to achieve a non-racial state by non-violence 
had achieved nothing.... 
At the beginning of June 1961…I, and some colleagues, came 
to the conclusion that as violence…was inevitable, it would be 
unrealistic and wrong for African leaders to continue preaching 
peace and non-violence at a time when the Government met our 
peaceful demands with force… the Government had left us 
with no other choice.1161 
Here Mandela argued that the South African history of attempts to assert the dignity of 
Black persons was futile, since it increased the dehumanizing violence perpetrated against 
Black persons. Accordingly, a different tactic was necessary to lay claim to the inherent dignity 
of Black people. 
                                               
 
1159 Mandela’s “I Am Prepared to Die,” statement from the dock during his trial was over 3 hours long. 
1160 Nelson Mandela, “I Am Prepared to Die Speech,” Nelson Mandela.Org, 2018 1964, 
http://db.nelsonmandela.org/speeches/pub_view.asp?pg=item&ItemID=NMS010&txtstr=prepared%20to%20die. 
1161 Mandela. 
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Quoting the MK Manifesto, Mandela continued, 
"The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain 
only two choices - submit or fight. That time has now come to 
South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to 
hit back by all means in our power in defence of our people, 
our future, and our freedom."1162 
Thus, the existential necessity of fighting for the humanity of the people and for 
freedom, compelled Mandela to endorse organized resistance “by all means in our power,” 
including acts of physical violence. 
Mandela’s adoption of an ideology that allowed for the use of physical violence was a 
means, not of physical force as a product, an end in itself. His acceptance of the use of 
physically coercive force was intended as an acknowledgement that violence is a wide-reaching 
process, and that the form of physical violence was needed to counter dehumanization with an 
assertion of humanity, and to defend “our people,” the most marginalized in the social order. 
Mandela’s intent was not wanton vigilantism but an intentional and thoughtful application of 
physical force that was not lethal, but consisted of “properly controlled sabotage.” This strategy 
was, in Mandela’s consideration, the means likely to bear the desired outcome without loss of 
life. It allowed for the possibility of continued relationship between the races while opposition 
to the White race’s violence against Blacks was being forcefully pressed. 
To this end MK’s plan for sabotage was formulated.  
We felt that planned destruction of power plants, and 
interference with rail and telephone communications would 
tend to scare away capital from the country, make it more 
difficult for goods from the industrial areas to reach the 
seaports on schedule, and would in the long run be a heavy 
drain on the economic life of the country, thus compelling the 
voters of the country to reconsider their position. 
Attacks on the economic life lines of the country were to be 
linked with sabotage on Government buildings and other 
symbols of apartheid. These attacks would serve as a source of 
inspiration to our people and encourage them to participate in 
non-violent mass action such as strikes. In addition, they would 
provide an outlet for those people who were urging the 
adoption of violent methods and would enable us to give 
concrete proof to our followers that we had adopted a stronger 
line, and we were fighting back against Government 
violence….[S]trict instructions were given to [MK]…that on no 
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account were they to injure or kill people in planning or 
carrying out operations. 
Mandela’s use of coercive physical force then, was based on assertion of dignity, was 
intended to preserve relationship with the violator, and was adamant that the use of force be 
non-lethal. It demonstrates a will that is rightly ordered and fully aware of the subversive 
tentacles of violence in the social order and what was necessary to resist it.  
10.4.3.2. Steve Biko 
Steve Biko has been called the Father of Black Consciousness in South Africa.1163 His 
work, which is concerned with the identity and being of Black people, oppressed subjects with 
legacies of slavery, colonization, and racism, is the work of Africana existentialist 
philosophy.1164  
Biko’s thought and written critiques of Apartheid were strongly influenced by the 
writing of Frantz Fanon. Like Fanon, Biko acknowledged the everyday recapitulations of 
existentially-diminishing conditions within which Black South Africans, specifically, were 
enmeshed. 
He notes: 
[T]he black man is subjected to two forces in this country. He 
is first of all oppressed by an external world through 
institutionalized machinery, through laws that restrict him from 
doing certain things, through heavy work conditions, through 
poor pay, through very difficult living conditions, through poor 
education, these are all external to him, and secondly, and this 
we regard as the most important, the black man in himself has 
developed a certain state of alienation…[Conditions for blacks 
are entirely inferior to conditions for whites.] The homes are 
different, the streets are different, the lighting is different, so 
you begin to tend to feel that there is something incomplete in 
your humanity, and that completeness goes with whiteness.1165  
Biko understood his task as that of rehabilitating the psychic selfhood of Black people, 
as the preliminary step to securing their political and economic self-actualization. Unlike 
Mandela, his public statements did not explicitly recognize the necessity of acts of physical 
violence as a means of resistance. Indeed, Biko has often been framed as an advocate of non-
                                               
 
1163 Steve Biko, I Write What I Like (Johannesburg: Picador Africa, 2004), 2. 
1164 Mabogo P. More, “Biko: Africana Existentialist Philosopher,” Alternation 11, no. 1 (January 1, 2004): 
82–83. 
1165 Biko, I Write What I Like, 2004, 110–11. 
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violence. He seemed in some cases to state an opposite position. For example, he gave 
testimony at trial that his organization was different from other organizations on issues of 
violence: 
“[W]e have groups that are known in this country, who have 
opted for another way of operation, who have opted for 
violence. We know that the ANC and PAC have done this in 
the past; they have taken this step. Now we don’t believe it is 
the only alternative. We believe that there is a way of getting 
across to where we want to go, through peaceful means”1166  
Nonetheless, there is sufficient cause to be sceptical of the “non-violent” framing of 
Biko.  First, language expressing commitment to “peaceful means” is language used by Biko 
under conditions of close monitoring. Being a banned person,1167 repeatedly facing charges of 
terrorism, under house arrest on unspecified charges, and confronted with the knowledge of 
routine assaults and murders of Black activists by the State,1168 Biko was hardly likely to offer 
self-incriminating statements of an intent to incite insurrection, or to make any statements that 
could be construed in such a way. For the same reason, documents of the organizations with 
which Biko was involved,1169 must be read in light of the heightened state of security that 
controlled the lives of those involved in activism.1170 
Two short examples of Biko’s responses to questions are instructive. When asked, “Is 
BPC a strong organization at the moment?” He replied, “I wouldn’t say it is strong; I don’t 
                                               
 
1166 Biko, 151. 
1167 Banning Steve Biko meant that he could not: enter an educational institution, write anything for 
publication, speak in public, be quoted in the press or in any publication. He could not attend any gathering other 
than “a bona fide church service,” or have visitors to his home except a doctor, or ever be in the company of 
more than one person at a time. Biko, I Write What I Like, 1987, 183. 
1168 Biko was banned from Durban in 1973 and confined to his hometown of Kingwilliamstown, due to 
his activism with Black Community Programmes (“BCP”). His activism nonetheless continued, and in 1975 his 
banning orders were amended to prohibit his work with BCP. In 1976 he was detained for 101 days under the 
Terrorism Act in 1976, and was then released without being charged. His repeat detention in 1977 culminated in 
his assassination at the hands of the security forces Biko, 1–2.. 
1169 During Biko’s trial much attention is paid to the written documents of the organization which 
describe the group’s goals, methods, and intentions for their operation. At one point Biko relates that the Black 
People’s Convention documents make clear statements of the organization’s intention of obeying the existing 
laws without confrontation and without provoking a police response. Biko, 154. 
1170 See, e.g., an interview he gave where he described his impression of the Government’s view of 
SASO, the student organization he founded: [The government is] obviously watching. You see, unlike the old 
movements, which they could easily associate with communism-or violence, which they still define as 
communism-their initial analysis of SASO was that it sounded like an organization which was going to function 
along the kind of lines they wanted to see…They haven't outlawed black consciousness as a philosophy in the 
same way that they've outlawed socialism. So that nobody can be held to ransom for preaching black 
consciousness. In any case it would be extremely untenable for them to preach white power and outlaw what 
they regard as black power.” http://abahlali.org/files/Interview%20with%20Steve.pdf Gerhart byline. 
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know what strength you are using; for instance, I would not compare it to the Nationalist Party,” 
which was the controlling political party of the country at that time.1171 
When asked if he was “building up a hostile power bloc…oriented for action….[that 
his work was] conscientization pointing out to [Black people] what enemies they have in the 
white people?”, Biko responded, “…this is just a common starting point…you  move from 
there to create some kind of hope, some kind of opportunity, and in fact I think you are giving 
them some kind of psychotherapy to move away from being a defeated society to being a 
hopeful society…”  His responses appear tailored to his audience of prosecutors. 
Despite Biko’s claim that the Black Consciousness Movement’s aim was nothing more 
than to provide hope, it is clear that the ultimate goal of BCM, was that of securing respect for 
the human dignity of Black persons; that through the psychological rehabilitation of Black 
people their political and economic rights would be demanded and secured.  
However, even if the threat of the Black majority actively securing their rights were not 
Biko’s intent, his consciousness raising, and rhetoric of inherent human dignity and equality of 
Black people, was itself a dangerous aggression against the laws, culture, and hegemonic 
discourse of South Africa, which normalized the inferiority of the Black person. As Bahktin’s 
theory of “authoritative discourse,” 1172  makes clear, the act of questioning authoritative 
discourse “is itself a transgressive and treasonous act, a sign of rebellion.”1173 
Second, Biko regularly noted that Fanon was an intellectual influence. That influence 
is clear with respect to both Fanon and Biko’s concern with Africana existentialism. Though 
there is not an express affirmation of Fanon’s theorizing around the use of physical force in 
revolutionary movements in Biko’s writing, there is also no express repudiation, distancing, or 
declared divergence of understanding from Fanon in Biko’s writing. Without such a distinction 
between where he differs from Fanon, at best the assessment of his position is that he may have 
                                               
 
1171 Biko, I Write What I Like, 2004, 152. 
1172 Authoritative discourse, says Nielsen, is more than simply a set of rules, directives, and fact-like 
information; it “strives rather to determine the very bases of our ideological interrelations with the world, the 
very basis of our behavior.” It “is located in a distanced zone, organically connected with a past that is felt to be 
hierarchically higher. It is, so to speak, the word of the fathers”; it “is given (it sounds) in lofty spheres, not those 
of familiar contact. its language is a special (as it were, hieratic) language…it is akin to taboo, i.e., a name that 
must not be taken in vain” Cynthia Nielsen, “Resistance Is Not Futile: Frederick Douglass on Panoptic 
Plantations and the Un-Making of Docile Bodies and Enslaved Souls,” Philosphy and Literature 35 (2011): 
260–61 citing Bakhtin.. 
1173 Nielsen, 261. 
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been in full agreement with Fanon with respect to revolutionary necessities, or he may not have 
been in full agreement.  
It is certainly clear that in his own life and personal struggle against the Apartheid 
apparatus of State security, Biko was no pacifist. In an interview shortly before his final 
detention, he recalls an arrest where, “some guy tried to clout me with a club. I went into him 
like a bull.”1174 He describes a philosophy of dealing with his interrogators that included his 
meeting of physical force from them, with his own even greater physical force, so that his 
tormentors would have to overcome him using much greater force than they had planned. “I’m 
afraid you may have to kill me in the process even if it is not your intention,” he would 
advise.1175 His autopsy revealed just such an excessive beating. 
Finally, the culture’s propensity to craft innocuous narratives around resistance leaders, 
narratives of non-violence, moderation, and preservation of order, should make us cautious 
about the framing of Biko’s message as wholly non-violent. Recently, the former President of 
South Africa, who faces a number of criminal complaints for acts committed during his tenure 
in office,1176 likened himself to Steve Biko, saying “we are there, some of us, hated as he was 
hated.” 1177 The leadership contributions of both men, however, are entirely opposite. Such 
reframings are a sharp demonstration that the memory of historic figures, such as Biko, can be 
an ongoing matter of contestation.1178 
Like Martin Luther King, Jr., whose image is employed globally as a non-violent 
change agent despite the radical stance he made against systems of poverty and war, a stance 
that resulted in his assassination; and like Mandela, who was the principle proponent of 
                                               
 
1174 Biko, I Write What I Like, 2004, 173–74. 
1175 Biko, 175. 
1176 Lodged against President Zuma have been charges of rape, as well as allegations of influence 
peddling, corruption, and misappropriation of funds. See, The Guardian. May 8, 2016. “Jacob Zuma Cleared of 
Rape Charges.” Retrieved October 5, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/may/08/aids.southafrica, 
Reuters. June 15, 2017. “Public Protector Launches Probe Of Influence-Peddling In State-Owned Firms.” 
Retrieved September 30, 2017. https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/south-africa/public-protector-launches-probe-
of-influence-peddling-in-state-owned-firms/, Tran, Mark. 2016. “South Africa's High Court Rules Jacob Zuma 
Should Face Corruption Charges,” The Guardian, April 29. Retrieved September 30, 2017 
(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/29/jacob-zuma-corruption-charges-review-south-africa-high-
court), and Smith, David. 2014. “Jacob Zuma Told to Repay Cash Spent On Private Home,” The Guardian, March 
19. Retrieved September 30, 2017 (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/19/jacob-zuma-watchdog-
report). 
1177 Virginia Keppler, “I’m like Steve Biko, Says Zuma,” The Citizen, September 13, 2017, 
http://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1651023/im-like-steve-biko-says-zuma/. 
1178 See, Athi Mongezeleli Joja, “The Quiet Violence of Steve Biko,” Sunday World, September 15, 2014, 
http://www.sundayworld.co.za/talk/2014/09/15/the-quiet-violence-of-steve-biko. 
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inaugurating armed struggle as a tactic of resistance to the oppressions of the South African 
state, Biko’s image is sought to be captured by those who would neuter voices that have the 
potential to revive the will of the marginalized and thereby to arouse the vigorous spirit of 
resistance. 
Biko was a Fanonian existentialist, who was well versed in the power, and also the 
limitations, of rhetoric of the struggle for liberation. For Fanon, and for Biko, psychological 
reinvention, would necessarily lead to action. To assert, “Black man you are on your own!”1179 
must mean just this.1180 That understanding oneself as Black, equal in value and dignity to those 
who are White, is a preliminary movement; full understanding of who and what it means to be 
Black requires understanding that action must be taken to secure one’s Black being.  
The philosophy of Black Consciousness therefore expresses 
group pride and the determination of the black to rise and attain 
the envisaged self. Freedom is the ability to define oneself with 
one's possibilities held back not by the power of other people 
over one but only by one's relationship to God and to natural 
surroundings. On his own, therefore, the black man wishes to 
explore his surroundings and test his possibilities---in other 
words to make his freedom real by whatever means he deems 
fit.1181 
                                               
 
1179 Biko, I Write What I Like, 2004, 100, 108. 
1180 Biko used this phrase, which was originated by Barney Pityana Don Makatile, “Black Man Was Truly 
on His Own - Sowetan LIVE,” Newspaper, Sowetan LIVE, September 13, 2010, 
http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/columnists/2010/09/13/black-man-was-truly-on-his-own, memorably in one of his 
more popular articles, “Black Consciousness and the Quest for a True Humanity.” It concludes a paragraph that 
is highly suggestive of the thought of Fanon: 
We must learn to accept that no group, however benevolent, can ever hand power to 
the vanquished on a plate. We must accept that the limits of tyrants are prescribed by 
the endurance of those whom they oppress. As long as we go to Whitey begging cap in 
hand for our own emancipation, we are giving him further sanction to continue with his 
racist and oppressive system. We must realise that our situation is not a mistake on the 
part of whites but a deliberate act, and that no amount of moral lecturing will persuade the 
white man to "correct" the situation. The system concedes nothing without demand, for it 
formulates its very method of operation on the basis that the ignorant will learn to 
know, the child will grow into an adult and therefore demands will begin to be made. It 
gears itself to resist demands in whatever way it sees fit. When you refuse to make these 
demands and choose to come to a round table to beg for your deliverance, you are asking for 
the contempt of those who have power over you. This is why we must reject the beggar tactics 
that are being forced on us by those who wish to appease our cruel masters. This is where the 
SASO message and cry " Black man, you are on your own! " Biko, I Write What I Like, 1987, 
100 emphasis added. 
1181 Biko, I Write What I Like, 2004, 92. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
310 
It would seem that the images of Mandela and Biko have been framed as fully infused 
with a non-violent ethos. This attempt at non-violent framing constitutes an attempt by 
hegemonic culture-forming systems, to appropriate the memory of figures who wield cultural 
influence, and to affix to them the language-label of “non-violent” to symbolically code them 
as nonthreatening to the established social order. For Mandela, who as President of a 
democratized South Africa, became a symbol for the legitimacy and possibility of the 
established social order, a re-coding as non-threatening may be valid. However, it is not a valid 
re-coding with Biko, who died resisting, as it is not a valid re-coding often when it is employed. 
This “non-violent” coding represents a re-conception of the identity of such influential 
figures. It is an imagination of their persons that represents them as having ideals that 
legitimized and accepted the terms of engagement prescribed by those in power. Precisely the 
opposite of the ideals for which these figures were actually proponents. What Mandela and 
Biko symbolize are a twentieth century incarnation of the theoretical conceptualization of 
human freedom’s telic movement towards being free.  
10.4.4. Protest, Freedom of the Will, and South African Activists 
Mandela’s adoption of tactics that were morally prescribed in the culture, overcomes 
the cultural and structural violence that refuses to be named as violence. It overcomes the 
systems that prohibit and outlaw any overt resistance by the violated. It overcomes the volatility 
of the violated, who might allow their emotional response to unfreedom to physically do harm 
to others, and to their own dignity. Finally, it overcomes the cultural, structural, and existential 
violence that is inherent in a system that dictates the parameters of how the violated are allowed 
to express the fact of their violation; i.e., the gathering in church to pray is allowable, the 
gathering in the public square to be arrested is not. Mandela recognized what Jesus recognized, 
that dignity demands action, and that action must reflect the dignity of the person undertaking 
the act. Theirs is a power that determines for itself, without regard for what culture approves 
of, what is necessary under the particular circumstances to love, honour, and value, one’s own 
self-identity and one’s neighbours, especially the marginalized. What neither insisted upon was 
that resistance not include the use of physical force. This is the thesis of the project.  
10.4.4.1. The Student Protests of 2015-2016 in South Africa 
Nelson Mandela and Steve Biko are examples of the working out of the human impetus 
to be or to become free. The same may be said of the protests of South African “born-free” 
student activists. The protests of South African students are iterations of this same manner of 
human freedom needing to be free.  
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Students in university in 2015-2016 are living in the shadow of a democracy that seems 
to have failed to fulfil its promises of equality and dignity for all. Over twenty years after the 
transition in governments, there has been little change in the lived experience of the daily lives 
of many. Presence on university campuses where the possibility of freedom is apparent, 
together with the actual limitations that are imposed by one’s economic, cultural, and racial 
social location, may be cause for the development of frustration and hostility. It may be cause 
for refusing to accept the legitimacy of the limitations to being, and for challenging the system 
that creates and maintains the limitations. 
In the spaces meant for freeness inside the university students encountered a reality that 
imposed restrictions upon their free being, i.e., human being, in ways that they did not before 
realize that they were limited and restricted, the existential impediment may be seen as leading 
to contemplation of, and conduct of coercive acts of force simply to allow the will-ing to move 
towards its telos; a space where the will can do the act of will-ing. This is particularly so when 
students have histories of marginalization, where desire and will-ing towards one’s greatest 
good has been strongly suppressed, in favour of willing survival or aversion to penalization; 
and where these methods of not-will-ing, or willing against one’s own greatest good, have been 
deeply internalized. In these cases, to resist the powers that represent the system of oppression, 
by all means one deems appropriate within one’s power, is a mark of fully alive humanity. 
Such protest is to be witnessed with understanding, it is to be responded to on its terms. 
10.4.4.1. Critique of the Contemporary (Boesak) Paradigm of Non-violent 
Resistance 
Allan Boesak provides a valuable and necessary, detailed apology for the deployment 
of physically violent resistance by Christians, particularly those who endorsed armed struggle 
in South Africa, in his Kairos, Crisis, and Global Apartheid. 1182  His position warrants 
consideration as his words make clear a sympathetic understanding of those who seek to obtain 
freedom through the use of physical force. Nonetheless, after careful consideration, he 
articulates a disavowal of the use of physical force. Boesak’s views are significant to, and merit 
analysis in, this project because he is a South African who was deeply involved in the struggle 
for justice prior to 1994, and because he is now based in the West and undertakes theological 
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work that encompasses the struggles of the marginalized globally. Thus, his views might be 
seen as representing a Western, African, and global sensibility. 
10.4.4.1.1. Boesak’s View of (Non)Violence 
Boesak’s position is one that is not infrequently adopted by Christians who are 
committed to the work of justice and reconciliation. Contemporary Christian sensibilities 
generally do not oppose political protest, and often support it. Forster has concluded that the 
church is “called to protest, to bear witness, wherever we see God’s hope, but also where we 
see it as absent.”1183 The Boesak paradigm supports protest by Christians, however concludes 
is that the legitimization and use of “violence” (by which he means coercive, and possibly 
lethal, physical force), whether it is by the imperial powers or by those “freedom fighters” 
seeking justice on behalf of the marginalized, is morally wrong. In his view, violent acts 
trivialize the pain of the innocent who are wounded by such violence.1184 
Participation in acts of physical violence must, then, be repudiated by all, though such 
repudiation is contrary to the core tenets of our social order. 
To question…violence is to question not only the efficacy of it; 
it is to question its salvific power, which, in situations where 
violence is glorified, always becomes an article of faith. It is to 
question the belief that violence is the god we need, to whom, 
in the first and the last resort, we turn for liberation, to whom 
we bow in submission and worship.1185 
Boesak views violence as the god of this age; as an idol whose worship must end. 
Boesak’s theological heuristic is one that I regard as compatible with the arguments 
that I have made in this paper, to the extent that his theology is deeply concerned with the 
marginalized and with transformation of the culture. However, our theology diverges on the 
matter of (non)violence. Ultimately, the broad strokes painted by the Boesak view are unsuited 
for capturing the details involved in discussions of the Christian use of force during protest.  
Boesak’s articulation of the mainstream Christian view collapses the concept of 
violence into one broad category, regardless of what the violence consists of, who enacts the 
violence, and who is affected by the violence. Because of this, no allowance is made for the 
particularities of circumstance that shade what the use of force represents for those who choose 
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it, nor is there a possibility offered of the Christian integrity of pursuing the use of force when 
conscience dictates such a course of action.  
The Boesak view insists that justice and love require a radical and revolutionary 
engagement with situations akin to a neighbour being robbed in our presence (e.g., 
encountering the robbery in progress in the Good Samaritan parable).1186 It insists that the 
humanity of both the robber and the victim be recognized, as both are likely victims, on some 
level, of a system of violence. It insists that what is required “is not the turn to violence, it is in 
fact the embrace of compassionate, combative love.”1187 What is required is transformation of 
the “Jericho Road” itself. Which entails working for economic justice, a spiritually infused 
struggle, revolutionary neighbourliness, and a Spirit-filled Jericho Road ministry that is able to 
see the victims along the road.1188 
10.4.4.1.1. Limitations of the Boesak View 
These are necessary responses to the systemic Jericho Road situations around the world. 
However, they do not offer much guidance as to what the Christian travelling on the road is to 
do about looming attackers.1189 Is one to accept the risk of travel on the road, and the threat of 
bodily injury, trusting that there will be Spirit-filled ministry to aid one’s recovery after one is 
attacked? Can a woman carry mace and stun her attacker? Can a brother, and his friends, escort 
a sister along the road, with all prepared to defend and protect themselves should the need 
arise? Can a child walk along the road with a large dog that will allow no harm to befall the 
child? Are these acts of violence that a Christian must turn from? And what is the principle, or 
analytical frame, at work that determines if they are or are not? Is it love? Is one to love her 
attacker more than she loves herself? Surely that moves outside the teaching of Jesus.  
The too-common shortcoming of the Boesak view (that it does not make clear what 
course of action the victimized Christian traveller is to follow, and why)1190 is the willingness 
                                               
 
1186 See, Boesak, 180–92. Boesak poses the question of Jean Cardonnel, “What would have happened if 
the Samaritan had come upon the scene while the robbers were still attacking their victim?” 
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Boesaks’ constructed ethics in Farewell to Innocence, Motlhabi questions, “On what norms, principles and values is 
it based? What is its method of decision-making? What guidelines does it give for moral practice? Indeed, what 
he provides is a vision of an ethic of liberation without giving any content to such an ethic.” Mokgethi Motlhabi, 
“The Problem of Ethical Method in Black Theology,” Black Theology 2, no. 1 (January 2004): 64. 
1190 Boesak’s prescription for what must happen when robbery is witnessed in our presence is that there 
must be love and neighbourliness, which demands one’s intervention.  
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to provide a universal prescription based on this parable, while failing to consider the Jericho 
Road from the perspective of victim. Those who are not victimized on the Road should 
certainly be engaged in aiding victims, and in transforming the Road to make it safe for all 
travellers. But perhaps their ministry also entails helping, or at least in no way interfering with 
those helping the often-targeted learn how not to be targeted, or learn what to do if they are 
targeted. 
10.4.4.1.1.1. Primarily Only Addresses Physical Violence 
What can be learned from the Boesak view are ways that teaching about love of 
neighbour are not helpful to those who are historic victims of cultural violence. First, the 
dictation of what measures are appropriate, and what acts of force or non-use of force are 
allowed, is but a re-instantiation of the operation of hierarchical power that resulted in 
victimization in the first instance. Deciding for targeted persons who travel the road the best 
means to navigate it without assault, is to impose upon those who are personally at risk, the 
parameters of behaviour that are allowed and acceptable. It is to impose this set of boundaries 
in the name of Jesus and religion. It is to participate in a system that victimizes, and then to 
insist upon limits to the means that the victim may use to escape victimization. In addition to 
allowing room for the creative and ingenious work of the Spirit in transforming the culture, 
that same freedom must be allowed for the Spirit to inspire the traveller on the violent road.1191 
Second, Boesak’s paradigm of (non)violence does not take into account the existential 
violence perpetually undergone in the being of Blackness. A robber does not need to have a 
weapon of “violence” to do violence on roads around the globe when the victim is Black. The 
                                               
 
Combatant love and revolutionary neighborliness…cannot look away, cannot stand 
aside, cannot wait for intermittent, safe charity…[I]ntervenes, steps into the breach, 
takes the risk of attack and retribution, taking upon itself the violence intended for the 
victim. It wrests control of the wheel out of the hands of the violent perpetrator and 
stops the cycle of destruction. That is the combative love that leads to the revolutionary 
neighborliness that Jesus talks about. Boesak, Kairos, Crisis, and Global Apartheid, 193. 
1191 This reminds me of a church I visited once in Brooklyn, NY, many years ago. I do not remember the 
context of this story but will never forget the story itself. The preacher described how on one occasion he was 
preaching energetically when a man came to the front of the church and assaulted him. The man yoked the 
preacher from behind. Using his arm, he squeezed the preacher’s neck preventing him from breathing. The 
preacher was paralyzed in shock when it happened, first trying to figure out what was happening and why it was 
happening, before beginning to send up frantic prayers to God. The preacher said as he was gasping for breath, 
praying, “Lord, help!” he had a moment of epiphany. A thought came to him: “You grew up in Red Hook [a 
rough section of Brooklyn]. Help yourself.” Suddenly he remembered that he could get out of a head yoke, and 
that he knew how to subdue an attacker. So he did. The attacker was not seriously injured, but his attack was 
foiled, by the use of physical force. 
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“highway robbery” can exist in making the Black person’s mere presence on the road, or even 
visibility from the road, an act of transgression. Because of the transgression of being the robber 
then punishes/penalizes the Black person in a way that leaves the Black person, especially if 
she is a Black woman, bleeding and wounded on the road that she should have known better 
than to trespass upon, or be seen from, in the first place. Boesak’s paradigm fails to account for 
that violence that does not recognize violence against the Black person as violence. 
The Boesak paradigm does not see the violence that determines that a Black woman’s 
body lying in the road is a violated body. It does not name as violence what happens to the 
Black woman’s body that is daily troubled by pain of indeterminate origin that appears here, 
there, and also there, after her transit, and labour, and going to market, and cooking, and 
cleaning, washing, and ironing, and caring for children, and praying and worshiping; after her 
heartbreak. Her body in pain that has no time for recuperation, nor means for recreation, much 
less time or means for consultation with a medical professional to investigate or cure the pain, 
which she, then, has no choice but to endure. It does not name as violent the existence she 
experiences that causes her to self-medicate with food to numb her pain. The invisible Black 
woman is fine, she is strong, she slays, but she lives--hands raised in praise--in a condition of 
invisible violation. Her life consists of being left prone on the road. Her Black body in pain and 
unable to move (from the ghetto, or township, or out of abusive exploitation) is not even 
remarkable to those passing by. 
Boesak poses the question that was posed first by Jean Cardonnel, “What should we do 
if we come upon the scene while the robbery is still underway?” It is a question that merits the 
considered response that he provides, but the answer proposed, which turns to “non-violence” 
as a solution, tends to miss the nuance of the parable. What Jesus’s parable recognizes is that 
the violence often perpetrated against persons is often perpetrated by those who are not seen. 
Indeed, the violence that is committed, is not committed by anyone that can be seen. The 
question posed by Cardonnel is valuable for this very reason. It asks us passers-by on the road, 
to be aware of the violent robberies that are wounding and killing our neighbours. It asks us to 
see violence, even when the robber is not a person who can be seen, and the victim is one whom 
we usually choose to overlook. 
Third, the Boesak paradigm, which does offer a cogent articulation of a Christian ethics 
of justice, critiques systems of injustice. Yet at the same time, it uses the same rationale, to 
suggest that the violence that happens on the road of life that Jesus is concerned about is the 
violence that involves the use of a weapon. The paradigm suggests that the peace that Jesus 
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cares about is justice, but then makes the condition of justice dependant upon the absence of 
physical force of the violated. This ignores the fact that the absence of physical force of the 
violated is often a symptom of, or evidence of, the violence that has been perpetrated against 
them.1192 
There is a categorical distinction that must be maintained between the use of violence 
of the powers and the use of physical force by the powerless. Focusing the Gospel on the use 
of force in the life of the Christian, places the emphasis on the symptom, but not the cause of 
the problem. What those who are marginalized by the powerful (including the marginalized 
earth) know for certain, is that men in suits, and who make deals on golf courses and in private 
rooms, are the initiators of violence in the world that often has the residual effect of denying 
people the necessities of life, which then leads to petty physical violence. Such physical 
violence is not the heart issue that Jesus seeks to resolve. Rather it is the heart issue of greed, 
and of damaged self-hood that allows one to participate in their own diminishment, by engaging 
in acts of petty violence and submitting to acts of violence large and small. 
10.4.4.1.1.2. The Concept of “Violence” is Discursive 
Finally, what the Boesak paradigm overlooks is that violence is what those in power 
name as violence. One person’s non-violent act of subversion or omission is another person’s 
act of sedition or treason. “Non-violent” is coded language for acts that affirm the social 
structure. “Violent” is coded language for acts that undermine the social structure. What the 
powers are against is not the use of coercive force; this is sanctioned every day in multiple 
ways. Parents disciplining children, brawls in drinking and sporting establishments, men 
protecting and defending “their” women and children, etc. There are also ample occasions 
when there is no use of coercive force, yet a “peaceful” act is construed as unlawful, such as 
                                               
 
1192 Boesak has in his writing acknowledged that the psyche of Black persons has been impaired by anti-
black racism. See, e.g., Farewell to Innocence, where he notes, “the greatest ally of the oppressor is the mind of the 
oppressed. Gettng rid of an implanted slave mentality is central to the philosphy of Black consciousness.” Allan A. 
Boesak, Farewell to Innocence: A Socio-Ethical Study on Black Theology and Black Power, Reissue edition (Wipf and 
Stock, 2015), 5–6. Later in this text he writes, “[Apartheid South Africa is] a country where blackness is non-
beingness, where black people have no rights, dignity, or self-respect, where an extremely refined system of laws 
shouts “inferiority”at the black person at every level.” Allan A. Boesak, Farewell to Innocence: A Socio-Ethical Study 
on Black Theology and Black Power, Reissue edition (Wipf and Stock, 2015), 139–40. However, paragraphs later he 
explicitly defines Black Consciousness as relating to Black collective economic and political power only, with no 
mention of the actual “consciousness”, or psychic healing. See, Boesak, 142.  Boesak, therefore seems to express 
a affirmation of psychic violence, however an ambivalence with respect whether the redress of this violence is 
the task of Black Consciousness. See, also, DeYoung, “From Resistance to Reconciliation,” 14–15, wherein 
Boesak's co-author DeYoung explicitly relays the concept of the impaired Black psyche, which presumably 
Boesak affirms as co-author.  
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when Martin Luther King, Jr. organized marches, or Steve Biko spread the message of Black 
Consciousness. 
The violence that the powers recognize as deeply harmful, is not that induced by the 
use of coercive force, rather it is that violent threat posed by the self-will, self-definition and 
self-determination of the masses, and most especially of the Black marginalized masses. A 
Black person with a weapon is not a cause for concern in the same way as he would be if he 
also had a self-determination to be free of domination and oppression. What the culture reflects 
is that self-will and self-determination is considered to be the weapon which must be disarmed. 
This is the lesson of Steve Biko’s assassination and Robert Sobukwe’s internment. It is the 
lesson that one’s unmasking of the system is not tolerable by the system. One who unmasks 
the lie of the innate dishonour of the Black person, and the lie of the innate honourableness of 
the White person, must be eliminated. Martin Luther King, Jr. unmasked the lie of the 
honourableness of Southern White people and the dishonour of Southern Blacks, and he was 
reviled. When he began to unmask the lie of the U.S. being a force for peace in the world and 
to reveal the U.S. as a force for war and devastation, he was assassinated. Jesus unmasked the 
lie of the holiness of some people and the profaneness of other people, and the powers had him 
crucified. The powers would have Christians focus on preventing the use of coercive physical 
force. The powers’ intent is for those with the hegemonic and discursive power in the culture 
(Christians) to privilege the values of suffering, forgiveness, and love, which allow for the 
powers’ control, instead of privileging the values of dignity, self-respect, defence of the dignity 
of Others, and commitment unto death to the truth that one adheres to; values which are not 
susceptible to the control of the powers. 
10.4.4.1.1. Critique of Kingian Nonviolence that Informs the Boesak 
Paradigm 
10.4.4.1.1.1. The Inflence of Martin Luther King’s Nonviolence 
As he regularly makes clear, Boesak is a proponent of MLK’s views on nonviolence.1193 
Boesak even references King’s treatment of the Samaritan parable in Boesak’s own 
consideration of the text.1194 Boesak concludes with King that the parable points to the need 
                                               
 
1193 Boesak has described himself as “…more a spiritual child of…Martin Luther King, Jr., than of Franz 
Fanon and Ché Guevara.” Allan Aubrey Boesak, Dare We Speak of Hope?: Searching for a Language of Life in Faith 
and Politics (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 2014), 94.  
1194 Boesak, Kairos, Crisis, and Global Apartheid, 177. 
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for systemic change. Because it is clear that the Boesak paradigm is influenced by the 
nonviolence ethics of MLK, a brief comment on MLK’s ethics is warranted. 
10.4.4.1.1.2. Martin Luther King and “Nonviolence” 
King pursued the tactics of nonviolent resistance to effect societal change beginning 
with the Montgomery, Alabama bus boycott of 1955-1956, to his assassination in 1968. King 
began his work of nonviolence as a man in his mid-twenties, a preacher within an historic 
denomination, and engaged with activist work against de facto segregation in the U.S. South. 
By the time his life ended King was older, his work had split his denomination, and the activist 
task had transitioned to resisting “separated integration” in the U.S. North, economic 
inequality, colonization, and U.S. imperialist wars and ambitions. King’s message had 
originally been grounded in his optimistic belief in the goodness of all humanity. 1195  He 
emphasized the important of love and understanding, as well as forgiveness, of Whites, and the 
redemptive suffering of Blacks. King was concerned that Blacks and Whites would equally 
participate in the “American Dream.” However, as a result of his encounter with northern Black 
rage during the Watts riots of 1965,1196 King’s emphasis underwent a shift. King began to 
question the reality of the American Dream. He began to work to change the systems that 
America was built upon, and that moved away from talk of common humanity, towards talk of 
Black pride and embrace of power. This is exemplified by his speech delivered at the eleventh 
annual convention of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in 1967: 
…[W]e must honestly face the fact that the movement must address itself 
to the question of restructuring the whole of American society…There are 
forty million poor people here, and one day we must ask the question, "Why 
are there forty million poor people in America?" And when you begin to 
ask that question, you are raising a question about the economic system, 
about a broader distribution of wealth. When you ask that question, you 
begin to question the capitalistic economy…We are called upon to help the 
discouraged beggars in life's marketplace…But one day we must come to 
see that an edifice which produces beggars needs restructuring.1197 
                                               
 
1195 James H. Cone, Martin & Malcolm & America: A Dream or a Nightmare, 20th Anniversary edition 
(Orbis Books, 2012), 213–20. 
1196 Cone, 222–23. 
1197 Martin Luther King, Jr., “Where Do We Go From Here,” in A Call to Conscience: The Landmark 
Speeches of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., ed. Clayborne Carson and Kris Shepard, Reprint edition (New York, NY: 
Grand Central Publishing, 2002), 193. 
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King advances a complete restructuring of America, based on a restructuring of capitalism. 
Elsewhere in the speech he even calls for a “guaranteed annual income.”1198 King told his 
audience that to continue moving forward, “[f]irst, we must massively assert our dignity and 
worth.” Further, that, “one of the great problems that the Negro confronts is his lack of power… 
we've had it wrong and mixed up in our country…Negro Americans…[sought] their goals 
through love and moral suasion devoid of power, and white Americans [sought] their goals 
through power devoid of love and conscience.”1199 
It is the post-Watts Riot King said that “the vast majority of white Americans are racist, 
either consciously or unconsciously,”1200 and that “however difficult it is to hear…we’ve got 
to face the fact that America is a racist country.”1201 
early writing describes the manner in which his views regarding nonviolent resistance 
evolved over time.1202 He was exposed to the idea of pacifism for the first time in seminary. 
Encounters with Ghandi and the work of Reinhold Niebuhr were large influences of King that 
moved him toward an ethics of non-resistance that did not equate to passivity. Upon beginning 
a pastorate and being asked to lead a protest in Montgomery, AL, King was caused to put his 
ideas into practice. “Living through the actual experience of the protest, nonviolence became 
more than a method to which I gave intellectual assent; it became a commitment to a way of 
life. Many of the things that I had not cleared up intellectually concerning nonviolence were 
now solved in the sphere of practical action.”1203 
King’s emphasis in his later years on the perniciousness of anti-Black racism, on the 
imperative need for a recovery of Black personhood, on riot violence being a response to 
structural violence; his insistence on “militant, massive nonviolence” (including “disruptive 
dimensions,” that would “[bring] the nation’s capital to a halt”), 1204  to exact government 
response to the activists’ demands, and most especially his commitment to radically altering 
the economic and relational structure of the country, make stark the need for re-evaluation of 
how the term “violence” is understood. If it is, a I have argued, understood broadly, as more 
                                               
 
1198 King, Jr., 187–89. 
1199 King, Jr., 185–87. 
1200 Cone, Martin & Malcolm & America, 233. 
1201 Drew Dellinger, “The Last March of Martin Luther King Jr.,” The Atlantic, April 4, 2018, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/04/mlk-last-march/555953/. 
1202 King, Stride Toward Freedom, 77–95. 
1203 King, 89. 
1204 James A. Colaiaco, Martin Luther King, Jr.: Apostle of Militant Nonviolence (New York: Springer, 2016), 
189–90. 
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than the physical act of force; if it encompasses structural, cultural, and foundational influences 
on social relations, then it is difficult to regard King’s later activism as “nonviolent.” It is 
undisputable that King was staunchly anti-riot. However, his intention to use the force of bodies 
gathered en masse for militant disruption, is not so clearly identifiable as “nonviolent.” I 
suggest that if a leader advancing the same claims as King (whom I’ll refer to as KingSouth 
for the purposes of this example), for Black dignity and complete social transformation, rose 
to prominence in South Africa; and if KingSouth gained a mass following throughout the 
country; and if KingSouth organized a massive, militant march on Parliament, led and 
participated in by primarily Black Africans and other marginalized persons of color; and if such 
a march was led with the express intention of disrupting government operations until the 
government responded to the demands of KingSouth, then it is doubtful that KingSouth would 
be championed as a beacon of nonviolent change. Fear of Blackness, specifically South African 
Black rage, would more likely result in KingSouth being villainized as a dangerous militant 
threat to the safety, security, and order of the nation. A KingSouth who preached a message of 
Black honour and dignity, and of economic equality, and of action in support of both, who had 
mass popular support against the governing order, would likely meet the same fate as MLK, 
the same fate that met Jesus; and KingSouth would meet that fate for the same reasons. As 
“nonviolent” as his actions might appear (to some), they constitute responsive structural and 
cultural violence to the prevailing system. 
10.4.4.1.1.3. Howard Thurman and Nonviolence 
An important, but often unacknowledged,1205 influence on King’s thought and methods 
was Howard Thurman. Thurman’s views aligned more with the ahimsa philosophy of Ghandi 
than with the social justice agenda of King. For Thurman nonviolence was an inward 
disposition meant to transform the individual. Nonviolence is a creative, positive response to a 
violent act towards oneself that meets the need of the perpetrator to be cared for, to be 
understood, and to be loved.1206 Violence, in contrast, is an attempt to force one’s will upon 
another; it is to express one’s own need to be cared for and loved.1207 For Thurman, without 
                                               
 
1205 For evidence of Thurman’s influence, particularly echoes in their work, see, Quinton Hosford Dixie 
and Peter R. Eisenstadt, Visions of a Better World: Howard Thurman’s Pilgrimage to India and the Origins of African 
American Nonviolence (Beacon Press, 2011), 190–93. 
1206 Howard Thurman, Disciplines of the Spirit, Reprint edition (Richmond, Ind: Friends United Press, 
1963), 112. 
1207 Thurman, 112. 
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addressing one’s opponent and convincing them of the need for changed values, nonviolence 
is counterproductive, destructive, and a weapon of violence. Thus, when nonviolence is 
employed as a practical necessity, by those who are inwardly not at peace:  
it has the same moral basis as violence. This is one of the ancient weapons 
of the weak against the strong and is part of the over-all tactic of 
deception…Because nonviolence is an affirmation of the existence of the 
man of violent deeds, in contradistinction to the fact that violence embodies 
a will to nonexistence, the moral impact which nonviolence carries, may 
potentially realize itself in a given situation, by rendering the violent act 
ineffective, and bringing about the profoundest kind of change in attitude. 
For Thurman, the purpose of nonviolence is always the redemption of the other with 
the goal of creating community.1208 Thurman was firmly committed to the idea of redemptive 
suffering, which he found was demanded by the Christian call to love. The violated must 
forgive as, ultimately, vengeance belongs to the Lord.1209 Thurman’s overall conception was 
that social structures are remade by individuals, and individuals are remade by love.1210  
The objections that might be made to Thurman’s spiritualized stance have been 
frequently made by those who have no spiritual dimension to either their refrain from physical 
violence, or to their acts of physical violence. With respect to nonviolence, the practical 
effectiveness of the tactic is often key to its use, and is deemed ethical simply due to its greater 
respect for biological human life than alternatives that engage the use of physical force. With 
respect to violence, such as war, revolutionary war, or revolutionary counter-violence, it is 
often asserted, in a Niebuhrian vein, that justice—and love for the oppressed (e.g., the Jews in 
the Holocaust)—dictates that physical action be taken against the aggressor. As Smith points 
out, Thurman gives little attention to the possibility that redemptive consequences may not be 
possible through nonviolence.1211 
10.4.4.1.1.4. Conclusion of Kingian Critique 
What the arguments from the perspective of King and Thurman demonstrate, is that 
much greater attention is needed to the language of violence and nonviolence, and that 
distinctions, e.g., spiritual motivation, effectiveness, etc., are often readily apparent in the 
“nonviolence” ideologies of its Black proponents. What is also seen is that the pursuit of dignity 
                                               
 
1208 Thurman, 118–19. 
1209 Thurman, Jesus and the Disinherited, 98. 
1210 Luther E. Jr Smith, Howard Thurman: The Mystic as Prophet, 1st edition (Richmond, Ind.: Friends 
United Press, 2007), 147. 
1211 Smith, 153. 
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for Black persons is often seen as a key necessity for any program of liberation, however the 
“nonviolent” protocol is framed. 
10.5. Conclusion of Violent Protest in South Africa 
What this chapter has shown is that South Africa continues to experience inequality 
that is related to its history of colonial racial segregation and oppression. Black South Africans 
have endured generations of dehumanization and indignity. 
In the course of a long tradition of protest, the mid-twentieth century produced a Black 
public whose Black Consciousness was awakened and who would not accept conditions of 
degradation. They organized and transgressed public norms to assert and claim the human 
dignity that belonged to them. Their protests were met with the physical violence of state 
repression, and even murder. The will-ing of Black persons for collective power was opposed 
fiercely. Nonetheless, the awakened consciousness of freedom could no longer accept imposed 
societal limitations. The will insisted, and in some cases the insistence became a physical act 
of coercive force. Ultimately, the will of the people prevailed and the system of government, 
that legislated dehumanity, fell.  
Twenty plus years after its fall, students again insisted on realization of the ability to 
will their desires for their own highest good. Again, the will to freedom would not be restrained 
and in some cases became a physical act of coercive force. 
The protests of the students should not be seen as morally reprehensible. Instead, they 
must be appreciated for what they are: necessary transgressions against systems of injustice by 
the freely operating will of those who have a long history of being oppressed and marginalized. 
It must be accepted that a possible consequence of the resuscitation of the will is the expression 
of coercive physical force. 
Obviously, the destruction of property, and damage to life, is not optimal. To that end, 
the typical response would be to counsel to desist from exercising the will in a way that 
damages. This attempt at restriction only contributes to the will will-ing its freedom, however. 
Instead, the will must be freed to imagine, to exercise options, to plan with well thought out 
intention the course of action that it deems best. This process should be facilitated, without 
policing or censure. Following this, the essence of the cry, whatever it is, must be heard. My 
sense is that the process of allowing protestors to be, on their own terms, and to experience the 
self-worth that comes from insisting upon one’s own terms of engagement, as much as having 
the inequitable conditions ameliorated, the facilitation of the protestors being made visible can 
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contribute to the ending of ongoing protest and to the ending of the eruptions of physical 
violence. 
Yet an even more important measure may be implemented to quell the coercive use of 
force that results from the will seeking full expression. This involves proactively anticipating 
and providing an outlet for the will that may imminently be resuscitated to will-ing freedom. 
This includes, on university campuses, providing spaces for unfreeness to be candidly 
discussed, and fostering the discussions of what freedom is being witnessed that appears to be 
off-limits to Black students. It includes leading discussions with students in which they are 
encouraged to imagine what their apprehension of such long- denied-freedom would entail. It 
includes helping students to see how they might make their imagination of freeness a reality. 
In other words, helping students to channel the will to be free in practical, personal terms. Most 
importantly, making the students visible, by affirming and encouraging them that their sense 
of unfreeness is based in fact, and that their freeness and dignity is of utmost importance; that 
it is imperative for them to know their value and worth; to exemplify that knowledge in their 
choices. The goal is to water the planted seeds in the minds of the students that they have power 
and that possibilities exist for their unique and creative participation in the community without 
shame or diminishment. 
To ascribe the claim of humanity, and the operation of the will-that-is-being-freed to 
moral iniquity, is to misunderstand the needs of human being, and to deny compassion to the 
repairing human will. Critiques of protest violence, such as that presented in the Boesak 
paradigm, must be careful to distinguish the harms and the harmed when it comes to judging 
violence. The silenced victims who are harmed by Black being, must have their violation 
accounted for as a matter of pre-eminence, and must be free to will the appropriate response to 
their violation. The relevant question for those in the Christian tradition is not whether South 
African students may legitimately use violence during protest actions. The more relevant 
question is how long South Africans with Christian faith commitments will disregard the 
complex violences embedded in the social order, with which they are complicit, while 
expecting continued support and legitimation from the violated. 
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11. Part III SUMMARY: Violence, Freedom of the Will, 
and Black Being 
11.1. Introduction 
This section is a compilation of the different “Conclusion” sections from chapters 
included in Part III. No new research is presented. It is included for ease of reference, and for 
tracking the argument that is presented in detail in the three chapters of the section. 
11.2. Summary of Conclusions for Theorization of Violence 
11.2.1. Violence and Black Being 
Understanding the ways that “violent” phenomena have been observed by social 
scientists provides a helpful way of beginning to understand how the concept functions. 
Towards this end, a limited overview of the social scientific treatment of “violence” will be 
undertaken in this section. This section will present an overview of the study of violence from 
specialized fields of anthropology and psychology. 
11.2.1.1. Conclusions of Social Science Fields of Anthropology and 
Psychology 
The review of the literature of anthropological and psychological fields of study reveals 
that, in the social sciences, violence is primarily understood as physical aggression or the 
coercive use of physical force. Cultural anthropologists alone have identified the social and 
political elements, including colonialism, that constitute phenomena of violence. This void in 
the canon of scholarship in itself suggests the reifying role that academic knowledge plays in 
the invisibilisation of violence in society. Within anthropology, cultural anthropologists have 
identified the ways that social structures constitute violence. However, within the same field 
this knowledge is not absorbed. The academy of the social sciences fails to fully interrogate 
culture, and fails to appreciate, as cultural anthropologists have pointed out, the role that they 
themselves play in creating and maintaining systems that are violent and that do violence. 
Instead the violence goes unseen, unreported, unlearned, and untaught. It remains a consistent 
invisible force in the social ecology. The ongoing non-acknowledgement of the violence 
embedded in the social structure, means that often only the results are studied, while the root 
of the phenomena goes unaddressed. 
The social science scholarship has great implications for the subject matter of this 
project. First, it provides evidence that the view of structural and cultural violence, invisible 
violence, that is argued for in this paper, is supported by scholarship. The research itself 
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confirms the nature of the violence that is named. Second, the study of the social scientific 
purview of violence makes clear the utter radicality of Jesus’s teaching in the first century, as 
argued in Chapter Two. Jesus made a connection between psychology and violence that seems 
to be unnamed some two thousand years later. Those in the academic study of psychology and 
violence primarily identify violence as being related to human proclivity towards aggression, 
as a result of natural/biological and environmental factors. Jesus’s teaching, in contrast, makes 
a connection between one’s inner life, and inward sense of self-worth, and how an intact and 
uplifted psychological perspective can lead to a diminution in one’s engagement in acts of 
physical violence. For the post-modern scientist there is genetic grounds for violence. For 
Jesus, there is a psychology that is able overcome the power of social forces, and also to 
overcome the internal natural/biological impulses triggered by those social forces. Ultimately, 
the psychological reorientation results in overcoming the inclination to use aggressive or 
coercive physical force. Further, because it insulates the individual from socially determined 
notions of worthiness and unworthiness, it disarms the powers that create violent structures and 
that instrumentalize violent systems to diminish and destroy the human beings that it deems to 
have disposable lives. Jesus’s psychology was far ahead of its time. 
11.2.1.2. Conclusions from Broad Conceptualization of Violence 
Violence is known according to specific acts, is best understood as process and not 
product, and may be either instrumental or non-instrumental, with both having damaging 
outcomes. This theorization is helpful in establishing a broad framework for thinking 
conceptually about violence. The framework does not account for every instance of violence, 
nor for every violent practice. Neither is it desirable for a theory to do so. As Enderß and Ramp 
have observed, prematurely narrowing down the phenomenal domain “can lead to the danger 
of overlooking central aspects. Instead…it is sensible to begin by conceiving violence as 
openly as possible in order to do justice to its historical manifoldness.”1212 The next section of 
this chapter will examine the work of Johan Galtung to construct a framework upon the 
theoretical ground that has been discussed. 
11.2.1.3. Conclusion from Galtung’s Typology of Violence 
A typological description of violence, then, has several manifestations. It includes 
direct acts that cause a diminishing of one’s experience in the body or mind, indirect structural 
                                               
 
1212 Endreß and Rampp, “Introduction,” 3. 
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acts of such diminution, internalized acceptance of and support for such acts of diminished life 
experience, and acts of obliteration and pretence connected to founding political entities. It 
encompasses all of these violences together as they relate to Black life, in its diminishing 
psychic impact. 
11.2.1.4. Conclusion from Cultural Hegemonic Violence Analysis 
When the phenomena of violence is registered through the experiences of women, those 
formerly colonized by Western nations, and Black persons, it becomes clear that the experience 
of violence is not fully accounted for by a narrow “product” definition of the term. The idea 
that violence is imbedded in structures, institutions, and occurs as a normative feature of 
cultural hegemonic life of society, reveals the nature of violence as, indeed, “cumulative,” 
“boundless,” and “spilling over.” 
11.2.1.5. Final Conclusion of Theorization of Violence 
This chapter reflected on the meaning of violence. It showed the ways that social 
science has understood violence in the life of human beings from the perspective of 
anthropology and psychology. The branch of cultural anthropology provides grounds for 
conception of violence as encompassing more than mere physical aggression or use of force. 
Rather, scholars have determined that violence involves underlying and interrelated social and 
cultural constructs. Psychological scholarship has also argued for conception of violence as 
multifaceted and complex, as a “wicked” problem. The psychological scholarship’s more 
relevant contribution, for the purposes of this paper is the notion of a three-stage cycle of 
aggression, which includes inputs, internal processing, and outputs. This provides support for 
the argument of Part One of the paper that Jesus was interested in addressing, not the human 
output of violence, so much as he was interested in re-orientating human interpretation of 
inputs, the psychology of violence. 
Violence broadly conceptualized requires acceptance that violence is not only a 
“product,” a narrowly defined act of force that is episodic or sporadic, but that violence is 
“process.” It is cumulative and boundless and spills over. The process of violence lends itself 
to understanding by types or categories of manifestations. Galtung’s typology of violence 
names, direct, structural, and cultural violence, to which might be added the types of 
foundational violence and existential violence. Existential violence is a violence committed to 
the being of Black persons, as discussed by Fanon, Césaire, and the school of Afro-pessimism. 
It damages one’s self-ness; one’s self-understanding and self-expression. Existential violence 
arises for Black persons specifically because of their experiences of slavery and social death 
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that continue into the present. The violence of gender and colonial oppression are also 
discussed in this chapter. 
Connection to Larger Project: 
What this discussion of violence shows is that violence is a broad concept, and that the 
being of Black persons, especially female, formerly colonized black persons, is the subject of 
violence whether or not there is the presence of coercive physical force.  The social death that 
attends to those who were marked as slaves (despite actual condition of enslavement) is an act 
of violation that is ongoing. To discuss non-violence under these circumstances is to fail to 
address the ways that continuing to exist in the face of powers that seek to extinguish the 
individual’s unique humanity, is to be non-violent. Black existence that does not implode or 
explode is non-violence. Which brings to the fore the fact that much of the self-damaging 
pathology that is witnessed in communities that have been “Blackened,” excluded from social 
life or marked for social death, might be viewed as the result of the existential violence that 
these communities are subjected to without relief. Even where there is no use of force—no 
guns, no knives, no rape, no killing by gangs, where there is widespread addiction, unrestrained 
licentiousness, emotionally-rooted obesity, and the like; where there is diminished life without 
physical violence, in other words, the pathology is a response of a diminishment of existence. 
It is an inward directed violence responding to the unnamed existential violence that the social 
order directs against Black being.  
In which case, what good news does a non-violent-Jesus narrative offer? The non-
violent-Jesus narrative does not speak to issues of existential violence. However, the Jesus-
Who-Resists paradigm that I propose does. The Jesus-Who-Resists acknowledges the 
violences to dignity, which are as damaging as violence to the body. The Jesus-Who-Resists 
registers that life, salvation, and wholeness do not come from possessing physical weapons, 
nor is true life taken away by physical weapons. Jesus-Who-Resists urges the cultivation of an 
inward being, that is lived into by one’s actions. Jesus-Who-Resists recognizes the 
dehumanizing messages and methods of the culture. He tells his followers not to be followers 
of cultural norms that diminish them. But to accept that they are children of God, loved by 
God. He endows his followers with the authority and power to be, as they are, without shame, 
debasement, or humiliation. From this place of dignity one can receive the input of 
disparagement or degradation, and not allow the input to have meaning as to the truth of who 
one is; one can offer an output, a response, that does not necessitate the use of physical force. 
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One can demonstrate through one’s actions the lie of the input, and the truth that one believes 
about oneself. 
The following table (See, table 11-2, below) provides a comparison of the different 
approaches to offense. 
Table 11-1 Comparison of (Non)Violent Responses 
 Violence Non-violence Pacifism Jesus 
Resistance 
Hit in the face by 
someone who 
intends to 
humiliate you. 
Hit the perpetrator 
back. 
Gather with 
others and 
protest to the 
perpetrator that 
hitting is bad.  
Walk away; 
accept the 
battery as 
suffering to be 
endured; hope 
God 
intervenes. 
Demonstrate 
that you are not 
afraid, will not 
back down, or 
be made 
ashamed, e.g., 
look them in 
the eye, don’t 
cow, stick out 
your chin out 
and dare them 
to hit you 
again. 
     
“Nigger/Kaffir!” Punch the 
perpetrator in the 
face. 
Answer the 
perpetrator, 
“Do not dare 
call me that!”; 
publicize the 
perpetrator’s 
words to 
shame them. 
Ignore the 
insult; let 
people call 
you names; 
endure 
suffering. 
Demonstrate 
that you are not 
impressed with 
their words, n 
or are you 
shamed, e.g., 
reply, “You 
mean to say, 
‘Lazy 
nigger/kaffir!’, 
since I am  
about to sit 
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down right here 
in the sunshine, 
sip my cool 
drink, and 
enjoy the 
breeze on this 
fine day.” 
 
I use the second example to paint a realistic picture of how outlandish Jesus’s 
suggestions must have sounded to his hearers. My point is to show that Jesus’s emphasis in his 
Sermon was on the power of the individual to refuse to give the perpetrator of violence the 
power to humiliate, dishonour, or dehumanize. To show how Jesus’s resistance disables the 
weapons of humiliation.   
This example also shows the limited nature of Jesus’s instructions. He was not speaking 
to the matter of corporate and state use of force, or even violence, per se, at all. Jesus was 
offering to his hearers, what continues to be necessary today, a way of acclaiming dignity in 
the face of those who despise you. 
Violence is, ultimately, a vast web. It has been most destructive for Black people in its 
existential dimensions. Jesus-Who-Resists presents a theology that allows resistance, that 
allows creativity, that takes into account individual particularities of circumstance, and that 
refuses to accept the normativized terms of honour and shame, worth and worthlessness. 
11.2.2. Freedom of the Will and Violent Resistance 
11.2.2.1. Introduction 
This chapter considers how violence, particularly existential violence, provokes violent 
protest, and why the violent protest against existential conditions, is a faithful expression of the 
zoë life for which humanity is created. Relying upon the metaphysical deconstruction of the 
will of medieval philosopher Duns Scotus, it will be shown that Black persons’ physical 
violence during acts of protest is an expression of human will that was disordered by slavery, 
seeking to re-orient itself to proper function. It is a will that is free to will. I argue that the force 
of the effort of the will to re-orient itself metaphysically, may at times spill over into physical 
expression of force. This is not a bad or immoral result. The initial violence that disordered the 
will is the bad and immoral act. The restoration of the will of Black persons to proper function 
is a human good. 
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11.2.2.2. Conclusion from Black Humanity and Unfreedom 
11.2.2.2.1. Conclusion of Theological Constructions of Freedom 
The human capacity “to will” is made meaningful by understanding it as human 
freedom. To be free, or to be one who wills, entails, first, an inner disposition of being. To be 
free, or to be one who wills, is to be one who has inward desires and whose desires become the 
subject of one’s inner ruminations. It also means to be one who makes decisions regarding their 
desires. One’s will-ing derives from ones desiring. The essence of freedom, then, more 
fundamental than freedoms claimed as part of social-political community, is one’s ability to 
will in accordance with one’s desires.  
According to Duns Scotus, the will possesses a two-fold disposition. The affectio 
commodi, wills toward the personally beneficial while being moderated by the affectio iustitiae 
which elicits actions in furtherance of greater good, or principled good, or love. “It is just 
because the [dual-affectioned] will possesses the affection for justice that it is free to accept, 
reject or refrain from acting regarding the inclination of the affection for the advantageous.”1213 
The formal distinguishing of the freedom of the will is here intended only to emphasize 
the fact that, for Scotus, the will is free, and is the most free of any aspect of human personality. 
The freeness of the human will is uniquely and necessarily capable of self-restraint. Because 
of the freeness of the will, one is able to live lovingly, meaning in a restrained and ordered way, 
and “such ordered loving constitutes true human happiness.”1214 
11.2.2.2.2. Conclusion of Metaphysics of Black Unfreedom 
What may be concluded is that African persons were overdetermined to be lesser or 
other than human, and instead deemed Black, during the historical moment when the concepts 
of humanity and human dignity were formally constructed. To be Black was to be ontologically 
constituted as a being that is a slave--natally alienated, generally dishonored, and subject to 
permanent violent domination. Part of the consequence of this ontological disfigurement of 
African personhood, was that the human will was disfigured. The will of the Black being, 
instead of will-ing its own optimal good, towards the perfection of personhood and humanity, 
instead came to will the lesser good, towards mere survival. 
                                               
 
1213 González-Ayesta, “Duns Scotus on the Natural Will,” 48. 
1214 Ingham and Dreyer, The Philosophical Vision of John Duns Scotus, 157. 
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11.2.2.3. Conclusion from Freedom of the Will and Violent Resistance 
Once there is knowledge of freeness, cognition of the dimensions of one’s own un-
freeness arises. At the apprehension of one’s own unfreeness, and in the absence of external 
police and penal measures that discourage self-will-ing, a force of will intensifies sufficient to 
shift the orientation of the will. The will is shifts from will-ing what is less good to properly 
willing one’s greatest good. The intensity of force necessary to accomplish such an existential 
reorientation of the will, is an intensity that will not be constrained from elicitation of forceful 
external acts. Which is to say that because a violent inner force is requisite to the freeing of 
free will, the acts of the will elicited through that force might also be violent. Further, the 
intensity of the force necessary to overcome impediments to free will-ing is determined by the 
extent of the perceived restriction upon the will’s freeness. The greater the stifling of freeness, 
the more intense, and aggressive, the inclination towards resistance. 
The highest act of the will is self-restraint, in the interest of moral perfection.1215 Thus, 
the possibility and ideal hope, is that as the will is properly reordered to seeking the greater and 
not the lesser, that appropriate restraint will be exercised in one’s actions, whatever actions are 
willed. Under the circumstances of rehabilitating the will, however, it may be that the will’s 
right-ordering, becoming inclined to will more than marginalized existence, reaches the limit 
of the will’s capacity. Attaining the highest act of the will, which is self-restraint, might go 
beyond what the newly re-ordered will’s ability. 
11.2.2.4. Final Conclusion of Freedom of the Will and Violent Resistance 
Modern European knowledge systems fostered conceptions of the human, of “Man,” 
that excluded African persons, and that resulted in the denial of the humanity of Africans. 
Additionally, the freedom of Black persons was effaced. First, freedom was defaced through 
the bondage in which Africans were held. Defacement of freedom also occurred by the psycho-
social violence wrought against the ontology of the African person, and against the will of the 
African person. Ontologically the African went from being a human to being a slave. The will 
of the African went from being ordered to incline towards its own perfection and greatest good, 
to being inclined toward mere survival, and toward the lesser good of mere existence. When 
persons of African descent protest against inequality and marginalization it is an instance of 
rehabilitation of the will. The inner force that is necessary to accomplish proper ordering of the 
                                               
 
1215 Ingham, “Self-Mastery and Rational Freedom,” 369. 
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will, may possibly result in outward expressions of physical force, or violence. This violence 
may be the necessary cost of the restoration of Black persons’ human dignity.  
Key Implications: 
This presents the urgent task of revision of the Christian command to love. The love 
command has two parts. The first is to love God utterly, which is not what is of concern here. 
The second part is that which must be re-visioned. In the second love command Jesus instructs 
that the great task of the Christian, after loving God, is to love one’s neighbour as oneself.  
Matthew and Mark, where this verse appears, use the exact same language, “You shall love 
your neighbour as yourself.” (Matt. 22:39, Mark 12:31) Typically the verse is seen to focus on 
love of the neighbour. The biblical texts of various translations nearly all cross-reference the 
verse with verses that highlight Jesus’s teaching on “the neighbour.” This is not improper. It 
is, however, incomplete. Such an interpretation eliminates the significance of the second part 
of the verse. Both the Gospel teaching and the Hebrew teaching of the law, upon which the 
commandment is based, are concerned not only with the neighbour who is to be loved, but with 
the individual who is to do the loving.1216 The command is not simply to “love your neighbour,” 
as Church tradition is guilty of too frequently abridging it. It is to love the Other “as yourself.” 
This makes the love of self the basis of the command to love the Other. Without a love of self 
it is not possible to render to the Other the love that they are due. The love of myself allows 
me to love you. 
This has implications for the reading of the “non-violence” in the Sermon on the Mount 
as connected to the instruction to love the enemy. Typically, the passage is understood as 
meaning that the Christian should use no force against the Other because the Christian must 
love the Other. This reading fails to emphasize the self-love and self-concern upon which love 
for the enemy depends. It does an injustice to the meaning of text. When Jesus speaks of 
“turning the other cheek,” etc. and when Jesus says to “love your enemies,” he makes his 
assertations for the benefit, the good, the maximizing of the humanity of the individual who is 
                                               
 
1216 The Gospel command is based upon Lev. 19:18, “17 You shall not hate in your heart anyone of your 
kin; you shall reprove your neighbour, or you will incur guilt yourself. 18 You shall not take vengeance or bear a 
grudge against any of your people, but you shall love your neighbour as yourself: I am the Lord.” In Leviticus, the 
focus is the conduct of the individual, and the ways that treatment of the neighbour impact the individual. Jesus’s 
restatement of the command in the gospel retains this emphasis on the individual by the inclusion of the words 
“as yourself.” 
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the actor towards the Other. Thus, it is not merely, “love your enemies,” it is “love your 
enemies… so that you may be children of your Father in heaven.” 
That church tradition has failed to offer this fuller reading of the text is meaningful. It 
reflects what those who have read and rendered the text have deemed the most significant 
aspect of the teaching. Those who have translated and interpreted the text have been primarily 
those who are propertied, White, European men. Persons for whom no instruction or 
encouragement is necessary to assert and claim self-worth and dignity. For such interpreters 
the emphasis may be rightly placed upon the first clause of the texts; the emphasis may rightly 
attempt to cultivate a deep concern for the Other. However, Jesus’s teaching was not directed 
at those who occupied a place of privilege in the society. His concern was for those whose 
honour and dignity, through family, church, political and economic relationships (which were 
all connected and intertwined), were daily threatened. Jesus’s teaching was a lesson to the 
people in who they were, and how they were to relate to Others in light of their own identity 
as beloved, worthy, children of God. 
Finally, another key feature of the section should be highlighted, the brilliance of 
Scotus’s theorization. The insight of Scotus is in his determination that the highest operation 
of the will is the possibility of non velle, to will neither yea or nea, but to refrain from willing 
altogether. It speaks to the possibility that Jesus proposes that the essence of the fullness of 
dignity is that it is not a will-ing of a response in the way that the offense provokes. It is not a 
will-ing of no response that allows the offense to stand. It is the not willing to will at all in 
situations that seek one’s own complicity in one’s debasement. But to freely will differently, 
and ideally, towards one’s self-realization as worthy. 
Connection to Larger Project: 
The argument of this chapter, that the re-orientation of the will is positive and self-
healing of humanity, finds alignment with the previously asserted argument that Jesus is deeply 
concerned with, and promotes the reclamation of, one’s human dignity. 
Because Jesus is concerned with people attaining their full humanity and with 
individuals resisting the attempts of the powers to diminish them, it follows that the overflow 
of a self-healing human will would be supported by Jesus. This is even more apparent when 
the reading of key texts of scripture is expanded to highlight the significance of the self to the 
teaching about the Other. It becomes clear that the re-orientation of one’s will, towards human 
flourishing of the individual is consistent with Jesus’s teaching. 
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Jesus does not have more concern for the function of a violating social order than he 
has for individuals being and becoming fully themselves in community. Indeed, Jesus’s 
directives to resist the powers’ dehumanization expects and requires transgression of the social 
order. 
While Jesus never utilized lethal coercive force during his tenure on earth, the teaching 
of scripture leaves open the exact means and methods that are potential sources of resistance 
to the powers. Jesus uses specific examples of resistance, but only as a means of urging that 
concrete acts be undertaken in one’s everyday life. He does not use the examples of offering 
one’s face for further slapping, going naked in the streets, and giving even more when you are 
exploited, to assert that the particular acts and responses that he offers are those that are 
required when such situations arise. Jesus leaves room for creative defiance, that more 
important than being grounded in the non-use of force, is grounded in the claim and assertion 
of dignity and self-respect—the level of self-respect that is implied by being able to walk naked 
through the streets without shame, which is a deep affront to the pietistic social order of Jesus’s 
era. Jesus leaves room for individuals to determine what the best course of action is under the 
particular circumstances of debasement that they are facing. What is crucial is that action be 
taken to assert one’s dignity, not that non-forceful action be taken, or passive acceptance be 
shown. Thus, the overflow of will-ing in the healing of the self, will-ing that leads to action 
that reflects self-determination of one’s value and worth, is consistent with a Christian ethics 
of love. 
11.2.3. Violent Protest in South Africa 
11.2.3.1. Introduction 
In this final chapter, I make the argument that physical violence in South Africa during 
moments of protest exemplify the assertion of the will acting in furtherance of human dignity, 
in a context of humiliation. That such protest, far from being occurrences that should be 
overlooked or “excused,” by the Christian church, or that are outside of the bounds of Christian 
integrity, is a faithful attempt to lay claim to long denied human dignity that must be affirmed. 
11.2.3.2. Conclusion from History of Colonization and Subjugation 
Like first century Palestine, the contemporary context of South Africa involves multiple 
layers of violence. There was foundational violence with the arrival of Europeans to southern 
African shores. Erasure of cultures, of what was right and accompanying social orders, both 
for the indigenous and for those imported as slaves. Violence progressively increased in South 
African history and eventually encompassed direct, structural, and cultural violence perpetrated 
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by and between ethnic groups, and most egregiously against Black Africans. Hundreds of years 
of violence climaxed in the mid-20th century with the imposition of Apartheid rule. 
11.2.3.3. Conclusion from Current Context of Inequality  
The statistical quantifications of inequality have the potential to inure us to the reality 
of the lives represented by the numbers. We are numbed to the diminished humanity that results 
when a child lives in a shack, with no running water, and has not been empowered to read, 
while at the same time she witnesses the material beauty and brilliance of a neighbouring South 
African’s lived experience. Without question, the South African context involves a ferocious 
complex of violences--direct, structural, cultural, foundational, and existential. 
11.2.3.4. Conclusion from Context of Protest 
11.2.3.4.1. Contemporary Protest 
In contemporary South Africa, whether protest action relates to social issues, as with 
service delivery, economic issues, as with unions, or education, as with Rhodes/Fees/Rape 
Culture Must Fall, violence has become a tool routinely used by social activists. 1217  The 
engagement in physical violence destabilizes the social order. Roads are blocked, schools and 
universities are shuttered, trains and buses are destroyed, which means alternate routes of 
transport become dangerously overcrowded, longer commute times and later arrivals home 
then compromise the safety of commuters. These are violences that are endured by the 
marginalized that generally go unnoticed. Protest leads to destruction of property, and often 
involves injury to persons involved. This is generally the point at which society takes notice of 
violence and reacts with additional violence against those damaging or threatening damage to 
property. 
The turn to physical violence, like the inequality that underlies much protest by Black 
persons in countries around the world, is inseparable from the racialized, gendered, and 
colonial histories of the context of South Africa.  
                                               
 
1217 There has been speculation that the violence of university protests is instigated not by student 
activists, but by members of the national political opposition party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (“EFF”). The 
EFF denies this charge. See, https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1308343/if-you-believe-eff-is-behind-protests-
youre-a-fool/ It is clear that some student leaders on various South African university campuses have also been 
members of the EFF, see, http://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/universities-who-is-behind-the-havoc, and thus 
activism and EFF membership seem to be co-occurring features of student leaders on campuses. Whether the 
EFF practices instumentalization and politicization of students’ grievances, and creates physically violent 
conditions that would otherwise be absent, is contested. 
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11.2.3.4.2. Tradition of Protest 
The protest tradition in South Africa is long. It shows that for nearly as long as South 
Africa has been occupied by Europeans who imposed oppressive conditions, Black persons 
have resisted being oppressed though various means. These means included fleeing 
enslavement, using the law to seek redress, and organizing mass boycotts and protest. They 
also included, in the late nineteenth century, going to war. The model of warfare to resolve 
disputes with the state was used by all interested parties during the period of industrialization 
when the modern formation of the nation took form. Industrialization worsened the 
dehumanizing life conditions of Black people. It divided the population into elites and workers, 
and created an industrial lifestyle for African workers that enforced as policy their imposed 
diminished social status. Attempts for redress were unheeded. Conditions worsened until the 
informal policy was legislated into law in 1948. Conditions worsened further for Blacks in 
South Africa at a time when Black Consciousness was blooming all over the world. The violent 
repression of attempts by Blacks to assert their human dignity in the 1950s and 1960s were met 
with a conscientized Black leadership that was “prepared to die” rather than live in humiliation. 
The dignified resistance of these leaders was exiled, jailed, and killed. The awakened 
consciousness of Black persons, their will to be free, was left without any guidance as to how 
to channel the will-ing of the will to freedom, when freedom appeared impossible, except the 
guidance that trickled down from the master classes on how to endure and love.  
The Black elites who had been resurrected into the cultural social life from social death, 
were inculcated with the values of the masters of the social order. Their protest arose from an 
expectation that the values of the masters—liberty, justice, equality--would be fully applicable 
to them. Their protest did not consider, however, that the values that they had been taught, were 
selective. Liberty, justice, and equality were values reserved for the propertied, White, man. 
Hard work, obedience, submission, suffering, forgiveness, and love were the values that most 
others were expected to adopt; with long-suffering being of particular importance for Blacks.  
The leaders born to elites, who experienced a measure of freeness from birth, were those 
who were found by the message of Black Consciousness and who sought to lead the people to 
experience the freedom that they knew and dared to claim more of. Without leaders, following 
their purge in South Africa, violence in protest, and violence as protest, ensued throughout the 
1970s and 1980s. 
11.2.3.4.3. Protest Icons of the Twentieth Century 
What Mandela and Biko symbolize are a 20th century incarnation of the theoretical 
conceptualization of human freedom’s telic movement towards being free.  
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11.2.3.4.4. Protest, Freedom of the Will, and South African Activists 
Boesak’s theological heuristic is one that I see as compatible with the arguments that I 
have made in this paper, to the extent that his theology is deeply concerned with the 
marginalized and with transformation of the culture. However, our theology diverges on the 
matter of (non)violence. Boesak’s mainstream Christian view mistakes what the use of force 
represents for those who choose it, and it misrepresents the Christian integrity of those whose 
conscience dictates that course of action. 
The protests of the students should not be seen as morally reprehensible. Instead, they 
must be appreciated for what they are, necessary transgressions against systems of injustice by 
the freely operating will of those who have a long history of being oppressed and marginalized. 
It must be accepted that a possible consequence of the resuscitation of the will is the expression 
of coercive physical force. 
11.2.3.5. Final Conclusion of Theology of Violent Protest in South Africa 
What this chapter has shown is that South Africa continues to experience inequality 
that is related to its history of colonial racial segregation and oppression. Black South Africans 
have endured generations of dehumanization and indignity. 
In the course of a long tradition of protest, the mid-twentieth century produced a Black 
public whose Black Consciousness was awakened and who would not accept conditions of 
degradation. They organized and transgressed public norms to assert and claim the human 
dignity that belonged to them. Their protests were met with the physical violence of state 
repression, and even murder. The will-ing of Black persons for collective power was opposed 
fiercely. Nonetheless, the awakened consciousness of freedom could no longer accept imposed 
societal limitations. The will insisted, and in some cases the insistence became a physical act 
of coercive force. Ultimately, the will of the people prevailed and the system of government, 
that legislated dehumanity, fell.  
Twenty plus years after its fall, students again insisted on realization of the ability to 
will their desires for their own highest good. Again, the will to freedom would not be restrained 
and in some cases became a physical act of coercive force. 
The protests of the students should not be seen as morally reprehensible. Instead, they 
must be appreciated for what they are, necessary transgressions against systems of injustice by 
the freely operating will of those who have a long history of being oppressed and marginalized. 
It must be accepted that a possible consequence of the resuscitation of the will is the expression 
of coercive physical force. 
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Obviously, the destruction of property, and damage to life, is not optimal. To that end, 
the typical response would be to counsel to desist from exercising the will in a way that 
damages. This attempt at restriction only contributes to the will will-ing its freedom, however. 
Instead, the will must be freed to imagine, to exercise options, to plan with well thought out 
intention the course of action that it deems best. This process should be facilitated, without 
policing or censure. Following this, the essence of the cry, whatever it is, must be heard. My 
sense is that the process of allowing protestors to be, on their own terms, and to experience the 
self-worth that comes from insisting upon one’s own terms of engagement, as much as having 
the inequitable conditions ameliorated, the facilitation of the protestors being made visible can 
contribute to the ending of ongoing protest and to the ending of the eruptions of physical 
violence. 
Yet an even more important measure may be implemented to quell the coercive use of 
force that results from the will seeking full expression. This involves proactively anticipating, 
and providing an outlet for the will that may imminently be resuscitated to will-ing freedom. 
This includes, on university campuses, providing spaces for unfreeness to be candidly 
discussed, and fostering the discussions of what freedom is being witnessed that appears to be 
off-limits to Black students. It includes leading discussion with students in which they are 
encouraged to imagine what their apprehension of such long- denied-freedom would entail. It 
includes helping students to see how they might make their imagination of freeness a reality. 
In other words, helping students to channel the will to be free in practical, personal terms. Most 
importantly, making the students visible, by affirming and encouraging them that their sense 
of unfreeness is based in fact, and that their freeness and dignity is of utmost importance; that 
it is imperative for them to know their value and worth; to exemplify that knowledge in their 
choices. The goal is to water the planted seeds in the minds of the students that they have power 
and that possibilities exist for their unique and creative participation in the community without 
shame or diminishment. 
To ascribe the claim of humanity, and the operation of the will-that-is-being-freed to 
moral iniquity is to misunderstand the needs of human being, and to deny compassion to the 
repairing human will. Critiques of protest violence, such as that presented in the Boesak 
paradigm, must be careful to distinguish the harms and the harmed when it comes to judging 
violence. The silenced victims who are harmed by Black being, must have their violation 
accounted for as a matter of pre-eminence, and must be free to will the appropriate response to 
their violation. The relevant question for those in the Christian tradition is not whether South 
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African students may legitimately use violence during protest actions. The more relevant 
question is how long South Africans with Christian faith commitments will disregard the 
complex violences embedded in the social order, with which they are complicit, while 
expecting continued support and legitimation from the violated. 
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12. Conclusion 
This project has accomplished several tasks. It has examined biblical texts that are often 
used to establish that Jesus was principally concerned with non-violence in the lives of his 
followers  and with the necessity of suffering; it has demonstrated the misreadings of such 
texts. It has offered an alternative understanding based upon the first century context, which is 
more fitting to the contemporary context of a social order that intrinsically maintains the 
racialized dishonour and marginalization of many. 
The project has reviewed the Christian tradition for assessment of how non-violence 
has been conceived and practiced from its origin two thousand years ago, and has concluded 
that the term and idea of non-violence has been mutable. It has taken on different meanings 
during different periods in church history. Most importantly the historic overview has 
demonstrated that there has never in the history of the church been a period when the coercive 
use of force has been fully delegitimized. Nor has there ever been a period when the church 
has fully practiced non-violence as that term is more broadly construed, including respect for 
the dignity of all human persons, eschewing slavery, respecting women, and allowing the 
unmolested co-existence of the “foreign” Other. 
The research used the scriptural and historical findings that non-violence is not pivotal 
to the Christian tradition to then consider the meaning of violence, with a special focus on the 
lives of the marginalized. This analysis showed that violence is not a “product” or a singular 
event, but is a wide-ranging process. Johan Galtung’s typology of violence provided 
categorizations for the types of violence that exist in the culture. Added to that was the 
conceptualization of foundational and existential violence. Existential violence, which impacts 
the being and identity of Black persons by racializing them as Black, and thereby dishonoured 
and less- or non-human, was discussed at length. The link between existential violence and 
Orlando Patterson’s idea of slavery and social death was made. The cultural violence that is 
perpetrated against women and the colonized was also discussed. Because violence functions 
primarily in an existential way against Black persons, the good news of the Gospel must 
address violence, primarily, in an existential way. A reading of scripture that focuses on the 
non-use of force fails to do this. What is required is a reading, of scripture and history, that 
privileges Jesus’s concern for the dignity of despised persons. Such a reading is that which I 
have proposed. 
The research then demonstrated, using the metaphysics of the will outlined by medieval 
philosopher John Duns Scotus, the ways that the existential violence against Black persons 
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resulted in impairment of the will of Black persons. The will of the Black person, through 
torture and social control, was disfigured so that it became normal for Black persons to will 
against their own highest good, and instead to will towards survival or the cessation of pain. I 
argued that when Black persons engage in acts that transgress established systems, which 
perpetrate existential violence against them, it is evidence that the will is re-orienting into 
proper function to seek its own highest good. My central argument has been that the force of 
energy that is required to re-orient the internal operation of the will, may spill over from internal 
force to external force, and become an outward expression of the physical use of force. My 
argument is that Jesus is deeply concerned with the wellness and regenerative possibilities 
underway in the will of the marginalized person. Because his message seeks to bring life to the 
person, Jesus’s message is consistent with supporting and encouraging the resuscitation of the 
will of Black persons, rather than insisting upon the undisturbed operation of social structures 
that do violence to the marginalized. 
Finally, the research demonstrated a history of Black oppression and a tradition of 
protest in the South African context that influence the contemporary protests of students who 
are seeking the freedom to fully be in society. These protests, which at times include the use of 
physical force, are an example of the will of the marginalized being re-aligned to seek its 
highest good. The protest is contextually normative, as it is consistent with the tradition of 
South African protest, as well. Such protests against marginalization should not be condemned 
or “excused” by the church. Instead, evidence of will-ing to be free should be engaged, 
accommodated, and encouraged. 
The ethos of non-violence as an end goal in itself generally fails to aid the Christian, 
particularly the Black Christian, in the task of honouring oneself and one’s neighbour. 
Particularly with respect to protest violence, it gags on the gnat of damaged property, and 
swallows the camel of degraded lives. This ethos is inconsistent with the Gospel of Jesus, which 
has its foremost concern for the abundant life of the person. I do not assert in this project that 
Jesus promoted the use of force, or that Jesus opposed the use of force. I argue that the issue of 
the use of force was not as central to the teachings of Jesus as the tradition has made it. 
Ultimately, Jesus’s ethics allow for either the use of force or the non-use of force; the choice 
of acts depends upon the person and the circumstances. Jesus’s utmost concern was the 
internalization and assertion of one’s dignity, not as an upright citizen, but as a child of God. 
The goal of this research is to shine a light on the violence that goes unnamed that is perpetrated 
against Black being in ways that debilitate and destroy life. Being raced as Black is to be always 
already violently acted upon, and also to be made a threat or perpetrator of violence by virtue 
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of being. Until Blackness becomes the center of theologies of (non)violence, such theologies 
will remain incomplete, and operate in complicity with the violence of the culture against Black 
life. 
When students, or workers, or those at the bottom of society’s social order protest their 
dehumanizing treatment, their protest is not deserving of objection even where property is 
destroyed. What matters is whether the protest evidenced a self-determined dignity for 
themselves, or the upholding of the dignity of other marginalized people. 
It is my hope that the ideas that are developed in this project serve the human family, 
and cause the people of God to grow in love, in the grace and knowledge Christ, and in maturity 
in our practice of loving the Other, which, in the end, is to love ourselves. 
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